

SECRET (When Filled In)

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ABSTRACT

These thermofax copies of newspaper clippings contain the text of official published statements and selected editorial opinion regarding Congressional proposals to establish a "Watch Dog" Committee for CIA.

(Note in file indicates there are about 50 items selected from several thousand in Colonel Grogan's office.)

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STATINTL

A CIA Watchdog Might Destroy Its Charge

Sen. Mike Mansfield (D-Mont) is displeased with our foreign intelligence system. "We were caught short," he says, when fateful events burst out recently in Hungary and the Middle East. The senator proposes, therefore, to introduce again at the next session of Congress his measure to set up a congressional watchdog committee to keep tabs on the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

The arguments in favor of such a watchdog committee are persuasive. CIA is a hush-hush agency about which Congress and the public know virtually nothing. Allen W. Dulles, its director, has authority to hire and fire personnel without regard to any existing laws. Funds for the agency are concealed deliberately under appropriations for other agencies, and Mr. Dulles can spend that money "without regard to the provisions of law and regulations relating to the expenditure of government funds."

No information as to the size of the CIA ever has been made public. Guesses have suggested that it may employ between 8,000 and 30,000 persons and may have an annual operating budget in the neighborhood of a half billion dollars. These guesses may be wide of the mark. Even so, CIA must be a large and expensive agency. The fact that it functions behind a cloak of secrecy makes it

an anachronism in a democratic government, and an agency which, in less able hands, could be wide open to abuse.

The Hoover Commission made a careful examination of CIA last year. It recognized the need for secrecy, yet recommended as desirable the proposal to set up a congressional watchdog committee. Such a committee functions effectively in the sensitive field of atomic energy. A similar one, the Hoover Commission suggested, could assure Congress and the public that CIA was operating "in an efficient, effective and reasonably economical manner."

The other side has some persuasive arguments, too—so persuasive, in fact, that Senator Mansfield's proposal was voted down, 59 to 27, in the Senate last April.

By its very nature, CIA must operate in secrecy. It is an espionage organization. Its agents are scattered around the globe, gathering information vital to the security of the United States. However repugnant the idea of spying may be to the average American, the fact is that a nation like ours with vast influence and responsibilities in the world couldn't function effectively, and perhaps couldn't survive, without something like the CIA. In an uneasy world, it is as essential to our

security as a military establishment.

The danger in Senator Mansfield's proposal is that a congressional watchdog committee might destroy the effectiveness of the CIA by leaking some of its secrets, perhaps inadvertently. Surely, any such committee would have to be made up of the most responsible and dependable members of Congress. It would have to be a "select" committee and great care would have to be exercised in the selecting for a single irresponsible or headline-grabbing congressman could cause untold damage. One has only to recall that Senator McCarthy, itching to get a look at CIA, once announced that he had "more than 100 pages of evidence of bungling, incompetence, inefficiency, waste and Communist infiltration in CIA."

Current happenings put CIA in a new light. Most of the previous assessments of its work have dealt largely with abstracts. The recent events in Poland, Hungary and the Middle East, however, are tangible events; they provide something concrete against which the performance of CIA can be measured.

The public should not expect to have all the details spread out on the record. It would seem useful and desirable, however, for a special committee of Congress to inquire as to how well or how badly CIA functioned in anticipating the recent events in Central Europe and the Middle East. Out of such an inquiry could come a better judgment on the value of Senator Mansfield's proposal.



Dulles



Mansfield

APR 11 1956

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STATINTL

ESTABLISHMENT OF A JOINT COMMITTEE ON CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

The Senate resumed the consideration of the concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 2) to establish a Joint Committee on Central Intelligence.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, will the Senator from California yield me 2 minutes?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished junior Senator from Wisconsin.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I have in my hand a documentation of incompetence, theft, and Communist infiltration in the CIA. I shall not introduce it into the Record, because it may contain some security information. But I want the Chair to know that the minute the proposed committee is established, I will promptly turn over all this information to the committee.

Mr. LANGER. Mr. President, will the majority leader yield me 1 minute?

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I yield my friend from North Dakota 2 minutes.

Mr. LANGER. As a cosponsor of the concurrent resolution, I wish to reply to the reference made by the distinguished Senator from South Dakota (Mr. CASE) that the staff of the committee which would be created could not be trusted. He did not say anything about the 1,000 or 5,000 or 10,000 employees of the CIA. I would trust a staff made up of 5 or 10 or 25 persons as much as I would one, two, three, or five thousand employees working for the CIA, whose names we do not know, not one of whom has been confirmed by the Senate.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BIBLE in the chair). The clerk will call the roll.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the time not be charged to the other side, because I do not know whether the majority leader has other commitments.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I understand the majority leader does not have any other commitments.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time has about expired. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll, and the following Senators answered to their names:

Aiken	Bridges	Curtis
Allott	Bush	Daniel
Barkley	Butler	Dirksen
Barrett	Capehart	Douglas
Beall	Carlson	Duff
Bender	Case, N. J.	Dworshak
Bennett	Case, S. Dak.	Eastland
Bible	Clements	Ellender
Bricker	Cotton	Ervin

Flanders	Kerr	Pastore
Frear	Knowland	Payne
Fulbright	Kuchel	Potter
George	Laird	Purtell
Goldwater	Langer	Robertson
Gore	Lehman	Russell
Green	Mallone	Saltonstall
Hayden	Mansfield	Schoeppel
Hennings	Martin, Iowa	Scott
Hickenlooper	Martin, Pa.	Smith, Maine
Hill	McCarthy	Smith, N. J.
Holland	McClellan	Stennis
Hruska	McNamara	Symington
Humphrey	Millikin	Thye
Jackson	Morse	Watkins
Jenner	Mundt	Welker
Johnson, Tex.	Murray	Wiley
Johnston, S. C.	Neely	Williams
Kefauver	Neuberger	Wofford
Kennedy	O'Mahoney	Young

The PRESIDING OFFICER. A quorum is present.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time, with the understanding that the opposition will do likewise.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the opposition has expired. The Senator from Texas has yielded back the time under his control.

The question is on agreeing to Senate Concurrent Resolution 2, as amended. The yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. GEORGE (when his name was called). On this vote, I have a pair with the senior Senator from Virginia (Mr. BYRD). If the Senator from Virginia were present and voting, he would vote "nay." If I were at liberty to vote, I would vote "yea." I withhold my vote.

The rollcall was concluded.

Mr. CLEMENTS. I announce that the Senators from New Mexico (Mr. ANDERSON and Mr. CHAVEZ), the Senator from Louisiana (Mr. LONG), the Senator from Washington (Mr. MAGNUSON), the Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. MONROE), the Senator from Florida (Mr. SMATHERS), and the Senator from Alabama (Mr. SPARKMAN) are absent on official business.

The Senator from Virginia (Mr. BYRD) is absent because of illness.

I further announce that if present and voting, the Senator from New Mexico (Mr. CHAVEZ), the Senator from Washington (Mr. MAGNUSON), the Senator from Florida (Mr. SMATHERS), and the Senator from Alabama (Mr. SPARKMAN) would each vote "yea."

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I announce that the Senator from New York (Mr. Ives) is absent because of illness. If present and voting, the Senator from New York would vote "nay."

The result was announced—yeas 27, nays 59, as follows:

YEAS—27

Barrett	Jenner	Morse
Clements	Kefauver	Mundt
Ervin	Kennedy	Murray
Fulbright	Kerr	Neely
Gore	Langer	Neuberger
Green	Lehman	Pastore
Hill	Mansfield	Payne
Humphrey	McCarthy	Smith, Maine
Jackson	McNamara	Welker

NAYS—59

Aiken	Bible	Carlson
Allott	Bricker	Case, N. J.
Barkley	Bridges	Case, S. Dak.
Beall	Bush	Cotton
Bender	Butler	Curtis
Bennett	Capehart	Daniel

Dirksen	Johnson, Tex.	Russell
Douglas	Johnston, S. C.	Saltonstall
Duff	Knowland	Schoeppel
Dworshak	Kuchel	Scott
Eastland	Laird	Smith, N. J.
Ellender	Malone	Stennis
Flanders	Martin, Iowa	Symington
Frear	Martin, Pa.	Thye
Goldwater	McClellan	Watkins
Hayden	Millikin	Wiley
Hennings	O'Mahoney	Williams
Hickenlooper	Purtell	Wofford
Holland	Robertson	Young
Hruska		

NOT VOTING—10

Anderson	Ives	Smathers
Byrd	Long	Sparkman
Chavez	Magnuson	
George	Monroney	

So the concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 2) was rejected.

CONGRESS CHECK ON C.I.A. BACKED

Senate Rules Unit Gives
Strong Support to Bill—
Hits Excessive Secrecy

By ALLEN DRURY
Special to The New York Times.

WASHINGTON, Feb. 24—The Senate Rules Committee gave powerful endorsement today to the creation of a special "watch-dog" committee of Congress to supervise the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency.

The C. I. A. is the Government's super-secret agency for gathering information abroad concerning the strength and intentions of other nations.

In a report heavy with criticism of C. I. A.'s present operations, the Rules Committee approved for Senate consideration a bill by Senator Mike Mansfield, Democrat of Montana, to create a special committee. This group would supervise C. I. A. in the same way Congress supervises the Atomic Energy Commission. The committee would receive \$250,000 for its first year.

The bill is opposed by President Eisenhower and by Allen W. Dulles, director of the C. I. A. The President recently created an eight-man citizen's advisory board to study C. I. A.'s activities and report directly to him concerning them.

Sees too Much Secrecy

The Rules Committee based its chief argument for the Mansfield bill on the secrecy that surrounds the C. I. A. It recognized the need for much secrecy in gathering intelligence but said there was "a profound difference between an essential degree of secrecy to achieve a specific purpose, and secrecy for the mere sake of secrecy."

The committee pointed out

that secrecy "now beclouds everything about C. I. A.: its cost, its personnel, its efficiency, its failures. An aura of superiority has been built around it. It is freed from practically every ordinary form of Congressional review."

"The C. I. A. has unquestionably placed itself above other Government agencies. There has been no regular methodical review of this agency, other than a briefing which is supplied to a few members of selected subcommittees."

An equally tart minority report was given by the second-ranking member of the Rules Committee, Senator Carl Hayden, Democrat of Arizona. He argued that through these subcommittees—of the House and Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees—Congress continues to maintain "supervision over the operations of that agency to an entirely adequate degree."

Senator Hayden said that the charge that Congress did not sufficiently control C. I. A. was a "mistaken and erroneous assumption."

The Senate Armed Services subcommittee on C. I. A. heard Mr. Dulles in closed session this morning. As usual, it refused to make public what Mr. Dulles said.

Hoover Inquiries Cited

The Rules Committee majority pointed out that over the last six years the C. I. A. had been investigated four times by different task forces of the Hoover Commission.

"The substance of the findings over the spread of these years,"

it said, "were generally the same — that inadequacies and poor organization existed and had gone uncorrected."

The committee praised the President for appointing his own eight-man Citizens' Board on Intelligence. But it offered these objections:

1. "The board will report its findings directly to the President. No provision is made to require the board to maintain Congressional liaison. . . ."
2. "The board functions essentially on a schedule of semi-annual meetings and operates on a per diem and travel allowance. There is no provision for a continuous staff . . . capable of conducting comprehensive surveys. The board is a part-time survey."
3. "The board will report its information, good or bad, to the President, thus strengthening the already tight control of the Executive over C. I. A."

The committee noted that Mr. Dulles had opposed a Joint Congressional committee for fear that sufficient security would not be maintained. It cited the Joint Atomic Energy Committee as proof that this fear was groundless.

STATINTL

How Strong Is Russia?

Intelligence Agency Under Fire on Method It Uses to Estimate Soviet's Armed Might

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 28—Gen. Walter Bedell Smith told the American Legion this week that the United States Intelligence Service was as good as, or better than, any in the world, except possibly that of the Soviet Union.

The retiring chief of the Central Intelligence Agency—the largest and most important of the complex of agencies and sources that compile the intelligence data on which our national policies depend—has done much to improve the number of our service.

In sheer size, the United States Intelligence Service—once the stepchild of Government—probably exceeds that of any nation, possibly excepting Russia's. No figures on the Central Intelligence Agency's employees ever have been made public, but there are estimates to be 9,000 to 15,000 persons employed by this one agency alone in the United States and overseas, in addition to other thousands employed by the Army, Navy and Air Force.

However, the quality of the analyses and factual data produced by the Central Intelligence Agency and its service counterparts is not always commensurate with the size of the agencies. There is general agreement with General Smith's estimate that the United States Intelligence Services are among the best in the world, and there is praise—here and abroad—for the improvement in these services in recent years.

But some observers believe that the British Intelligence Services, with perhaps 3,000 employees and, perhaps, with perhaps 300, produce results—in the form of facts and analyses that are fully as useful in guiding national policy, and perhaps more accurate—than those produced by our much larger agencies.

The Major Question

The comparative worth of the intelligence services of the world powers is not, however, the yardstick by which their success should be measured. The sole criterion by which our agencies should be judged is whether or not they can answer successfully the question: How strong is Russia? Unless intelligence can answer that question with reasonable accuracy and completeness, our national policies will be founded on ignorance and policy makers will be blinded. There is no doubt that this \$64 million question is being answered with greater accuracy than it was some years ago, but the question is not yet adequate. In

Americans—themselves experts in the difficult art of intelligence—believe some of our estimates of Russian armed strength are far too high.

Others point out that Russia—despite former President Truman's asserted belief to the contrary—undoubtedly has a growing stockpile of atomic weapons, and that her development of the MIG-15 demonstrates advanced technical, engineering and production capabilities.

This argument is at the core of many of the problems the new Eisenhower Administration faces: it rages in SHAPE in Paris, and it obviously will have to be settled before the new President can determine our future course in Korea.

The foreign and domestic critics of the factual grist upon which most United States Intelligence estimates are based center their fire chiefly on the military estimates made by the armed services.

Their criticism is by no means conclusive, but it has produced enough examples of doubtful extrapolation, dubious estimates and questionable analyses to suggest that another study of the methods used in Intelligence reporting might be illuminating.

"Safety factors"—arbitrarily applied—are freely used, for instance, to pad and build up estimates of Communist strength received from lower echelon commands.

In one instance some 600 planes were summarily added to an estimate of Soviet air strength received from a lower command, and the Intelligence officer, when questioned, said this figure represented a "safety factor."

In another instance one Communist airfield out of some seven or eight known to be in a certain area was photographed. The number of planes identified in the photograph was multiplied by two on the theory that at least half of those based on that airfield were in the air or at other fields.

The resultant figure was then multiplied by seven or eight on the theory that the other airfields in the area each had an equal number of aircraft assigned.

The official estimates of Russian air strength run as high as 18,000 or more operating aircraft and SHAPE's estimate of its requirements to meet the threat of Soviet air power in Europe, exclusive of Greece and Turkey, is at more than 9,000 planes.

Yet there are a number of examples of overestimates. In 8,000 operating military aircraft

and they question whether she could use more than 4,000 of these against European objectives from Norway to Italy.

Snorkel Figures Cited

Others who disagree with current Intelligence estimates question Russia's ability to supply more than 18,000 operating aircraft with fuel, and they doubt—judging by our own experience—Russia's ability to maintain an estimated 20,000 reserve aircraft in operating condition.

Still other critics point out that of Russia's submarine fleet, usually estimated at 300 to 400, only about twenty to thirty—instead of 100 or more—have actually been tabbed and identified as modern snorkel types.

Thus the differences between those who make our Intelligence estimates and those who criticize them are of such an order of magnitude that only an Intelligence Solomon can adjudicate and decide.

Allen Dulles, who succeeds General Smith as the head of the Central Intelligence Agency, is thus called upon to be Washington's new Solomon. It will be a tough job.

Mr. Dulles is the first civilian to head this agency and he must work with and coordinate military agencies jealous of their prerogatives. The groundwork of a sound intelligence system has been laid by General Smith but much remains to be done.

A study of the methods of collection and analysis and evaluation; reduction of the number of personnel but increase in quality; separation in the field but coordination in Washington of psychological and intelligence functions are among the problems Mr. Dulles must solve. If devotion, interest, an analytical mind and a large background of experience will solve them, Mr. Dulles will find the answers.

But the answers must be found particularly the answer to the question—how strong is Russia?—the policies of the new administration will depend upon them.

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STATINTL

LEIGH (N.C.) NEWS
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Congressional Probe Of CIA Demanded

By Bascom N. Timmons, Chief of The News and Observer's Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON—The enigma of the Central Intelligence Agency, until now the most hush hush operation in our peacetime history, is about to be probed again, this time more piercingly, than in the previous inquiries by committees named by President Eisenhower.

The director of CIA is Allen Dulles, brother of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Leading the demand for a congressional investigation, which seems likely of approval is Senator Michael J. "Mike" Mansfield (D-Mont.), newly designated Senate majority whip.

CIA looms as the great unknown in the vast federal government set-up—a sort of "what-is-it?" which would fright a side show barker, but in this case all ballyhoo of the agency has been discouraged or repressed. It spends an unspecified sum of money, estimated reliably to be at least half a billion dollars annually, has 15,000 employees, and its offices are distributed in 40 buildings in and around Washington.

Thousands of its employees are anonymous, forbidden to reveal where they work. Others will admit no more than that they are CIA employees. The agency is a part of government organization under the National Security Act, of which President Eisenhower is chairman.

The vast intelligence agency supplants secret information the way, largely on Communist accounts, but its extensive spy system includes both friendly and neutral

nations. What that information amounts to in the aggregate and how completely it has been questioned in high quarters again during the last month, when two developments of world shaking importance, the Polish and Hungarian revolts against Communism and the Israeli-British-French invasion of Egypt, have both evidently caught the CIA flat-footed.

Before that both CIA Dulles and State Department Dulles were charged in diplomatic circles with badly fumbling the Egyptian situation which led to Egyptian President G. A. Nasser's seizure of the Suez canal.

Back in 1950, three years after CIA was formed, it apparently gave no accurate information on the invasion of South Korea. Before that it had been mildly criticized in 1949 by the first Hoover commission as "not having achieved the desired degree of proficiency and dependability."

So far, Mansfield's plan has been for a joint congressional watchdog committee to supervise CIA activities, similar to the joint committee which has kept check on the Atomic Energy Commission, with a record of cooperation and accomplishment.

The move to X-ray the enigma comes at a time when plans are being completed for a 38 million dollar building for CIA, to concentrate at least 12,000 employees in nearby Virginia. The new building is referred to here as a "junior Pentagon."

The most revealing stories about the CIA have been written by two magazine writers, who evidently received much information from Dulles

and other agency officials. They told of secret codes, including such wonders as messages concealed under an inconspicuous dot on an envelope, secret U. S. Agents in constant danger behind the Iron Curtain and a wealth of other cloak and dagger operations.

Mansfield and other senators concede that the agency undoubtedly gathers a wealth of information about Communist activity, otherwise unobtainable, and that it may use some of its millions to promote anti-Communist activity in Europe and Asia. What they cannot understand is how CIA fails to tip off the White House in advance about the big upcoming critical developments.

They have made the same criticism of the State Department under John Foster Dulles, and some are harsh enough to say that both Dulles brothers might well be retired. But Allen Dulles won a reputation during World War I, as U. S. ambassador to Switzerland, when he reputedly negotiated for the surrender of German troops in Italy before Germany itself capitulated, which made him the choice to conduct this vast agency.

Last year President Eisenhower named a watchdog board of eight prominent individuals headed by Dr. James R. Killian, president of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, to check on CIA every six months. Previous inquiries had been headed by Lt. Gen. James H. Doolittle U.S.A.F., retd. and Lt. Gen. Mark Clark U.S.A. retd.

Neither of these three has made public any comprehensive report on the enigma.

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versation with the Senator from Arizona.

The Senator from Texas has so drafted the unanimous-consent request, and intends to propose it as soon as the absence of a quorum can be suggested.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there objection to the unanimous-consent request to proceed to the present consideration of Senate Concurrent Resolution 2?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the resolution (S. Con. Res. 2) to establish a Joint Committee on Central Intelligence, which had been reported from the Committee on Rules and Administration with amendments.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Secretary will call the roll.

The Chief Clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, on behalf of myself, the distinguished minority leader (Mr. KNOWLAND), the distinguished junior Senator from Montana (Mr. MANSFIELD), and the distinguished senior Senator from Arizona (Mr. HAYDEN), I have sent to the desk a proposed unanimous-consent agreement. I asked that it be read.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The proposed agreement will be stated.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

Ordered, That, effective on Wednesday, April 11, 1956, at the conclusion of routine morning business, during the further consideration of the concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 2) to establish a Joint Committee on Central Intelligence, debate on any amendment, motion, or appeal, except a motion to lay on the table, shall be limited to 1 hour, to be equally divided and controlled by the mover of any such amendment or motion and the majority leader: *Provided*, That in the event the majority leader is in favor of any such amendment or motion, the time in opposition thereto shall be controlled by the minority leader or some Senator designated by him: *Provided further*, That no amendment that is not germane to the provisions of the said concurrent resolution shall be received.

Ordered further, That on the question of the final passage of the said concurrent resolution debate shall be limited to 2 hours, to be equally divided and controlled, respectively, by the majority and minority leaders: *Provided*, That the said leaders, or either of them, may, from the time under their control on the passage of the said concurrent resolution, allot additional time to any Senator or Senators during the consideration of any amendment, motion, or appeal.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there objection to the proposed unanimous-consent agreement?

Mr. JOHNSON of South Carolina. Mr. President, the conference report on the farm bill probably will reach the Senate on either Wednesday or Thursday of this week. The conference report will be a privileged matter, when it is received, will it not?

The VICE PRESIDENT. Yes; it will be a privileged matter, and may be taken up whenever it is received.

Mr. JOHNSON of South Carolina. I thank the Chair.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there objection to the proposed unanimous-consent agreement?

Without objection, the agreement is entered.

HOURLY OF MEETING ON WEDNESDAY, APRIL 11

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate convenes on Wednesday next, it convene at 11 o'clock a. m.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered.

LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I should like to state that it is the intention of the leadership on both sides of the aisle to have our action on the unfinished business, the concurrent resolution relating to a Joint Committee on Central Intelligence, concluded at an early hour on Wednesday, perhaps at 1:30 or 2 p. m. If the House adopts the conference report on the farm bill by that time, it is the intention of the leadership to have action on the pending concurrent resolution followed immediately by the consideration of the conference report on the farm bill, and to have the Senate remain in session until late that evening, if necessary, in order to try to dispose of that measure.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President—

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I yield to my friend, the Senator from Illinois.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Let me ask the eminent majority leader what his plans are in regard to taking up the so-called bank-holding bill.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. At the moment we have no plans in regard to that bill. The distinguished chairman of the subcommittee handling that measure is in Yugoslavia. I called him this morning, to see whether that measure could be brought up today. But until he returns—and I am not informed when he will be ready to have that measure brought before the Senate—I cannot make any definite announcement in that regard. I shall inform my friend, the Senator from Illinois, as soon as the Senator from Virginia (Mr. ROBERTSON) returns, and we can ascertain the schedule from him.

Mr. DOUGLAS. I thank the Senator from Texas.

ESTABLISHMENT OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the consideration of Calendar No. 1595, Senate Concurrent Resolution 2.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The clerk will state the concurrent resolution by title.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A resolution (S. Con. Res. 2) to establish a Joint Committee on Central Intelligence.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there objection to the present consideration of the concurrent resolution?

Mr. HAYDEN. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, I should like to inquire if this is the measure on which an agreement to vote next Wednesday is to be proposed.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. The Senator from Texas proposes to propound such a unanimous-consent agreement as soon as there is a quorum call. The Senator from Texas will propound the agreement in accordance with the con-

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the new CIA headquarters building, and other incidents in the past year have only intensified my interest in seeing that such a committee is established by the Congress.

I feel that a joint congressional committee should be established and that the CIA should, as a matter of law, keep that committee as fully and as currently informed as possible with respect to its activities.

Allen Dulles, Director of CIA, may make no mistakes in assessing intelligence, but he should not be the lone judge in matters which have to do with the intentions of other nations with respect to war and peace.

Mr. President, as you know, the President recently appointed an eight-man board to review periodically the Nation's intelligence activities. This is a step forward, but not far enough to reach the goal which I and the cosponsors of Senate Concurrent Resolution 2 seek.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Montana yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. MORSE. I wonder if the Senator will make a brief statement at this time with regard to the nature of the jurisdiction of the proposed committee and the relationship, if any, between the President's so-called eight-man board and the Congress of the United States.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I may say to the distinguished senior Senator from Oregon that there is no relationship between that board and the Congress; that the board has had its lips sealed; that it is supposed to report at least once every six months; and that the report is to be made to the President only. What that means in effect is a further arrogation of power on the part of the Executive and a diminution to that extent of the equality between the executive and the legislative.

Mr. MORSE. Will the Senator yield for a question or two, or does he prefer to complete his remarks before yielding?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. MORSE. I am honored to be a cosponsor with the Senator from Montana, of Senate Concurrent Resolution 2, and I am glad he is discussing it today, because it seems to me that once again it is important that the American people—who, after all, in the last analysis, shall we say, "own" American foreign policy—should be apprised of the fact that there is a Government agency known as the CIA which works and functions in complete secrecy, and over which the Congress really has but little authority or jurisdiction except by way of the purse strings. In my view it is very dangerous to permit such an arrangement to continue, and I think Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 2 is essential from the standpoint of maintaining a people's check on American foreign policy, to the extent that the CIA is involved in American foreign policy.

With that statement, I should like to ask a few questions. Does the Senator agree with me that since the CIA organization functions in any country in any part of the world where it may operate with the secrecy that surrounds it, so far as its relationship to the Congress is concerned, it is bound to create the impres-

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ESTABLISHMENT OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

The Senate resumed the consideration of the concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 2) to establish a Joint Committee on Central Intelligence.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, at this time I ask unanimous consent that at the conclusion of my remarks on Senate Concurrent Resolution 2, a resolution to establish a Joint Committee on Central Intelligence, there be inserted in the Record a number of newspaper editorials and articles on the proposal to establish such a joint committee and also letters of approval of the resolution by the Citizens' Committee for the Hoover Report in the western area of the United States and a letter signed by Mr. Clarence Francis, chairman of the Citizens' Committee for the Hoover Report, both of which are in favor of the adoption of Senate Concurrent Resolution 2.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, today the Senate is considering Senate Concurrent Resolution 2, a concurrent resolution to create a Joint Committee on Central Intelligence. I have introduced similar measures on two previous occasions. However, this is the first time the proposal has come to the floor of the Senate for consideration. The concurrent resolution the Senate is considering today was cosponsored by 34 of my distinguished colleagues in the Senate.

The events of the past year have made it imperative that such a committee as is proposed be authorized before the adjournment of Congress this summer. This concurrent resolution was reported to the Senate by a majority of the members of the Committee on Rules and Administration.

To begin with, let me say that because of the very nature of the Central Intelligence Agency, I think it is important that a joint congressional committee be established for the purposes of making continued studies of the activities of the Agency and problems related to the gathering of intelligence affecting the national security. The Hoover Commission recommendations, the recent Presidential appointment of a commission to study CIA, the conflict over the site of

sh upon the leaders of the foreign countries in which it operates that its activities represent the official foreign policy of the United States?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I will say to the Senator from Oregon that that is a fairly sound assumption. The officials of the CIA could be considered as agents of American foreign policy, and perhaps they are so considered in some countries; but I could not, on the basis of what I know about the CIA, either prove or disprove the Senator's statement, because there is only limited congressional contact with the agency.

Mr. MORSE. That is so, for the simple reason that Congress, along with the American people, is kept in ignorance about the operation of the CIA. Is that correct?

Mr. MANSFIELD. That is correct.

Mr. MORSE. I have one further question. Has the Senator from Montana, as a colleague of mine on the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, ever received any correspondence or information or complaints in regard to the activities of CIA in foreign nations which indicate criticism of American foreign policy abroad?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I must say to the Senator that I have not.

Mr. MORSE. I should like to inform the Senator that I have received a series of communications in regard to alleged activities of the CIA which have caused me concern, and make me all the more enthusiastic in support of the Senator's resolution. I think it is highly desirable that we have, by congressional action, the authority which I think this resolution would give us to require this administration, through its CIA, to keep Congress, through the special committee which the Senator proposes to set up, informed as to exactly what it is doing in other countries by way of action that is bound to have some effect on American foreign policy and our standing in those nations.

This all goes back to what as the Senator knows, is a deep conviction of mine. I abhor government by secrecy. I cannot reconcile it with democratic processes. In the Senate of the United States I do not propose by my vote to endorse the action of any administration no matter what the party, that keeps the American people so much in the dark as the American people are being kept in the dark by the present administration in the whole field of foreign policy. As the Senator knows, I do not agree that there can be justification for keeping from the American people by so-called executive committee meetings in the Senate a good deal of information. But I particularly abhor the operation of government by secrecy in such a way that it threatens the liberties of the American people. Whenever there is government by secrecy, the freedom and liberties of the American people are endangered. A mistake by the CIA in some underbox area of the world might result in the loss of the lives of millions of our fellow citizens because no opportunity was afforded in advance to place a check on mistaken policies on the part of the CIA or other agencies of our Government.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I thank the Senator from Oregon for his pertinent observations.

Mr. President, the announcement of this new board was released 2 days after the time when the hearing on this bill was set by the Rules Committee. I do not think that was a deliberate attempt to head off the establishment of a congressional watchdog committee on the intelligence agency; I am sure that was only a matter of coincidence. But it does emphasize one thing: it extends and strengthens the executive control over the CIA.

I do not object to the formation of this new Commission, nor do I question the need by the Central Intelligence Agency and all other intelligence agencies in the Government for this kind of supervision. What I am concerned with, however, is the CIA's position of responsibility to none but the National Security Council. I believe this should be changed. The newly appointed board members will have neither power nor control over the CIA; and it appears to me that it is questionable how much this group will be permitted to learn under the agency's broad charter.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator from Montana yield for a question?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I am delighted to yield.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Concerning the responsibility of the CIA only to the National Security Council, if a change in that situation were to be made, would not a change of law be required, inasmuch as the law Congress passed in 1947, as I recall, requires the CIA to be responsible only to the National Security Council and to the President?

Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator from Massachusetts is correct. However, instead of changing the law, I think we should establish a joint watchdog committee composed of Members of the House and Members of the Senate. In that way we could provide safeguards in connection with the operation of the CIA, and we could also deal with questions which Members of Congress might have in their minds.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator from Montana yield further to me?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I am glad to yield.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Of course, the Senator from Montana will agree with me that the Armed Services Committee and the Appropriations Committee now have subcommittees with members assigned to follow the activities of the CIA. Is not that correct?

Mr. MANSFIELD. That is correct.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. As a member of both those committees, I consider I have been informed of the activities of the CIA to the extent that I believe it is wise for me to be informed. As regards further information, let me say that, so far as I know, nothing has been concealed from us.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Montana yield for a question?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. MORSE. I should like to ask a question of the Senator from Massachusetts.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Certainly.

Mr. MORSE. Has the Senator from Massachusetts ever informed the Foreign Relations Committee of the information he gained in regard to the CIA?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I have never been asked by the Foreign Relations Committee for any such information. We have discussed such matters rather briefly in the Armed Services Committee, in executive session, as I recall, and also, of course, in the Appropriations Committee.

Mr. MORSE. That is just my point. After all, both the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee have great responsibilities in regard to foreign policy. The Foreign Relations Committee has no such liaison officer of which I know in respect to CIA, and I think it is very important that there be established the joint committee the Senator from Montana is proposing, with the very definite understanding that the Joint Committee will keep the Foreign Relations Committee, the Armed Services Committee, the Appropriations Committee, and the Senate as a whole informed. Certainly, under the advice and consent clause of the Constitution, it is important that we keep ourselves informed regarding what is occurring in connection with American foreign policy.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. As one member of the committee, I reply that to the extent I can do so under security regulations and in accordance with my own knowledge, of course, I shall be very glad to inform the Senator from Oregon or any other Senator, insofar as it is proper for me to do so.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I know the Senator from Massachusetts speaks from his heart, but I wonder whether the question I shall ask now should be asked in public; if not, let the Senator from Massachusetts please refrain from answering it: How many times does the CIA request a meeting with the particular subcommittees of the Appropriations Committee and the Armed Services Committee, and how many times does the Senator from Massachusetts request the CIA to brief him in regard to existing affairs?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I believe the correct answer is that at least twice a year that happens in the Armed Services Committee, and at least once a year it happens in the Appropriations Committee. I speak from my knowledge of the situation during the last year or so; I do not attempt to refer to previous periods. Certainly the present administrator and the former administrator, Gen. Bedell Smith, stated that they were ready at all times to answer any questions we might wish to ask them. The difficulty in connection with asking questions and obtaining information is that we might obtain information which I personally would rather not have, unless it was essential for me as a Member of Congress to have it.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I think the Senator's answer tells the whole story, for he has informed us that a subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee has met only twice a year with members of the CIA, and that a subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee has met only once a year with members of the CIA. Of course, it is very likely that the meetings in connection with the Appropriations Committee occurred only at a time when the CIA was making requests for appropriations. That information from the Senator from Massachusetts does not indicate to me that there is sufficiently close contact between the congressional committees and the CIA, as such.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. In reply, let me state—and I should like to discuss this point more fully when I present my own views on this subject—that it is not a question of reluctance on the part of the CIA officials to speak to us. Instead, it is a question of our reluctance, if you will, to seek information and knowledge on subjects which I personally, as a Member of Congress and as a citizen, would rather not have, unless I believed it to be my responsibility to have it because it might involve the lives of American citizens.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I see. The Senator is to be commended.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Montana yield to me?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. MORSE. I wish to say that no one has greater respect for the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL] than do I, and what I say now goes only to the point of view he has expressed, and not to the Senator from Massachusetts himself. But it is the very point of view of the Senator from Massachusetts which I protest, because the very procedure for checking the CIA the Senator from Massachusetts has outlined is at best a voluntary one, and is not based upon the establishment by resolution of a mandatory jurisdiction of the Congress in relation to the CIA. That is what is necessary. But it does not exist under the present very loose and voluntary relationship existing between the CIA and the Armed Services Committee and the Appropriations Committee. What we must do is to write in black and white provisions which will give mandatory jurisdictional power to the Congress in relationship to the CIA.

The second point I wish to mention in connection with a comment made by the Senator from Massachusetts—whom I highly respect, but who has laid down a premise with which I am in total disagreement—is in relation to the argument that some information in this field should be kept from the Members of Congress who serve on the appropriate committees, and that such Members of Congress should not have knowledge of those matters.

Mr. President, let us consider the personnel of the CIA. Who are the supermen of the CIA? They are not elected officials of the Government. Instead, they are appointees of the executive branch of the Government. But the re-

sponsibility as the elected representatives of a free people happens to be ours, under the advice and consent clause of the Constitution, to protect the people, by serving as a check against the administration—and I care not whether it is a Republican or a Democratic administration. What is happening today, in connection with the trend toward government by secrecy in America, is that that Congress has been standing by and has not been insisting upon exercising its power to check the executive branch of the Government in many fields including foreign policy.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the Senator from Oregon is entirely correct. The trend to which he has referred began during the Roosevelt administration, if not before, and continued during the Truman administration and down into the present administration. I refer to the trend toward reposing more and more power in the hands of the executive branch of the Government, and less and less power in the hands of the Congress. The Senate must wake up and do something about this matter, because unless we do so, as time passes the Congress will become less of an equal branch under our constitutional system, and more power will rest in the hands of the Executive. The policy of increased executive power is nonpartisan. The same thing happened under Democratic administrations as is happening under a Republican administration.

Mr. MORSE. For years I sat over on the other side of the aisle and made the same protests under Democratic administrations that I am making today under a Republican administration.

This policy of too much secrecy has been characteristic of administrations of all parties in the executive branch. What we must do is to face up, before it is too late, to the fact that there is an increasing concentration of arbitrary power in the executive branch of the Government. This process has been going on for the past quarter of a century. We must stop it. The CIA issue affords a good example of what I am protesting.

I do not know of a single secret of Government which ought to be vested in the hands and minds of some appointees of the executive branch of Government in the CIA, to the exclusion of the elected Representatives of the people. Who are these CIA employees? Many of them are very young, and, from the standpoint of experience, very immature men. Does anyone suggest that it is safe for democracy to vest in them crucial information, and to say that because we are Members of Congress on the Foreign Relations or Armed Services Committee, we should not have or should not want such information? I say that we must insist on getting it, if we are to keep faith with the oath we took when we entered this body, and are properly to discharge our duties and responsibilities as elected Representatives of a free people.

Today we are talking about an abstraction in respect to a principle of Government, but the Senator from Montana is to be complimented and commended for raising the issue. He has

raised an issue of Government under our constitutional system which has been too long lost sight of by too many people in this country.

What is happening now in the United States is similar to what has happened in the history of other free nations. They flowered in freedom for a long time, and then gradually a small clique of Government officials in the executive branch started taking over their rights, freedoms, and liberties. The people woke up too late to discover that they had lost their freedoms, rights, and liberties. It can happen in America, if we do not stand on guard in relation to the principle of checks and balances under the Constitution.

I commend the Senator from Montana. Through this resolution I think he has placed his finger on a very important duty of Members of Congress. We ought to insist that the power which has been vested in the CIA be subjected to an occasional check, as provided by his resolution.

Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator from Oregon is absolutely correct. Under the Roosevelt administration so-called executive agreements were agreed to between this country and Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Nepal. Those executive agreements should have come before the Senate, under the advice-and-consent clause of the Constitution, because they were in reality treaties of friendship and commerce.

Under the Truman administration, Congress appropriated sufficient funds to provide for a 70-group Air Force. President Truman impounded the money and allowed only a 48-group Air Force to come into being.

Under this administration, last year Congress appropriated \$40 million to maintain the Marine Corps at its then present strength. What happened? Secretary of Defense Wilson said he would not use the money. He did use a part of it. A part of the cut went into effect. I note from the document asking additional appropriations for the fiscal year 1958, page 8, that it develops that under the Department of Defense, military functions, the Office of the Secretary of Defense used \$789,000—to be derived from where? From transfer from the appropriation "Military personnel, Marine Corps."

The Office of Public Affairs in the Department of Defense used \$27,500, to be derived by transfer from the appropriation "Military personnel, Marine Corps."

For Interservice Activities, Court of Military Appeals, \$41,400 was used, to be derived by transfer from the appropriation "Military personnel, Marine Corps."

For the Department of the Navy, servicewide supply and finance, \$7,400,000 was used, to be derived by transfer from the appropriation "Military personnel, Marine Corps."

For servicewide operations in the Department of the Navy, \$2,180,000 was used, to be derived by transfer from the appropriation "Military personnel, Marine Corps."

All this was after the Congress unanimously restored \$40 million to maintain the Marine Corps at its then present strength, 223,000 men. What happened

to those funds? What happened to the mandate laid down by Congress, which is supposed to control the Armed Forces of the United States, and to provide for them? What happened during the Truman administration when Congress appropriated for a 70-group Air Force? What happened during the Roosevelt administration when, in the field of foreign policy, Executive agreements were made which were in reality treaties of commerce and friendship?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. First, with respect to the executive agreements to which the Senator has referred, let me say that I believe they should have been made in the form of treaties, and should have been brought to the attention of the Senate.

So far as the Marine Corps appropriation is concerned, that question is now before the Committee on Appropriations. I agree with the Senator that if the money was not used for the Marine Corps, if the total strength of the Marine Corps provided for by the Congress was not maintained, and was not necessary, in the opinion of the Department, that money should have gone back to the Treasury, and, if money for other purposes was needed, new appropriations should have been requested. There should have been no transfers. I thoroughly agree with the Senator from Montana.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I am delighted to hear it.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I do not approve of the method by which the funds were handled. The question as to whether the strength of the Marine Corps provided for by Congress was necessary is another issue; but certainly the money should not have been transferred.

Mr. MANSFIELD. As the Senator knows far better than I, a portion of the Marine Corps cut was restored.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. That is correct.

Mr. MANSFIELD. But not to the point mandated by the Congress of the United States. The Senator from Massachusetts also voted last year for the \$40 million appropriation to maintain the Marine Corps at its then present strength. The money is being used for other purposes, which in my judgment is contrary to the intent and wish of the Congress.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. If my memory is correct as to the figures—and I am not sure it is—the number of marines last year was 215,000. The idea was to reduce the number to 195,000, in round figures. Congress directed that the strength be kept at 215,000. I believe that the present figure is 201,000, and that it will be 205,000 at the end of the present fiscal year. I am not quite certain as to the accuracy of those figures, but the present strength is more than 200,000.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I think the Senator is approximately correct; but it is still to be noted that the wishes of the Congress were ignored by Mr. Wilson, who is an agent of the President, and

the money was used as he saw fit, and not as Congress intended.

Mr. LANGER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. LANGER. I wish to join the distinguished Senator from Oregon (Mr. Morse) in complimenting the Senator from Montana for bringing this subject to the attention of the Senate.

I believe that the entire policy of secrecy in this connection is a cancer in the operation of our Government.

Only a short time ago we had the spectacle of Sherman Adams, assistant to the President, telephoning to the Securities and Exchange Commission and holding up for 3 or 4 days a hearing in connection with the Dixon-Yates matter. When we asked why an assistant to the President should call up an agency of Government and delay a hearing for 3 or 4 days, while in the House an appropriation of \$6,500,000 was being considered, we received a letter from the assistant secretary to the effect that this subject was secret.

When the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. Kefauver), as chairman of the subcommittee, joined with other members of the subcommittee in a letter requesting the assistant to the President, Sherman Adams, to come before us and tell us the reason for such procedures, we received a very brief letter of 3 or 4 lines in reply.

I fully agree with the Senator from Oregon that the policy of secrecy is resulting in keeping from the Congress and the people matters with which the Congress ought to be thoroughly familiar. We are called upon to enact laws dealing with those subjects, and we are dealing with them, as the Senator from Massachusetts stated a few moments ago, in such a manner that members of the Committee on Armed Services meet only twice a year with representatives of the CIA, and members of the Committee on Appropriations meet with them only once a year, when they need more money. I believe the Committee on Foreign Relations, of which the distinguished Senator from Oregon and the distinguished Senator from Montana and I are members, can testify to the fact that we see those gentlemen, members of the CIA, on very, very rare occasions, and then only when we practically invite them to attend.

Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator may well be correct. As a matter of fact, I do not recall ever seeing them before the Committee on Foreign Relations, although I may be mistaken about that.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield once more? I shall not interrupt him again after this comment if it can be avoided.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I am glad to yield to the Senator from Oregon.

Mr. MORSE. I wish to associate myself with the observations of the Senator from North Dakota (Mr. Langer), and I am very glad, indeed, that the Senator from Montana has mentioned the executive agreements which have been made with some Middle East countries, especially Saudi Arabia.

He has referred to agreements about which we were not apprised at the time

they were made. I do not believe it can be questioned that in regard to a good many of the agreements which are entered into the CIA has, so to speak, a background part to play, and does play; and it supplies what it believes to be information which ought to be influential in reaching executive decisions. That is why I believe it very important that the Committee on Foreign Relations be kept advised right up to the minute in regard to the findings of the CIA and the recommendations of the CIA as they may affect American foreign policy.

Let us take, for example, the executive agreement to which the Senator from Montana has referred. Now, belatedly, we are beginning to get information, for example, pointing out that in Saudi Arabia human-slavery traffic is rampant in the year 1956. Before the week is over I intend to discuss on the floor of the Senate human-slavery traffic in Saudi Arabia.

Nevertheless, Mr. President, the argument is made that we ought to ship military supplies to Saudi Arabia. The argument is made that in order to combat communism we ought to keep an airbase in Saudi Arabia.

Mr. President, I seriously question the whole program of America in Saudi Arabia, so long as evidence can be brought forth that the nation with whom we have the agreements is engaged in human slavery in this year of 1956.

We cannot reconcile that fact with the high moral principles for which we as a nation profess to stand in American foreign policy.

The reason I am pleading for full disclosure to the American people of American foreign policy is that if such disclosure is not made we get into the kind of situation the Senator from Montana has mentioned with regard to so-called executive agreements. That happens whenever we in the Congress do not have all the facts presented to us.

I sat on the Committee on Armed Services for 8 years. What did the brass do? They came before the committee and said, "This is our recommendation. However, because of the top secrecy involved, we do not want to go into the information and the facts on which the recommendation is based."

What did we do? We used to sit there and say, "Well, we will take you at your word."

In my judgment, we should not do that. In my judgment, in a democracy, the elected representatives of the people are entitled to whatever facts anyone who has brass on his shoulders may have in his head. I for one think we ought to stop the tendency to let the military, the CIA, and a few officials of the State Department determine foreign policy for the American people, without any check on the process by their elected representatives in the legislative halls of the Government.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I wish to say to the Senator that what frightens me about the whole matter is the fact that the Senate, particularly, has been willing to give up its share of

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its responsibility in the Government during the past 15 or 20 years, at least. It is a bad trend. I do not believe it is the President who is arrogating unto himself this added authority. I assume it is in the executive departments and in the praetorian guard in the White House where the authority is being used, to the detriment of the elected representatives of the people in both the House and in the Senate, and against the course laid down under the Constitution of the United States.

It is a very serious constitutional question. I deeply regret that I am not a constitutional lawyer, because I believe there is quite a field for discussion of this subject. I only hope that the Senate will recognize the fact and will take some action to restore the equality which should exist between the executive and the legislative branches of the Government.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator from Montana yield once more? Then, like the Senator from Oregon, I will not interrupt him again. That is, I hope I will not interrupt him again, but I cannot promise that I will not.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I am glad to yield to my friend from Massachusetts.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I am sure the Senator will agree with me that the CIA is not a policymaking body but that the policymaking body is the State Department which is an executive agency of the President in the initiation and determination of the foreign policy of the United States. In the same way, under the President, the Defense Department is the initiating body with regard to our national security. I am sure the Senator will agree with me on those primary facts.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes; except that in the field of foreign policy we do have the advice and consent clause in the Constitution. That clause can be stretched a long, long way. That is what has been happening in recent years, with the result that the Senate has exercised less and less influence in foreign affairs, and with the further result that the executive department has taken under its control more and more of that field.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. The point I wished to make especially in the present discussion is that the CIA is not a policymaking body of the executive branch of the Government, and that the policymaking body is the State Department. The CIA is one of the agencies which the State Department uses in determining what the foreign policy of the Government shall be.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I would be inclined to take the Senator's word for that. However, I do not know whether the CIA has any part in making policy. The Senator is correct in saying that it is the function of the State Department under the President of the United States to act in that field.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. The present Administrator of CIA does his utmost to maintain that principle within his agency. In other words, he does not alone determine policy, but carries out

the orders which are given to him by the policy-making body.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I agree with the Senator. In my remarks about the CIA I wish it to be clearly understood that I have nothing but the highest regard for Mr. Allen Dulles, the Director of CIA, and for the type of administration which he is carrying on. What I am talking about is the CIA as an executive agency and its relations to Congress.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I assume that the Administrator of CIA—the present one or any other Administrator, past or present—would come before the Committee on Foreign Relations and discuss with it any subject he could properly discuss within his field, if the committee asked him to appear before it.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes, I know and believe he would be glad to.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Of course the problem of security comes up, both in public and in executive sessions.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield once more?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I am glad to yield to the Senator from Oregon.

Mr. MORSE. I am always interested in the meaning that is given to words. Of course, when we argue that CIA is not a policymaking body because under the administrative setup it is not charged with making policy. It does not follow that it does not make policy. Let us take a look at Government operations and what happens when we give an assignment to an agency such as CIA.

It proceeds to gather information and to make investigations and studies. On the basis of such studies and investigations and what it discloses to the executive arm of the Government, and what it does not disclose, someone in the Government must then make a determination. The tendency is usually to follow the recommendation of the agency that was asked to do the job of investigating.

One of the reasons why I believe the pending concurrent resolution should be adopted is that we should find out to what extent in fact—not in theory, but in fact—CIA is forming policy. I will tell the Senate my suspicion. My suspicion is that it determines a great deal of policy. I happen to believe we have the duty of finding out whether my suspicion—and I am not the only one who has such a suspicion—is warranted or not. I think we must take it for granted that when we give broad powers to the CIA, which it has been exercising, it has great influence in determining foreign policy. I urge that a check be placed upon it. We ought to know to what extent its recommendations are being generally followed.

I agree with the Senator with respect to Allen Dulles, but I am not in favor of giving him unchecked power. I want to know to what extent the recommendations and the policies made by CIA under Allen Dulles become the policies of John Foster Dulles, his brother, the Secretary of State. I believe we need checks on families as well as checks on men who do not belong to the same families.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Not only would that question be interesting, but I am

sure the answer to it would also be interesting.

Mr. President, so long as the subject of the power of the Executive vis-a-vis the legislative has been brought up, I ask unanimous consent that at this point in my remarks an excerpt from a communication from the President of the United States to the 84th Congress, 2d session, Document 341, at the top of page 8, under the heading "Department of Defense—Military Functions," be incorporated in the Record.

There being no objection, the excerpt was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE—MILITARY FUNCTIONS

Office of the Secretary of Defense: "Salaries and expenses," \$769,000, to be derived by transfer from the appropriation "Military personnel, Marine Corps";

"Office of Public Affairs," \$27,500, to be derived by transfer from the appropriation "Military personnel, Marine Corps";

Interservice activities: "Court of Military Appeals," \$41,400, to be derived by transfer from the appropriation "Military personnel, Marine Corps";

Department of the Navy: "Service-wide supply and finance," \$7,400,000, to be derived by transfer from the appropriation "Military personnel, Marine Corps";

"Service-wide operations," \$2,180,000, to be derived by transfer from the appropriation "Military personnel, Marine Corps."

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I also ask unanimous consent to have made a part of the Record at this point in my remarks a copy of a speech which I made 2 years ago relative to 3 executive agreements under the Roosevelt administration which should have come before the Senate.

There being no objection, the speech was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

SPEECH BY SENATOR MANSFIELD

There is a real issue, and it has troubled me deeply, as I am sure it has troubled other Senators. It is to be found in the power of the executive branch in the field of foreign policy.

The Constitution specifically provides the President with certain unique powers to conduct our foreign relations, just as the other branches of Government have unique powers in other matters. I do not question those powers which accrue to him as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces.

But in one aspect of our foreign relations, the treaty-making power, he does not have unique, but rather concurrent, power shared with the Senate. Treaties are to be made by the President only with the advice and consent of the Senate. The most vital matters involving the relationships of this country with others are or should be conducted within this realm of concurrent power.

But it is precisely in this realm that an extra-constitutional device, the executive agreement, now threatens the fine balance of power which has been maintained under our system of government for a century and a half.

It will be argued, as it has been, that executive agreements are used almost exclusively in pursuance of authority delegated by Congress or to supplement certain valid undertakings growing out of the unique powers of the President. That is true, and I think the device, so used, is necessary and useful and harmless to the principle of balance of powers.

But it is not in the mass of executive agreements that the issue is to be found. It is, rather, in the few, in the very few. For it is in the few, the very few, that this extra-constitutional device can be used to stretch the unique powers of the Executive. It is in the few that there lies the danger of usurpation, destruction of the constitutional balance, and in the last analysis, the threat of Executive tyranny.

This is no imaginary fear which haunts me and other members of the Senate. Executive agreements have been used to stretch the powers of the Presidency and unless safeguards are established there is no reason to believe that they will not continue to be so used. If the Senate will bear with me for a few moments longer, I will undertake to prove by specific example how this extra-constitutional device can undermine the power of the Senate in foreign relations. I will endeavor to show how this device can and has been used to erode that power and transfer it painlessly, almost imperceptibly, from this body to the executive branch.

For decades, treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation have been made with other countries by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. As the Senators know, these are basic treaties which establish the framework of our relations with other countries. The Senate has traditionally given advice and consent to such treaties. It still does so, for the most part.

In 1933, however, the Department of State negotiated an agreement of friendship and commerce with Saudi Arabia. As far as I can determine, this was the first time an executive agreement, rather than a treaty, was used for this purpose. To be sure, the agreement with Saudi Arabia was labeled provisional in nature and was to remain in effect, I quote: "until the entry in force of a definitive treaty of commerce and navigation." Even though it was temporary, however, the State Department must have known that this executive agreement was treading on dangerous constitutional ground for it added the following clause, I quote "Should the Government of the United States of America be prevented by future action of its legislature from carrying out the terms of these stipulations the obligations thereof shall thereupon lapse."

This executive agreement was never replaced by a definitive treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation. Though the Senate has never given consent to ratification, it stands in equal force with genuine treaties dealing with the same subject matter, to which the Senate has given approval.

This agreement, Mr. President, established a precedent. Note now how the precedent is reinforced. Thirteen years later, in 1946, the State Department negotiated a similar agreement with the Kingdom of Yemen. The terms of the two agreements were practically identical except for two omissions. The agreement with Yemen no longer carried the phrase indicating that it was to remain in effect only, I quote: "until the entry in force of a definitive treaty of commerce and navigation." Also omitted was the phrase, I quote: "Should the Government of the United States of America be prevented by future action of its Legislature from carrying out the terms of these stipulations the obligations thereof shall thereupon lapse."

In short, the State Department appears, in 13 years, to have reached the conclusion that the power to make treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation had become, at least in some cases, a unique power of the executive branch, that the consent of the Senate was no longer necessary, at least in some of these agreements.

One year later, in 1947, a third agreement of friendship, commerce, and navigation was negotiated with the Kingdom of Nepal. In printing the text of this agreement in its

Bulletin, the State Department apparently still had a twinge of nervousness about the procedure it was following. It was constrained to point to two precedents. What were the precedents? The agreements with Yemen and Saudi Arabia.

Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Nepal. These are small, faraway lands. Few of us could locate them quickly on a map. Still fewer have any direct concern with what transpires in them. Yet, the agreements which have been negotiated with them constitute a series of precedents which is of vital importance to our constitutional division of powers. None of them has ever been replaced by a regular treaty, yet all of them cover subject matter which traditionally has been handled by treaty.

Twenty-one years have elapsed since the first of these three agreements was negotiated. Was the failure to replace the agreements by permanent treaty an oversight or a conscious expansion of the unique powers of the executive at the expense of the Senate? Is this example a straw man or a very real case of usurpation of power? Will the President now send these three agreements or their permanent replacements to the Senate for advice or consent or after years and decades is the need still for temporary agreements?

How is the Senate to deal with the disappearance of its prerogatives in this fashion?

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that some illustrations of the use of Executive power in relation to the power of Congress, which I requested the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress to compile for me, be incorporated in the Record at this point.

There being no objection, the illustrations were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE,
Washington, D. C.,

SOME ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE USE OF EXECUTIVE
POWER IN RELATION TO THE POWER OF
CONGRESS

The general nature of the alleged usurpation of the powers of Congress by Executive circumvention of legislative intent has been stated by Representative HOWARD W. SMITH.

Testifying before the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress on March 28, 1945, Representative SMITH said:

"Under our Constitution legislation is supposed to be enacted by the Congress. I want to call your attention to what I assert to be a fact, that we now have not only legislation by the Congress, but we have four other types of legislation. I will go into each one of them a little more fully . . . We have legislation by sanctions; we have legislation by subsidies; we have legislation by Executive regulations, under authority of acts of Congress; and we have legislation by interpretation—interpretations that Congress never dreamed of when we enacted the law.

"I think that that is of very great moment. . . . I do not think the American people realize to what extent our system of government is being changed by these innovations. . . .

"I do not think Congress as a Congress realizes it. On the other hand, I think almost every individual Member of Congress realizes what is going on, and they talk about it and fume about it, and they say something ought to be done about it, but as a rule Congress does not do anything about it.

"Now, much of this stuff is done in perfectly good faith. I am not here to say that any of it is not done in good faith. It is done under the spur of the emergency, but

when we once break down the constitutional boundaries and begin to do things that there is not any authority under the Constitution or the law for, we get into a field that spreads and gets worse, like a spreading disease.

"Personally I am very much disturbed about it and I hope that we can do something to check it and bring us back within the limits of what we ought to do."

Absolute and unequivocal proof of executive circumvention of legislative intent in the interpretation or administration of laws passed by Congress is in most cases impossible to obtain. In some instances disputes arising under these circumstances have been settled by adjudication, but in most cases these conflicts have been characterized by charges and allegations which were sometimes answered and sometimes ignored. Interpretations of what a law means and how it should be administered may very well often require the exercise of subjective judgment. The charges of circumvention may be equally subjective. There may be no conclusive evidence that either party is acting in bad faith, or that the Executive is deliberately flouting the law.

Certainly there are some instances where evasion or ignoring of the law was deliberate, but in these cases the President usually acted upon what might be argued to be mitigating circumstances or what he regarded as a more fundamental legal authority. For example, President Jackson felt that his re-election in 1832, after a thorough public discussion of his veto of the bill to recharter the National Bank, justified his withdrawal of public funds from the bank 8 years before its old charter was to expire. Although he acted legally through his Secretary of the Treasury, Jackson knew that he was acting contrary to congressional intent. "Indeed, Congress had already refused to pass a measure authorizing him specifically to do this. . . ."

In a case of historic importance, President Andrew Johnson fired Secretary of War Stanton in deliberate violation of the Tenure of Office Act, which had been passed over his veto, because he "was convinced that the act was unconstitutional and was consequently eager to get it in the courts for the purpose of a test." Although Johnson was impeached primarily for this action and escaped conviction by only one vote, this law was repealed in 1867, and a very similar measure was declared unconstitutional in 1926 in *Myers v. United States* (272 U. S. 52).

The illustrations of alleged executive circumvention or flouting of legislative intent in the following pages of this report do not by any means comprise a definitive listing of examples. They are, rather, cases that could be compiled in the time available, and it is hoped that, taken together, they offer a fairly representative picture of cases of this type.

One other explanatory word is needed. No attempt has been made to present the other side, the answers to charges of executive disregard for legislative intent. Much background material has also been omitted. The political context surrounding each example is held to the absolute minimum.

President Theodore Roosevelt is known as a Chief Executive who believed in using the power of his office to the full. Two examples of his alleged circumvention of legislative intent are recorded here:

¹ Binkley, Wilfred K. *The Powers of the President*, New York, Doubleday, Doran, 1937, pp. 76-77.

² Ibid., p. 149. See also Corwin, Edward S., *The President: Office and Powers*, New York, New York University Press, 1948, pp. 77-78.

³ Small, Norman J., *Some Presidential Interpretations of the Presidency*, Baltimore, the Johns Hopkins Press, 1932, pp. 148-149.

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In two other instances, although his conduct ultimately received a judicial sanction, [T. R.] Roosevelt aroused the ire of his political opponents by employing the powers granted to him by these statutes to secure a result apparently not intended by these acts, and certainly not approved by Congress. Having failed to convince Congress of the urgency of preventing the acquisition by monopolies of public coal lands at ridiculously low prices, he undertook to remedy this situation by issuing a series of proclamations withdrawing these coal lands from public entry and setting them aside as parts of the national forest reserves. That a doubt existed as to the legality of these orders is attested by the refusal of his successor, Taft, to proceed further without an express sanction of Congress. Again, when an attempt was made to obstruct his efforts at conservation by attaching to an appropriation bill a rider exempting from withdrawal as reserves a large portion of public lands in the Northwest, Roosevelt, without assuming the responsibility of vetoing a financial measure, defeated this effort by setting aside all the timber lands in question before the bill was presented to him for signature.

President Woodrow Wilson was another of the so-called strong Presidents who believed in the vigorous use of all of the powers of his office, as the following excerpt shows:

Even Wilson, staunch advocate that he was of the observance of strictly legitimate procedures, was not averse, on the occasion of impending war, to execute a policy for which statutory authorization, previously solicited from Congress, had been refused. In asking Congress to empower him to arm merchant vessels, Wilson had spoken as follows:

"No doubt I already possess that authority without special warrant of law by the plain implication of my constitutional duties and powers, but I prefer to act not upon implication. I wish to feel that the authority and power of Congress are behind me."

Notwithstanding the defeat of an authorizing statute by the action of 11 willful men, Wilson proceeded to arm merchant vessels in reliance not only upon his constitutional powers but upon the support derived from an obsolete statute of 1819. Where an Executive relies on a novel interpretation of an existing statute, which was designed at the date of its adoption to serve a wholly unrelated purpose, it would seem that by an act of repeal, Congress could deprive the Executive of the color of authority for his action. Whether the repeal of the law could, of itself, halt the President is probably dependent upon whether his action, through his subordinates, could be made the subject of litigation.

The following excerpt is taken from the annual message of President Warren G. Harding delivered to the Congress on December 8, 1921:

"The previous Congress, deeply concerned in behalf of our merchant marine, in 1920 enacted the existing shipping law, designed for the upbuilding of the American merchant marine. Among other things provided to encourage our shipping on the world's seas, the Executive was directed to give notice of the termination of all existing commercial treaties in order to admit of reduced duties on imports carried in American bottoms. During the life of the act no Executive has complied with this order of the Congress. When the present administration came into responsibility it began an early inquiry into the failure to execute the expressed purpose of the Jones Act. Only one conclusion has been possible. Frankly, Members of the

House and Senate, eager as I am to join you in the making of an American merchant marine commensurate with our commerce, the denouncement of our commercial treaties would involve us in a chaos of trade relationships and add indescribably to the confusion of the already disordered commercial world. Our power to do so is not disputed, but power and ships, without comity of relationship, will not give us the expanded trade which is inseparably linked with a great merchant marine. Moreover, the applied reduction of duty, for which the treaty denunciations were necessary, encouraged only the carrying of dutiable imports to our shores, while the tonnage which unfurls the flag on the seas is both free and dutiable, and the cargoes which make a nation eminent in trade are outgoing, rather than incoming.

"It is not my thought to lay the problem before you in detail today. It is desired only to say to you that the executive branch of the Government, uninfluenced by the protest of any nation, for none has been made, is well convinced that your proposal, highly intended and heartily supported here, is so fraught with difficulties and so marked by tendencies to discourage trade expansion, that I invite your tolerance of noncompliance for only a few weeks until a plan may be presented which contemplates no greater draft upon the Public Treasury, and which, though yet too crude to offer it today, gives such promise of expanding our merchant marine, that it will argue its own approval."

One outstanding authority on the presidency declares that Franklin D. Roosevelt, in a message of September 7, 1942, peremptorily demanded that Congress repeal a certain provision of the Emergency Price Control Act or that he, the President, would treat this provision as repealed. After quoting a passage from the Roosevelt message, Edward S. Corwin goes on to say:

"In a word, the President said to Congress: 'Unless you repeal a certain statutory provision forthwith, I shall nevertheless treat it as repealed.' On what grounds did Mr. Roosevelt rest his case for power of so transcendent a nature? Although he made a vague gesture toward congressional acts, it is obvious that his principal reliance was, and could only have been, on his powers under the Constitution—that is to say, his conception of these. Presidents have before this in a few instances announced that they did not consider themselves constitutionally obligated by something which Congress had enacted but which, as they contended, trenching on presidential prerogatives. This, for example, was Johnson's position in 1867. But the position advanced by Mr. Roosevelt goes beyond this, claiming as it does for the President the power and right to disregard a statutory provision which he did not venture to deny, and indeed could not possibly have denied, which Congress had complete constitutional authority to enact, and which, therefore, he was obligated by express words of the Constitution to take care should be faithfully executed."

Speaking of the administration of the Internal Security Act, former Senator Herbert R. O'Connor, of Maryland, said:

"There is strong evidence that some officials of this Government are engaged in a studied and deliberate effort to avoid compliance with certain basic provisions of the Internal Security Act of 1950 which are designed to protect this country against infiltration by Communist agents."

"Notwithstanding these provisions of the Internal Security Act which provide for the exclusion and deportation of aliens whose presence in this country endangers the public security, virtually nothing was being done

by the executive department to carry those provisions into effect."

"In the course of the last few days we held an executive session with the officials of the Department of State on this matter including the Chief of the Division of International Administration and the administrative attorney of the Division. So far as I can comprehend their attitude it is this, that the security of the United States should be weighed in the balance against a policy of facilitating our international relations with other nations. I assert that this is not only a direct violation of the Internal Security Act, which these officials are sworn to uphold and which is designed to protect this country, but is a course leading to the practical annulment of the statutory provisions passed by the Congress to protect our internal security."

"So long as certain officials of this Government refuse to heed the warnings of our intelligence agencies and deliberately ignore provisions of the Internal Security Act, we shall have an open door for the infiltration of spies and saboteurs."

Both President Truman and President Eisenhower have been subjected to congressional criticism for impounding funds which have been appropriated by Congress for specific purposes. In 1949 Congress appropriated money for 58 air groups. A Truman order of October 29 specified that funds would be spent for only the 48 air groups he had recommended. This policy was examined by the House Subcommittee on the Department of Defense Appropriations in January 1950. Members of the subcommittee regarded the action as an invasion of congressional authority. Representative Burke declared: "I would consider that there is a prohibition in the law against the things which now are being done. The Congress under the Constitution decides how much money is to be expended. . . . Anything done contrary to this is in my opinion contrary to the basic law of the land."

Last Summer President Eisenhower was accused by several Senators of acting, or threatening to act, with regard to already appropriated funds, in a manner that was contrary to the wishes and intentions of Congress. In the public works appropriation bill Congress inserted provisions for funds for some projects that did not appear in the President's budget. "According to the newspaper stories," said Senator Moss, "the President implied such unbudgeted projects will not be initiated even though the Congress has specifically appropriated the funds until detailed engineering plans have been completed. . . . It will be a sad day for government by law if a President is allowed to thwart the will of Congress as President Eisenhower apparently intimated he might do."

With reference to an aspect of the Dixon-Yates controversy, Senator O'Mahoney said: "If it shall continue to be true that the President and the Bureau of the Budget can defy the acts of Congress in making appropriations and can say, notwithstanding the appropriations, that the works will not be built because the executive department does not approve of them, although the President has signed the bill, it is useless to talk about saving free government." Referring to the congressional appropriation affecting the Marine Corps, Senator MAHAFIELD declared: "Why should Secretary [of Defense] Wilson thwart the will of the Congress by saying he

* Memorandum on the Powers of Congress, Short of Impeachment, To Control a President in Matters of the Faithful Execution of Congressional Legislation. Legislative Reference Service Report, October 20, 1942.

* Corwin, Edward S., op. cit., pp. 304-306.

* CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, 82d Cong., 1st sess., October 17, 1951, p. 13323-13324.

* Executive-Legislative Relations: Examples of Real or Alleged Overstepping, 1920-51, Legislative Reference Service Report, May 28, 1951.

* CONGRESSIONAL RECORD (daily edition), July 18, 1955, pp. 9176-9183.

had impounded the \$48 million authorized by the Congress to keep the marines at their present strength? . . . This is something the executive branch is doing regardless of the action taken by Congress." On another subject, Senator Neumann said: "The President announces to the world, in a press statement, that, even though the Congress has provided for the Cougar Dam, he evidently does not intend to proceed with the spending of the money for it, although the appropriation has been provided by the Congress."

A question of executive as against legislative authority arose last July when President Eisenhower signed the Defense Department appropriation bill. Section 638 of this measure gave to the Appropriations Committee of the Senate and the House a virtual veto power over certain proposed cutbacks in some of the business enterprises in the Defense Department. The President signed the bill because the Department had to have the money, but he declared in his message of July 13 that section 638 "constitutes an unconstitutional invasion of the province of the Executive. . . . Such section will be regarded as invalid . . . unless otherwise determined by a court of competent jurisdiction."

According to the Washington Star of July 15, Representative Sikes was completely shocked at the President's attitude. "Seldom have I heard such complete and utter disregard for the rights and privileges of Congress or of the constitutional processes of law." He said the President would "in this way seek to place himself above the law and to set aside a section of law that he or someone who speaks for him does not like. This is veto by paragraph, and veto by paragraph is not legal. This is usurpation of the powers of the Congress." House Majority Leader McCormack said: "I had the idea that the Civil War settled the question of nullification in this country, but this is a nullification of an act of Congress."

The following material consists entirely of examples of executive agreements and other international agreements arrived at through executive action. The first 2 excerpts discuss the subject in general terms; the next 4 consist of more specific illustrations:

The first of the general excerpts follows:

"Generally speaking, the interwar period was characterized by the wide use of executive agreements to effect international understandings on matters that seem quite as important as those dignified by the use of the treaty-making process. Approval by two-thirds of the Senate was not required to terminate the First World War, to join the International Labor Organization, to acquire Atlantic naval bases in British territory in return for overage destroyers, to accept the Atlantic Charter, nor to enter into lend-lease agreements."

The second of the general excerpts states:

"The United States annexed Texas and Hawaii, ended the First World War, joined the International Labor Organization, the Universal Postal Union and the Pan American Union, settled over \$10 billion worth of post-World War I debts, acquired Atlantic naval bases in British territory during World War II, acquired all financial claims of the Soviet Union in the United States, joined the United Nations pledging itself not to make separate peace in World War II and to accept the Atlantic Charter, submitted over a score of cases to international arbitration,

and modified the tariff in numerous reciprocal trade agreements by means other than the treaty-making process."

The more specific illustrations are:

"1. INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION"

"Membership of the United States of America, by proclamation by the President of the United States, September 10, 1934

"Whereas by a joint resolution of the Congress of the United States of America, approved June 19, 1934, the President was authorized to accept membership for the Government of the United States of America in the International Labor Organization, provided that in accepting such membership the President should assume on behalf of the United States of America no obligation under the covenant of the League of Nations. . . .

"2. ACQUISITION OF ATLANTIC NAVAL BASES"

"Naval and air bases

"United Kingdom

"Arrangement providing for lease to the United States of naval and air bases in Antigua, Bahamas, Bermuda, British Guiana, Jamaica, Newfoundland, St. Lucia, and Trinidad and for transfer to the United Kingdom of 50 United States Navy destroyers.

"Effected by exchange of notes signed at Washington September 2, 1940.

"Duration: Not stated; leases to run for 99 years.

"Text: (54 Stat. 2405; E. A. S. 181; 203 L. N. T. S. 201). Opinion of the Attorney General.

"Advising that the proposed arrangement might be concluded as an executive agreement and that there was Presidential power to transfer title and possession of the overage destroyers (39 Op. Att. Gen. 484).

"3. ATLANTIC CHARTER"

"On August 14, 1941, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, representing the United States and Great Britain, issued a joint declaration of peace aims. . . .

"4. PAN AMERICAN UNION"

"The Pan American Union was set up and continues to exist by virtue of a series of resolutions to which the President's plenipotentiaries, as members of international conferences of the American states, gave his and their consent, but in regard to which Congress appears to have exercised no influence other than its power—common to both treaty- and agreement-made unions—to grant or to withhold appropriations for the payment of the recurrent dues."

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will this new commission be able to make available to the public and to Congress anything they learn about CIA doing the wrong things or not doing enough of the right things? This commission is responsible to the executive department alone, and lacks the legal authority a congressional inquiry enjoys. An Executive order could conceal any report or recommendation the Board might make on the grounds that revealing such information might injure the country. The Congress would still remain in the dark.

It is true that intelligence services of other major countries operate without

"U. S. Congress, 75th Cong., 3d sess., Senate Doc. 134, p. 5531.

"U. S. Congress, 76th Cong., 3d sess., House Doc. 943.

"Langer, William L., comp. and ed., An Encyclopedia of World History, Boston, Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1952, p. 1137.

"McClure, Wallace M., International Executive Agreements, New York, Columbia University Press, 1941, p. 12.

direct control of the legislatures. This is understandable in a totalitarian government, such as the Soviet Union. It is even understandable in a parliamentary democracy, such as Great Britain, where the entire administration is a part of and is responsible to Parliament. Our form of Government, however, is based on a system of checks and balances. If this system gets seriously out of balance at any point, the whole system is jeopardized, and the way is opened for the growth of tyranny.

CIA is the only major Federal agency over which Congress exercises no direct and formal control. Its budget and its personnel lists are classified. By law the agency can withhold even such obviously unimportant information as the salaries of its top officials.

It has been the tradition in both Houses of Congress to have individual, but corresponding, committees to handle legislation in both the House and Senate. We have the Committees on Agriculture, Finance, Judiciary, Foreign Relations, and so on. These committees generally correspond to executive departments or agencies in their jurisdiction.

The Congressional Directory lists CIA as an executive agency, directly responsible to the President; however, the other agencies and commissions under this listing are relatively small in number of employees and many act largely in an advisory capacity. We do not know how large CIA is, but according to plans for its new concentrated headquarters, it is no longer a small agency, if it ever was.

CIA is subject to congressional review by four established and fully authorized subcommittees, and I am sure that they are doing a creditable and fine job. But this is not enough. The Senators on these committees have many other things to consider, as members of the full Armed Services and Appropriations Committees. In addition, there is no staff to rely on. The Appropriation Committee's check on CIA is generally, I assume, when the executive budget request is up for consideration. The Armed Services Committee receives a periodic report, or at the committee's request. In addition, several checks have been made by independent groups, as we know. Even the recent Commission set up by the President functions only parttime, and will make only a periodic check on the CIA. That is not what we need; these checks are fine, but we need a continual check on the operations of this agency which seems to be expanding continually. The most efficient method is by a Joint Committee on Central Intelligence.

There have been a number of reports recently that all is not well with the CIA. The Hoover Commission reported a woeful shortage of information about the Soviet Union, and noted that the agency could stand some internal administrative improvements. These are the sorts of inadequacies which the newly appointed Commission certainly will not allow, but congressional guardians might be able to compel even swifter and surer reform than could an executive committee.

Everything about CIA is clothed in secrecy. CIA is freed from practically

*Cheever, Daniel, and H. Field Haviland, American Foreign Policy and the Separation of Powers, P. 92.

*McDougal, Myron S. and Asher Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy, Yale Law Journal, Vol. 54, no. 2, March 1945, P. 236.

every ordinary form of congressional review. Control of its expenditures is exempted from the provisions of law which prevent financial abuses in other Government agencies.

I agree that an intelligence agency must maintain secrecy to be effective. And I certainly do not mean to suggest that CIA should reprint for public consumption every item that comes across the Director's desk. If sources of information were inadvertently revealed, they would quickly dry up. Not only would the flow of information be cut off, but the lives of many would be seriously endangered. In addition, much of the value of the intelligence product would be lost if it were known that we possessed it. For these reasons, secrecy is obviously necessary.

However, there is a profound difference between an essential degree of secrecy to achieve a specific purpose and secrecy for the mere sake of secrecy. Once secrecy becomes sacrosanct, it invites abuse. If we accept the idea of secrecy for secrecy's sake we will have no way of knowing whether we have a very fine intelligence service or a very poor one.

If a new joint committee is set up as proposed in Senate Concurrent Resolution 2, all bills, resolutions, and other matters in the Senate or in the House of Representatives relating primarily to the CIA, would be referred to the joint committee; and the joint committee would, from time to time, make whatever reports are necessary to the Congress concerning its relationship with the CIA.

The enactment of the concurrent resolution would establish a joint committee, composed of 6 Members of the Senate to be appointed by the President of the Senate, and 6 Members of the House of Representatives to be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives. Of the 6 Members to be appointed from the Senate, 3 shall be members of the Central Intelligence Agency Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and 3 shall be members of the Central Intelligence Agency Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate. The six House Members would be appointed from the corresponding subcommittees in the House. In each instance, not more than four members shall be of the same political party.

The joint committee or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof would be authorized to hold such hearings, to sit and to act at such places and times, to require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, to administer such oaths, to take such testimony, to procure such printing and binding, and to make such expenditures as it deemed advisable. The committee would be, in addition, empowered to appoint a small, selective staff of persons having the highest possible clearance, and would be authorized to utilize the services, information, facilities, and personnel of the departments and establishments of the Government.

The staff which I had envisioned for such a joint committee would be small and would be subject to the most rigor-

ous security regulations. Such a staff of trained, specialized, and dedicated persons would assist the committee members in making checks and appraisals on CIA and its operation. There certainly should be no more risk in trusting classified information to a trusted few connected with a congressional committee than there would be to a trusted many in a Government agency.

It has been pointed out that there is too little legislation to require a committee of this nature. Admittedly, proposed legislation which would be referred to the suggested joint committee might have helped to resolve problems and to make suggestions in the controversy over the site of the proposed CIA building. As to other legislation, it is difficult to know what might have happened. We must remember that a joint committee would also be a defender of CIA against unwarranted and unjustified attacks from within and outside the Federal Government.

Mr. President, in my opinion, the CIA is in somewhat the same category as the Atomic Energy Commission; and just as a special committee, with well-defined authority and powers, has been created on a joint congressional basis to oversee and supervise the interests of AEC, so I believe that a joint congressional committee should be created for the same purpose in connection with the CIA. I realize full well, because of the very nature of the duties of the CIA, that there has been no public scrutiny of its activities. This may be necessary in this day and age, but I believe that a joint congressional committee should be created for the purpose of making certain that good management is maintained in the CIA and also to keep a constant check on its intelligence policies. It is well, too, that this joint committee should be in a position to criticize any mistakes which the CIA may make.

Until a committee of the kind this resolution proposes is established, there will be no way of knowing what serious flaws in the Central Intelligence Agency may be covered by the curtain of secrecy in which it is shrouded.

The creation of the new executive board to review intelligence fulfills partially the suggestion of the recent Hoover Commission report on intelligence. However, it is only a partial fulfillment of the Hoover Commission recommendations. The Hoover Commission, on two occasions, suggested a bipartisan committee, including Members of both Houses of Congress, empowered by law to ask and get whatever information it thought necessary to aid, guide, or restrain CIA.

Recommendation No. 2 of the recent intelligence activities report of the Hoover Commission reads as follows:

That a small, permanent, bipartisan commission, composed of Members of both Houses of the Congress and other public-spirited citizens commanding the utmost national respect and confidence, to be established by act of Congress to make periodic surveys of the organizations, functions, policies, and results of the Government agencies handling foreign intelligence operations, and to report, under adequate security safeguards, its findings and recommenda-

tions to the Congress, and to the President, annually and at such other times as may be necessary or advisable. The proposed watchdog commission should be empowered by law to demand and receive any information it needed for its own use. It would be patterned after the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (Hoover Commission). Appointments by the President of persons from private life to the proposed commission should be made from a select list of distinguished individuals of unquestioned loyalty, integrity, and ability, with records of unselfish service to the Nation.

Mr. President, I wish to state again that the appointment of the citizens board should not preclude the establishment of a continuing and permanent congressional watchdog committee. Such a committee would act as a financial overseer, supervisor, guardian, sponsor, and defender of the CIA. It could give a constant and more thorough supervision to our intelligence activities than could any periodic check.

At the time of my appearance before the Rules Committee in behalf of this concurrent resolution I was informed by the distinguished senior Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. BRIDGES) that he voted against the creation of the civilian advisory group, and it is his belief that the distinguished senior Senator from Arkansas (Mr. McCLELLAN) joined him in this decision. Both of them, however, as members of the Hoover Commission, would recommend, according to the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. BRIDGES), the establishment of a Joint Congressional Committee for the CIA.

Two committees, the Joint Congressional Atomic Energy Committee and the Joint Congressional Central Intelligence Committee, would be mutually supporting. They should insure as far as humanly possible, a proper support for and control of our powerful intelligence organizations. This a citizens' committee cannot do alone.

Before concluding my statement in behalf of Senate Concurrent Resolution 2, I wish to comment briefly on the determined opposition to this measure being voiced by various members of the executive department. The determined effort to defeat this concurrent resolution is another instance of executive interference with a purely congressional function. In fact the President is quoted in the press to have said, "It is too sensitive for Congress to take it up."

I am sure that I need not remind my colleagues here in the Senate that a concurrent resolution is not subject to Presidential approval or disapproval. It is the prerogative of the Congress to set up such a joint committee if it so desires.

Executive control has been on the increase in recent years, and I do not feel that this is good for a Federal government whose secure foundation is based upon a system of checks and balances between the executive, legislative, and judiciary.

As an illustration—and I have mentioned this before—I wish to remind my colleagues that last year the Congress appropriated an additional \$40 million in funds to maintain the Marine Corps budget at a more satisfactory strength, but these funds were not used as di-

rected by Congress. In the American system each important segment of our governmental operation is subject to check by another segment. Such an important agency as CIA should not be left unchecked.

As has been so ably stated by New York Times columnist, Hanson Baldwin:

If war is too important to be left to the generals, it should be clear that intelligence is too important to be left unsupervised.

I firmly believe that it is now more imperative than ever that a joint congressional committee be created at the earliest opportunity. The representatives of the people are the ones who should be given, through a joint committee of Congress, the right to act for the Congress vis-a-vis the CIA, just as the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy does at the present time and has done for some years vis-a-vis the Atomic Energy Commission.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. MORSE. The most convincing argument, in my opinion, for the adoption of the concurrent resolution is President Eisenhower's objection to it. When the President of the United States says that the matter of the CIA is too sensitive for Congress to take up, he shows the American people what many of us have long known, namely, his lack of understanding and appreciation of the legislative process of the Government, and the check and balance system of the Constitution.

I say to the President of the United States from the floor today that no topic of Government belonging to all the people of the country is too sensitive for the elected representatives of a free people to handle. It is about time the American people made that clear to the President. What the President needs is a refresher course on the constitutional system of our country.

For the President to say that Congress, acting under the legislative process of a concurrence resolution, seeks to deal with a subject matter which is too delicate for Congress to handle, shows that the President lacks a sensitivity and an understanding of our constitutional system itself. His very criticism of the Senator's concurrent resolution is, in my opinion, a sound reason for the adoption of the concurrent resolution at the earliest possible hour.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I may say to the Senator from Oregon that the Senate, likewise, should wake up to its responsibilities and should recognize the fact that what we are considering today is a resolution which will not, under any conditions, be sent to the White House. This is a matter for Congress itself to decide. I think Congress can take care of its own housekeeping, and is fully capable of rendering its own decisions and making its own judgments.

Mr. MORSE. I completely agree with that comment. One of the reasons why I am one of the cosponsors of the concurrent resolution is that it is long overdue that the Congress of the United States should assume its clear responsibility in this matter. We should pro-

ceed, without any hesitation, to give the people of the country a service they are entitled to have from us, by adopting the concurrent resolution, thus bringing the CIA under the surveillance of the Congress, and putting an end to this type of government by secrecy on the part of the President of the United States.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I thank the Senator.

Mr. LANGER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. LANGER. I wish to agree fully with the viewpoints of the distinguished Senator from Montana.

EXHIBIT I

[From the Wall Street Journal of January 27, 1956]

THE LONE JUDGE

Mr. Allen Dulles, head of the cloak-and-dagger Central Intelligence Agency, opposes a bill now before the Senate which would create a congressional watchdog committee for CIA.

The bill would empower a 12-man committee drawn from the House and Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees to ask CIA how it's doing in intelligence matters and where the money's going that it spends. These are questions Congress cannot now ask.

Mr. Dulles doesn't like the idea; he says that if the bill becomes law there might be leaks of Agency secrets from the committee which might endanger the plans and programs of CIA. We can recall no important leaks from the Joint Congressional Atomic Energy Committee which watchdogs the AEC.

Apparently a number of Senators don't agree with Mr. Dulles' ideas on the subject. Thirty-five of them sponsored the watchdog bill under which Mr. Dulles will have to leak some information to the Congress which created the secret agency. Mr. Dulles may make no mistakes in assessing intelligence; but he should not be the lone judge in matters that have to do with the intentions of other nations for war or peace.

[From the Butte Standard of January 29, 1956]

OUR INTELLIGENCE HAS BEEN FOUND WANTING

A Hoover Commission task force looked into the operations of the highly secretive Central Intelligence Agency last spring and came up with this conclusion: "The task force is deeply concerned over the lack of adequate intelligence data from behind the Iron Curtain."

The task force also found: "Effective intelligence has become increasingly necessary for our protection against propaganda, infiltration and aggressions of the Communist leaders. By trial and error, study and skill, we have made progress; but we must not labor under any complacent delusions."

Reflecting upon this incident, as well as upon the fact that not all of the Hoover commission's recommendations have been carried out, might cause one to wonder if lack of intelligence about what is happening behind the Iron Curtain is not the direct cause of a lot of disorder in Washington.

The number of contradicting statements relative to the armed strength of the Soviet Union would indicate that we don't know very much about what the Soviet has. This fact could easily be the cause of much of the disunity in our own defense department.

If a commander is in the dark about what kind of opposition he is likely to run into, he is in a similar manner in the dark as to how to prepare for the contingency of conflict.

So it seems that our intelligence may be at fault, although the Hoover Commission task force found at least 12 major depart-

ments and agencies dealing in intelligence in one form or another.

The lack of knowledge would similarly have a blighting effect on the conduct of our foreign policy. It might even cause a war, whereas if our intelligence had been more complete war could have been avoided.

One of the recommendations made by the task force was that the President appoint a committee of experienced citizens to examine and report to him periodically on the work of the Government foreign intelligence activities. It was directed that the President might make public such findings as he saw fit.

Such a committee has just been appointed by President Eisenhower. It includes such personages as Robert A. Lovett, former Secretary of Defense.

The other part of the recommendations made public had to do with Congress. It was recommended that the Congress consider creating a joint congressional committee on foreign intelligence, similar to that on atomic energy.

It would be the duty of the two committees to collaborate on matters of special importance to the national security.

Congress as yet has not acted.

There was still a third part of the Hoover Commission report which dealt with the highest security classification. It was sent directly to the President.

Needless to say, the American people would rest easier if they knew more about and had greater confidence in our intelligence organizations.

On the reverse side, it has been demonstrated time and again the Communists have a world-wide intelligence system which works at a very high degree of efficiency.

[From the Washington Evening Star of February 20, 1956]

CIA LEADERS ARE COOL TO WATCHDOG PROPOSAL

(By Richard Fryklund)

The Central Intelligence Agency enthusiastically obeys the law which imposes strictest secrecy on its activities, but the Agency still is subject to the scrutiny of several outside executive and congressional groups.

Soon—possibly Wednesday—a group with the sole function of watchdogging the CIA is expected to get Senate Rules Committee approval.

Backers of the watchdog committee say that while it is true that four congressional subcommittees, the Budget Bureau and a new presidential commission all do look at some facets of the CIA, no congressional group keeps a close, constant check on it the way the Joint Atomic Energy Committee watches the also-secret Atomic Energy Commission.

COOL TO SCRUTINY

The CIA is reported to be cool toward the watchdog idea. But perhaps the most distasteful part of the expected Rules Committee approval of the bill will be the public attention sure to follow.

The job of the CIA is to gather intelligence and coordinate the intelligence activities of more than a score of other agencies.

The genesis of the CIA goes back to the day Japanese bombs shattered the morning calm at Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941. American intelligence agencies knew that raid was coming, but the information was never properly used.

To protect against future Pearl Harbors, a National Intelligence Authority was set up immediately after the war body created a Central Intelligence Group that grew into the Central Intelligence Agency. The job of the Agency is to gather foreign intelligence, which includes spying in the traditional sense as well as research into more conventional sources; coordinate intelligence activities of other agencies, and assemble the

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material in usable form and deliver it to the policymakers in time.

WEEKLY MEETINGS

Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles meets once a week with the heads of Army, Navy, and Air Force intelligence, the National Security Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the intelligence sections of the executive departments, to draw up summaries of latest estimates of a potential enemy's capabilities and to predict the potential enemy's probable course of action.

These estimates—and often vigorous dissenting opinions—are taken the next day to the National Security Council by Mr. Dulles. Sitting on the council are President Eisenhower, Vice President Nixon, Secretary of State Dulles, Secretary of Defense Wilson, and Office of Defense Mobilization Director Arthur S. Flemming.

How the CIA arrives at the intelligence estimate and the nature of the estimates themselves are things the potential enemy would very much like to know. To guard that information, the CIA was given unprecedented powers of secrecy by Congress.

CAN SET OWN PAY SCALES

The 1947 act setting up the agency specifies that the director need not make his spending public or explain the agency's organization or the identity of its personnel, its methods of operation or its sources. Mr. Dulles can hire or fire whom he pleases and set his own salary scales. He can bring as many as 100 unidentified aliens into this country every year, and he can hand out bribes to foreign code clerks or finance beautiful blondes in Vienna apartments.

There are some checks on the CIA, however. The agency is directly under the President and the National Security Council and must justify its activities there. And the CIA budget must be defended in detail before a small group of Budget Bureau officials.

An eight-man board of consultants was named by President Eisenhower last month to review semiannually the work of the CIA. Its chairman is Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., president of Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

The group has set up shop with a small staff in the executive offices building. It will report directly to the President, and only a few innocuous parts of each report will be made public.

The CIA also is checked by four subcommittees of Congress, made up of 17 Congressmen, the senior members of the House and Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees.

The CIA tells the appropriations subcommittees as much as they want to know about the agency's budget. Figures are not made public. They are concealed in the published Federal budget, in fact, by being scattered through appropriations for other agencies.

GET COMPLETE ANSWERS

The Armed Services Subcommittees receive intelligence reports and complete answers, according to Senator Russell, to all questions asked about CIA activities.

The annual spending of the CIA is known only to the Appropriations Subcommittees. Many guesses have been made—ranging from a few hundred million dollars a year up to more than a billion. But the Hoover Commission said other intelligence agencies outspend the CIA, so it is perhaps a fair guess to say the CIA budget is around \$100 million and that the agency employs about 15,000 full-time persons.

HEADQUARTERS NO SECRET

Headquarters of the agency is a group of aged brick buildings at 2430 E Street NW. Its location is no secret. Any cab driver can take you there if you just ask for the Central Intelligence Agency.

Once you are there, however, you cannot enter any building unless you're on business. Security restrictions inside, of course, are maximum. No visitor wanders through the halls alone. Guards are everywhere.

Much of the work—perhaps 90 percent—is routine research in unclassified documents—foreign publications, phone books, technical journals, newspapers, and the like. It is not the material, but the way it is put together and the conclusions that can be drawn that are important.

A minor number of employees are engaged in cloak-and-dagger activities abroad.

NO DOMESTIC FUNCTIONS

The CIA has no domestic function, according to the law, but every once in a while a CIA man turns up with a bit of domestic intelligence—such as the time an agent reported erroneously that Far East specialist Owen Lattimore was about to leave the country.

Job applications are mistrusted—they might be from Communists trying to gain entry—and the Agency likes to seek out its own prospective employees. Higher echelon workers are recruited through personal contact.

Of all persons who formally apply for jobs with the CIA, more than 82 percent are rejected by personnel or security officials. Every employee must undergo a full FBI security check.

As director of Central Intelligence, Mr. Dulles' brother of the Secretary of State, is head of the CIA and coordinator of all Government intelligence activities. Mr. Dulles, 62 years old, has had a long career in diplomacy, international law and spying. His exploits as an OSS agent in Switzerland during World War II have become spy-thriller classics.

He is as friendly and shaggy as a St. Bernard, dresses in rumpled tweeds and baggy sweaters, and gestures with a pipe. His appearance creates two impressions valuable to him: He is a man you can trust; he has nothing to hide.

Mr. Dulles' deputy is Lt. Gen. Charles P. Cabell, formerly director of the Joint Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and intelligence director of the Air Force. He is 50 years old.

Head of the CIA's technical intelligence is a former Harvard law professor, Robert Amory, Jr. He is 39.

[From the Washington Evening Star of February 21, 1956]

PRODUCT OF CIA EXPENSES QUEERED ON CAPITOL HILL

(By Richard Fryklund)

Several Congressmen who are not on 1 of the 4 unpublicized subcommittees which have contact with the Central Intelligence Agency want to know if the country is getting its money's worth out of the supersecret organization.

"The average Member of Congress knows no more about the CIA than what he reads in the papers," said Representative McCarthy, Democrat of Minnesota. "We don't know how much the group spends or what it produces, and that disturbs many of us."

"I doubt if even Chairman Vinson, of the Armed Services Subcommittee on the CIA, knows enough about the Agency—and, of course, what he does know he quite properly keeps to himself."

Neither Representative McCarthy nor other backers of bills to set up a House-Senate committee to "watchdog" the CIA want the Agency's affairs made public. Nor do they believe the CIA is grossly maladministered.

CHECK IS SOUGHT

But they do believe that the interests of good government require that a standing committee keep a continual check on the CIA.

"Such a committee would not pass on much information either," Mr. McCarthy said, "but it could assure other Congressmen and the public that the CIA is operating efficiently."

Whether the CIA is a topflight intelligence organization spending its money judiciously, no one is in a position to say publicly. Most criticism is necessarily uninformed, and the CIA never answers back openly.

Allen Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence, will sometimes call a critic in for a private chat or will drop a note of protest to the editor of a paper which he thinks has attacked the CIA injudiciously.

The most authoritative criticism has come from the Hoover Commission task force, headed by Gen. Mark Clark. The group was given full access to CIA secrets. In a public report filed last June (there was another classified report given to the President) the Commission gave the CIA this endorsement:

"On the basis of its comprehensive studies the task force feels that the American people can and should give their full confidence and support to the intelligence program."

DULLES' BURDEN CITED

But there were also these specific criticisms:

Director Dulles has taken on too many burdensome duties and responsibilities himself.

There is not enough concentration on collection of intelligence information from behind the Iron Curtain.

The glamour and excitement of some aspects of the work sometimes overshadows other vital functions.

There is not enough machinery available for outside surveillance of the CIA.

On the first criticism, the Hoover Commission was whistling into the wind. Mr. Dulles, considered one of the world's master intelligence experts by the cognoscenti, loves his work and is not about to turn the fun over to subordinates. If anything, he has assumed more responsibilities since the Clark report.

Mr. Dulles does not tense up under responsibility. His friends believe he can safely assume more work than could another administrator.

KEYS TOUGH TO PENETRATE

The quality of intelligence from the Soviet Union, Red China, and the satellites does not satisfy Mr. Dulles. The Communist countries are tougher to penetrate than Germany was during World War II, and spying there is an exceedingly difficult job.

The problem of glamour versus grubbing always will be with the CIA. Employees have no reward except their Government salaries and inward satisfaction. The occasionally exciting assignment is what keeps many employees on the job.

A Hoover Commission recommendations for a Presidential panel to examine the CIA periodically was approved by Mr. Dulles, and the panel is now operating. Another recommendation for a congressional watchdog committee has been ignored officially by the CIA.

Senator Mansfield, author of a watchdog bill scheduled to be approved by the Senate Rules Committee tomorrow, believes that Mr. Dulles opposes his bill on two grounds: The present intermittent contacts with congressional committees are very satisfactory, and the more persons who know about CIA activities, the more difficult it will be to maintain secrecy.

SUCCESS AND FAILURE

The proof of the CIA pudding lies, of course, in the eating. What are the successes and failures of the group?

Again one runs into uninformed opinion and "no comment." Critics say the CIA snuffed the Red Chinese invasion of North

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Korea, the release by South Korean President Rhee of the Red prisoners of war during the truce negotiations and the recent Soviet economic penetration of South Asia. They say the CIA has lost friends for America in Burma by maintaining a group of Nationalist Chinese guerrillas there, and the CIA agents have messed unsuccessfully in palace revolutions in several countries.

These are the answers:

No one knows when the CIA muffs because the Agency's responsibility ends when it has gathered and evaluated the intelligence. If this country was caught off base in North Korea, it may be because men responsible for policy and action did not properly use the intelligence available.

There are some well-known successes. The CIA is credited with the overthrow of the Red-oriented government of Guatemala and the Iranian regime of Premier Mossadegh. In both instances, apparently, CIA agents helped organize and supply the opposing, more democratic, forces.

STILL HAS BUGS IN IT

The CIA is a new agency, organized in 1947, so it certainly has bugs to be worked out.

Its biggest administrative problem is personnel. Mr. Dulles pays civil-service wage scales, yet he needs employees of high intellectual quality. A young man who can get money, public prestige, and the admiration of his wife by doing a good job in law or business has little inclination to bury his talents in the CIA—where he can't even boast to his wife.

Relatively low pay and complete anonymity has lost many good men for Mr. Dulles. The Director is sufficiently worried about it that he personally examines the problems of all persons above clerical level who submit resignations.

He does not expect to solve the personnel problem. He hopes to ease it by making working conditions more attractive. That is why he wants a new campus headquarters for the CIA in a pleasant residential area near Langley, Va.

Security within CIA walls is a constant problem. The Hoover Commission said, however, that the CIA handles it well—that there apparently has been no effective Communist penetration of the agency. Lower-level employees have been ousted, however, for alleged subversive associations.

There comes a final area of criticism: The trivial secrecy rules that are always good for laughs at Washington cocktail parties.

CAN'T REVEAL JOB

Except for a half dozen topmost employees, CIA workers are not permitted to say publicly where they work. So frequently when a group of Government people get together to talk shop there will be one man in the crowd who will say, "I can't tell you where I work." The group laughs and says, "CIA."

When one telephones the CIA—the number is in the book—an operator answers with the phone number, under the impression, it seems that she can keep secret the outfit one is calling.

And the CIA used to get along without an identifying sign on the gate—despite the fact most any cab driver can take a passenger there without directions.

The CIA knows everyone is laughing, but maintains there are good reasons for the cloak and dagger stuff. What the reasons are specifically, it won't say, but apparently the agency believes a few extra precautions are worth the general merriment.

[From the New York Times of February 22, 1956]

GOP SENATORS BACK CIA CHECK—POLICY GROUP BRUSHES ASIDE EISENHOWER'S OPPOSITION TO CONGRESSIONAL GROUP

WASHINGTON, February 21.—Senate Republicans brushed aside today President Eisenhower's objections to a special Con-

gressional committee to check on the Central Intelligence Agency.

They indicated that they would give active, and possibly unanimous, support to the basic principle of a bill by Senator MINK MANFIELD, Democrat of Montana, calling for a CIA committee similar to the Joint Congressional Committee on atomic energy, which keeps watch on the Atomic Energy Commission.

The intelligence agency gathers worldwide information on action and intentions of other nations.

The Republican Senators obviously were miffed by what they regarded as the President's implied lack of trust in Congress' discretion in handling super-secret intelligence matters.

President Eisenhower created a special eight-man citizen's commission on the CIA in January, but it contained no Members of Congress. It also was directed to report directly to the President with no provision for congressional review.

Senator STYLIS BRIDGES of New Hampshire, chairman of the Senate Republican Policy Committee, told reporters after the regular weekly luncheon of all Republican members that the group had been advised the President was "very much opposed" to the MANFIELD bill.

"He [the President] said it was too sensitive for Congress to take it up," Senator BRIDGES declared.

BRIDGES NOT IMPRESSED

Senator WILLIAM F. KNOWLAND of California, the Senate Republican leader, told the policy group of the President's views. Senator BRIDGES said that the news did not impress him, nor did it have any noticeable effect on other Republican members.

Senator BRIDGES declared that most of his colleagues seemed to believe the President, in his creation of the citizens' advisory board, had indirectly suggested that intelligence bearing on this country's security was "too delicate" for Congress to handle.

He said that this implication that outsiders were more to be trusted than Members of Congress had "annoyed" the Senators and brought them "much nearer" the Mansfield bill. The measure already has 34 cosponsors on both sides of the aisle.

As matters now stand, the CIA is the only major Federal agency over which Congress exercises no direct and formal control. Its budget and its personnel lists are classified, and the only supervision Congress exercises is through subcommittees of the Senate and House Appropriations and Armed Services Committees. Even these receive only sketchy reports on the agency's activities.

ALLEN DULLES OPPOSES MOVE

The Director of the Agency, Allen W. Dulles, a brother of John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State, has argued against creation of a congressional committee on the ground that members might leak vital secrets to the press.

Senator MANFIELD and other Members of Congress have retorted that members of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee have not leaked information about the activities of that highly sensitive agency.

The Mansfield bill would create a 12-man joint committee, to be composed of 3 members each from the House and Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Subcommittees. It would be empowered to maintain a constant check on the budget, personnel, and general activities of the Intelligence Agency.

The Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government recently urged creation of a permanent bipartisan commission on intelligence that would include Members of both Houses of Congress and other public-spirited citizens "empowered by law to demand and receive any information it needed for its own use."

[From the Washington Daily News of February 25, 1956]

THIS ONE IS ESSENTIAL

In its report on our intelligence agencies, and more particularly the Central Intelligence Agency which is overall top dog, the Hoover Commission said in effect we are pretty fair. But—

It was deeply concerned about the lack of adequate information from behind the Iron Curtain.

And it went on to report other findings which led to the conclusion that our intelligence is not as good as it ought to be, it ought to be superlative.

"Intelligence," said the Hoover task force, "deals with all things which should be known in advance of initiating a course of action."

Whatever we do, militarily, politically, diplomatically, economically, in world affairs, is hit or miss unless it is based on facts.

Our ability to exist and survive in this kind of world depends on assembling the facts, faithfully, and promptly. And then on correct evaluation of the facts. There is evidence that we have missed on both points, too often.

That could be fatal.

The Central Intelligence Agency is a big, top secret, costly operation. Nobody in it will tell you the time of day. We don't want 'em to. But—

"The people who support these operations are entitled to assurance that the investment is paying dividends."

So said the Hoover Commission. So, in effect, said President Eisenhower, who then appointed an independent, civilian committee to keep watch on the CIA. An able committee, too.

Now the Senate Rules Committee has cleared a resolution creating a Senate-House committee to do the same thing. This the Hoover Commission also recommended. It makes good sense.

Congress ought to know whether the CIA is doing its job. It ought not to just think it is doing O. K. It ought to know, positively.

This joint committee is the way to know. Senate and House should pass this resolution as an urgent safeguard of our national interest.

[From the Washington Daily News of February 25, 1956]

CHECK IS URGED ON CIA

(By Marshall McNeil)

The chief United States spy and counter-spy bureau—the little known and highly secret Central Intelligence Agency—has been accused by a Senate committee of unquestionably placing itself above other Government departments.

The Senate Rules Committee with this accusation has recommended creation of a permanent congressional committee to keep an eye on CIA. There was one dissenter.

Its recommendation comes after 35 Senators and 25 Members of the House have sponsored bills to provide continuing congressional surveillance of this agency whose every aspect is now, the committee said, bedeviled with secrecy.

The pattern for the special "kibitzing" congressional committee was set in the first law turning our atomic-energy enterprise over to civilian control. The atomic "watch-dog" committee is generally regarded as having done a first-class job in keeping an eye on our atomic advances.

In World War I, the Rules Committee said, the United States "had no intelligence service equal to the name." Between the two World Wars, reliance in this field was placed upon the military services and the State Department.

As World War II started, the Office of Coordinator of Information was set up to col-

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lect and analyze information bearing upon national defense. This was transformed into the Office of Strategic Services. In 1947, Congress established the National Security Council and under it the present CIA.

Although it has immense powers, worldwide operations, and many millions to spend, CIA is listed with four lines of type in the Congressional Directory. These give its name, main address and telephone number, and the names of its two bosses: The Director, Allen W. Dulles, brother of the Secretary of State, and the Deputy Director, Lt. Gen. C. P. Cabell, an Air Force officer.

The Rules Committee found these studies insufficient. "It is not enough," its report says, "that CIA be responsible alone to the White House or the National Security Council. Such responsibility should be shared with Congress in a more complete manner."

"It is agreed that an intelligence agency must maintain secrecy to be effective," the Rules Committee said. "There is, however, a profound difference between an essential degree of secrecy to achieve a specific purpose and secrecy for the mere sake of secrecy. Secrecy now beclouds everything about CIA, its cost, its personnel, its efficiency, its failures, its successes."

"The CIA has unquestionably placed itself above other Government agencies. . . . It is difficult to legislate intelligently if there is a dearth of information upon which Congress must rely . . . to protect the public welfare . . ."

[From the San Francisco Examiner of February 28, 1956]

ANOTHER LOOK

President Eisenhower is reported to be very much opposed to a bill sponsored by Senator MANFIELD of Montana, and already approved by the Senate Rules Committee, which would set up a joint Senate-House "watchdog" committee to check on the operations of the Central Intelligence Agency.

If this is true, we think the President should take another look at the matter.

He is right that the CIA is a sensitive operation, being mainly concerned with what goes on secretly behind the diplomatic and military scenes at international levels.

But immunity from scrutiny is a dangerous thing to grant under any system of government, and it is particularly repugnant in a democracy where the people are the masters rather than the servants of Government.

It seems to borrow a page out of the book of rules of the authoritarian state, to suggest that neither the people nor their representatives in Congress are entitled to hold any agency of Government accountable for its acts and expenditures.

Every bureaucrat covets that immunity, and most bureaucrats think they could do better jobs under it, and perhaps there are even some who could be safely entrusted with it.

But the bureaucratic aspiration to be free of all responsibility to the people is always the forerunner of tyranny, because it not only gives freedom of action to the sincere and the worthy but it also provides a cover for the mistakes and crimes of the inefficient and the corrupt.

There are many so-called sensitive agencies in Government, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, but it is doubtful if blank check authority would increase their usefulness to the Nation.

[From the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of March 12, 1956]

CONTROL OVER CIA NOT IMPRACTICAL

(Extension of remarks of Hon. CLEMENT J. ZARLOCKI, of Wisconsin, in the House of Representatives, Thursday, March 8, 1956)

Mr. ZARLOCKI. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks in the Record, I wish to recommend to the attention of the membership of this body an editorial which appeared

in the Milwaukee Journal on March 6, 1956, entitled "Some Congressional Control Over CIA Is Not Impractical."

During the last 3 years I have exerted repeated efforts on behalf of the proposal to establish a Joint Committee on Intelligence Matters. I have first outlined my proposal on this subject in House Concurrent Resolution 169, 83d Congress, and reintroduced it, in an amended version, in House Concurrent Resolution 28, 84th Congress, together with over a score of my distinguished colleagues.

It is my sincere hope that the House Rules Committee will report House Concurrent Resolution 28 in the near future.

"SOME CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OVER CIA IS NOT IMPRACTICAL"

"For several years there has been a rash of resolutions in Congress calling for an agency to watch over the Central Intelligence Agency, our top cloak and dagger corps.

"The second Hoover Commission called for the same thing. It suggested that a small, permanent Commission composed of a bipartisan representation from Congress and distinguished private citizens handle the job.

"President Eisenhower has gone halfway. He recently named a civilian Commission in the executive branch to serve as watchdog and report to him. But he has shied away from letting Congress in on the act. This hasn't stilled demands that Congress take a hand in watching an agency for which it appropriates money. Senator MANFIELD, Democrat, Montana, has come up with a bill to create a joint committee of both Houses of Congress to work with the CIA. The Senate Rules Committee has agreed to congressional action on the bill and it has attracted a large measure of support.

"The Hoover Commission pointed out that the CIA, because it needs a large degree of secrecy to operate, is exempted by law from rules that control other Government agencies. For instance, the General Services Administration, the Government's housekeeper, has no control over CIA at all. CIA is exempted from compliance with any provision of law limiting transfers of appropriations; any requirements for publication or disclosure of the organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed by the agency; and any regulations relating to the expenditure of Government funds.

"Such exemptions are, by and large, proper. The Atomic Energy Commission has similar exemptions. But Congress does have to appropriate funds for the CIA. It created the Agency and set its scope of activities. Surely someone in Congress should be given at least peek enough to make sure that CIA is operating efficiently and properly. This is particularly true because of criticisms—some from the Hoover Commission itself—of some shortcomings in CIA.

"The AEC, which hoards secrets, too, has a joint congressional committee which is given enough of a picture to judge whether the organization is handling Government funds properly. The joint committee has worked exceedingly well, and without weakening national security. The same sort of committee could do the same sort of job for CIA. It wouldn't have to be told everything—and shouldn't.

"But Congress ought to be able to determine whether the dagger is being kept sharp and the cloak is kept cleaned and pressed and buttoned. It's basic that Congress, with control of the purse, must get enough information to make an informed judgment on how the purse is expended.

"That's all MANFIELD and others want—and it's little enough to ask."

[From the Wall Street Journal of January 13, 1956]

A CHECK ON THE WATCH

Recently President Eisenhower announced the appointment of a committee of eight

citizens to serve as watchdog over the Central Intelligence Agency. Their duties will be to review periodically the workings of the supersecret CIA and report their suggestions and give their advice to the Chief Executive. So far so good.

But there is a serious question whether the authority of the committee goes far enough. The CIA is clothed in such secrecy that even the Congress cannot ask about its inner activities. By law it can withhold even such obviously unimportant information as the salaries of its top officials. Its adventures are known only to a few people. The gentlemen serving on Mr. Eisenhower's committee will have neither power nor control over CIA. And there is a question how much they will be permitted to learn under the Agency's broad charter.

There is the further question whether this committee will be able to make public anything they may learn about CIA doing the wrong things or not doing enough of the right things. The reports are to go to the executive department and no executive department under whatever administration likes to see errors or shortcomings publicly revealed. In the case of CIA, an Executive order could clothe in secrecy whatever the watchdog committee thought should be revealed even from the Congress on the ground that revelation might injure the country.

It has been said that the appointment of the committee follows the suggestion of the Hoover Commission. The fact is that it does not. The Hoover Commission suggested a bipartisan committee including Members of both Houses of Congress empowered by law to ask and get whatever information it thought necessary to aid, guide, or restrain CIA.

Though nearly everything CIA does is secret, there is no secret about one thing. CIA is run by men, and though the men who run it may be more intelligent than other men they still may make mistakes as do all other men. Slight errors in intelligence assessment may not, individually, amount to a very great deal; collectively, they could have the most serious consequences. To set a national policy on a wrong course because of compounded errors could be more dangerous than no intelligence agency at all.

We hope no one will read into these remarks a suggestion that CIA run off carbon copies for all who ask about its activities; that would be as silly as it would be unwise to leave CIA answerable only to itself.

Neither do we suggest that CIA is not doing its job properly; we could not so suggest, for even the Congress does not know whether it is or not. And that is precisely our point.

Surely the Congress, with its power to declare war, has a responsibility to watch carefully over an agency it created to stand watch in that shadowland between peace and war.

[From the New York Times of January 15, 1956]

WATCHDOG OF THE CIA—AN EVALUATION OF THE PRESIDENT'S ACTION IN NAMING BOARD TO REVIEW INTELLIGENCE

(By Hanson W. Baldwin)

The President's appointment last week of an eight-man board to review periodically the Nation's intelligence activities is a step in the right direction. But unfortunately it does not go far enough.

The establishment of the citizen's commission was approved by Allen W. Dulles, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. The action will be interpreted on one hand as an attempt to head off the establishment of a congressional watchdog committee on the Intelligence Agency. On the other hand it lends tacit support to frequent and repeated criticisms of our intelligence services, particularly of the CIA.

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The recent Hoover Commission report on intelligence activities recommended the establishment of a permanent bipartisan commission on intelligence. But it suggested a different form from that announced last week.

The Hoover Commission urged the inclusion of "Members of both Houses of the Congress and other public-spirited citizens . . . empowered by law to demand and receive any information it needed for its own use."

The President's board has no congressional members. Although it has executive authority for support it does not have the legal authority that congressional enactment could give. In other words, it is not powerful enough or broad enough. Nor will it have sufficient continuity.

CIA UNDER CRITICISM

Nevertheless the reputation, experience, and character of the eight appointees, who include Robert A. Lovett, former Secretary of Defense, give promise that the board will, in fact, as the President suggested, "make a real contribution to the task of Government." It is well fitted to take a fresh outside look at intelligence, even though it has no authority and will be able merely to suggest and advise rather than to control and supervise.

But there have been so many intelligence failures, so much friction, and such sharp criticism, particularly of the CIA, that the appointment of the citizens board should not preclude the establishment of a continuing and permanent congressional watchdog committee.

Such a committee could act, in the same manner as the Joint Congressional Atomic Energy Committee, as purse watcher, supervisor, guardian, sponsor, and defender of the CIA. It could give a constant and more thorough supervision to our intelligence activities than could any periodic check.

The two committees, working together, would be mutually supporting. They should insure as far as human checks and balances can do, a proper support for, and control of, our powerful intelligence organizations. This the citizen committee alone cannot do.

The need for such support and control should be obvious. As the President said, "prompt and accurate intelligence is essential to the policymaking branches of Government." But it is more than that. It could mean national life or death in the atomic age.

On the other hand, uncontrolled secret intelligence agencies are in a position to dominate policymaking, and hence government. Their very secrecy gives them power; there are few to accept or reject their findings. Their facts do not pass through the sieve of congressional debate or public inquiry. Few, even in the executive branch, know what they do.

The CIA, for instance, by the very breadth of its charter, is beyond the normal checks and balances of the law. An overpowerful secret intelligence agency is dangerous, not alone to the formulation of sound policy, but to the viability of democratic institutions.

RECORD IS SPOTTY

The intelligence record of the Nation and of the Central Intelligence Agency in particular is spotty. There have been notable successes but also notable failures. The Hoover Commission's public critique was positively critical of some of our shortcomings.

The secret report of the same Hoover Commission task force on intelligence is far more critical.

Lt. Gen. James H. Doolittle, a member of the President's new board, investigated CIA and other intelligence activities in Germany a year ago and found much overlapping and ineffectiveness.

Late this summer, Maj. Gen. Arthur G. Trudeau, Assistant Chief of Staff of the Army for Intelligence, was relieved after Mr. Dulles had sent a long and detailed bill of com-

plaints against General Trudeau to the Pentagon.

A great many other incidents also suggest that all is not well with our intelligence establishment.

It can only profit from the new committee. But it could profit more from a permanent congressional watchdog committee. If war is too important to be left to the generals, it should be clear that intelligence is too important to be left unsupervised.

CITIZENS COMMITTEE FOR THE

HOOPER REPORT,

Washington, D. C., March 5, 1956.

Hon. MIKE MANFIELD,

Senate Office Building,

Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR: During a recent conference in Helena, Mont., the Citizens Committee for the Hoover Report passed a resolution supporting your Senate Concurrent Resolution 2 which implements recommendation No. 1B of the Hoover Commission Report on Intelligence Activities in the Federal Government.

The attached editorial which appeared in the February 28 issue of the San Francisco Examiner also supports your resolution. We would appreciate very much if you would have the Citizens Committee resolution and this editorial inserted in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

Very truly yours,

HARVEY HAWCOCK,

Regional Director.

CITIZENS COMMITTEE FOR THE

HOOPER REPORT,

Washington, D. C., March 13, 1956.

The Honorable MIKE J. MANFIELD,

United States Senate Office Building,

Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR MANFIELD: I am gratified to learn that you are anxious to have the views of the Citizens Committee on the Hoover Report concerning Senate Concurrent Resolution 2, that you have introduced in the Senate.

This Concurrent Resolution would create a Joint Congressional Committee on Central Intelligence to "make continuing studies of the Central Intelligence Agency and of problems relating to the gathering of intelligence affecting the national security and its coordination and utilization by the various departments, agencies, and instrumentalities of the Government." The Committee would be composed of six Members from each House of Congress.

The Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government recommended in its report on Intelligence Activities:

"That the Congress consider creating a Joint Congressional Committee on Foreign Intelligence, similar to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy."

This recommendation was based on a detailed study of our intelligence activities that was made for the Commission by a group of eminent citizens. This group pointed out concerning the Central Intelligence Agency that:

"The act" (creating it) "exempts the Agency from compliance with any provision of law limiting transfers of appropriations; any requirements for publication or disclosure of the organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed by the Agency; and any regulations relating to the expenditure of Government funds. . . ."

"The task force fully realizes that the Central Intelligence Agency, as a major fountain of intelligence for the Nation, must of necessity operate in an atmosphere of secrecy and with an unusual amount of freedom and independence. Obviously, it cannot achieve its full purpose if subjected to open scrutiny and the extensive checks and

balances which apply to the average governmental agency.

"Because of its peculiar position, the CIA has been freed by the Congress from outside surveillance of its operations and its fiscal accounts. There is always a danger that such freedom from restraints could inspire laxity and abuses which might prove costly to the American people."

Thus, this group of able citizens found that there was no effective control over intelligence agencies. On principle, such a situation is undesirable, but in addition the task force found that there were defects in the organization and function of our intelligence agencies. Thus it concluded that:

"The task force is deeply concerned over the lack of adequate intelligence from behind the Iron Curtain. Proper directional emphasis, aggressive leadership, boldness and persistence are essential to achieve desired results."

"The task force feels that certain administrative flaws have developed in the CIA, which must be corrected to give proper emphasis and direction to its basic responsibilities."

These conclusions of the task force were endorsed by the Commission.

It is significant that the first Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government in 1946 in its report on the National Security Organization recommended (Recommendation 4c):

"That vigorous steps be taken to improve the Central Intelligence Agency and its work."

The Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government in its 1955 report on Intelligence Activities was anxious that Congress have adequate information concerning the operation of our foreign intelligence activities while still preserving the secrecy required for national security.

I am pleased to inform you that the Citizens Committee on the Hoover Report believes that House Concurrent Resolution 2, would if enacted implement fully the recommendations of the Commission that there be created a Joint Congressional Committee on Foreign Intelligence.

Yours sincerely,

CLARENCE FRANCIS,

Chairman.

ORDER FOR RECESS TO WEDNESDAY AT 11 O'CLOCK A. M.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate concludes its business today, it stand in recess until Wednesday, April 11, 1956, at 11 o'clock a. m.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ESTABLISHMENT OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

The Senate resumed the consideration of the resolution (S. Con. Res. 2) to establish a Joint Committee on Central Intelligence.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, I rise to speak very briefly on the subject matter of Senate Concurrent Resolution 2. When the Senate discusses the subject again on Wednesday, I hope to make further remarks in more detail concerning it. I may add that I respect the sincerity of the Senator from Montana in submitting the concurrent resolution. He has discussed the matter a number of times, and I know he believes in the objective of

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the resolution and the creation of such a joint committee as is provided for. Personally, I do not think the administration of the Central Intelligence Agency would be improved by the creation of another joint congressional committee.

Mr. President, all of us want security for our country, and all of us want our country to have the best possible defenses. All of us want the best and most accurate intelligence reports to be obtained. All of us want to protect the lives of those who are engaged in this work. All of us want to protect our sources of information. There is no difference between us in regard to these matters. The difference comes in regard to the methods to be employed.

First, let me say that the Federal Bureau of Investigation—an agency whose work and whose leader all of us respect—provides us with sources of information within the United States. There is no criticism of the FBI of which I know; there is no effort to set up a joint committee to supervise it.

Second, our intelligence sources, which provide us with information from outside the United States are threefold: One is the State Department, which has its ambassadors and consuls and their staffs. Next, there are the armed services, which have their official aides in our embassies. Finally, there is the CIA. In broad outline, that Agency does for us outside the United States the work the FBI does inside the United States.

Let me say that there is complete coordination and almost daily interchange between these two agencies concerning information and intelligence. Naturally, the methods of the CIA are different from those of the FBI. The methods of operation of the CIA vary in the several countries where it operates; but its aim is to provide the United States with information which will help us to be more secure, and to carry out within its jurisdiction the orders which may be given it by the highest executive agency which protects us, namely, the National Security Council.

Some of the work of the CIA may be done in the open. But most of its work is absolutely under cover. If it were not under cover, the CIA would not function, for the simple reason that its sources of information would dry up very quickly; in many places its agents would be quickly liquidated or forcibly evacuated. So one point is crystal clear: There is no secrecy for secrecy's sake. There is secrecy because by means of secrecy, results can be obtained. Without secrecy, nothing would be accomplished, and the lives of many brave men would be sacrificed. In broad outline, that is the situation which confronts us today.

As the majority report points out, before World War II we had no service of this character. Instead, we relied upon our friends in other nations, or upon our guesses, or upon whatever information the State Department or the armed services could pick up. But we soon found that was not enough for the strongest free nation to have, in order to function. So President Roosevelt asked Colonel Donovan to organize the OSS. It functioned under his leadership

during the war years. Later, its work was continued by two agencies created by Executive order, until the National Security Act in 1947 created the Central Intelligence Agency, as we know it today. The amendments to the National Security Act of 1947 which were passed in 1949 set up its procedures.

The CIA is essentially an executive agency under the direction of the National Security Council, which is the highest policymaking body for our security. The functions of the CIA are threefold, in broad general outline: First, intelligence, both covert and overt; second, activities ordered by the National Security Council; third, the coordination of intelligence. It coordinates that intelligence in Washington and reports it to the National Security Council. The CIA is not, I repeat, a policymaking body.

As has been pointed out, at the present time the CIA is supervised by subcommittees of the congressional Armed Services Committees, under whose jurisdiction the CIA comes, and by subcommittees of the Appropriations Committees of the Congress. If the work of the Members of Congress who serve on those subcommittees is not well done, the members of those subcommittees should be blamed. Let that be done, instead of creating a new agency to duplicate or take over the work which now is being done by 2 regular, legalized committees of the Senate and 2 regular, legalized committees of the House of Representatives.

As the Senator from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD] has said, several commissions have studied the work of the CIA and have submitted reports thereon. That was done by the Hoover Commission, and also by the so-called Clark Commission, headed by General Mark Clark, which I believe served under the Hoover Commission. Its report was made to the President. A portion of it was made public; and a part of it was not made public, for the sake of security.

The Senator from Montana has referred to the establishment of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy as a precedent for the establishment of a new congressional joint committee on the CIA. Let me point out that there is an essential difference between the work of the Atomic Energy Commission and the work of the CIA. The Atomic Energy Commission is a manufacturing commission. It is the first agency of the Government, I believe, which actually is in the manufacturing business. It has continual activities which are subject to congressional consideration, in connection with proposals for legislative changes. The work of the Atomic Energy Commission is constantly changing. The Commission makes annual reports.

On the other hand, the CIA has made very few requests for legislation. As I have stated, it is an executive agency, similar to the Federal Bureau of Investigation or similar to the Department of Agriculture or the Department of the Interior or other executive departments. The CIA does not often have changes made by means of legislation in its fundamental structure.

So the work of Congress in supervising the CIA from a legislative point of view is essentially that of seeing that its funds are properly spent and that its activities are properly carried out in the way intended by Congress. As I have said, such supervision is now being conducted by a subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee and a subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, and is similarly conducted in the House of Representatives.

The Senator from Montana has referred to the functioning of the staff of the proposed joint committee. I do not see how such a staff could possibly conduct investigations of its own. I do not see how the members of such a staff would be able to investigate to any great degree the work of the CIA, for the simple reason that the necessary papers and the personnel with whom it would be essential to have discussions are within the National Security Council. Therefore, unless the matter under inquiry could be discussed openly, the staff members would not be able to obtain any information other than that which the Members of Congress now are able to obtain if they themselves request it.

In other words, the work of the CIA is essentially the work it does under the orders of the President and the National Security Council; and, as such, it must do that work. As I have said, I do not see how the staff members of the proposed joint committee could investigate the work of the CIA or could steer it into new and useful lines of endeavor.

Very briefly, those are the reasons why I oppose the establishment of a new committee. I happen to be a member of both subcommittees to which reference has been made. If the members of the subcommittees are not now doing their work properly, let them take the blame, and let new members be placed on those subcommittees.

On the Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee at present are the distinguished Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], the Senator from Virginia [Mr. BYRD], the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. BAIRD], and the distinguished majority leader, the Senator from Texas [Mr. JOHNSON], and myself.

The members of the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, of which subcommittee I was formerly chairman, are the Senator from Arizona [Mr. HAYDEN], the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. CHAVEZ], the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], and, on the Republican side, the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. BAIRD] and myself.

We have gone into the subject to the degree we believe necessary to determine that the CIA is functioning properly. If we do not do our work, we should be the ones to be criticized, and we should be given suggestions as to what policies should be carried out.

For those reasons, briefly, I am opposed to the concurrent resolution. This is not a subject that can be discussed at length, because it is surrounded with security problems. I am opposed to the concurrent resolution which the Senator from Montana has submitted, although, as I say, I know that he is sincere, and

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I hope he accords me the same credit in opposing his resolution.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. The distinguished senior Senator from Massachusetts has a very high credit rating with me, I assure him.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I appreciate that statement.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I am delighted at the high level upon which the Senator has kept the discussion of the concurrent resolution.

Did I correctly understand the Senator to say that the National Security Council is the chief policy-determining body of the Nation?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. For defense purposes. That is my understanding. I shall be glad to be corrected if I am mistaken. The President, as the head of the executive department, conducts foreign policy through the State Department. He conducts security policies through the Defense Department; and the CIA is an administrative agency which funnels to the National Security Council the information which the State Department, the Defense Department, and the CIA obtain in various parts of the world. The information comes to the National Security Council, where it can be used as a basis for the determination of the policies best fitted to promote our security. That is my understanding.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I now understand a little more clearly the question raised by the Senator from Massachusetts. The Senator says that if there is any fault, the members of the subcommittees are the ones who should be replaced. I assure the Senator that in my opinion the members of the various subcommittees are not the ones at fault. The concurrent resolution specifically provides that the membership of the new committee shall be composed of Senators and Representatives who at present are members of the CIA subcommittees in both the House and Senate.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I understand.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I have nothing but the highest regard and esteem for all the Members who comprise the subcommittees, both Republicans and Democrats. All I am saying is that this activity should not be conducted on a subcommittee basis, but that a joint committee, with regular standing, should be appointed. It should have a small staff, so that an outlet could be furnished for the Congress, and the security and welfare of the CIA could be further insured.

From the remarks of the Senator, and from our personal conversations, I know that he understands my position on this question. I assure him that I understand his position, and have nothing but the highest regard for him.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. The sentiment is mutual. I thank the Senator.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I had not intended to discuss Senate Concurrent Resolution 2 today. However, I believe the remarks of the Senator from Massa-

chusetts make it imperative that they be answered before the Senate adjourns today.

I think the Senator from Massachusetts knows that I hold him in exceptionally high regard. However, I have differed with him many times with regard to the administration of both military and foreign policies. In my judgment, our difference is very basic. As I see it, our difference is that I believe in putting to full and complete use our system of checks and balances. I have interpreted a great many of the positions of the Senator from Massachusetts, as I interpret his position today, as indicating what I consider to be an undue and unsound willingness to delegate to the executive branch of Government control which should always be vested in the people of the country through their elected representatives in the Congress. So I rise now to answer what I consider to be a complete fallacy of argument by false analogy used by the Senator from Massachusetts.

The Senator from Massachusetts compares the CIA with the FBI, and says that the procedure followed in regard to the FBI corresponds to the procedure followed in respect to the CIA. I deny it. I deny it because of the many checks which we exercise with respect to the FBI as a branch of the Department of Justice and do not exercise in respect to CIA. We are constantly checking the FBI. We check it with full disclosure in connection with appropriations. We check it with full disclosure in regard to the salaries paid by the FBI. We have neither such check on the CIA.

We check the FBI also in respect to its jurisdiction. We check it in respect to the authority we give it, and we check it—although not to the degree I think we should—even in respect to the type of files it maintains and the evidence it collects and the use to which it puts its files. We exercise some check on it even in respect to so-called secret information.

For some years past, in almost every session of Congress, we have gotten into a little difficulty with the FBI over the question whether or not the Congress, as the legislative body of the people of the United States, shall have access to the information we think we are entitled to, when we consider there is a possibility of a wrong being done by the FBI. What happens then? I think the record is replete with instances of at least exercising a check upon the FBI to the extent that representatives of the FBI sit down with the chairmen of the committees concerned, and with the majority and minority representatives of such committees, and make available the material in their possession in connection with some alleged injustice. In such cases Congress has called for the FBI files so that they can be examined in order that we may determine whether or not we should impose further checks on the FBI.

Thus in the operation of the so-called FBI internal police system it is simply not true that we fail to exercise checks upon it, as has been contended by the Senator from Massachusetts this afternoon.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MORSE. I yield.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Let me say to the Senator from Oregon that I respect his sincerity in the position he takes.

Mr. MORSE. I thank the Senator.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. As I see it the checks on the FBI, through the chairmen of committees, or through the ranking members of committees, are the same checks that we exercise with respect to the CIA.

As I say, the information which we obtain as members of the subcommittee is available, so far as it can be made available consistent with security purposes, to Members of the Senate in open debate or in executive session. So I think the procedure is the same in that regard.

Mr. MORSE. There are many rebuttals I could make to the statement of the Senator from Massachusetts.

Consider, for example, reports from the Committee on Appropriations. Compare the FBI reports with the CIA reports, as they relate to the Committee on Appropriations.

The FBI makes full public disclosure to the American people with regard to the amounts appropriated, and the uses to which they are put. That is not true with respect to the CIA. As a member of the Committee on Appropriations, the Senator from Massachusetts may know something with respect to the CIA which I, as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, do not know, and which the American people do not know. That is what I am protesting against. I see nothing about any Member of the United States Senate which should entitle him to any information which is denied to the entire membership of the Senate as representatives of the American people.

We are dealing with America's spy system when we are dealing with the CIA; and when we are dealing with America's spy system, we had better take care that we do not deal with a police state system. We do not have to fight communism with a police state system. We did not have to fight Nazism with a police state system. We had better keep on free ground. We had better keep intact the system of checks provided by our form of government.

I wish to say to the Senator from Massachusetts that when he countenances and gives support to the kind of procedure which exists in the handling of CIA—and I say this most respectfully—he is supporting a form of American police state system. Never will my voice be raised in defense of it. I believe the manner in which the American spy system functions ought to be known by all the members of the Armed Services Committee and by all the members of the Foreign Relations Committee. We do not know it today. The Senator from Massachusetts stands on the floor of the Senate today and makes an argument in support of an exclusive system under which certain favorite ones are picked out and given certain secret information. That is not a system of checks and balances, I say most respectfully to the Senator from Massachusetts; it is government by selection.

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Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MORSE. I yield.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. As the Senator well knows, I would never support any kind of police state system. That is furthest from my mind. I am trying to support a system which is making an effort to obtain for us the necessary information on which to base our security policies. In doing that we are trying to protect the lives of men who are endeavoring to get the information for us. Those are brave men.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, the Senator from Massachusetts would not support a system with the label "police state" pinned on it. I say to him again most respectfully that when he defends the present CIA system, he defends a spy system that is based upon a police state procedure. I say that because when such procedures keep away from elected officials of a free people and from the people themselves facts which are important to them, then they constitute, in my judgment, a police state procedure. I shall never support it.

I believe it is very important that we maintain a legislative check on the spy system our Government maintains around the world. I say that because if that spy system miscarries, if it is not based upon sound procedures, it can get us into a great deal of trouble.

I wish to say something about the argument the Senator is making, from the standpoint of security. During my 11 years in the Senate, whenever we try to discuss this subject, some Senator rises, as the Senator from Massachusetts has done, and argues that we have to do a certain thing in the interest of security. I say that is an unsound argument. I feel that America is most secure when there is a full public disclosure made to the elected representatives of the people of the facts about our foreign policy.

We cannot escape the fact that CIA has a great deal to do with forming the foreign policy of the United States. As it makes its report to the Secretary of State, as it makes its report to the National Security Council, and as it makes its report indirectly to the President of the United States, it is bound to influence foreign policies.

That is why the Senator from Massachusetts has heard me say so many times—and I repeat it because it is a truth that must be drummed into the thinking of the American people—that our rights as free people are no better than our procedural rights.

We had better always look at the procedure we are defending. Let us forget labels for a minute. Let us forget all the talk about security. Let us, instead, ask what the procedure is that we countenance.

I say to the Senator from Massachusetts that under the procedure he countenances in regard to the CIA, there are being kept from the American people and their representatives in Congress facts which in my judgment they ought to know. They are facts which go into the formation of American foreign

policy. I am worried about America's foreign policy.

If the Senator from Massachusetts wishes to know why I believe the Secretary of State stumbles so much, it is because we do not have sufficient check on him in regard to the policy he follows, which we discover only too late as a result of his stumbling.

I believe the pending concurrent resolution to be of great importance because it would give to the American people, through their representatives in the Congress a check on the activities of the CIA, for the resolution would establish a joint committee which would have as its primary and sole duty checking on the functions of the CIA.

I cast no reflection on the Senator from Massachusetts and on the other members of the subcommittee. However, I wish to say that his membership on the subcommittee is not the major job of the Senator from Massachusetts. As a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations I do not have any information which has ever been given to me by the Senator's subcommittee with respect to the so-called checks the Senator has made on the CIA. The Senator says that if we had asked him for information he would have always been willing to give it to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

I happen to believe—and I say this most respectfully—that, if the Senator claims the subcommittee has been checking on the CIA, then the Senator should have been making reports right along, periodically, to the Committee on Foreign Relations. His subcommittee should have been submitting such reports. It should have been submitting such reports to the Committee on Armed Services and to the Committee on Appropriations. The three committees I have mentioned, the Armed Services, the Appropriations, and the Foreign Relations Committees, ought to be kept apprised of the subcommittee's findings and with respect to the information the subcommittee has gathered in regard to its so-called studies of CIA.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator from Oregon yield? Then I shall not interrupt him any further.

Mr. MORSE. I am glad to yield to the Senator from Massachusetts.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I have never personally—and I make this a personal matter because I do not wish to speak for anyone else—asked the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy for any knowledge it may have obtained, either in private or open hearings, because I have always considered that those matters were of primary concern to that joint committee, and that they were handling the matter very well so far as I knew, and therefore I did not wish to have that kind of information given to me if it was not necessary for me to have it.

In the same spirit, we operate with the CIA. We discuss questions with them. If the Senator from Oregon were to ask me about certain information, I might be able to tell him, and tell him reasonably accurately. I have not done so in the past, because the Senator has not

asked me. I believe also that he has not asked for such information of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, particularly information which that committee may have obtained in its investigations.

Mr. MORSE. I should like to make two observations with respect to what the Senator has commented on. First, I should like to say that there is a great difference in the thinking of the Senator from Massachusetts and myself. How do I know what information I ought to have in regard to CIA that is in the mind of the Senator from Massachusetts and the other members of his subcommittee if he does not volunteer it?

If he has been conducting, as a subcommittee of the Senate, an investigation or a study of the CIA, and acquires information which has a bearing upon American foreign policy, I believe it to be his duty to inform the Committee on Foreign Relations, and not to wait for us to pitch in the dark and say, at a meeting of the Committee on Foreign Relations, "I wonder whether the subcommittee has something in which we might be interested." I believe, in carrying out my duty as a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations, I am entitled to that information.

I go back to the Saudi Arabian matter which I discussed earlier today. As a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations, I have been greatly concerned about what is going on in the Middle East. I believe we ought to have some information on it from the CIA. We ought to have some information as to what is going on in Saudi Arabia and in the other countries in the Middle East. The kind of joint committee that is called for in Senate Concurrent Resolution 2 will make that kind of information available to us. The joint resolution makes it the clear duty of the CIA to supply such information to us. The Senator's subcommittee has no such mandate from the Senate. I want a committee established that will have that kind of mandate. I want to have established a committee which will have as its duty periodically to report to the committees of the Senate the kind of information they can use.

I close by saying that what is represented in the debate today is a serious difference of opinion in the administration of our Government. Certainly a very dangerous trend has been developing in Government during the past quarter of a century. It is the trend toward Government by secrecy on the part of the executive branch of the Government. I want to know whether that trend is to continue, and whether, as the Senator from Massachusetts argues this afternoon, in the interest of security there is a body of information which ought to be kept secret from the elected representatives of the people.

I deny the premise. I say that under our constitutional system of checks and balances we must watch out for that kind of argument, because in my judgment such an argument indicates that dangerous shoals lie ahead, shoals which can easily wreck our whole ship of freedom which has been built up under our great Constitution.

As this debate proceeds on Wednesday, I think we will have the right to get the answers from the subcommittee to which the Senator from Massachusetts has referred, in regard to some of their findings. If they do not want to give them to us in open session, I think we have the right to get them in executive session, because, Mr. President, when we are dealing with the CIA, we are dealing with America's spy system; and the American people have a right to know what kind of spying we are doing and what kind of policy we have. A spy system, unless it is very rightly handled, can be a major cause of war.

I see that my junior colleague is on the floor, and I shall defer the suggestion of a quorum call, because I understand he wishes to address the Senate.

Mr. NEUBERGER. Mr. President—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The junior Senator from Oregon.

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CONFIDENTIAL

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Mr. LANGER subsequently said:

Mr. President, just before the Senator from Montana began to discuss the matter of the CIA, he mentioned the fact that Secretary of the Interior McKay had written a letter involving care of Indians. I did not quite clearly understand the attitude of the Secretary of the Interior. Will the Senator tell me exactly what it is?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I may say to my distinguished friend from North Dakota that I made a few remarks before speaking on Senate Concurrent Resolution 2, relative to the position in which the Indians on Hill 57 in Great Falls, Mont., were placed, and I quoted a letter from Secretary McKay which seemed to indicate that, so far as Indians off the reservation were concerned, there was not a great deal the Federal Government could do or that it intended to do for them.

As the Senator from North Dakota well knows, because he has been a true friend of the American Indian during his many years of service in the Congress, we think the Indians off the reservation are entitled at least to relief and succor when they are in need and when they are living in the deplorable circumstances under which they do live, not only in Montana, but in the State of North Dakota and elsewhere.

Mr. LANGER. I may say that the Secretary of the Interior is woefully ignorant of the real situation of the Indians, when he writes that kind of letter. Before the Senator began his remarks on the CIA, he mentioned the Turtle Mountain Reservation, for example, where five or six thousand Indians live on the land in two townships. The Indian Commissioner is saying that they should get jobs, so some of them have been working on the Garrison Dam. If the Indians stay on the reservation and become ill or if their families become destitute, it is the job of the Indian Commissioner to see that hospital facilities are provided and that the families are taken care of. But the moment an Indian goes 20, 30, or 40 miles away from home to get work, because there is no work on the Turtle Mountain Reservation, and he then becomes ill, it is apparently the position of Mr. McKay that the Indian should go to a private hospital and that the Government should not have to pay for his care.

Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator is correct.

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ESTABLISHMENT OF A JOINT COMMITTEE ON CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

The Senate resumed the consideration of the concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 2) to establish a Joint Committee on Central Intelligence.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, I yield 2 minutes to the junior Senator from South Dakota.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. Mr. President, I am one of the cosponsors of Senate Concurrent Resolution 2, but I now expect to vote against it. Hence I desire to state briefly the reasons for the vote I shall cast.

I offered my name as a cosponsor of the concurrent resolution in the belief that the Central Intelligence Agency needed closer supervision; that it needed to have a sharper sense of responsibility in the spending of money illustrated, for example, by the exorbitant figure they asked for the construction of their new building, and because of other evidence of an indifference to the dollar sign.

I thought it might be desirable also to have joint meetings of the subcommittees of the Senate and House Committees on Armed Services and the subcommittees of the Committees on Appropriations which deal with the Central Intelligence Agency. I think it might be desirable to have such meetings in any event, whether the concurrent resolution shall be agreed to or not.

I think it might be desirable also—and I hope that will be the result of this discussion—for the subcommittees which deal with the Central Intelligence Agency to exert a greater sense of responsibility and closer supervision with respect to some of the activities of that agency.

I have concluded to vote against the concurrent resolution because in the broad authority to create a large staff, and in the provision for the borrowing of consultants, experts, technicians, and clerical and stenographic assistance from various agencies of the Government, I think I sense possibilities that some very highly classified information might become too widely diffused.

In that connection, I am reminded of the story—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from South Dakota has expired.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. May I have 1 more minute?

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I yield 1 more minute to the Senator from South Dakota.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. I am reminded of the story once told by CHARLIE HALLECK, a Member of the House of Representatives. Mr. HALLECK told of the man who said, "I never have any trouble in keeping a secret. The trouble is that the folks to whom I tell it will not keep their mouths shut."

In this instance, the trouble might be that if we start to borrow clerks and assistants from agencies of the Government to create the kind of staff which would be represented by \$250,000, we might be having secrets told to too many people.

I believe, therefore, that the responsibility should rest where it now does, namely, with the Committees on Armed Services and the Committees on Appropriations. But I sincerely hope that as a result of the presentation of the concurrent resolution and the discussion in connection therewith, those committees will exert a closer scrutiny upon the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency.

APR 11 1956

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S. 3269. An act to provide transportation on Canadian vessels between ports in southeastern Alaska, and between Hyder, Alaska, and other points in southeastern Alaska or the continental United States, either directly or via a foreign port, or for any part of the transportation.

ESTABLISHMENT OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BIBLE in the chair). Is there further morning business? If not, morning business is closed.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The Chair lays before the Senate the unfinished business.

The Senate resumed the consideration of the concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 2) to establish a Joint Committee on Central Intelligence.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas will state it.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. As I understand, there are several committee amendments. Under the unanimous consent agreement, debate on any amendment is limited to 1 hour; and the time on each committee amendment is to be controlled by the chairman of the Committee on Rules and Administration, the distinguished Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. GREEN), and by the majority leader or the minority leader. Is that correct?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's statement is correct. There are about a half dozen committee amendments to the concurrent resolution.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the majority leader yield?

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. As I understand, debate on the resolution itself is limited to 2 hours.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. There are several committee amendments which are to be acted on first. If any Senator desires time, time can be yielded on an amendment; and the unanimous-consent agreement provides also for 1 hour to each side on the bill.

Mr. HAYDEN. Mr. President, I am opposed to the concurrent resolution and have filed minority views. I should like to have some time allotted to me so that I may speak in opposition to the concurrent resolution.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Under the unanimous-consent agreement, the Senator can be yielded time by either the majority leader or the minority leader. Does the Senator wish to have time yielded to him?

Mr. HAYDEN. I should like to speak for about 5 minutes a little later in the debate.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, would the Senator from Georgia be agreeable to speaking in opposition to a committee amendment?

Mr. RUSSELL. I merely wish to make a brief statement.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, may the clerk state the first committee amendment?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will state the first committee amendment.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. On page 3, 21, after "report", it is proposed to strike out "public."

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the committee amendment.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I yield 15 minutes to the distinguished junior Senator from Georgia.

Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, I have such high regard for the ability and the patriotism of the distinguished junior Senator from Montana (Mr. MANSFIELD), who is the principal sponsor of the concurrent resolution, that ordinarily I am reluctant to differ with him on legislative matters. But in the case of the pending concurrent resolution, I can but believe that the efforts of the Senator from Montana are based upon a mistake of fact and a misapprehension of the functions of the Central Intelligence Agency.

I was unable to be on the floor Monday when the debate occurred on the concurrent resolution, but I have read in the RECORD all that occurred, and I do not find that there was advanced one substantial argument, predicated on established facts which would justify the Senate in adopting the concurrent resolution.

Some Senators who addressed themselves to the resolution on Monday last seemed to hold the opinion that the CIA was a policymaking agency. That theme ran all through the remarks which were made in advocacy of the adoption of the resolution.

Mr. President, the Central Intelligence Agency is far from being a policymaking agency. It makes no policy. It was established to coordinate all the activities of the various agencies of the Government which gather intelligence vital to our national security, to coordinate the intelligence thus obtained, to gather intelligence on its own initiative, appraise it, and present it to a policymaking body, one that is seldom heard of, but which is probably the most important policymaking body in our Government, namely, the National Security Council.

Mr. President, the argument was made that the failure to apprise Members of Congress of the detailed activities of the Central Intelligence Agency was an invasion of the prerogatives of the Congress. I will lay my record in this body, in defense of the prerogatives of the Congress of the United States under the Constitution, against the record of any other Senator who serves here today or

who has served during my tenure of office. I have jealously sought to guard every prerogative of the Congress. I complained when I thought those prerogatives were being taken over by the executive branch of the Government, when the President of the United States was a member of my own party, as I have when the President was a member of the Republican Party. I have complained about the invasion of the prerogatives of Congress by the judicial branch of the Government.

But, Mr. President, we go very far afield when we undertake to predicate a resolution of this nature on the right of individual Members of the Congress to know all the details of all the agencies of Government that are working in secrecy in an effort to secure information which would warn us, for instance, of a sneak act which might destroy us, or which would advise us as to the potential strength of the enemies who are arrayed against us.

There have been intelligence agencies in the Army since the beginning of our Government. There have been intelligence agencies in the Navy since the Navy was established. The Air Force has had its intelligence agency since the Department of the Air Force was created. To my knowledge, not once has a Member of Congress risen on the floor and said he was being denied his prerogatives because he was not informed as to all the activities of all the agencies which were seeking to gather vital security information. Now the situation has allegedly changed because, forsooth, the three departments have been coordinated into one. In addition, there has been brought into the picture the OSS, which did invaluable service behind enemy lines in World War II.

I shall not accept that argument. I do not believe we should announce a principle of that nature. I am proud of the Senate of the United States, but I must say that early in my service I became disillusioned on finding that information classified as secret which was given in committees in executive session, within a couple of days had trickled to the press of the Nation. That has been my one disillusionment with the Senate of the United States, and, indeed, with both bodies of the Congress.

I say here today that, in my judgment, it would be more desirable to abolish the CIA and close it up, lock, stock, and barrel, than to adopt any such theory as that all the Members of the Congress of the United States are entitled to know the details of all the activities of this farflung organization.

Mr. President, it was stated in the debate, which I read in the RECORD, that the Central Intelligence Agency does not present to the Congress a detailed budget estimate of all its expenditures. That statement is true. It does not present to the Congress an estimate such as comes from the Department of Agriculture, the Post Office Department, the Treasury Department, and other departments of government, because to do so would be to give the Soviet Union a

blueprint whereby it might readily run down and ascertain the activities and the identity of every person who is risking his life today in an effort to secure information which can be vital to the future of the United States.

I say, and I say it in the full conviction of the correctness of the statement, that one bit of information which has been used on 2 or 3 occasions is well worth the total cost of the administration of all our security agencies. They undoubtedly waste some money. They make mistakes. They have not been able to penetrate behind the Iron Curtain and gather the last detail as to the strength of the Russian forces. Other agencies, such as the British intelligence, which was in existence long before our agency was, have likewise failed. That is certainly no reason for circumscribing the Central Intelligence Agency's efforts and hampering it at the very top, when the program is developing and bringing to us information which is of vital value.

There has been talk about the amount of money involved. I shall not state what it is, but I will state it is a very, very small percentage of the amount of tax money spent each year by the Armed Forces for research and development of new weapons. Certainly, we should not complain about a portion of the amount of money spent for research and development being expended in an effort to keep up with the activities of those arrayed against us in that field. I say no person would risk his life in carrying on this work if every Member of the Congress and the large staff of a new committee were in a position to know where that person was every day and to know the nature of the work in which he was engaged.

I was interested to learn that the distinguished author of the resolution said it was contemplated that the committee would have only a small staff. Every Senator present has had experience in that field. It is next to impossible, when a committee is created, to keep the staff down to the size intended originally. Every Senator knows of occasions when a committee has started with a small staff, with the assurance that it would be kept small, and in 2 or 3 years it has been extended all over the Capitol. Most of us are, instinctively, empire builders. We build in our own little field whenever we have authority to do so. It would not be long before the staff of the proposed committee would be large.

The point has been raised that there is not any committee supervision over the Agency. The Committee on Armed Services, and its predecessor committees, have, since the inception of the Congress, had jurisdiction over intelligence activities of the various branches of the service. During World War II that committee had supervision over the activities of the OSS. Therefore, it was but natural that the Armed Services Committee would be considered the parent committee of the Central Intelligence Agency.

I hope I have not been derelict in my duty in reference to this very important Agency. I appointed the subcommittee, having jurisdiction over it, which I am

confident is composed of as able men as any who sit in this body. The distinguished senior Senator from Virginia (Mr. BYRD), who is vigorously opposed to the resolution, the distinguished majority leader, the Senator from Texas (Mr. JOHNSON), the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. SALTONSTALL), and the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. BRIDGES), are members of that subcommittee.

On at least 2 occasions in each year, and more often on 3, we have had before us the head of the Central Intelligence Agency and his staff. We have never had them fail to respond to a single question we have asked them. They have been forthright and frank.

On the floor of the Senate the statement has been made, in effect, that we have not told all the country about what we have learned from the Central Intelligence Agency; and one Senator said the country was entitled to know. No, Mr. President; we have not told the country, and I do not propose to tell the country in the future, because if there is anything in the United States which should be held sacred behind the curtain of classified matter, it is information regarding the activities of this Agency. I repeat that it would be better to abolish it out of hand than it would be to adopt a theory that such information should be spread and made available to every Member of Congress and to the members of the staff of any committee. Rather than do that, it would be better to abolish the Central Intelligence Agency and, by so doing, to save the money appropriated and the lives of American citizens.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. Mr. President, will the Senator from Georgia yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Georgia yield to the Senator from Iowa?

Mr. RUSSELL. Yes; if I have the time.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. Is the time limited?

Mr. RUSSELL. Yes; but I yield to the Senator from Iowa.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. I merely wished to make an observation and to ask a question of the Senator from Georgia.

Mr. RUSSELL. Certainly.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. The Senator from Georgia and I have had some mutual experiences along this line. He was a member of the Special Committee on Atomic Energy, which was the predecessor of the present Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. At all times since its creation, he has been a member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy; and I have shared that experience with him, to my very great benefit. So I am intrigued and interested and very much moved by the argument of the Senator from Georgia.

Having served, myself, on the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, and understanding that an attempt has been made by some Members, on the floor of the Senate, to draw an analogy between the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and the proposed Joint Committee on Central Intelligence, I merely wish to say to the Senator from Georgia that I believe he is utterly correct in what he has

said. There is no real parallel between the problems confronting the two groups. The work of the Central Intelligence Agency is vastly different from that of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, even though probably it is not more vital and requires no greater secrecy than some of the activities of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, in its dealings with the atomic energy program.

But I myself cannot adopt the philosophy that because we have a Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and because its operations are secret, the establishment of a Joint Committee on Central Intelligence, to deal with the Central Intelligence Agency, is justified.

So I commend the Senator from Georgia on his very powerful and forceful argument along this line.

Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Iowa for bringing out that point, which I had overlooked thus far in my discussion. The point he has mentioned has been raised.

I started serving with the Senator from Iowa on what was first the Special Committee on Atomic Energy, when it was created.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. Yes, both of us were on that special committee, which was created to write the Atomic Energy Act.

Mr. RUSSELL. Yes. Since that time I have served—with great profit to myself—with the Senator from Iowa on the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

I have also served on the Committee on Naval Affairs, a predecessor of the present Armed Services Committee, since I have been a Member of this body. I state on my responsibility as a Senator that there is no comparison whatever between the activities of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency or the contemplated activities of the proposed Joint Committee on Central Intelligence.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. They operate in two different fields. Although secrecy is involved in both, the methods of operation and of accomplishment of the two groups are entirely different.

Mr. RUSSELL. Yes. For example, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy has the duty of maintaining surveillance on a very large and important construction program, under which certain production is had. In that work, thousands of persons, including scientists, are employed; and a large part of that work is devoted to seeing to it that the production program and the construction program of the Atomic Energy Commission are maintained. But nothing whatever of that nature pertains to the secret intelligence work of such a group as the Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. Mr. President, the Senator from Georgia has placed his finger on one of the most important differences between the two agencies. There are other differences, of course; but I shall not attempt to discuss them at this time. Suffice it to say that the operations of the two groups are fundamentally and basically different; and it is inherent in the operation of the CIA that it be given certain broad powers and authority, subject, in my

judgment, to the major supervision of the executive branch of the Government.

Mr. RUSSELL. Yes. Of course, the National Security Council has direct supervision over it.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

Mr. RUSSELL. But I wish to reiterate that although Mr. Allen W. Dulles has been before us and although we have asked him very searching questions about some activities which it almost chills the marrow of a man to hear about, he has never failed to answer us forthrightly and frankly in response to any question we have asked him. I think the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL] has been present at practically every one of those meetings during the past 2 or 3 years.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. Mr. President, I should like to ask only one other question, and then I shall conclude.

As the Senator from Georgia well knows, before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy we have had Mr. Allen Dulles and his top assistants, in connection with the various categories of the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency. They have appeared before our committee in connection with matters applicable to our responsibility in the atomic energy field. I also wish to testify, following the statement of the Senator from Georgia, that at no time has Mr. Dulles or any of those under him who are knowledgeable regarding so broad a subject, failed to give us full, complete, and frank answers to our questions regarding the matters which come within our responsibility. Let me say that we, as a committee, do not attempt to trespass upon the responsibility of other committees in other areas.

Mr. RUSSELL. Yes; Mr. President; that has been the experience of the Armed Services Committee.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator from Georgia yield to me?

Mr. RUSSELL. I yield.

Mr. KNOWLAND. First of all, I wish to commend the distinguished Senator from Georgia for the very powerful argument he has made in regard to the differences between the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and the proposed Joint Committee on Central Intelligence.

As the Senator from Georgia well knows, among the other differences is the fact that the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy was created by statute and was given legislative power, as a legislative committee. Matters relating to the Atomic Energy Act go to that committee.

Second, I refer to a fact which must be brought home in this connection: I know that the President of the United States and others in the executive branch of the Government have very grave misgivings regarding the pending concurrent resolution, not only for the reason that the lives of Americans who may be seeking to obtain information which we need for the very defense of our country may be involved, but also because we have cooperative arrangements with other agencies and perhaps with friendly countries, and the slightest leakage of information regarding perhaps just one field of activity might re-

sult in the disclosure of all the agents who had been operating there, and might mean their death by hanging or execution in the matter of a few days' time.

Mr. RUSSELL. Of course they would be liquidated immediately.

Mr. President, I shall not dwell on all of the many differences between the CIA and the Atomic Energy Commission. Instead, I shall point out only one or two.

In the first place, the principal operations of the Atomic Energy Commission are within the United States, whereas most of the operations of the CIA are outside the United States. The Atomic Energy Commission is primarily concerned with preserving security. On the other hand, the CIA is primarily concerned with breaking security and obtaining secrets. There is a great deal of difference between the two groups, when we consider that fundamental of their activities.

I feel very deeply that it would be a serious mistake to approve the concurrent resolution.

The Committee on Appropriations is headed by the distinguished Senator from Arizona [Mr. HAYDEN]. Representatives of the Central Intelligence Agency come before the Committee on Appropriations each year. I have been present on 2 or 3 occasions when the committee was hearing the request of the CIA for funds with which to operate. The representatives of that Agency have never failed to answer a question which was asked on any of the occasions when I was present, as to the operations and the use of the money which had been appropriated for the Agency.

Great stress has been laid on the fact that the law does not limit the expenditures for individual personnel, as made by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. I can say here—and I do not think it involves any violation of secrecy—that that question has arisen repeatedly, both in the Appropriations Committee and before the subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee, when the Director of the CIA appeared before the subcommittee. With the exception of the Director and his assistant, whose salaries are fixed by statute, all the other employees are paid according to civil service scales.

It has been exceedingly difficult to obtain the character of men needed to carry on this work. The CIA cannot send a mere plodder or dullard, however earnest he may be, to do some of the work which is necessary to be done. With the exception of the Director and his assistant, whose salaries are fixed by statute, the agency pays only civil service scales.

Mr. President, I can think of no sound reason which would justify approval of this concurrent resolution. I think it would be just as appropriate to establish a joint committee to deal with foreign policy—or perhaps even more appropriate—as it would be to establish a joint committee to deal with the Central Intelligence Agency.

I shall endeavor, to the best of my ability, to keep in touch with what the

CIA is doing. I do not mean to say by that that I intend to undertake to find out whether or not we have an agent in some foreign country—perhaps a satellite—who is tapping the telephone of some foreign embassy, or anything of that nature. However, I shall undertake to exercise as close supervision over this Agency as is ordinarily exercised by the parent committees of the Congress in dealing with the agencies which are responsible to them.

I doubt very much whether the heads of many of the independent agencies have spent more time with the committees to which they are supposed to report, over the course of the average year, than Mr. Dulles, as Director, has spent before my committee.

This is a grave question, and one which should not be considered from the standpoint of politics. It should be considered only from the standpoint of the national interest. In my judgment, the national interest does not require that we create a new joint committee, with a new staff. To do so would result only in increasing the hazards to the lives of those who work for the CIA, and dry up sources of information which are vital to the national security.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for one question?

Mr. RUSSELL. I yield.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Does not the Senator agree with me that the CIA is essentially a service agency? It is not a policy-making body in any way, as is the Atomic Energy Commission, to which reference has been made. The differences between the two have been pointed out. The CIA is a service agency. The Director, Mr. Allen Dulles, does not make policy. He does not judge conditions. He merely reports to the National Security Council, which is directly under the President, who is the Director's boss.

Mr. RUSSELL. As I undertook to state at the outset of my remarks, I was somewhat dumbfounded to note that the argument had been made that the CIA was a policymaking agency. I think it is far from that. The best analogy I can draw is this: When the National Security Council meets—and there is present in the Chamber at this moment the distinguished junior Senator from Kentucky [Mr. BARKLEY], a former Vice President of the United States, who sat with that Council through some of the very trying hours in the life of this Republic—it has two primary advisers. The first is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, of the Military Establishment, to advise as to the military situation. The second is the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, who gives the National Security Council the results of the efforts of his Agency in relation to the intelligence it has been able to assemble concerning the problem at hand. He is an adviser. He is not even a member of the National Security Council; and by no stretch of the imagination can the CIA be considered a policymaking agency.

In the course of the debate on Monday, which I have read, a number of extraneous questions were brought up. Among

other things, it was stated that there had been some secrecy in connection with the Dixon-Yates contract. That was unfortunate. I deplore it, but I hope Members of the Senate will not lay at the feet of the CIA responsibility for any secrecy which may have obtained with respect to a telephone call from someone at the White House regarding the Dixon-Yates contract.

Some question was raised with respect to the signing by the Chief Executive of executive agreements concerning which Congress had no knowledge. I feel as deeply on that subject as do most other Members of the Senate. Perhaps I do not feel quite so deeply about it as does the distinguished Senator from Ohio [Mr. BAICKE], but I have followed him in his efforts to see that such executive agreements were not made. However, we cannot attribute to the CIA responsibility for the fact that executive agreements were made. The CIA has no power even to negotiate executive agreements.

Other arguments were made. Something was said about the impounding of Marine Corps funds. That has no relation whatever to the functions of the CIA, or the desirability of our doing all we can, while still performing our functions as a legislative body, to see that the lives of those who work for this agency are not endangered by any haphazard administration by the large staff of a joint committee, which, in my opinion, would be a very cumbersome fifth wheel.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President—

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will state it.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Does the acting minority leader have charge of the time in opposition?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct. To whom does the Senator yield?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Of course, the Senator from Montana is in favor of the concurrent resolution, so he would take time on the affirmative side.

Mr. BARKLEY. Mr. President, a further parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will state it.

Mr. BARKLEY. There are pending 2 or 3 committee amendments, on 1 of which I believe the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL] took time to discuss the concurrent resolution itself. Has any limitation of debate been imposed up to this time with respect to amendments?

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I think the answer is that an hour is allowed on each amendment, 30 minutes to a side, and 2 hours on the concurrent resolution itself.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Texas yield to the Senator from Montana?

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I am willing to yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Montana. Has the first committee amendment been disposed of?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. It has not.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Has time been consumed on that amendment?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Time is now running on that amendment.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Has all time been used on that amendment?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The opposition time is exhausted. Thirty minutes remain on the affirmative side.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. The majority leader controls the time on behalf of the chairman of the Committee on Rules and Administration [Mr. HAYDEN], so he controls only the time in favor of the amendment. Is the Senator from Montana opposed to the amendment?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I am not opposed to it.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Will the acting minority leader yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Montana?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, I am glad to yield time to the Senator from Montana. I respectfully suggest to the majority leader that I do not think there is any objection to the committee amendments. It seems to me that the Senate could agree to the committee amendments, and then proceed to debate the concurrent resolution itself.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, if the Senate will permit me to do so, we will charge the time the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL] has used to the time of the opposition, and I will then yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Montana.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will state it.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Would it be possible at this time to vote on all the amendments en bloc?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. By unanimous consent it could be done.

Mr. BARKLEY. Mr. President, I desire to address the Senate on the concurrent resolution itself. I do not know how much time I may want to use, but I do not wish to deprive myself of addressing the Senate on the resolution. If I agreed to the adoption of all the amendments en bloc, that would leave time only on the measure itself, as I understand. May I inquire how I may obtain some time to speak on the resolution, and when I may have that time?

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. The Senator from Kentucky may have as much time as he wishes to use, if he will indicate to me when he desires to speak, and how much time he may want.

Mr. BARKLEY. I told the Senator from Arizona that I would like not less than 10 minutes.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Does the Senator from Kentucky desire to use that time now?

Mr. BARKLEY. No; I do not.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I assure the Senator from Kentucky that he will have 10 minutes, and 10 additional minutes if he should desire them.

As this time I do not agree to the adoption of the amendments en bloc. I have yielded 10 minutes to the Senator from Montana. After the Senator from Montana has concluded his remarks, I am prepared to yield time to other Sen-

ators. I am now yielding 10 minutes to the Senator from Montana.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I do not believe I desire to take 10 minutes at this time, because I am beginning to feel a little like David facing Goliath, although I fear the results will not be the same. Inasmuch as I am to be the only one who will speak in favor of the resolution, I do not wish to be squeezed in this early. Therefore, if the majority leader does not mind, I shall wait until the distinguished former Vice President, the distinguished minority leader, the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee, and other Senators, have an opportunity to speak. Then I should like to make some remarks in favor of the adoption of the resolution.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. The Senator from Montana will have ample time to speak. Does he yield back the time I yielded him?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield back the time.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Does any other Senator desire time to speak in favor of the committee amendment?

If no other Senator desires time at this time, I am prepared to yield back my time.

Mr. BARKLEY. Mr. President—
Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I yield time to the Senator from Kentucky, if he desires to speak now. Does the Senator from Kentucky desire that I yield him some time?

Mr. BARKLEY. I do.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I yield 15 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Kentucky.

Mr. BARKLEY. Mr. President, I do not know that I shall need 15 minutes. I am very deeply concerned about the resolution. If it were a bill or a joint resolution, instead of a concurrent resolution, I feel very definitely that the President of the United States would have no alternative except to veto it. I sincerely regret to say that I am compelled to disagree with my good friend from Montana about the wisdom of the resolution.

We have before us a concurrent resolution which proposes to set up a committee of 12 members, with a staff. It would cost \$250,000 a year. I would not object to that sum of money being appropriated, if the proposed joint committee were needed. In my judgment it is not only not needed, but it would be very unwise on the part of Congress to establish it.

The concurrent resolution would authorize the joint committee to summon members of the Central Intelligence Agency. It would authorize the joint committee to summon all the papers and documents of the Central Intelligence Agency, and to obtain from that agency all the information the joint committee desired to obtain, which information, of course, would then be public.

I ask my colleagues if the desire to make public, for the benefit of the American people, all the confidential information the CIA obtains all over the world is sufficient reason to justify the danger,

to which we would subject ourselves and which we would assume by the creation of such a committee and taking the chances on its operations.

As the Senate knows, Congress enacted a law creating the Central Intelligence Agency. That Agency is a confidential body. It is an arm of the President of the United States for obtaining, not only in the United States, but all over the world, information which is of advantage to him in the protection of the interests and rights of the American people. Being an arm of the President, it is therefore an arm of the National Security Council.

CIA is the information-gathering agency of the National Security Council. The duty of the CIA is to gather from all sources and to lay before the President and the National Security Council information of the most intimate and confidential nature, which will enable the President and the National Security Council to act to protect the security of our own country, without making public the information which this Agency has gathered from all parts of the world.

I sat on the National Security Council for 4 years as Vice President of the United States. The present Vice President has sat on it since his induction into office, on the 20th day of January 1953. Some of the information gathered by the Central Intelligence Agency and laid before the National Security Council itself was so confidential and secret that the very portfolios in which it was contained were under lock and key. The members of the National Security Council were not even permitted to take those folders and portfolios to their homes. They had to be unlocked in the presence of other members.

One of the distinguished heads of that Agency for 2 or 3 years was Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, the famous soldier and diplomat. During the time when he was the head of the Agency he sat in the National Security Council. The information I received as a member of the National Security Council, in my capacity as Vice President, was so confidential that I would lose my right arm before I would divulge it to anyone, even to members of my own family.

To say that now we should establish a joint committee to pry into and look into secret documents, to submit them before the joint committee, and to make them public seems to me incredible.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. BARKLEY. I am glad to yield.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I would appreciate very much the Senator's views on what a staff member of such a committee could do. It seems to me that a staff member could do nothing.

Mr. BARKLEY. I presume the staff members, whoever they might be, would be under the direction of the joint committee, and perhaps under the chairman of the joint committee, whoever he might be. According to the custom of committees, whether joint or single, the staff members would probably be authorized by the joint committee, if not directed, to invade the precincts of the

National Security Council and obtain confidential information for the benefit of the joint committee, preparatory to a public hearing, to which they would have the right to summon members of the Security Council, and for which they would have the right to subpoena documents.

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Kentucky yield?

Mr. BARKLEY. I yield.

Mr. GORE. I am a member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. In that capacity I have received information upon many occasions which I would regard as just as confidential, just as delicate, just as sensitive, as is the information to which the distinguished junior Senator from Kentucky has referred. It is difficult for me to draw the line of distinction. How is it that the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy can deal with the topmost secrets of the Government and establish a responsible record in doing so, a record both in the retention and safeguarding of secrets given in executive session, and also in the conduct of public hearings, when some other committee could not establish a similarly satisfactory record?

Mr. BARKLEY. The Senator from Georgia and the Senator from Iowa a moment ago discussed the fundamental difference between the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and the proposed Joint Committee on the CIA. The Senator from Tennessee may not have been present at the time the discussion took place, and I should be glad to yield to the Senator from Georgia if he wishes to repeat what was said, because I am not a member of the Atomic Energy Committee, a member of the Armed Services Committee, or a member of the Appropriations Committee. Both the Armed Services Committee and the Appropriations Committee receive information from the CIA and also from the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. I should prefer that the Senator from Georgia answer the question of the Senator from Tennessee.

Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, I stated that I was on the original Atomic Energy Committee of the Senate which wrote the legislation creating the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, and I have served on that committee, although not so actively as has the Senator from Tennessee, during the past few years. I was on one of the original committees which was superseded by the Committee on Armed Services, and I had been on the Naval Affairs Committee ever since I became a Member of the Senate.

In my opinion, there is no comparison whatever between the activities of the two committees. The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy is supposed more or less to be a policy-developing agency which deals with tremendous programs of construction and production. Its primary function is to undertake to preserve secrecy within the United States. On the other hand, the CIA, which is a consolidation of the intelligence agencies which existed heretofore, functions outside the United States, and its principal endeavor is to break secrecy and to obtain secrets.

There is a great deal of difference between undertaking to preserve secrets as to what occurs in one of the great plants of the Atomic Energy Commission, and the case of Joe Jones who may be endeavoring to obtain secrets in one of the satellite countries, and who, if his activities were disclosed, would be liquidated immediately.

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Georgia yield?

Mr. RUSSELL. I yield.

Mr. GORE. A little more than an hour from now a subcommittee of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy is scheduled to meet in executive session. One of the great military figures of our country is scheduled to testify before it. He is called to testify on one of the most sensitive and delicate matters of national policy. He is to discuss stockpiling and stockpile needs and requirements. That is just as secret, just as sensitive, just as necessary to be safeguarded as is the information to which the able junior Senator from Georgia has referred.

As I understood his remarks the distinguished junior Senator from Kentucky was addressing the Senate on the inadvisability of having a joint committee of the Congress deal with highly secret matters. I rose to point out that the committee on which the junior Senator from Georgia and the junior Senator from Tennessee have the opportunity to serve has established an enviable and almost unblemished record of preserving secrets, dealing with them responsibly, and also holding public hearings so as to enlighten the public on matters which can safely be brought to public notice. I cannot quite draw the line of distinction.

Mr. RUSSELL. If the Senator from Kentucky will indulge me, I did not make the point he cited. The Central Intelligence Agency does report to the Armed Services Committee when it is requested to do so. I have stated that they have answered frankly, forthrightly, and fully every question asked by the Armed Services Committee. There is no necessity for having the proposed joint committee when there are four committees which are in a satisfactory manner supervising intelligence activities, as has been done since the beginning of the Republic. I stated that there was no need of creating a joint committee, with a staff added, to undertake to delve into the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency overseas.

I do not wish to prolong the discussion. I appreciate the indulgence of the Senator from Kentucky, but I must state for the Record that I disagree with the Senator from Tennessee that there is no difference between evidence relating to stockpiling in the United States and evidence relating to someone who has succeeded in some satellite country in tapping the telephone of a foreign ambassador. I think there is a considerable difference. If we adopt this kind of policy and establish a new joint committee, we are going to dry up sources of information. Men will not be willing to endanger their lives, and there will be a disruption of the very fine cooperative relations existing between our agency and the similar agencies of other coun-

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tries, notably the British Intelligence Agency, which has been one of the best for many years.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from Kentucky has expired.

Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, the Senator from Texas [Mr. JOHNSON] was called from the floor and asked me temporarily to function in his absence. I shall be glad to yield 5 additional minutes to the Senator from Kentucky.

Mr. BARKLEY. I thank the Senator from Georgia.

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Kentucky yield?

Mr. BARKLEY. I yield.

Mr. GORE. I thank the distinguished junior Senator from Kentucky.

The observations of the junior Senator from Georgia are well taken with reference to the substantial ground on which he has indicated he is opposed to the pending proposal. Other than on the ground that a joint committee cannot be trusted with preserving essential secrecy, I shall not challenge his position. But I would respectfully challenge the position taken by any Senator, if such a position should be taken, that a joint committee could not responsibly deal with the most sensitive secrets of our Government. It was for that purpose that I rose, and I thank my distinguished and able friend from Kentucky for yielding.

Mr. BARKLEY. Mr. President, there is one thing which differentiates the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy from the proposed committee. The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy deals legislatively with atomic energy. I have nothing but the greatest admiration for the manner in which that joint committee has functioned. But the Central Intelligence Agency deals with all manner of subjects, everywhere throughout the world. It is not limited to any particular form of defense or any particular form of offense. It is the duty of the CIA to encompass the entire world, and to report to the Security Council and the President. On the Security Council the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff sits, just as does the chairman of the Central Intelligence Agency.

I feel very deeply and sincerely that to open the records and the personnel of the CIA, which is an intelligence agency that gathers valuable and highly confidential information from all over the world, would handicap the CIA in obtaining the information which is so essential to our defense. The activities of the CIA cover the entire world, and the CIA makes reports on the entire world situation.

Because I believe it is not now necessary to create such a joint committee, and because I believe that to do so would be fraught with great danger, I shall oppose and vote against the concurrent resolution which is now before the Senate.

There is nothing more that I can say, and nothing more that I desire to say, in regard to the matter. I hope the Senate will not agree to the concurrent resolution.

Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, I do not know whether any other Senator,

while I am acting temporarily for the Senator from Texas, desires to have me yield him time.

If the Senator from Montana were agreeable, I would have no objection to having the committee amendments agreed to en bloc, and then yielding to the Senator from Montana such time as he might desire as the author of the concurrent resolution.

I may say to the Senator from Montana that the Senator from Missouri [Mr. SYMINGTON] wishes to speak for a few minutes. Did the Senator from Montana wish to conclude the debate?

Mr. MANSFIELD. Not necessarily. I shall be glad to follow the Senator's suggestion.

Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, with the agreement of the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL], who is the acting minority leader, I, as the acting majority leader, ask unanimous consent that the committee amendments be considered as agreed to en bloc, and that the time remaining on the amendments be yielded back.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

The committee amendments agreed to en bloc are as follows:

On page 3, line 21, after the word "report", to strike out "public"; in line 23, after the word "Senate", to strike out "The cost of such services to report executive hearings shall be fixed at an equitable rate by the joint committee"; on page 4, line 6, after the word "Government", to insert "on a reimbursable basis with the prior consent of the heads of the departments or agencies concerned and the Committee on Rules and Administration"; in line 11, after the word "paid", to strike out "one-half"; in line 12 after the word "Senate", to strike out "and one-half from the contingent fund of the House of Representatives"; and in line 14, after the word "chairman", to strike out "Disbursements to pay such expenses shall be made by the Secretary of the Senate out of the contingent fund of the Senate, such contingent fund to be reimbursed from the contingent fund of the House of Representatives in the amount of one-half of the disbursements so made."; so as to make the concurrent resolution read:

"Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That there is hereby established a Joint Committee on Central Intelligence to be composed of 6 Members of the Senate to be appointed by the President of the Senate, and 6 Members of the House of Representatives to be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives. Of the 6 members to be appointed from the Senate, 3 shall be members of the Central Intelligence Agency Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and 3 shall be members of the Central Intelligence Agency Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate. Of the 6 members to be appointed from the House of Representatives, 3 shall be members of the Central Intelligence Agency Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and 3 shall be members of the Central Intelligence Agency Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives. Not more than four members appointed from either the Senate or the House of Representatives shall be from the same political party.

"Sec. 2. (a) The joint committee shall make continuing studies of the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency and of prob-

lems relating to the gathering of intelligence affecting the national security and of its coordination and utilization by the various departments, agencies, and instrumentalities of the Government. The Central Intelligence Agency shall keep the joint committee fully and currently informed with respect to its activities. All bills, resolutions, and other matters in the Senate or the House of Representatives relating primarily to the Central Intelligence Agency shall be referred to the joint committee.

"(b) The members of the joint committee who are Members of the Senate shall from time to time report to the Senate, and the members of the joint committee who are Members of the House of Representatives shall from time to time report to the House, by bill or otherwise, their recommendations with respect to matters within the jurisdiction of their respective Houses which are (1) referred to the joint committee, or (2) otherwise within the jurisdiction of the joint committee.

"Sec. 3. Vacancies in the membership of the joint committee shall not affect the power of the remaining members to execute the functions of the joint committee, and shall be filled in the same manner as in the case of the original selection. The joint committee shall select a chairman and a vice chairman from among its members.

"Sec. 4. The joint committee, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, is authorized to hold such hearings, to sit and act at such places and times, to require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, to administer such oaths, to take such testimony, to procure such printing and binding, and to make such expenditures as it deems advisable. The cost of stenographic services to report hearings shall not be in excess of the amounts prescribed by law for reporting the hearings of standing committees of the Senate.

"Sec. 5. The joint committee is empowered to appoint such experts, consultants, technicians, and clerical and stenographic assistants as it deems necessary and advisable. The committee is authorized to utilize the services, information, facilities, and personnel of the departments and establishments of the Government on a reimbursable basis with the prior consent of the heads of the departments or agencies concerned and the Committee on Rules and Administration.

"Sec. 6. The expenses of the joint committee, which shall not exceed \$250,000 per year, shall be paid from the contingent fund of the Senate upon vouchers signed by the chairman."

Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, as I understand, the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL] would have to yield time to the Senator from Missouri. Although I am very much opposed to the concurrent resolution, I, as the acting majority leader, am supposed to yield time only to Senators who favor the concurrent resolution.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, do I understand correctly that the committee amendments have been agreed to?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendments have been agreed to en bloc. The question before the Senate is on agreeing to the concurrent resolution, as amended.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I yield 10 minutes, or as much of that time as he desires, to the Senator from Missouri [Mr. SYMINGTON] who wishes to speak in opposition to the concurrent resolution.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I appreciate the kindness of the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts.

As a former member of the National Security Council, I have had considerable experience with the Central Intelligence Agency, which reports to the National Security Council.

In my opinion, it would be a mistake to establish the proposed joint committee. The Central Intelligence Agency Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services is composed of the distinguished junior Senator from Georgia (Mr. RUSSELL), as chairman; the majority leader, the distinguished senior Senator from Texas (Mr. JOHNSON); the distinguished senior Senator from Virginia (Mr. BYRD); the present acting minority leader, the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. SALTONSTALL); and the distinguished senior Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. BRIDGES), who is the ranking Republican Member of the Senate.

Where could one find a better committee of the Senate?

I do not see why, under the present circumstances, there should be a special joint committee to supervise the Central Intelligence Agency.

I am sorry not to have been present for all the debate, having just returned from Omaha, Nebr., and have just now reached the floor.

This is one of the few times it has been my misfortune not to be able to vote with my able colleague, the distinguished junior Senator from Montana (Mr. MANSFIELD). He knows of my respect and affection for him. Nevertheless, in this case I cannot agree with him.

I thank the Senator from Massachusetts for yielding to me.

Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, I shall be glad to yield to the junior Senator from Montana as much time as he may desire from the 2 hours on the bill.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I shall take only 15 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The junior Senator from Montana is recognized for 15 minutes.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I wish my friend, the distinguished Senator from Missouri, had remained in Omaha. Unfortunately for the concurrent resolution, he has returned and is opposed to it. That means, of course, that the odds are lengthening a little more, because in addition to a former Vice President of the United States, who also was a member of the National Security Council; in addition to the distinguished junior Senator from Georgia (Mr. RUSSELL), who is a great statesman and a fine friend, and is outstanding as the chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed Services; in addition to the senior Senator from Arizona (Mr. HAYDEN), who has served his State ably and well since it achieved statehood, and who also is a very fine friend; in addition to the ranking minority member of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. SALTONSTALL); and in addition to the minority leader of the House; we find also that the President of the United States and the Central Intelligence Agency itself are opposed to the concurrent resolution.

The Senator from Georgia (Mr. RUSSELL) suggested that the statement with

reference to the \$40 million appropriated by Congress last year for the Marine Corps which the executive branch did not use to carry out the unanimous intent and mandate of Congress, had no proper connection with this subject. Of course, it has no connection directly, but it has a connection indirectly.

What is the executive branch trying to do? It is trying to take over, lock, stock, and barrel, as many of the functions of the legislative branch as it possibly can. Let us examine the record, simply to prove that point. The criticism applies to Democratic as well as to Republican administrations.

When President Roosevelt was in office, on three separate occasions he promulgated executive agreements which were, in effect and in fact, treaties of friendship and commerce. Under the advice and consent clause of the Constitution, those treaties should have come before the Senate for consideration and approval. Mind you, Mr. President, there were three executive agreements which should have been negotiated as treaties of friendship and commerce, and which should have come before the Senate for its advice and consent. But what did the Senate do in that respect? The Senate did nothing. It willingly relinquished the authority and the responsibility which were accorded it under the Constitution.

President Truman acted in similar fashion. Again, what did Congress do? Congress appropriated funds for a 70-group Air Force. What happened? President Truman impounded the money and allowed only enough to be spent for a 48-group Air Force. That was just before the Korean war. Do Senators remember that? If that was not a flouting of congressional authority, I do not know what it was. Certainly it meant that the executive branch was not a co-equal branch of the Government, but was the predominant branch of the Government.

We find that last year Congress unanimously restored \$40 million in order to keep the Marine Corps at its then strength, to prevent its reduction by some 25,000 men in this fiscal year. That was done under the leadership of the distinguished junior Senator from Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON), who now speaks against the concurrent resolution.

Was it only the Marine Corps which was cut down last year? Not at all. The strength of the Army was reduced by approximately 300,000 men. So on June 30 of this year there will be 1,025,000 men in the Army of the United States. Think of that, notwithstanding the worldwide commitments we have. In addition, the Navy was cut down. Those actions on the part of the administration indicate to me that there is a trend—a strong trend—and a trend to which the Senate and the Congress are acceding—on the part of the executive to take over more and more control.

I cannot understand why the constitutional lawyers in this body do not rise on their hind legs and protest against the loss of power which is being suffered by the Congress, and especially the Senate, and take some action to regain the powers which the Executive, through

the praetorian guard it has in the White House, and certain agencies, has taken unto himself. If Senators do not wake up, some day they will find that they are members of a debating society, and not Members of the Senate of the United States, as the Constitution intended them to be.

Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. McNAMARA in the chair). Does the Senator from Montana yield to the Senator from Georgia?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I shall yield in a moment. What happened when the resolution was to be considered by the Committee on Rules and Administration? Two days before, the President of the United States announced the creation of an 8-man Civilian Board to advise him on the CIA. What kind of powers does that Board have? None, really. It is to meet once every 6 months. To whom is the Board to report? To the President of the United States. Will the members of the Board be able to give out any information to anybody else? No, not at all. In this particular instance where does Congress come in? What type of men are we? Do we have responsibilities? We are elected. We have to fight for these jobs. We represent the people. We are not appointed. We have to make an accounting of the responsibilities which have been thrust upon us.

When word was received that the resolution was going to be considered, the President announced, and I believe hurriedly—and I do not blame him for it—that the Board had been created, and he said he was doing it in accord with the recommendations of the Hoover Commission. He was partly right, but only halfway right, because the Hoover Commission said that not only should a civilian board be created, but that a joint congressional committee should be created as well. And that was the second time the Hoover Commission had recommended the creation of a joint congressional committee.

What do we have now? We have the CIA doing everything it possibly can to defeat this resolution—a resolution which is intended to safeguard them and give them some security and an outlet which they do not have now, because the contracts they have with the Congress are very thin, indeed.

What did the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts say on Monday last? Twice a year the CIA appears before the appropriate subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services. Once a year it appears before the Appropriations Subcommittee, and at that time the officials of the CIA ask for money. Ask for how much? What do we know about the funds appropriated to them? What do we know about the agency's personnel? We do not know anything. Perhaps we should not, but we ought to have a standing joint committee which can take care of it.

I think it is well to refer to another point, since the distinguished Senator from Georgia has brought it out. The Senator referred to my remarks about a small staff. Of course, that staff would

have to have the highest possible clearance. I should like to ask the Senator from Georgia if in the meetings, having to do with the CIA, which Mr. Allen Dulles and his assistants have with the members of the Armed Services Subcommittee and with members of the Appropriations Subcommittee, staff members are absent and only Members of the Senate are in attendance.

Mr. RUSSELL. I shall answer the question of the Senator from Montana with a "no," even though he would not permit me to ask a question a moment ago. I have had one staff member present during the course of the hearings. I have had one staff member present, and only one, who has been with the committee since I have been a member of the committee. I have not brought in other staff members of the committee, even though I have full confidence in them, because I see no necessity for it, just as I see no necessity for an appropriation of \$150,000 for a new staff which it is proposed to create.

The Senator from Montana has said the Armed Services Committee knows nothing about the agency, and that the Appropriations Committee knows nothing about it. Before the debate is concluded, the Senator from Arizona [Mr. HAYDEN] will state that officials of the agency come before the Appropriations Committee, and the committee members know as much about how the agency spends its money as they know in the case of many other agencies.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I thank the Senator, and apologize to him for not having yielded when he asked me to.

Mr. RUSSELL. I certainly intended no criticism of the Senator for not yielding to me. I know how it is when the Senator is in the course of making his remarks, which he has outlined in his mind. I would not have interrupted the Senator, who was making a very eloquent speech, if I had not wanted to call something to his attention, which I have forgotten now. I hope my interruption did not have the effect of annoying the Senator.

Mr. MANSFIELD. No, indeed.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I agree with much of the remarks of the distinguished Senator regarding the encroachment of the executive on the legislative branch of Government. I am sure the Senator knows, in illustrations he gave with respect to the Military Establishment, what my feelings are in those matters. But we have a fine subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee handling the CIA from the standpoint of Senate legislative analysis and determination. I think that committee as capable a committee—and I believe the distinguished Senator from Montana would agree—as could be obtained in the Senate.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I certainly would agree with the Senator. It is a good committee.

Mr. SYMINGTON. If he believes the committee has been remiss in its handling of the CIA, which is a function of the Senate Armed Services Committee, I

shall be very glad to cooperate with my distinguished friend from Montana in any suggestions he may care to make.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I may say to my good friend, the Senator from Missouri, that the one thing he could do to put into effect his offer is to vote for the resolution, because what the resolution proposes to do is to bring the subcommittees together. It would not break the continuity they now have with the CIA. The same persons would be involved, but there would be a standing joint committee, with a small staff, with the highest possible clearance. This committee could furnish an outlet for both the Congress and the CIA. I think this is the best way to handle the matter.

Certainly, I have never advocated that we should exercise undue oversight over the CIA, because I recognize the need for a certain amount of secrecy. I have not even advocated open sessions of the joint committee, if it should be created, because the occasions would be rare when such an instance would arise. Had there been a joint committee at the time the CIA headquarters fight was on, perhaps something could have been done; but otherwise there is no reason I can see why any of the meetings should be open.

There is no reason for anyone to suspect or be suspicious that the sponsors of the resolution want to pry into the secrets of the CIA; but I say to my colleagues that the Senate and the House—the Congress of the United States—have the right, under our system of checks and balances, to exercise some degree of control, not through subcommittees which meet occasionally, but through a regular standing joint committee. I, for one, feel that Members of Congress can be trusted as well as can a group of private citizens who may occasionally be given such information as the Agency wants to put before them. I think Members of the Congress can be trusted just as much as can the members of the National Security Council. Certainly I have every faith in the men and women with whom I am associated in the Congress; and I would say that insofar as the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy is concerned, it has exercised a high degree of discretion during the many years it has been in operation.

The distinguished junior Senator from Kentucky [Mr. BARKLEY], formerly Vice President of the United States, told the Senate about his contacts with the National Security Council while he was Vice President, and he referred to Gen. Walter Bedell Smith. I should like to inform the Members of the Senate that, so far as I know, Walter Bedell Smith is in favor of a measure of this kind, and I believe he has so stated on a number of occasions. I believe that any right-thinking Director of the CIA would welcome such a group, if for no other reason than the agency's security and its protection from unjustified attacks by individuals or groups.

Mr. President, there are other things I should like to discuss.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from Montana has expired.

Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, I am glad to yield to the Senator from Montana as much further time as he may desire to have.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I should like to have 10 more minutes.

Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, I yield an additional 10 minutes to the Senator from Montana.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Montana is recognized for 10 minutes more.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, today our attention has been called to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and its application to the pending proposal. Let me point out that at the bottom of page 12 of the report of the Committee on Rules and Administration in regard to Senate Concurrent Resolution 2, we find the following recommendation—one of the recommendations of the Hoover Commission:

RECOMMENDATION

(a) That the President appoint a committee of experienced private citizens, who shall have the responsibility to examine and report to him periodically on the work of Government foreign intelligence activities. This committee should also give such information to the public as the President may direct. The Commission should function on a part-time and per diem basis.

The second part of the recommendation of the Hoover Commission is the important one:

(b) That the Congress consider creating a joint congressional committee on foreign intelligence, similar to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. In such case, the two committees, one Presidential and the other congressional, should collaborate on matters of special importance to the national security.

What did the President do? He appointed a group of private citizens, but he took a stand against the creation of a joint committee; and, according to the newspapers, he said that the CIA was too sensitive for Congress to take up.

Mr. President, who does the President of the United States think the Members of Congress are? In our own way, we have just as much responsibility as he does; and I, for one, intend to do everything I possibly can to see to it that the powers given to Congress by the Constitution are retained by the Congress, and are not whittled down or taken away, and are not willingly given up. I think the Congress is in danger, and we should recognize that fact.

I should also like to bring to the attention of the Senate the fact that I hold in my hand a letter from Mr. Clarence Francis, chairman of the Committee for the Hoover Report. He was a member of the Hoover Commission when it was in operation. In speaking for the Committee for the Hoover Report, he comes out in wholehearted support of Senate Concurrent Resolution 2.

Let me point out that two Members of the Senate were members of the Hoover Commission—the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. BARBERS] and the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. McCLELLAN]. According to information given to me by the Senator from New Hampshire, they went on record, during the

time when the Commission was in existence, as being opposed to the creation of a civilian commission, and as being in favor of the establishment of a joint congressional committee. Those two Senators were our representatives on the Hoover Commission; and that was their recommendation, as I understand.

Instead of having this matter handled by the two subcommittees to which reference has been made—which meet occasionally, but are not vitally and solely interested in the CIA, for they have many other duties—I certainly believe that a regular, standing joint committee of the Senate and the House of Representatives should be established to look after the interests of the Congress and also to look after the interests of the people of the United States in this field. I trust those with whom I am associated in the House and the Senate; I trust them, regardless of whether they be Republicans or Democrats.

Certainly we as a body are entitled to as much consideration as are members of the National Security Council or members of a private commission or members of any other group. After all, the Congress has the ultimate responsibility. Congress has the obligation of appropriating the moneys used in the Government service. Congress creates the various agencies, but then sits back and lets the Executive take over as much control as it desires to have. Mr. President, I think it is about time for the Senate to wake up.

Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, will the Senator from Montana yield to me?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. RUSSELL. I do not wish to prolong the debate, but certainly I do not like to have the Senator from Montana leave me in the position of seemingly wishing to surrender any of the powers of the Congress.

What I am trying to have the Congress do is keep where they are now, in the Armed Services Committee and the Appropriations Committee, the powers which the Senator from Montana proposes to take from those committees and lodge in the proposed joint committee. I know of nothing such a joint committee could do that the Armed Services Committee and the Appropriations Committee cannot do.

The Senator from Montana referred to the Marine Corps fiasco in the executive branch of the government. To the very best of my ability, I have fought to obtain the appropriations for the Marine Corps. I have expressed my grievous and distinct disapproval of the action of the executive branch in not expending those appropriations for the purpose for which they were made by Congress. I have undertaken to—well, Mr. President, I do not like to use a strong word, but I have made it perfectly clear to the Secretary of Defense and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that I think they have gone directly counter to the clear intent of the Congress. Of course, they added insult to injury by submitting budget estimates by means of which they undertook to have the money we appropriated for the Marine Corps used by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and by other

civilian agencies. On yesterday afternoon I had the privilege, in the Appropriations Committee, of making a motion to strike out that language, so as at least to show that we do not propose to stand by and have insult added to injury.

But I must confess that I do not exactly see the relationship between the Marine Corps incident—much as I deplore it and much as I condemn it—and the efforts which are being made to remove these powers of supervision from the committees which now have them.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I wish to say again—I have already said it many times—that the Marines have never had a better friend than the distinguished Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], the chairman of the Armed Services Committee. That is a well known and an established fact; and I know he was the one who was primarily responsible, behind the actions of the distinguished Senator from Missouri [Mr. SYMINGTON], last year, in bringing about a restoration of the \$40 million which Mr. Wilson, the Secretary of Defense, acting for the President, impounded, and later used in part for other purposes in the office of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy, and a few other of the agencies under his jurisdiction. So I am delighted that the distinguished Senator from Georgia did what he did on yesterday. I only hope that he will see to it that if these moneys are not used for the Marine Corps, as they should be, they will be returned to the general Treasury and will not be used for other purposes.

Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, if the Senator from Montana will indulge me, let me say that I think the funds should be reappropriated, so as again to have the Congress go on record regarding its desire to have the money used for the Marine Corps, and so as again to show that the present Department of Defense, acting under the Chief Executive, has been clearly flouting its responsibility to act in accordance with the directives of the Congress, which has the responsibility of raising and maintaining armies for the defense of the United States.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Am I to understand from what the distinguished Senator says that if he has his way this money is to be used by the Marine Corps for the purposes intended?

Mr. RUSSELL. We shall have to reappropriate it, but I shall certainly make every effort, when the defense bill comes before the Senate, to see that it is reappropriated for the Marine Corps.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I thank the Senator.

Referring to the second part of the Senator's question, I did not say that the Marine Corps matter, the 70-group Air Force matter, or the matter of executive agreements was directly connected with the CIA. However, I tried to indicate that indirectly, through the years, both during Democratic and Republican administrations, there has been a tendency on the part of the Executive to assume our responsibility, and to get away from the idea of coequality, as provided by the Constitution. I certainly did not mean to imply any per-

sonal responsibility on the part of the distinguished Senator from Georgia, whom I recognize as one of the great constitutional lawyers of this body. I tried to indicate that that was being done willingly, so far as the Congress as a whole was concerned, because we are not fighting the tendency to shift power away from us.

Mr. RUSSELL. So far as the Senator from Georgia is concerned, he will condemn such a trend at every opportunity. I know of no other way to fight it. I regret that there are not more Members of Congress who feel as does the Senator from Montana, who has expressed himself so forcefully.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I thank the Senator from Georgia.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes in opposition to the distinguished Senator from Idaho [Mr. DWORSHAK].

Mr. DWORSHAK. Mr. President, I have listened to the debate this afternoon with a great deal of interest. I have been undecided as to whether I would vote for or against the concurrent resolution.

I have profound respect for my colleague, the junior Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], with whom I serve as a member of the Appropriations Committee; and likewise for the distinguished chairman of the Appropriations Committee, the senior Senator from Arizona [Mr. HAYDEN].

Logically there is much truth in what has been said, to the effect that there is little justification for the creation of another joint committee. We have an adequate number of standing committees now, if they function effectively and discharge their duties as they should. It is true, as the Senator from Georgia pointed out, that probably we now have access to information, data, and records of the Central Intelligence Agency through the Armed Services Committee, of which he is the chairman, and likewise through the Appropriations Committee.

I have had some experiences in this connection during the past year. A year ago I was assigned to membership on the subcommittee on Defense Appropriations. For a long time I had had certain misgivings and uncertainty with respect to the operations of the CIA. I was very eager to find out something about the CIA, because it is a very vital and important agency in the executive department of the Government.

When the director of the CIA appeared before the Senate appropriations subcommittee, I was so naive as to think that, as a member of the committee, and a Member of the Senate, I might be entitled to some information.

I ventured to ask certain questions of the director. I was told very emphatically "This information is classified." Information as to the number of personnel is classified, whether there are 1,000, 10,000, or 20,000 employees and officials working for CIA. Oh, Mr. President, that is highly classified information!

Then when I directed questions to the director about the amount of money required to operate the CIA, I was again told, quite forthrightly, "This is classified

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information." Hush, hush! Members of the Appropriations Committee must be willing to assume that the CIA, as a part of our Defense Establishment, is operating efficiently. We are told that it should not be our concern to inquire whether we are obtaining full value for the several millions of dollars which are appropriated annually for the CIA.

At this point I should like to have the Record show that while I do not think it is necessary to establish another committee to ride herd on the CIA, I am wondering whether members of the Appropriations Committee and the Armed Services Committee are fully informed as to the far-flung operations of the CIA. I wonder whether the former Vice President, the Junior Senator from Kentucky (Mr. BARKLEY), and the Junior Senator from Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON), who was formerly the head of the Air Force of our country, are fully informed.

The CIA must operate in a manner which provides the maximum safeguards for the safety of those who place their own lives in jeopardy when they go abroad to work in countries behind the Iron Curtain and obtain information essential to our national defense. But, Mr. President, I think it is the direct responsibility of the Congress and its duly constituted committees to take a profound interest in the operations of the CIA, and to determine whether or not an efficient job is being done. It is not enough to receive assurances from the Director that his agency is doing outstanding work and to say at that point that the Congress of the United States has no further responsibility with respect to the operations of the CIA.

During the past year the CIA personnel near the top level probably have been concerned with many vital questions of intelligence. However, they have not been too busily engaged to avert a controversy concerning the proposed construction of a \$50 million showplace across the Potomac in Virginia.

I wonder, if the CIA spreads out its personnel throughout the entire world to gather this vital information, why it is necessary to build a grand showplace on the Potomac costing \$50 million. I do not know how many employees would be housed there, but I leave it to the good judgment of my colleagues to say whether it is necessary to have a \$50 million administration building for the CIA. If it is, then obviously it is proposed to house probably several thousand employees. I think the newspapers have indicated that 6,000 or 7,000 employees would be located in this magnificent palace on the banks of the Potomac.

I ask Members of the Senate whether the CIA operatives and officials propose to obtain this vital secret information right here in the National Capital. Why should it be necessary to house 6,000 or 7,000 employees in the National Capital? I had assumed that the primary function of the CIA was to visit the far-flung areas of the world to gather this vital information. I certainly hope the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Armed Services will make it his responsibility to find out why it is necessary to have that grand showplace on

the Potomac. It is already being called the Little Pentagon.

I remember when some Members of the Senate, especially of my own party, were critical of a Democratic President who had the Pentagon constructed at a cost of about three times the funds that had been originally requested of Congress. We were quite critical, because we thought it was too lavish a building for the military.

Now we are to have a Little Pentagon. It may be very difficult to get CIA operating personnel to leave the lush showplace on the banks of the Potomac and undertake dangerous and hazardous missions in countries throughout the world.

Mr. President, last summer, I like many other Americans, read articles in the press and listened to reports over the radio which indicated that possibly in the Soviet Union an economic upheaval of some kind was imminent.

There was confusing information available upon which to base any definite conclusions. Therefore, with the Senator from North Dakota (Mr. Young) and other Members of the Senate, I made a brief visit behind the Iron Curtain last September. We visited Moscow for 6 days, including 2 hours conferring with Khrushchev and Bulganin, as well as with Ambassador Bohlen and members of his staff.

The most amazing and astounding thing we learned on our visit behind the Iron Curtain was that there was little evidence of an impending economic upheaval or crash of any kind. I was somewhat dumfounded as I viewed the situation there. I am sure the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee will agree with me—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from Idaho has expired.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, I yield five additional minutes to the Senator from Idaho.

Mr. DWORSHAK. I am sure the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, who likewise traveled behind the Iron Curtain, made similar observations. Is that not true?

Mr. RUSSELL. I will say to the distinguished Senator from Idaho that I spent 17 days in Russia. I went from the Baltic to the Caspian over to the Black Sea, and up to Kiev, through the center of Russia, and I found that there was no impending revolution. If there was, it was certainly well disguised from the eyes of tourists.

Mr. DWORSHAK. Did the Senator from Georgia see any apparent evidence of the oncoming crash of any kind?

Mr. RUSSELL. No; I did not. Of course, under the Soviet system, no one has very much to have a crash with, unless it be a failure of crops. From what I saw, they had fairly good crops when I visited the farms.

Mr. DWORSHAK. In the city of Moscow it was apparent that seven or eight million people were enjoying economic security to a large extent. Is that correct?

Mr. RUSSELL. They were not enjoying the kind of standard living that

Americans have. However, according to their standards, I suppose that is so. They had plenty of bread and enough clothing, so far as I could see.

Mr. DWORSHAK. I thank the Senator for his observation. The only reason I am referring to my experience behind the Iron Curtain is that I was convinced the highly rated CIA, charged with the responsibility of getting information in far-flung places, did not have any information, or very little reliable information, concerning the economic status of people behind the Iron Curtain.

Again I ask Members of Congress whether it is not our responsibility to learn whether the millions of dollars which we annually appropriate for CIA are used properly and effectively. If Members of Congress, after spending a few weeks behind the Iron Curtain can come home with definite ideas about the economic conditions in Russia, then certainly it is not expected too much of CIA to be able to gather the information for the people of this country. Congress, the armed services, and the National Security Council should be properly informed about the very vital conditions that exist in the countries which are opposed to our way of life.

I shall not belabor the point, Mr. President, because I feel sure that the concurrent resolution will not be adopted. However, I hope that those who are responsible for the operations of the CIA will not assume that such action is evidence that Congress is not interested in what is done by that agency. Certainly CIA has features which require its operation without complete disclosure of what is being done, but the agency should make reports to standing committees, like the Committee on Appropriations and the Armed Services Committee. However, I think it is our responsibility, and I charge the two committees and the chairmen of those two committees to see to it that we do not permit the CIA to operate in any but in the most efficient manner, which will justify the appropriations which are being made for its operations. Because the funds for the agency are integrated with the funds appropriated for the armed services, it should not be assumed that Congress is not interested in—or that the American people are not demanding—a full report to the responsible committees of the Congress.

In closing, Mr. President, I should like to say that, whether we have a special committee appointed or have standing committees deal with this vital question, I take the position that Members of Congress can be trusted to consider any vital classified information to the same extent that the civilian employees of CIA can be trusted.

Likewise, I hope when the great showplace on the Potomac is completed—its construction has already been authorized—that CIA will not make the tragic blunder of housing surplus employees there and giving them soft berths when they should be operating in the field. It is the responsibility of Congress to make certain that CIA knows what is going on behind the Iron Curtain and that it is

aware of conditions that exist everywhere in the world, if it is to function in accordance with its obligations and responsibilities as a vital arm of our defense.

Mr. ROOSEVELT. Mr. President, I yield myself 2 minutes in opposition. I wish the House to show in this debate that I am very much opposed to the concurrent resolution. I gave my reasons at length on Monday when I debated the matter with the Senator from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD].

I merely wish to add at this time that I am opposed to the resolution because it is impractical and because I believe it is unnecessary. It is impractical because it will be a step toward drying up the sources of our information which it is necessary for our intelligence agency to have, and will make it very dangerous for the grave men who are conducting our intelligence activities.

I believe it is unnecessary because two subcommittees of committees of the House and of the Senate now have the responsibility of looking into CIA and its duties and into the way it is carrying out its duties. If Congress is not given sufficient attention, it is the fault of Congress, not the fault of methods of organization. For these reasons and for the reasons I gave last Monday, I am opposed to the concurrent resolution.

Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes, or as much time as he may need in opposition, to the Senator from Arizona [Mr. HAYDEN].

Mr. HAYDEN. Mr. President, as a member of the Committee on Rules and Administration I filed my individual views in opposition to the pending concurrent resolution, and I ask that they be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. LAIRD in the chair). Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. HAYDEN. Mr. President, I have listened with great interest to the debate, and, like the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], I have very carefully read the proceedings of last Monday, not being privileged, as he was not, to be present at that time. I was interested in noting that there was a repetition of the idea expressed by the provision in section 2 of the concurrent resolution that "the Central Intelligence Agency shall keep the joint committee fully and currently informed with respect to its activities." I was urged that the information thus disclosed should be made available not only to members of the joint committee, but, it was further stated, to all Members of the Congress and even generally to the American people. How it would be possible to keep the American people fully informed and at the same time keep our Communist enemies in Moscow in the dark, it is difficult to imagine.

There must be secrets. There are men all over the world who are engaged in the service of the CIA. Are we to tell the dictators in Moscow how much money we are spending in employing these men, and where they are employed? If a representative of the Central Intelligence

Agency should penetrate into China and obtain information from a Chinese, if he obtained any information for which he had to pay, would it be thought that he should furnish a voucher for it? The CIA cannot do business that way. If it became known that a resident of China gave any information about the widespread human slavery which communism has imposed upon the people there to one of our Central Intelligence agents, he would not live very long.

I was interested in the assertion that we must maintain some kind of supervision and control of congressional prerogatives. A Marine Corps appropriation was used as an illustration. The facts in the Marine Corps case were that Congress appropriated money to maintain the Marine Corps at 215,000 men, and the administration allowed the corps to drop down to less than 200,000 men, and consequently did not spend the money which Congress had appropriated. There is absolutely no way to compel the executive branch to spend money which Congress has appropriated. I found that out when I first became a Member of the House of Representatives. I made my first political campaign in Arizona in an Apperson Jackrabbit automobile, which became stuck in the quicksands of the Gila River and we had to have the help of Apache horsemen who used their ropes and saddle horns to pull us out. At that time I made a vow that if I should be elected to Congress I would try to have a bridge built across the Gila River. When I was elected I proceeded to try to carry out my vow. I introduced a bill, which provided money to build a bridge across the Gila River on the San Carlos Reservation. When the bill was under discussion, Mr. James R. Mann, the Republican minority leader of the House at that time, insisted that since the Osage Indians who were once very poor but who had become rich through oil discoveries, the San Carlos Apaches might some day become wealthy and in that event should reimburse the Government for the cost of the bridge and his amendment was adopted. The Bureau of Indian Affairs refused to build the bridge so long as that condition was attached; Congress had appropriated the money for it but the bridge was never built.

The Constitution provides that the President "shall take care that the laws are faithfully executed" but does not fix the time when he shall do so. Congress can appropriate money for maintaining the Marine Corps at full strength but the President does not care to spend it, there is nothing we can do about it. There is no way of compelling any executive department to spend money if it does not wish to do so. Consequently there is no connection between the failure of the administration to spend money appropriated for the Marine Corps and the need for the pending resolution.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator from Arizona yield?

Mr. HAYDEN. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. There is no direct connection, but there is a pattern. I tried to point out earlier in the debate that 2 days before we had a hearing the

President hurried up his appointment of the private commission recommended by the Hoover Commission. I think he did it to forestall action by the Senate committee and to make certain that he could say, "I followed the Hoover Commission's recommendations," which he did in part, but he did not follow the main part, which was the creation of a joint committee on the CIA, a proposal which had been advocated by both this and the previous Hoover Commission some 5 years before.

The executive department, I submit, is arrogating unto itself more and more power all the time. I stated that under Roosevelt there were executive agreements which were in reality treaties of friendship and commerce and which should have been brought before the Senate. Under Truman, Congress appropriated funds for a 70-group Air Force, but these funds were impounded by the President and enough allowed for only a 48-group Air Force. Under Eisenhower, Congress appropriated \$40 million, which Congress said should be used to maintain the Marine Corps at its then present level. So they tie in.

Mr. HAYDEN. In my opinion, there is no tie-in. The Central Intelligence Agency is an arm of the President. Under the Constitution, I feel we have no right to attempt to regulate an agency which is designed solely to provide the President, who, under the Constitution, is responsible for our foreign relations, with information to enable him to make decisions.

There is complaint that the various departments do not tell us all we should know. If that be the case, and they do not give Congress all the information it should receive, why not appoint a watchdog committee to supervise the President's Cabinet? Cabinet members can perform their duties out loud or be quiet about it, but their official actions are included in the responsibility placed upon the executive department. There are three distinct branches of government. I am just as much opposed to congressional invasion of the executive branch as I am to an invasion by the executive of the congressional branch. Each has its place. If we are to place watchdogs elsewhere, why not insist that Congress have a watchdog in attendance at every meeting of the President's Cabinet?

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator from Arizona yield further?

Mr. HAYDEN. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I think the Senator is taking an extreme view of the resolution. The purpose is not to pry into the secrets of the CIA. The idea, in reality, is to safeguard and secure the CIA in furnishing outlets both ways. I do not see how the Senator can disagree with reference to treaties of friendship and commerce—

Mr. HAYDEN. I do not wish to enter into an argument with my good friend. I know there have been at times efforts on the part of the legislative branch to exercise dominating power. The Senator will remember the attempted impeachment of President Andrew Johnson. The legislative branch can go to

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extremes and the executive branch can go to extremes. Some complaints have recently been made that the judicial branch has gone to extremes. But there are certain constitutional limitations on all three branches of the Government and, because of those limitations, our Government is today the oldest continuous government in the world. We should keep our Government of divided responsibility the way it is. Nothing of value would be gained by agreeing to the concurrent resolution.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. HAYDEN. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I agree with the Senator from Arizona that our Government should be conducted as it was intended to be conducted under the Constitution. But am I not correct in assuming that differences relative to the equal division of powers, so-called, and supposedly, between the executive branch and the legislative branch can be settled in the judicial branch by the Supreme Court?

Mr. HAYDEN. Sometimes.

Mr. MANSFIELD. If that is the case, why not agree to a concurrent resolution, which will be purely congressional action, which does not call for approval by the President of the United States, but which requires only a majority vote of both Houses? Then, if the executive branch thinks that the legislative branch is infringing upon the powers of the Executive under the Constitution, let the matter be taken to the Supreme Court, so that the executive and the legislative branches can ascertain where they both stand.

Mr. HAYDEN. There would be no necessity for the executive branch to take such a matter to the Supreme Court. The Executive could simply refuse to cooperate and Congress could not do anything about it. As I have said when the executive branch does not want to spend appropriated money, it does not have to do so. When the executive branch wants to hold a closed-door meeting of the Cabinet, it can do so, and Congress can do nothing about it.

EXHIBIT 1

INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF MR. HAYDEN STATEMENT

Senate Concurrent Resolution 2 is based upon the mistaken and erroneous assumption that the Congress has maintained little or no control over the expenditures of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and that Senators and Members of Congress who should be informed have been kept in the dark as to its activities because of a veil of secrecy imposed by the executive branch. The truth is that the Armed Services Committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives have continuously and do now maintain supervision over the operations of that Agency to an entirely adequate degree. This is made clear by quoting a paragraph from a letter addressed on January 26, 1956, to the chairman of the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration by the Senator from Georgia, Mr. Russell, who is the chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed Services:

"The responsible officials in the Central Intelligence Agency have demonstrated their willingness to keep the Armed Services and Appropriations Subcommittee fully informed on the subject of the Agency's ac-

tivities and operations. Although I cannot speak with authority on the extent to which all the existing subcommittees on Central Intelligence Agency carry out their functions, I do know that the subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee has had periodic contact with the appropriate Central Intelligence Agency officials. At these meetings the Central Intelligence Agency representatives have candidly furnished the desired information and have responded to the specific complaints and criticisms that have been voiced in Congress and in the press. It is entirely coincidental but it happens that the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee is holding its first meeting of 1956 with Central Intelligence Agency officials on the same date that your committee has scheduled for the consideration of Senate Concurrent Resolution 2."

ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE JURISDICTION

While no definite rule has been adopted by either body conferring jurisdiction over legislation relating to the Central Intelligence Agency upon the Armed Services Committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives there is a clear precedent which establishes that jurisdiction. The National Security Act of 1947 created the Central Intelligence Agency and since then the 3 subsequent amendments to that act affecting the Agency have all been considered by and reported from those 2 committees.

The functions of the Central Intelligence Agency are essentially functions of an executive character in assisting the President of the United States, the National Security Council, the State Department, and the Department of Defense to carry out their responsibilities. If a joint committee of the Congress is established to supervise the work of this executive Agency, it might very well be argued that due to some failure of the standing committees of both branches of Congress properly to perform their duties, a joint committee should be set up for each of the Departments of Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, and other executive agencies. If the CIA must have a "watchdog" joint committee, why not have one for the FBI?

THE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEES

Owing to the active interest taken by the ranking members of the Senate and House Armed Services Committees in the operations of the Central Intelligence Agency, it has not been necessary for like members of the Senate and House Appropriations Committees to devote as much attention to what the Agency is doing as would otherwise be required. When submitting requests for funds to carry on its activities, responsible officials of the Agency have demonstrated each year their willingness to keep the designated members of the Appropriations Committees fully informed as to its operations.

There has been open and free exchange of all necessary information required for an adequate liaison between the Congress and the Central Intelligence Agency. No information has been denied and all desired information has been candidly supplied.

I can also personally certify that committee members have, from time to time, refused proffered information because such information has no relation to the normal legislative procedures of Congress. How far to go in seeking detailed information is well stated in this further quotation from Senator Russell's letter:

"Throughout my tenure in the Senate I have consistently advocated the right of Members of Congress to information that was required for the formulation of legislation. In this instance, the legislation affecting the Central Intelligence Agency is not of sufficient magnitude to be burdensome. On the other hand, the importance of the results of Central Intelligence Agency activities to our national safety can hardly be exaggerated. If there is one agency of

the Government in which we must take some matters on faith without a constant examination of its methods and sources, I believe this Agency is the Central Intelligence Agency."

The concurrent resolution leaves little or no room to "take some matters in faith" by specifically directing that—

The Central Intelligence Agency shall keep the joint committee fully and currently informed with respect to all of its activities.

INVESTIGATIONS OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

As the history in the majority report indicates the Central Intelligence Agency has been intensely and repeatedly investigated by various special commissions during the past 5 years. Reference is made to a number of recommendations by these commissions and the report implies that there is little or no evidence of any action by the Central Intelligence Agency as a result of these recommendations. It is not alleged that the Central Intelligence Agency has failed to cooperate fully with commissions, sponsored both by the Congress and by the Executive, which have investigated its activities, or that it has failed to take positive action on their recommendations and to report such action to the appropriate congressional committees.

For example, the majority report refers to recommendations in the 1949 Hoover Commission report that a top-level evaluation board be set up within the Agency and that the internal structure of the Agency be reorganized and improved. In 1950, such an evaluation board was set up, and the internal structure of the Agency has been reorganized so as to improve its effectiveness. It is a fact that successive commissions which have investigated the Central Intelligence Agency have disagreed with the recommendations of their predecessors. It is also a fact that the Agency has adopted legitimate recommendations made in such reports without disrupting the continuity of its organization and activities.

The majority report also shows that, as recommended in the 1955 Hoover Commission report, the President by an Executive order issued on February 6, 1956, has established a board of consultants consisting of eight distinguished citizens, outside of the Government, to keep him regularly advised on the conduct of activities in the foreign intelligence field and to report its findings at least twice a year. The imposition of another supervisory committee with jurisdiction over the Agency would only serve to complicate matters.

The Congress and the President have given the Central Intelligence Agency a most important job to do. Subcommittees of standing committees of Congress have been created to provide for the appropriate jurisdiction of the Congress over this activity. The greatest service we can do now is to facilitate the important work of the Agency and to let it get its job done without being watchdogged to death.

THERE IS NO SECRECY FOR THE SAKE OF SECRECY

It should be emphasized, most strongly, that secrecy for secrecy's sake does not exist in, nor is it an objective of, the Central Intelligence Agency.

Such confidential and secret procedures and operations necessarily characterize its activities are designed wholly for the security of this Nation, the saving of men's lives and the obtaining of essential information which will achieve these vital ends. There is no present evidence of any policy of secrecy having become sacrosanct. Upon the contrary, such secrecy as is being observed is appropriate and necessary.

Furthermore, I repeat that the Central Intelligence Agency is subject to congressional review by four established and fully authorized subcommittees. The first 2 of

There are the subcommittees on the Central Intelligence Agency of the Senate and House Armed Services Committees; the second 2 of these are subcommittees of the Senate and House Appropriations Committees. These subcommittees seem clearly to be adequate for such a supervisory purpose and function. If they are not doing their job fully and properly, it should be brought promptly and emphatically to their attention as a more appropriate and effective means of achieving the end desired than the creation of a new joint congressional committee for such a purpose.

THE JOINT COMMITTEE STAFF

It would be almost impossible for the staff of such a joint legislative committee to function helpfully because of the high security demanded in the work of the Central Intelligence Agency. The information given to Members of Congress by officials of the Central Intelligence Agency is given to them personally and their judgment as to what may be properly reported is final.

Senate Concurrent Resolution 2 empowers the joint committee "to appoint such experts, consultants, technicians, and clerical and stenographic assistants as it deems necessary" and the majority report states that—

"The establishment of a Joint Committee on Central Intelligence will insure the existence of a trained, specialized, and dedicated staff to gather information and make independent checks and appraisals of CIA activities pursuant to the committee's directives and supervision."

This statement appears to contemplate that the staff will do the work and reach conclusions as to how effectively the Central Intelligence Agency is operating.

A new and separate staff of some magnitude must be contemplated since an annual expenditure of \$250,000 is authorized. This is almost as much as the \$288,000 now available to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, which at present maintains a professional and clerical staff of 21 individuals.

There is actually no real need for such a staff either large or small. Despite the flexibility which the Congress has granted to the Central Intelligence Agency in carrying out its unique functions, the Agency has administratively taken measures to control its expenditures in at least as strict a manner as other Government agencies and to require a complete accounting for the use of all of its funds, vouchered or unvouchered. This system, and the actual use of the funds are described each year to the appropriations subcommittees.

The Central Intelligence Agency is essentially any executive Agency. It is not an arm of the Congress to carry into effect legislative policies as are the Interstate Commerce, the Federal Trade or other like Commissions. The act of July 26, 1947, after first creating a National Security Council to advise the President on national security matters then established the Central Intelligence Agency under the National Security Council. The principal functions of the Agency were to correlate and evaluate for the Council information obtained from other departments and agencies of the Government and to keep the Chief Executive informed from day to day as to the activities of foreign governments with whom the Constitution gives the President the sole right to conduct foreign relations and to negotiate treaties.

It is obvious that there is no possible way for the joint committee to keep "fully and currently informed" with respect to all of the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency except to have a member of its staff sit in as a "watchdog" at all meetings of the National Security Council, and after each meeting make a report to the joint committee of what he has learned.

THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH CANNOT TAKE OVER AN EXECUTIVE FUNCTION

The creation of a Joint Committee on Central Intelligence, with the functions and powers provided for in Senate Concurrent Resolution 2 would be certain to raise a constitutional issue on the separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches of the Government. Activities are undertaken by the Central Intelligence Agency only in accordance with directives of the National Security Council. The availability of intelligence of the highest order to the President and to the National Security Council is an essential element in the formulation of the foreign policy of the United States, and in the conduct of foreign relations by the President in carrying out that policy. Any congressional action which seeks to alter the legally established relationship between the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Council would tend to impinge upon the constitutional authority and responsibility of the President in the conduct of foreign affairs.

The provisions of the National Security Act are a recognition by the Congress of the highly sensitive nature of Government intelligence activities. Senate Concurrent Resolution 2, if adopted, will not be submitted to the President for approval or disapproval. Consequently, any of its provisions which contravene existing law will have no mandatory effect. The existence of such provisions in a resolution agreed to by both Houses, however, would lead inevitably to continuing difficulties of construction and interpretation which would impair the continuity of sound and proper relationships between the executive and legislative branches in intelligence matters.

THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

The Central Intelligence Agency and the Atomic Energy Commission have nothing in common except the secrecy which is required because both deal with highly classified matters of the greatest importance to the national security. Beyond that, their functions are not comparable. Through the Commission as its operator, the Government is in the manufacturing business—the business of making nuclear energy. Consequently, the Congress has a very different relationship with that Commission than any other governmental agency.

The cost of this business operation is enormous. Beginning in 1941 with the Manhattan project, financed first from the emergency fund for the President and later in various hidden amounts in appropriation bills, and continuing with the Atomic Energy Commission since 1947, appropriations have totaled \$15,202,800,000, of which \$6,806,200,000 has been expended for operations and \$8,396,600,000 has been expended for facilities. The total amount made available to the Central Intelligence Agency since it was created in 1947 is only a minor fraction of even the smallest of those vast sums.

There has been need to make only minor changes in the act creating the Central Intelligence Agency, but the problems of atomic energy are constantly changing. Legislation concerning the activities of the Atomic Energy Commission must be frequently brought up to date to permit it to function adequately.

The dynamics of the program for developing peacetime aspects of atomic energy have tremendous potential consequences for major aspects of national policy. The future production of electric power from coal, oil, or natural gas may be vitally affected. Atomic Energy Commission policies can give rise to conflicts of interest between various groups and individuals and the resulting issues must be subjected to legislative scrutiny. For example, bills before the Joint Commit-

tee have such subjects as construction of industrial facilities, housing at Oak Ridge and self-government at Hanford, taxation, patents, contract awards, and guaranty of uranium ore prices. No such factors relate to the conduct of foreign intelligence.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A Joint Committee on Atomic Energy was established because of the particular nature of the nuclear problem and the fact that the Federal Government was forced to go into private business on a massive scale. This had important domestic implications in a broad range of fields. The intelligence activities, which it is proposed be subject to a joint committee's scrutiny, are peculiarly the prerogative of the Executive and intimately associated with the conduct of the foreign relations of the country.

I am firmly convinced that Congress now, through its regular Committees on Armed Services and on Appropriations has the opportunity to get the necessary information from the Central Intelligence Agency and the designated members of those committees are doing so without in any way endangering the security of the information given them. We must also remember that the Central Intelligence Agency carries on its work outside the United States boundaries. Many of its agents are in constant physical danger. We, as Members of Congress, must do our part to see that the work is carried on wisely, efficiently, and with due security to the persons who are working in the interests of our Government.

The contacts between the Central Intelligence Agency and the Congress should never be allowed to prejudice or compromise the highly secret work of that Agency. What the Congress has needed to know in the past it has been told. What the Congress will require to know in the future it can obtain through means already in existence. A new joint committee will only complicate the process.

For the above stated reasons I voted against reporting Senate Concurrent Resolution 2 to the Senate and urgently recommend that it be not agreed to.

Mr. BUSH. Mr. President, I should like to speak for 2 minutes in opposition to the concurrent resolution.

Mr. KNOWLAND. I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from Connecticut.

Mr. BUSH. Mr. President, I wish to associate myself fully with the remarks recently made by the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL] and also with the position so ably taken by the distinguished Senator from Arizona [Mr. HAYDEN], both in his written individual views and on the floor. I think the Senator from Arizona has made the situation very clear and has covered three important points.

I should like to emphasize, first, that the language of the concurrent resolution seems to me to be utterly impossible of fulfillment when it provides:

The Central Intelligence Agency shall keep the joint committee fully and currently informed with respect to its activities.

I consider it to be absolutely impossible for the Agency to function in that manner. If it tried to do so, it would endanger the lives of Americans who may be in the service of this Government behind the Iron Curtain, and of persons who may be prisoners of war or who may be, indeed, nationals of some of the countries which are behind the Iron Curtain. I think it would be a perilous undertak-

ing, and on that ground alone the concurrent resolution should be rejected.

The Senator from Arizona (Mr. HAYDEN) has pointed out very ably that the Central Intelligence Agency is a functionary of the executive branch and is intimately associated with the conduct of the foreign relations of the United States. That, I believe, is true and should be true.

The important thing in connection with the administration of the CIA is that we have as the top Administrator of that organization a man of the highest quality and the greatest ability. I take this opportunity to say that I believe the Government and the country as a whole are very fortunate to have in that position now, in the person of Allen Dulles, a man who is ideally suited by experience, by temperament, and by character to fulfill the obligations of that office.

Therefore, Mr. President, I join very strongly with the distinguished Senator from Arizona in opposing the concurrent resolution.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished junior Senator from Montana.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I have listened with much interest this afternoon to my friends, the distinguished senior Senator from Arizona and the distinguished senior Senator from Connecticut. It was an unusual feature of today's session to hear the Senator from Arizona relate some of the experiences of his early days in politics. I wish to assure the Senator that not only were they apropos, but they were well appreciated.

The Senator from Arizona in his individual views has raised a number of questions, and I should like to try to answer some of them, so long as the report and the individual views of Mr. HAYDEN will be included in the RECORD of today's debate.

On page 24, in the individual views of Mr. HAYDEN, the Senator from Arizona states:

If the CIA must have a "watchdog" joint committee, why not have one for the FBI?

As I understand the FBI is a part of the Department of Justice. There are committees in both House of Congress whose purpose it is to supervise matters affecting the Department of Justice, of which the FBI is a part.

Further on the same page, the Senator from Arizona states:

The concurrent resolution leaves little or no room to "take some matters in faith" by specifically directing that—

The Central Intelligence Agency shall keep the joint committee fully and currently informed with respect to all of its activities.

The word "all" is italicized.

I would be willing to agree to the elimination of the word "all," so that the sentence would read:

The Central Intelligence Agency shall keep the joint committee fully and currently informed with respect to its activities.

In that way, a wrong interpretation could not be attached to that particular word.

The question relative to the joint committee staff has been answered in the

colloquy between the Senator from Georgia (Mr. RUSSELL) and myself. Once again, all I can state is that I recognize the difficulties which the CIA apprehends, and that the staff to be selected, if the resolution shall be agreed to, should be very small and certainly should have the highest possible clearance.

Reference has been made to the sum of \$250,000 provided in the concurrent resolution. I would say that the amount is unimportant; that when I submitted the concurrent resolution, the space for the amount was left blank. The amount of \$250,000 was inserted by the Committee on Rules and Administration. So far as I am concerned, \$25,000 would do the job. I think that amount would be sufficient.

At the bottom of page 26, the Senator from Arizona states:

The legislative branch cannot take over an executive function.

I cannot agree with that statement, because I have tried to point out that that is not the purpose of this particular concurrent resolution. The purpose of the concurrent resolution is to retain for Congress the powers which have been granted to it under the Constitution, and to stop the trend of power grabbing which the administrations, both Democratic and Republican, have been following in recent years.

I wish to say again that I think the Senate, and Congress as a whole, ought to wake up to its responsibilities, to guard them, and to guard them well. I wonder if Senators think it odd that the CIA does not want a committee of the kind proposed by the concurrent resolution? Can Senators think of any other agency of the Government which would willingly agree to have a congressional committee supervise it? Not at all. If Senators will examine the legislative history, they will find that all executive agencies do not want to have any congressional supervision, because they feel they will be hamstrung, they will be held down, they will not be allowed to spend as much as they would like to spend. That is the history of bureaucracy under Republican and Democratic administrations.

Do Senators think the executive branch trusts Congress? I think that is immaterial. The question I want to ask is, Does Congress trust itself? Do we think that civilian groups should be given greater authority, and that the Executive should show more confidence in them than we can place in ourselves?

I think we should consider this particular matter and recognize that the concurrent resolution now before the Senate does not call for presidential approval. It is a matter which Congress itself—the Senate and the House—must consider and pass upon. In conclusion, I only say that the choice is ours.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the question of agreeing to the concurrent resolution.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, I yield myself 2 minutes.

I rise in opposition to the Mansfield resolution. I thought the distinguished Senator from Georgia (Mr. RUSSELL)

made a very powerful argument, and I only wish that all the Members of the Senate had been present to hear his remarks and the other debate on the pending concurrent resolution which took place on the floor. The situation with respect to the proposed joint committee is not comparable with that affecting the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, as has so ably been pointed out by the Senator from Iowa (Mr. HICKENLOOPER) and the Senator from Georgia (Mr. RUSSELL). Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a unanimous-consent request that I may suggest the absence of a quorum without taking it from his time?

Mr. KNOWLAND. Yes.

Mr. McCARTHY. While I disagree with the Senator from California, I think the Senate should hear him.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from California yield for that purpose?

Mr. KNOWLAND. Yes; I yield for that purpose, with the understanding that the time will not be taken from either side.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the unanimous-consent request?

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, is the request that there be a quorum call, without the time being taken from either side?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.

The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll, and the following Senators answered to their names:

Aiken	Fulbright	McClellan
Allott	George	McNamara
Barkley	Goldwater	Millikin
Barrett	Gore	Morse
Beall	Green	Mundt
Bendor	Hayden	Murray
Bennett	Hennings	Neely
Bible	Hickenlooper	Neuberger
Bricker	Hill	O'Mahoney
Bridges	Holland	Pastore
Bueh	Hruska	Payne
Butler	Humphrey	Potter
Capehart	Jackson	Purcell
Carlson	Jenner	Robertson
Case, N. J.	Johnson, Tex.	Russell
Case, S. Dak.	Johnston, S. C.	Saltanostall
Clement	Kefauver	Schuppel
Cotton	Kennedy	Scott
Curtis	Kerr	Smith, Maine
Daniel	Knowland	Smith, N. J.
Dirksen	Kuchel	Stennis
Douglas	Laird	Symington
Duff	Langer	Thye
Dworshak	Lehman	Watkins
Eastland	Malone	Walker
Ellender	Mansfield	Wiley
Ervin	Martin, Iowa	Williams
Flanders	Martin, Pa.	Wofford
Frear	McCarthy	Young

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. KENNEDY in the chair). A quorum is present.

The Senator from California is recognized for 2 minutes.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, to continue with my statement, let me say that I speak in opposition to adoption of the pending concurrent resolution, which was submitted by the Senator from Montana (Mr. MANSFIELD), on behalf of himself and certain other Senators, and which proposes to establish a Joint Committee on Central Intelligence.

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Earlier, the distinguished Senator from Georgia (Mr. Russell) very ably pointed out that the proposed Joint Committee on Central Intelligence and the existing Joint Committee on Atomic Energy are not comparable; and the accuracy of that statement by him was borne out by the distinguished former chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, the Senator from Iowa (Mr. Hickenlooper).

Mr. President, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy was created by statute, and was given legislative powers. It deals with a subject primarily within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States.

Furthermore, as has been pointed out, I think the key to the present situation is to be found in the fact that the Central Intelligence Agency gathers information outside the United States, in hostile areas of the world where the slightest slip, inadvertent though it might be, could result in uncovering our intelligence system in those areas, and would jeopardize not only the lives of American citizens, but also the lives of the citizens of our allies who may be working in cooperation with us, as well as the lives of many other persons. The lives of all those persons would immediately be endangered; and, as a result, the whole fabric of such a system would be destroyed.

It has been pointed out that at the present time supervision of the CIA is being handled, in part, by a subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee, which is under the able leadership of the Senator from Georgia (Mr. Russell), who has named the members of that subcommittee who have met with Mr. Allen Dulles, the head of the Central Intelligence Agency; and it has been pointed out that such supervision is also shared by a subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee, headed by the distinguished senior Senator from Arizona (Mr. Hayden), one of the senior Members of this body. Those Senators have joined in minority views in opposition to adoption of the pending resolution; and I hope all Members of the Senate have now read their views. It has also been pointed out that those subcommittees have available to them whatever information may be necessary.

Some Members of the Senate had, I believe, originally intended to support the pending resolution, based on the report of the Hoover Commission. However, I call attention to the fact that on page 9 of the report which Senators have on their desks, it is shown that the recommendation of the Hoover Commission was that there be established a small, permanent, bipartisan commission composed of Members of both Houses of Congress and other public-spirited citizens commanding the utmost respect and public confidence. The Hoover Commission recommended that such a commission be established by act of Congress, that the commission should make periodic surveys, and so forth. However, the joint committee proposed to be established by the pending resolution is not at all of that type.

Mr. BRIDGES. Mr. President, will the Senator from California yield to me?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from California has expired.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, I yield myself 5 additional minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California is recognized for 5 additional minutes.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, at this time I yield to the Senator from New Hampshire.

Mr. BRIDGES. I thank the Senator from California.

Let me say that I was a member of the Hoover Commission, along with the distinguished Senator from Arkansas (Mr. McClellan). We went very carefully into this situation. I have always felt that this field of government is a very sensitive one, but I have also felt that some check should be had upon it.

I wish to say that the distinguished Senator from Montana (Mr. Mansfield) is, I know, a very conscientious and a very able Member of the Senate, and is seeking the answer to this problem; and he has proposed one approach to it.

The approach recommended by the Hoover Commission, of which I had the honor to be a member, was a little different. It recommended an approach by means of an act of Congress or a resolution, under which the President of the United States would enter the field, and under which the Members of both Houses of Congress would be represented on a commission, along with other public-spirited citizens.

I find that I do not agree particularly with the way the President has proceeded by appointing an independent group of citizens, without congressional authority. I am not in accord with the proposal made by the Senator from Montana, in connection with the pending concurrent resolution. I believe that the approach recommended by the Hoover Commission is the best one.

However, I concede, first, that the President, in endeavoring to meet the need to deal with this subject, has proceeded according to his best judgment; and I think he has done so in order to fill this vacuum. I think the Senator from Montana has proceeded according to his best judgment. But somewhere between the two approaches the Hoover Commission plan is probably the most equitable and logical answer to the problem. For that reason I commend the Senator from California for bringing out the particular phase of the approach which was recommended by the Hoover Commission.

Mr. KNOWLAND. I thank the Senator from New Hampshire.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I hold in my hand a letter dated March 13, 1956, addressed to me and signed by Mr. Clarence Francis, Chairman of the Citizens Committee for the Hoover Report, who was, I believe a member of the Hoover Commission. This letter was placed in the Record on Monday, but for the benefit of

the distinguished minority leader I read the following portion:

I am pleased to inform you that the Citizens Committee on the Hoover Report believes that House Concurrent Resolution 2,

It should be "Senate Concurrent Resolution 2"—

would if enacted implement fully the recommendations of the Commission that there be created a Joint Congressional Committee on Foreign Intelligence.

Yours sincerely,

CLARENCE FRANCIS,
Chairman.

Mr. KNOWLAND. I thank the Senator. Of course, that is not the recommendation which the Hoover Commission made, although obviously the Senator is entitled to his opinion.

I fully concur in what the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. Bridges) says. I have the highest respect for the Senator from Montana. I know that he is concerned with this problem. I know that other Members are concerned with it. But I think there is great merit in what the distinguished Senator from Georgia (Mr. Russell) pointed out. We are dealing with an extremely sensitive field, involving jeopardy to the lives of our own citizens and those with whom we are associated abroad. While I will not go so far, perhaps, as to say, as he did, that we would be better off by abolishing the CIA than by establishing this type of committee, through which we might uncover and destroy the effectiveness of this agency at a time when we are perhaps facing some of the most crucial intelligence problems the country will confront, I think there is much merit in what the Senator from Georgia said.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I shall certainly be glad to sit down with the Senator from Montana, as I know the able Senator from New Hampshire would be glad to do, and discuss means of meeting some of the very real questions he has in mind.

Mr. President, I hope the Senate will not agree to the concurrent resolution.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from California has expired.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I yield myself an additional 2 minutes, and yield to the Senator from Wisconsin.

Mr. McCARTHY. Let me say to the able Senator from California that, while he has made a very good presentation, I heartily disagree with him.

I wonder if he knows that Mr. Bundy, who contributed \$400 to Alger Hiss' defense fund, is now being appointed to a top position in the CIA.

I should also like to say to the able Senator that I have roughly 100 pages of documentation covering incompetence, inefficiency, waste, and Communist infiltration in the CIA, which I am holding in the hope that a committee will be established so that I can turn the information over to it.

Mr. KNOWLAND. I will say to the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin that I do not have the facts which he

states he has. However, I respectfully say to the Senator from Wisconsin, who has been deeply concerned by the question of Communist infiltration and Communist expansion in the world, as have other Members of this body on both sides of the aisle, that when it comes to the question of the defense of our country there is no center aisle in this Chamber. I believe that Members on both sides of the aisle are vitally concerned with the ultimate security of our country and the preservation of a free world. However, I know, as well as I know that I stand here, that if the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin were to present the facts to which he has referred to the Senator from Georgia (Mr. Russell), in whom I know he has great confidence; to the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. Bridges), who serves on that committee; to the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Saltonstall), who serves on the Committee on Appropriations as well as on the Committee on Armed Services; or to the distinguished chairman of the Appropriations Committee (Mr. Hayden), on which committee the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin serves, they would be in a position to go into the subject very fully, without the necessity of creating a new joint committee in this manner.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from California has again expired.

Mr. KNOWLAND. I yield myself 2 additional minutes.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I yield to the Senator from Wisconsin.

Mr. McCARTHY. The unfortunate situation is that Mr. Dulles takes the position that we cannot call any witnesses from the CIA. I think it would require a committee such as the able Senator from Montana suggests to empower the Senate to subpoena the proper witnesses from the CIA.

As the Senator from California knows, the CIA has hundreds of thousands of dollars of unvouchered funds. There is no accounting for those funds. The CIA is making foreign policy, and refuses to respond to subpoenas. I do not believe any of the committees the Senator has mentioned have the power of subpoena. I think the able Senator from Montana has arrived at the proper answer to this problem. Without further discussion, let me say that I will heartily support the concurrent resolution.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from California has again expired.

Mr. KNOWLAND. I yield myself 2 minutes.

I appreciate the comments of the Senator from Wisconsin. Of course, he is entitled to his opinion and judgment. However, I believe that under the rules of the Senate the existing Committee on Armed Services has the power of subpoena. I think there is no question about it. In any event, Mr. President, I know that the President of the United States, who has had some experience in the field of intelligence, as Supreme Commander in Europe during the war, feels

that this proposal would jeopardize the Intelligence Service of this country abroad.

I hope the concurrent resolution will be defeated.

DECISION OF SUPREME COURT IN PENNSYLVANIA ANTISEDITION CASE

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I request that either the proponents or the opponents of the concurrent resolution yield me 7 minutes. I have two bills to introduce, and I should like to discuss them very briefly.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I yield 7 minutes to the Senator from Wisconsin.

Mr. McCARTHY. I thank the Senator. I now introduce the bills.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the bills will be received and appropriately referred.

The bills, introduced by Mr. McCARTHY, were received, read twice by their titles, and referred, as indicated:

S. 3602. A bill amending section 500 of the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, as amended; to the Committee on Finance.

S. 3603. A bill to amend section 3231, title 18, United States Code, to reaffirm the jurisdiction of State courts to enforce State statutes prohibiting subversive activities; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, a decision by the Supreme Court, announced last week, urgently requires action by Congress.

In the case of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania against Nelson, the Court ruled that Pennsylvania's Sedition Act was unconstitutional because the Federal Government had preempted the anti-sedition field. The effect of this extraordinary ruling is to invalidate all State laws providing for prosecution of subversion and sedition.

The Nelson decision was based primarily on the argument that, in enacting various Federal statutes against subversion, Congress intended to exclude the States from this field. A more ridiculous interpretation of the Federal Statutes can hardly be imagined. There is not a word in the United States Code that permits this inference; and, as a matter of fact, one section of the code explicitly recognizes the concurrent jurisdiction of the States.

Fortunately, however, this error can be corrected. When the Supreme Court makes a bad decision as the result of misinterpreting the will of the Congress, Congress can remedy the situation by passing new legislation. Therefore, I am introducing today a bill which will put beyond doubt the intention of Congress to share with the States responsibility for protecting this country against subversion. My bill provides, in effect, that no Federal antisubversion legislation shall be construed to deprive the States of jurisdiction to enforce their own antisubversion or antisedition statutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time yielded to the Senator by the Senator from Texas has expired.

Mr. KNOWLAND. I yield 4 minutes to the Senator from Wisconsin.

Mr. McCARTHY. I thank the Senator very much.

I may say, Mr. President, that I think this matter is of utmost urgency. I hope the Judiciary Committee will report this bill, or one substantially like it, with all possible haste. But I want to say also that I deeply resent the fact that Congress is called upon to enact such legislation. Congress has enough to do without having to spend its time repealing laws enacted by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court's job is to interpret laws, not to make them. And the Court's decision in the Nelson case is the most outrageous instance of judicial legislation that has ever come to my attention.

By no stretch of logic—or even of the fertile imaginations for which this bench is famous—is the Nelson decision a reasonable interpretation of existing laws. The Court's ruling, and the arguments cited to support that ruling, compel the conclusion that the Court simply made up its own mind about what was best for the country, and then set about looking for reasons, however implausible, to support its position. There are some questions on which reasonable men can differ, but I deny that the issue of supersession as raised in the Nelson case is one of them.

Let me review briefly the reasoning cited by the majority of the Court to support its decision. The Court conveniently listed its reasons as "first," "second," and "third," so let us take them in order.

First, the Court contends that, after reviewing all Federal subversion and sedition laws, "the conclusion is inescapable that Congress has intended to occupy the field of sedition." But the Court does not cite a single passage of any Act that supports this contention. It could not because none exists. Beyond this, the majority of the Court completely ignored a provision of the Federal law which explicitly contradicts its contention. The Smith Act of 1940, which the Court cites as primary evidence that the Federal Government meant to preempt the anti-sedition field, is contained in title 18 of the United States Code. Section 3231 of that title provides that "nothing in this title shall be held to take away or impair the jurisdiction of the courts of the several States under the laws thereof."

Now, Mr. President, what could be clearer than that?

It cannot be said that the majority of the Court was unaware of this provision for it is cited by the dissenting judges as a "decisive" reason "in and for itself" for upholding the Pennsylvania statute. I do not see how the Supreme Court can look at an enactment of Congress and proclaim that it means exactly the opposite of what the language plainly says, and still maintain the respect of the American people.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, I yield 3 additional minutes to the Senator from Wisconsin.

Mr. McCARTHY. I thank the Senator very much.

CORRECTION:

PLEASE DISREGARD CIA STORY TIMED 1242P. THE BILL WAS ON THE UNANIMOUS CONSENT CALENDAR FOR SENATE ACTION TODAY AND WAS UNDERSTOOD TO HAVE PASSED WITHOUT OBJECTION. BUT THE SPONSOR, SEN. MANSFIELD, NOW SAYS THERE WAS AN OBJECTION, AND THAT THE BILL WAS THEREFORE AUTOMATICALLY DEFERRED. THIS MEANS IT REMAINS ON THE CALENDAR FOR POSSIBLE ACTION LATER.

WCNS 3/19--JE133P

(CIA)

THE SENATE APPROVED WITHOUT DEBATE LEGISLATION TO ESTABLISH A JOINT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE TO ACT AS A "WATCHDOG" OVER THE SUPER-SECRET OPERATIONS OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

ESTABLISHMENT OF SUCH A CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE ON THE CIA HAS BEEN OPPOSED BY PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, WHO EARLIER THIS YEAR APPOINTED HIS OWN COMMISSION TO WATCH OVER FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

THE LEGISLATION, WHICH HAS BEEN SPONSORED FOR THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS BY SEN. MIKE MANSFIELD (D-MONT.), NOW GOES TO THE HOUSE. THE SENATE BILL WAS CO-SPONSORED BY 35 SENATORS.

THE PROPOSED COMMITTEE ON THE CIA WOULD BE SIMILAR TO THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY, WHICH WATCHES OVER THE OPERATIONS OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION. THE COMMITTEE WOULD BE COMPOSED OF SIX MEMBERS FROM THE SENATE AND SIX FROM THE HOUSE.

3/19--JE1242P

ADD 1 CIA

THE SENATE RULES COMMITTEE REPORT APPROVING THE LEGISLATION SAID THE PROPOSED NEW JOINT COMMITTEE WOULD PROVIDE "AN EFFECTIVE CHECK ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE CIA" AS WELL AS "PROMOTE NEW CONFIDENCE BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE CIA."

THE OPERATIONS OF THE CIA ARE NOW CLOAKED IN SECRECY, WITH ITS APPROPRIATIONS CAREFULLY HIDDEN AMONG REGULAR APPROPRIATION BILLS. THE ONLY CONGRESSIONAL CHECK ON ITS OPERATIONS HAS BEEN BY A FEW SELECT MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE AND SENATE APPROPRIATIONS AND ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEES WHO ARE PERIODICALLY BRIEFED ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

THE RULES COMMITTEE REPORT SAID THAT "AN AURA OF SUPERIORITY" HAS BEEN BUILT UP AROUND THE CIA BECAUSE OF ITS SECRECY, WITH THE AGENCY PLACING ITSELF ABOVE OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES.

"SECRECY NOW BECLOUDS EVERYTHING ABOUT CIA, ITS COST, ITS PERSONNEL, ITS EFFICIENCY, ITS FAILURES, ITS SUCCESSES," THE REPORT SAID. "IF WE ACCEPT THIS IDEA OF SECRECY FOR SECRECY'S SAKE, WE WILL HAVE NO WAY OF KNOWING WHETHER WE HAVE A FINE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OR A VERY POOR ONE."

3/19--JE1257P

ADD 2 CIA

UNTIL A JOINT COMMITTEE IS ESTABLISHED, THE REPORT SAID, "THERE WILL BE NO WAY OF KNOWING WHAT SERIOUS FLAWS IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY MAY BE COVERED BY THE CURTAIN OF SECRECY IN WHICH IT IS SHROUDED."

THE REPORT SAID THE COMMISSION ESTABLISHED BY THE PRESIDENT WILL BE INADEQUATE SINCE IT WILL REPORT ITS FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ONLY TO THE WHITE HOUSE, "THUS STRENGTHENING THE ALREADY TIGHT CONTROL OF THE EXECUTIVE OVER CIA."

THE REPORT SAID ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE WOULD CARRY OUT "THE ESSENCE" OF A RECOMMENDATION MADE LAST YEAR BY THE HOOVER COMMISSION. THE COMMISSION RECOMMENDED ESTABLISHMENT OF BOTH A COMMITTEE OF PRIVATE CITIZENS BY THE PRESIDENT AS WELL AS A JOINT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE.

THE REPORT SAID ESTABLISHMENT OF A JOINT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE WOULD HAVE THE ADDITIONAL ADVANTAGE OF GIVING THE AGENCY "PROTECTION AGAINST UNWARRANTED ATTACK OR INQUIRY."

3/19--JE103P

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SHOWDOWN NEAR ON C. I. A. POLICY

Senate Bipartisan Group Will
Back Bill for Some Hand
in Intelligence Agency

By WILLIAM S. WHITE

Special to The New York Times.

WASHINGTON, April 5—Formidable bipartisan Senate forces are gathering for a showdown with the Eisenhower Administration on demands for some Congressional control over the Central Intelligence Agency.

Democratic leaders have scheduled for debate next week a bill by Senator Mike Mansfield of Montana to set up a Joint Congressional Committee to oversee the operations of the C. I. A.

The most informed estimate today were that Mr. Mansfield's project would prevail in the Senate, notwithstanding the objections of President Eisenhower. The consensus thus was that what happened later in the House of Representatives would determine whether a "watchdog" committee would in fact be thrust upon the Administration.

34 Others Sponsor Bill

For two years, Senator Mansfield, one of the foreign policy leaders of the Senate, has been asserting that some right to look into the necessarily shadowy operations of the agency must be given to Congress. Thirty-four Senators are now co-sponsors of his bill. He has other pledges of support.

Mr. Mansfield and his associates argue that the C. I. A. is now so hidden from Congressional or public view that there can be no assurance that its function of gathering intelligence about the world is being performed satisfactorily.

The Administration asserts that the agency which is solely responsible to the President's National Security Council, already is adequately overseen and that Congressional intervention might be dangerous.

Once the debate is opened next week Mr. Mansfield and his colleagues will argue that a joint committee would shield the agency from unfounded criticism. The Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government twice has recommended the creation of such a joint committee.

President Eisenhower on Jan. 13 appointed an eight-man board of private citizens to look into foreign intelligence agencies.

View Voiced by President

His last public comment on the subject was in a press conference on March 7. In answer to a question then as to why there should not be a Congressional overseeing committee, he replied:

"Well, this is what I think: Intelligence is a military matter, largely.

"Now, of course, you need intelligence also in the economic field, but it is all wrapped up in the matter of national security.

"I think that the established military committees [of Congress] are fully competent to take care of this matter; in fact, I think they have taken care of this matter."

Four Congressional subcommittees, units of the Senate and House Armed Services and Appropriations Committees, have had some disputed form of liaison with the Central Intelligence Agency since its establishment in 1947. The Mansfield group asserts that this liaison has been quite inadequate and that Congress knows next to nothing of what the agency spends, whom and how many it employs, and how effective is its work.

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Confidential *Working* *Proposals*

The Distrustful Senate

A Congressman we know once described the Central Intelligence Agency as "John Edgar Hoover in a Graustark cloak." So far as we know, his remark may have been unjust to the F.B.I.'s Mr. Hoover, to the C.I.A. or to the author of the novel.

And so far as the Congress itself is concerned, nobody is likely soon to know. Just the other day the Senate voted down a bill by Senator Mansfield to create a joint House-Senate committee to keep an eye on the cloak-and-dagger agency. Thus, the Senate concluded, it is not the business of Congress to check on C.I.A.'s appropriations, activities or accomplishments.

The necessity for such checks seems to be recognized by almost everybody except the Congress and, of course, the C.I.A. which prefers to remain unanswerable to Congress. It is true that C.I.A. sends people about twice a year before the Senate and House Armed Services and Appropriations committees, but Congress cannot demand to be told even such things as what the top officials' salaries are.

The Hoover Commission people took as much of a look at C.I.A. as they were allowed, and they didn't like everything they saw. Somebody, the Commission said, ought to keep a check on the agency and that somebody ought to be the Congress.

After the Hoover Commission's report on C.I.A. was published, Mr. Eisenhower appointed an eight-man committee of citizens whose duties will be to review "periodically" the work of C.I.A. and report to the White House on its findings. But the committee will have neither power nor control

over C.I.A. Only the Congress can assume control.

During the Senate debate, the point was made that C.I.A. was created by Congress. It receives its funds from Congress. Congress is responsible to the public for whatever adventures and endeavors C.I.A. engages in. Certainly, Senator Mansfield argued, Congress has a responsibility to check on what C.I.A. does.

Congress certainly has such a responsibility. The C.I.A. operates in a shadowland, gathering intelligence data on activities about the globe which may have the utmost bearing on our security. The wrong kind of information may lead to the wrong kind of assessment. A wrong assessment may help create a wrong policy. A wrong policy can lead to a situation ending in a decision about war. And a declaration of war is Constitutionally a responsibility of the Congress.

Senator Russell of Georgia argued that "it would be more desirable to abolish the C.I.A." than to have Congress know all about its activities because that would be giving everyone a blueprint of its operations.

This argument was, to say the least, imprecise. The bill did not authorize every Congressman, clerk and page to peer into the doings of C.I.A. and run off mimeograph copies of the agency's plans and functions. The bill would have created a committee of six Senators and six Representatives with authority to check up on C.I.A.

Nor was the Senator's argument altogether complimentary to his fellows. And in accepting that argument, the Senate quite plainly confessed that it preferred to trust C.I.A.'s secrecy than to trust six Senators with any of C.I.A.'s secrets.

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APR 9 1956

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TXN3 BULLETIN CIA
BY WILLIAM KERWIN

WASHINGTON- APRIL 9--(INS)--THE SENATE IGNORED PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S OBJECTIONS TODAY AND AGREED TO THE HOUSE'S PROPOSAL ON A MEASURE CREATING A WATCHDOG COMMITTEE TO OVERSEE THE SUPER-SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

HOT DEBATE FLARED AS THE BILL CAME UP FOR CONSIDERATION ON THE SENATE FLOOR. ADMINISTRATION SUPPORTERS ASSERTED THAT CREATION OF THE HOUSE-SENATE COMMITTEE WOULD JEOPARDIZE NATIONAL SECURITY AND MIGHT LEAK U. S. INTELLIGENCE SOURCES TO ENEMY NATIONS.

MR. EISENHOWER AT A RECENT NEWS CONFERENCE SAID THE MATTER OF INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS "WAS NO BUSINESS FOR CONGRESS TO TAKE UP." THE MEASURE HAS BEEN SPONSORED BY 31 SENATORS.

DEMOCRATS ASSAILED THE PRO-SIENATE POSITION- CHARGING IT IS EVIDENCE OF "ANOTHER INSTANCE OF EXECUTIVE INTERFERENCE WITH A PURELY CONGRESSIONAL FUNCTION."

(MORE) ANDERSON

TXN5 ADD ONE CIA (KERWIN) WASHN LXX FUNCTION.

SEN. MIKE MANSFIELD (D) MONT.- CARGUED "THERE HAVE BEEN A NUMBER OF REPORTS THAT ALL IS NOT WELL WITH THE CIA. HE NOTED THE HOOVER COMMISSION REPORTED "A WOEFUL SHORTAGE OF INFORMATION ABOUT THE SOVIET UNION AND NOTED THAT THE AGENCY COULD STAND SOME INTERNAL ADMINISTRATIVE IMPROVEMENTS."

HE SAID: "UNTIL A COMMITTEE OF THE KIND THIS RESOLUTION PROPOSES IS ESTABLISHED- THERE WILL BE NO WAY OF KNOWING WHAT SERIOUS FLAWS IN THE CIA MAY BE UNCOVERED BY THE CURTAIN OF SECRECY IN WHICH IT IS SHROUDED."

SEN. WAYNE MORSE (D) ORE.- SAID THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT SHOWS "HIS LACK OF UNDERSTANDING AND APPRECIATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT."

BUT SEN. LEVERETT SALTONSTALL (R) MASS.- ARGUED THAT THE HOUSE AND SENATE ARMED SERVICES AND APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEES ARE KEPT ABREAST OF CIA ACTIVITIES.

HE DEFENDED CIA'S SECRECY ON GROUNDS THAT "WITHOUT SECRECY- NOTHING WOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED AND THE LIVES OF MANY BRAVE MEN WOULD BE SACRIFICED."

POINTING OUT THAT CIA INFORMATION IS USED IN FORMULATING FOREIGN POLICY- MORSE SAID THAT IF THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE MADE A MISTAKE- "IT COULD GET US INTO A WAR AND RESULT IN THE KILLING OF MILLIONS OF OUR CITIZENS."

HE SAID: "THE AMERICAN PEOPLE HAVE A RIGHT TO KNOW WHAT KIND OF SPYING WE ARE DOING."

KAR PPT

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APR 9 1956

STATINTL

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WASHINGTON--ADD CIA (145)

MANSFIELD WAS SUPPORTED THROUGHOUT HIS SPEECH BY SEN. MORSE, WHO IS A CO-SPONSOR OF THE RESOLUTION. MORSE INSISTED THE PRESENT LACK OF CONGRESSIONAL SUPERVISION OF CIA "IS A VERY DANGEROUS SITUATION TO BE PERMITTED TO CONTINUE."

HOWEVER, MANSFIELD AND MORSE WERE CHALLENGED BY SEN. SALTONSTALL, THE REPUBLICAN SENATE WHIP. SALTONSTALL IS A MEMBER OF BOTH THE ARMED SERVICES AND APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEES, AND SERVES ON SUBCOMMITTEES OF THESE TWO GROUPS WHICH ARE BRIEFED OCCASIONALLY BY CIA OFFICIALS.

SALTONSTALL SAID THAT IN HIS WORK ON THESE SUBCOMMITTEES, HE FELT "NOTHING HAS BEEN CONCEALED FROM US" BY CIA.

"I HAVE BEEN INFORMED TO THE EXTENT THAT I FEEL I SHOULD BE INFORMED," HE TOLD HIS COLLEAGUES.

SALTONSTALL ADDED HE WOULD BE GLAD TO INFORM ANY SENATOR "OF ANYTHING (ABOUT CIA) IT'S PROPER TO DO UNDER SECURITY REGULATIONS."

MANSFIELD ASKED HOW OFTEN THE SUBCOMMITTEES CHECKED ON CIA. SALTONSTALL ANSWERED "AT LEAST TWICE A YEAR" IN THE CASE OF THE ARMED SERVICES GROUP, AND "AT LEAST ONCE A YEAR" ON THE PART OF THE APPROPRIATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE.

MANSFIELD COMMENTED THIS DID NOT SEEM TO BE "ENOUGH CONTACT" TO HIM.

"IT IS NOT A QUESTION OF THE RETICENCE OF CIA," SALTONSTALL TOLD HIM. "IT IS A QUESTION OF GETTING INFORMATION I PERSONALLY WOULD RATHER NOT HAVE. TOO MANY LIVES ARE AT STAKE."

RZ508P 4-9

SENATORS ASSAIL SECURITY OF C. I. A.

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Begin Showdown Battle to Have Agency Checked by Congress Watchdog

By RUSSELL BAKER

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

WASHINGTON, April 9—In an apathetic atmosphere the Senate opened today its showdown fight with the Administration for the right to some control over the Central Intelligence Agency.

The issue was how much secrecy democracy could survive. Only three Senators took part in the debate, and rarely were there more than four in the chamber to listen to it.

A resolution sponsored by Senator Mike Mansfield, Democrat of Montana, has formidable bipartisan backing and is given a good chance of passage when it is voted on Wednesday.

It calls for a Senate-House "watchdog" committee to check on the agency in Congress' behalf. The agency now operates in nearly absolute secrecy. It was described by Senator Wayne Morse, Democrat of Oregon, as "America's spy system."

Linked to 'Cold War'

Created at the start of the "cold war," the C. I. A. is the only major Executive agency not subject to Congressional scrutiny.

In January, President Eisenhower appointed a board of eight citizens to monitor the activities of the C. I. A. and other units gathering security information.

Senator Morse joined Senator Mansfield in assailing this secrecy as dangerous to the country's constitutional foundations.

Senator Leverett Saltonstall, Republican of Massachusetts, defended President Eisenhower's stand that Congressional invasion of its secrecy might destroy the organization. He stressed that most of the agency's work had to be kept "absolutely under cover." If it were not, he said, its information sources would "dry up very quickly" and its agents "would be liquidated."

"There is no secrecy for secrecy's sake," he argued. If there were no secrecy, he warned, there would soon be no C. I. A.

Senator Mansfield held that the essential secrecy of the organization could be maintained under a watchdog committee, just as the Joint Atomic Energy Commission was.

Debate Interrupted

Until Congress is granted some control, he added, there can be no way of knowing what serious flaws may be covered by the agency.

Midway in the debate there was an interruption by Senator William Langer, Republican of North Dakota, the only other member on the floor at the time. With agitation, Senator Langer declared he had been thinking about the Department of Interior Indian policy.

It developed that Mr. Langer wanted to attack Douglas McKay, former Secretary of Interior, for the Indian policy in North Dakota. He did so at considerable length. When he sat down the C. I. A. debate resumed.

Senator Mansfield charged that lack of Congressional control over the agency was indefensible in a republic.

The absence of control would be "understandable" in a totalitarian state or in a parliamentary democracy where the administration was part of the parliament and directly accountable to it, he said.

But the American Government is a structure of checks and balances, he declared, and "if this system gets seriously out of balance on any point the whole system is jeopardized and the way is open for the growth of tyranny," he said.

He argued that the agency's expanding activities gave it a role in the formation of foreign policy. Yet, congress has no way of knowing how adequately it fulfills this role, he went on.

The director of the C. I. A. "should not be the lone judge in matters that have to do with the intentions of other nations for war and peace," the Senator asserted.

The Administration's attempt to block creation of the committee is "another instance of executive interference with a purely Congressional function," he charged.

Senator Morse attacked a "trend" toward "government by secrecy on the part of the President." He dismissed arguments that absolute secrecy was essential for national security. "America is most secure when there is full disclosure to the people," he said.

"We're dealing with America's spy system, and when you're dealing with a spy system, you'd better watch out that the work of the subcommittees.

you're not dealing with a police-state system," he continued.

"The public has the right to know what kind of spying we're doing," he said.

The C. I. A. is directly responsible to the National Security Council and the President. Senator Saltonstall noted that the Armed Services and Appropriations subcommittee in both houses had some knowledge of its workings. He said a new

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The Washington Post

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AN INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 11, 1956

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Scrutiny for CIA

An extremely close question is involved in the resolution before the Senate today to set up a Joint Committee on Central Intelligence. Senator Mansfield has broadened his resolution, which is cosponsored by 34 other Senators, to draw members of the Joint Committee from the Armed Services and Appropriations Subcommittees of both houses that now deal with intelligence. The question is whether formalization of procedures in one recognized combined committee would buttress and improve the work of the Central Intelligence Agency, or whether it would be likely to result in leaks, embarrassment and free-wheeling by the committee staff.

Our own feeling is that on balance the establishment of a Joint Committee would be a good thing. It ought to be acknowledged at the beginning that the CIA is for the most part a clearing house and evaluation agency for information gathered by other sources, mostly the military; secret operations of the cloak-and-dagger variety make up a relatively small part of the CIA's functions. Logically a Joint Committee should also take account of the work done by the military intelligence agencies. Obviously care would have to be taken to see that the committee staff were kept small and under close supervision. Congressional leaders would have to choose new committee members with care and to make sure that the committee did not become a tool for headline-hunters.

With all of these caveats, however, we think that the principle of accountability is one that merits fuller recognition in the case of the CIA. The CIA is of course an executive agency responsible to the National Security Council and the President; and it does have some accountability to Congress now through the existing subcommittees. But this liaison is hardly enough to keep legislators abreast of policy and of the uses made of the money Congress votes. Nor does the supervisory board appointed by President Eisenhower serve this purpose. Congress, in its efforts to improve and remedy the weaknesses of intelligence activities, would have to guard against any tendency to meddle in operations. But a fuller recognition of the congressional interest seems desirable in an activity which for certain reasons must be shielded from the public eye.

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SENATE REJECTS C.I.A. 'WATCHDOG'

**Votes 59-27 Against Move
for Joint Supervision of
Intelligence Agency**

By ALLEN DEURY

(Special to The New York Times)

WASHINGTON, April 11—The Senate bowed today to the wishes of the President and the Central Intelligence Agency. It rejected, 59 to 27, a resolution that would have created a Joint Congressional committee to supervise the intelligence organization.

The vote marked a sharp reversal of the position in the Senate when debate began on Monday. At that time the resolution, with thirty-five co-sponsors and pledges of additional support from other Senators, seemed assured of passage by a comfortable margin.

President Eisenhower's declared opposition plus intensive behind-the-scenes opposition by the C. I. A. itself proved sufficient to turn the tide overwhelmingly against the resolution. Ten of the original co-sponsors switched to vote against it on final passage.

The Senate action killed the measure for the current session of Congress, and perhaps permanently.

It preserved the present situation, in which the C. I. A. is accountable only to four subcommittees of the Senate and House Appropriations and Armed Services Committees. These subcommittees hear representatives of the agency on an average of twice a year.

Budget Is Camouflaged

Congress, as a whole, is denied information on C. I. A.'s total payroll. Its yearly budget is concealed in appropriations for other agencies.

Senator Mike Mansfield, Democrat of Montana, the resolution's author, found himself ranged against a phalanx of the Senate's most powerful members, several of whom seemed to take his proposal as a personal insult. He said this made him feel "like David facing Goliath."

Senator Richard B. Russell, Democrat of Georgia and chairman of the Armed Services Committee, told the Senate that "it would be more desirable to abolish the C. I. A. and close it up lock, stock and barrel" than to have Congress know all about its activities in gathering secret intelligence information abroad.

He said that if the C. I. A. were required to submit a detailed budget request to Congress as other agencies do, it would be like giving the Soviet Union "a blueprint" of its operations.

"No sane man," the Georgian declared, "would risk his life in carrying on this work if every member of Congress and a committee staff would be able to put a finger on him and say where he was."

Senator Alben W. Barkley, Democrat of Kentucky, who was a member of the National Security Council from January, 1949, to January, 1952, when he was Vice President, said he had received information from C. I. A. during that period "so secret that I would have given my right arm before I would divulge it even to members of my own family." He said the resolution was "not only unneeded, but would be very unwise."

Senator Mansfield was joined in his defense of the resolution only by Senators Joseph R. McCarthy, Republican of Wisconsin, and William Langer, Republican of North Dakota.

Senator McCarthy said he had "more than 100 pages of evidence of lugling incompetence, inefficiency, waste and Communist infiltration in the C. I. A." that he would turn over "immediately" to a special committee if it

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(CIA)

SEN. MIKE MANSFIELD (D.-MONT.) TODAY URGED THE SENATE TO ESTABLISH A CONGRESSIONAL "WATCHDOG" COMMITTEE TO CHECK ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE SUPER-SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA).

UNTIL SUCH A COMMITTEE IS ESTABLISHED, HE SAID, "THERE WILL BE NO WAY OF KNOWING WHAT SERIOUS FLAWS IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY MAY BE COVERED BY THE CURTAIN OF SECRECY IN WHICH IT IS SHROUDED."

MANSFIELD OPENED SENATE DEBATE ON A RESOLUTION TO CREATE A JOINT HOUSE-SENATE COMMITTEE ON CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE. THE RESOLUTION WAS INTRODUCED BY MANSFIELD AND CO-SPONSORED BY 34 OTHER SENATORS.

ESTABLISHMENT OF SUCH A COMMITTEE HAS BEEN OPPOSED BY THE ADMINISTRATION, WHICH ARGUES CIA IS TOO SENSITIVE IN ITS OPERATIONS TO COME UNDER CONGRESSIONAL SCRUTINY.

MANSFIELD AGREED THAT AN INTELLIGENCE AGENCY MUST MAINTAIN SECRECY TO BE EFFECTIVE. BUT HE SAID "ONCE SECRECY BECOMES SACROSANCT, IT INVITES ABUSE."

"IF WE ACCEPT THIS IDEA OF SECRECY FOR SECRECY'S SAKE," HE SAID, "WE WILL HAVE NO WAY OF KNOWING WHETHER WE HAVE A FINE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OR A VERY POOR ONE."

THE CIA, HE SAID, "IS THE ONLY MAJOR FEDERAL AGENCY OVER WHICH CONGRESS EXERCISES NO DIRECT AND FORMAL CONTROL. ITS BUDGET AND ITS PERSONNEL LISTS ARE CLASSIFIED. BY LAW THE AGENCY CAN WITHHOLD EVEN SUCH OBVIOUSLY UNIMPORTANT INFORMATION AS THE SALARIES OF ITS STOP OFFICIALS."

MANSFIELD OBSERVED THERE HAVE BEEN "A NUMBER OF REPORTS RECENTLY THAT ALL IS NOT WELL WITH THE CIA. THE HOOVER COMMISSION REPORTED A WOEFUL SHORTAGE OF INFORMATION ABOUT THE SOVIET UNION AND NOTED THAT THE AGENCY COULD STAND SOME INTERNAL ADMINISTRATIVE IMPROVEMENTS."

A JOINT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE, MANSFIELD SAID, WOULD BE IN "A POSITION TO CRITICIZE ANY MISTAKE WHICH THE CIA MAY MAKE." AT THE SAME TIME, HE SAID, IT WOULD BE "A DEFENDER OF CIA AGAINST UNWARRANTED AND UNJUSTIFIED ATTACKS FROM WITHIN AND OUTSIDE THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT."

MANSFIELD ACCUSED THE ADMINISTRATION OF "EXECUTIVE INTERFERENCE WITH A PURELY CONGRESSIONAL FUNCTION" IN ITS "DETERMINED OPPOSITION" TO ESTABLISHMENT OF A CONGRESSIONAL CIA COMMITTEE. HE NOTED THAT PRESIDENT EISENHOWER HAS SAID THAT "IT IS TOO SENSITIVE FOR CONGRESS TO TAKE IT UP."

MANSFIELD SAID "IT IS THE PEROGATIVE OF THE CONGRESS TO SET UP SUCH A JOINT COMMITTEE IF IT SO DESIRES" AND IS NOT SUBJECT TO PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL.

THE SENATE AGREED TO VOTE ON THE MEASURE WEDNESDAY BUT THE VOTE MAY BE DELAYED BY THE FARM BILL WHICH WILL BE TAKEN UP BY THE SENATE IMMEDIATELY IF THE HOUSE PASSES IT.

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ADD 5 CIA

SEN. LEVERETT SALTONSTALL (R-MASS.) POINTED OUT TO MANSFIELD THAT SUBCOMMITTEES OF THE APPROPRIATIONS AND ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEES PRESENTLY FOLLOW THE ACTIVITIES OF THE CIA. UNDER QUESTIONING, SALTONSTALL SAID THE ARMED SERVICES SUBCOMMITTEE IS BRIEFED AT LEAST TWICE A YEAR AND THE APPROPRIATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE ONCE A YEAR.

MANSFIELD SAID THE INFREQUENCY OF THE BRIEFINGS IS AN ADMISSION THAT THERE IS NOT "CLOSE ENOUGH CONTACT" BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE CIA.

SEN. WAYNE MORSE (D-ORE.) JOINED MANSFIELD IN WARNING ABOUT "THE INCREASING CONCENTRATION OF ARBITRARY POWER IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH." MORSE SAID IT PRESENTS "A VERY DANGEROUS SITUATION" WHEN ANY GOVERNMENT AGENCY CAN OPERATE WITHOUT A "PEOPLES' CHECK" THROUGH CONGRESS.

SALTONSTALL SAID THE WORK OF THE CIA ROUGHLY CORRESPONDS, OVERSEAS, TO THE DOMESTIC ACTIVITIES OF THE FBI. YET, HE SAID, NO SPECIAL COMMITTEE SUPERVISES THE FBI.

THE WORK OF THE CIA, SALTONSTALL SAID, IS NECESSARILY SECRET SO AS TO PROTECT CIA AGENTS OVERSEAS AND PREVENT THE COMPROMISE OF ITS INFORMATION.

"THERE IS NO SECRECY FOR SECRECY'S SAKE," SALTONSTALL DECLARED.

A MEMBER OF THE ARMED SERVICES AND APPROPRIATIONS SUBCOMMITTEES WHICH RIDE HERD ON CIA, SALTONSTALL URGED FELLOW SENATORS TO "BLAME US" IF CIA'S WORK IS NOT WELL DONE. BUT HE SAID CONGRESS SHOULD NOT SET UP ANOTHER GROUP TO "DUPLICATE" THE SUPERVISORY CHORES.

MORSE REPLIED THAT IT WAS A "FALSE ANALOGY" TO COMPARE THE FBI AND CIA SINCE CONGRESS HAS "MANY CHECKS" ON THE FBI WHICH OPERATES AS AN ARM OF THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT. MORSE ALSO JOINED MANSFIELD IN COMMENTING ON THE STATEMENT, ATTRIBUTED TO THE PRESIDENT, THAT CIA WORKINGS ARE "TOO SENSITIVE" FOR CONGRESS.

"THERE ISN'T ANY TOPIC TOO SENSITIVE FOR THE ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES OF A FREE PEOPLE TO HANDLE," MORSE SAID. HE ADDED THAT MR. EISENHOWER NEEDS A "PREEMPTIVE COURSE" IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM AND ITS CHECKS AND BALANCES.

4/9--E333P

CIA

WASHINGTON (AP)-THE SENATE, IN THE FACE OF VIGOROUS OPPOSITION BY THE WHITE HOUSE, OPENED DEBATE TODAY ON A RESOLUTION TO CREATE A SPECIAL CONGRESSIONAL "WATCHDOG" COMMITTEE TO BRING HEED ON THE SUPERSECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

SENATE LEADERS, DRIVING TO BRING IT TO A VOTE WEDNESDAY, OBTAINED A UNANIMOUS CONSENT AGREEMENT TO MEET AN HOUR EARLIER THAN USUAL THAT DAY (11 A.M.) AND CLAMP A TIME LIMIT ON THE DEBATE THEN.

THE MEASURE IS NOT SUBJECT TO A PRESIDENTIAL VETO, BUT REPORTEDLY FACES AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE IN THE HOUSE IF THE SENATE PASSES IT.

SEN. MANSFIELD, CALLING SIGNALS FOR THE BILL'S BACKERS, KICKED OFF THE DEBATE WITH A PREPARED SENATE SPEECH ASSAILING WHITE HOUSE OPPOSITION TO THE PLAN AS "ANOTHER INSTANCE OF EXECUTIVE INTERFERENCE WITH A PURELY CONGRESSIONAL FUNCTION."

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WASHINGTON--ADD CIA (115)

MANSFIELD SAID THERE NOW IS NO WAY FOR CONGRESS TO LEARN ABOUT "SERIOUS FLAWS" THAT MAY EXIST IN CIA'S FULFILLMENT OF ITS COUNTER ESPIONAGE ASSIGNMENT.

"THERE HAVE BEEN A NUMBER OF REPORTS RECENTLY THAT ALL IS NOT WELL WITH THE CIA," MANSFIELD SAID. HE SAID HE THOUGHT A CONGRESSIONAL WATCHDOG GROUP COULD "COMPEL EVEN SWIFTER AND SURER REFORM" THAN ONE SET UP BY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH.

"ALLAN DULLES, DIRECTOR OF CIA, MAY MAKE NO MISTAKES IN ASSESSING INTELLIGENCE," MANSFIELD SAID. "BUT HE SHOULD NOT BE THE LONE JUDGE IN MATTERS THAT HAVE TO DO WITH THE INTENTIONS OF OTHER NATIONS FOR WAR AND PEACE."

LT230PES 4/9

145

WASHINGTON--ADD CIA (144)

MANSFIELD SAID FEW IN THE GOVERNMENT HAVE BEEN PERMITTED TO KNOW MUCH ABOUT CIA, AND QUESTIONED WHETHER "SECRECY FOR THE MERE SAKE OF SECRECY" WAS INVOLVED. CONGRESS, HE SAID, DOESN'T EVEN KNOW HOW BIG CIA IS, AND KNOWS LITTLE ABOUT ITS FINANCIAL AFFAIRS AND POLICIES.

HIS RESOLUTION, SIGNED BY 34 OTHER SENATORS, WOULD CREATE A COMMITTEE OF SIX SENATORS AND SIX HOUSE MEMBERS, FOUR FROM EACH SIDE TO BE MEMBERS OF THE MAJORITY PARTY. HE SAID IT WOULD HAVE THE ASSISTANCE OF A SMALL BUT "DEDICATED" STAFF.

ITS JOB, HE SAID, WOULD BE TO SEE TO IT THAT "GOOD MANAGEMENT IS MAINTAINED IN THE CIA AND ALSO TO KEEP A CONSTANT CHECK ON ITS INTELLIGENCE POLICIES."

LT242PES 4/9

APR 9 1956

TINTL

Approved For Release 2002/01/24 : CIA-RDP84-00161R000100110002-6

207

WASHINGTON--ADD CIA (201)

SALTONSTALL SAID STAFF INVESTIGATORS OF THE PROPOSED NEW INVESTIGATING GROUP PROBABLY NEITHER COULD NOR SHOULD GET VERY FAR POKING INTO INNER WORKINGS OF AN AGENCY AS SECRET AS HE CONTENDS CIA HAS TO BE IF IT IS TO BE EFFECTIVE.

"THERE IS NO SECRECY FOR SECRECY'S SAKE," SALTONSTALL ARGUED. BUT WITHOUT THE SECRECY BEHIND WHICH IT WORKS, HE SAID, THIS COUNTRY COULD FACE A SITUATION IN WHICH "MANY BRAVES LIVES WOULD BE SACRIFICED" FOR LACK OF INTELLIGENCE.

HE DENIED THAT CIA IS A MAKER OF POLICY, WHICH MORSE HAD SUGGESTED. "IT IS A COORDINATOR OF OUR INTELLIGENCE," SALTONSTALL SAID.

MORSE HAD VOICED WHAT HE TERMED "MY SUSPICION" THAT THE CIA DOES HAVE A LOT OF INFLUENCE ON POLICY, PARTICULARLY BECAUSE ALLEN DULLES, ITS DIRECTOR, AND SECRETARY OF STATE JOHN FOSTER DULLES ARE BROTHERS. CONGRESS, MORSE SAID, NEEDS "SOME CHECKS ON FAMILIES" IN THE GOVERNMENT.

MANSFIELD SAID HE ACKNOWLEDGES MUCH SECRECY IS NECESSARY, BUT THAT CONGRESS AND THE PEOPLE SHOULD KNOW "WHEN THEY DO WRONG THINGS OR NOT ENOUGH OF THE RIGHT THINGS" IN CIA.

RZ515P 4-9

APR 12 1956

STATINTL

Approved For Release 2002/01/24 : CIA-RDP8

Roll-Call of Senate Vote Rejecting C. I. A. Study

WASHINGTON, April 11 (AP)—Following is the 59-27 vote by which the Senate defeated today the resolution to create a special Senate-House committee to keep a watch on the Central Intelligence Agency:

FOR THE RESOLUTION—27

Democrats—19
Clements (Ky.) Kerr (Okla.)
Evin (N. C.) Lehman (N. Y.)
Fulbright (Ark.) Mansfield (Mont.)
Gore (Tenn.) McNamara (Mich.)
Green (R. I.) Morse (Ore.)
Hill (Ala.) Murray (Mont.)
Humphrey (Minn.) Neely (W. Va.)
Jackson (Wash.) Neuberger (Ore.)
Kefauver (Tenn.) Pastore (R. I.)
Kennedy (Mass.)

Republicans—8
Barrett (Wyo.) Mundt (S. D.)
Jenner (Ind.) Payne (Me.)
Langer (N. D.) Smith (Me.)
McCarthy (Wis.) Welke (Idaho)

AGAINST THE RESOLUTION—20

Democrats—11
Barkley (Ky.) Johnston (S. C.)
Bible (Nev.) Laird (W. Va.)
Daniel (Tex.) McClellan (Ark.)
Douglas (Ill.) O'Mahoney (Wyo.)
Eastland (Miss.) Robertson (Va.)
Ellender (La.) Russell (Ga.)
Farr (Del.) Scott (N. C.)
Hayden (Ariz.) Stennis (Miss.)
Hennings (Mo.) Symington (Mo.)
Holland (Fla.) Wofford (S. C.)
Johnson (Tex.)

Republicans—18
Aiken (Vt.) Goldwater (Ariz.)
Allott (Colo.) Hickenlooper (Iowa)
Beall (Md.) Hruska (Neb.)
Bender (Ohio) Knowland (Calif.)
Bennett (Utah) Kuchel (Calif.)
Bricker (Ohio) Malone (Nev.)
Bridges (N. H.) Martin (Iowa)
Bush (Conn.) Martin (Pa.)
Butler (Md.) Millikin (Colo.)
Capehart (Ind.) Potter (Mich.)
Carlson (Kan.) Purcell (Conn.)
Case (N. J.) Santostall (Mass.)
Case (S. D.) Schoepel (Kan.)
Cotton (N. H.) Smith (N. J.)
Curtis (Neb.) Thye (Minn.)
Dirksen (Ill.) Watkins (Utah)
Duff (Pa.) Wiley (Wis.)
Dworkin (Idaho) Williams (Del.)
Flanagan (Vt.) Young (N. D.)
Not voting but paired on the resolution
Byrd (Democrat, Va.) for and Byrd
(Democrat, Va.) against.

Watchdog for C. I. A. Voted Down in Senate


By Rowland Evans Jr.

WASHINGTON, Apr. 11.—The Senate today smothered an effort to bring the super-secret Central Intelligence Agency under close and continuing Congressional scrutiny.

By a vote of 59 to 27, the proposal advanced by Sen. Mike Mansfield, D., Mont., and thirty-four other Senators was killed after grave warnings of Sens. Richard B. Russell, D., Ga., and William F. Knowland, Calif., Senate Republican leader, that it would imperil this nation's whole intelligence fabric and the lives of American agents.

Sen. Knowland declared that President Eisenhower had "grave misgivings" over the proposal. It would have set up a special joint Congressional committee empowered to keep "fully and currently informed" on all activities of the C. I. A.

Sen. Alben W. Barkley, D., Ky., who sat on the National Security Council during his Vice-Presidential tenure, warned the Senate the President would have had to veto the proposal had it been in a parliamentary form that would take it to his desk. Actually, the proposal



Herald Tribune—Warman
Allen Dulles

was a concurrent resolution, needing only Senate and House passage.

The C. I. A. was established in 1947 under act of Congress to bring together all the diverse

arms of American intelligence, including the war-time Office of Strategic Services, to correlate and evaluate all intelligence and to advise the then-new National Security Council, the nation's highest strategic body.

The agency has had little direct contact with Congress. Its budget, said by some to exceed \$1,000,000,000 annually, is partly concealed in the regular appropriations requests of other agencies, such as the Defense Department. Its far-flung activities send its agents to remote and often unfriendly areas of the world. It works in closest collaboration with the secret intelligence agencies of friendly foreign powers.

Fear for Co-operation

Senators who opposed the Mansfield resolution said it would jeopardize this co-operation. The agency itself, it was recalled, had the gravest fears on this score when its own employee-security program was brought into question on the Senate floor two years ago.

Sen. Russell is chairman of a Senate Armed Services subcommittee which has some jurisdiction over the C. I. A. and occasionally takes secret testimony from Allen W. Dulles, C. I. A. director. Sen. Carl Hayden, D., Ariz., is chairman of a like panel in the Senate Appropriations committee. Both these Senators, and in fact virtually all members of those two subcommittees, took sharp exception to Sen. Mansfield's resolution.

Sen. Russell praised Mr. Dulles. He said the C. I. A. director had never failed "to respond to a single question asked"—had, in fact, been "forthright and frank."

Sen. Barkley said the staff of

the proposed joint committee "probably would be ordered . . . to invade the precincts of the National Security Council itself" to obtain information. And Sen. Hayden declared Congress had "no right under the Constitution to break in on" a Presidential advisory body such as the C. I. A.

Against that onslaught by some of the Senate's most powerful members, Sen. Mansfield's persuasions were vain.

Ten of the original sponsors of the resolution voted against it on the roll-call vote, again calling into question the value and meaning of multiple sponsorship. Sen. Mansfield's resolution had the overwhelming approval of the Senate Rules Committee. Only Sen. Hayden, senior committee Democrat, filed a minority report.

Sen. Mansfield advanced these arguments in support of his proposal:

1. The Hoover Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch recommended last year that a bipartisan commission, containing representation from Congress, be named to watch over the C. I. A.

2. He ridiculed charges that the staff of the proposed joint committee would "leak" secrets and endanger the lives of American and other secret agents in foreign lands. A joint "watchdog" committee was essential, he said, to keep constant tab on the agency's world-wide spending and to prevent administrative cover-ups and fumbles.

3. Lack of Congressional control over the agency, he said, was indefensible and but another indication of what he called the constant growth of power within the executive branch at the expense of Congress.

4. The C. I. A., he said, is the only agency in government that

is virtually free from Congressional stricture. That is unpardonable in a democracy, he said.

APR 12 1956

Approved For Release 2002/01/24 : CIA

(PUBL. STATE)

Richard Rendell at 11:00 P.M. even. JAL (Washington):

"A genial smiling pipesmoker, who on a number of occasions has gone into places of very great danger as an American public servant, may now reveal, if he wishes, in an endorsement by the United States Senate of a sort extended to very, very few persons. I refer to the Director of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, Allen Welsh Dulles, the 63-year-old brother of the Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles. There has been suggested a watchdog committee of Congress be created to check on the operations of the Central Intelligence Agency. A resolution to set up such a committee has been defeated in the Senate by a vote of 59 to 27. That, in itself, amounts to a vote of approval of what Allen Dulles has been doing.

"The Central Intelligence Agency, it should be noted, is the governmental organization charged with correlating the information gathered overseas about Communist undertakings. Allen Dulles is a very mannerly personality; he is a very easy man to see in comparison with other men of his rank in Washington. He likes to have callers, no matter how strange or unusual, because he knows there is always the possibility that the caller will have something of value to contribute to his reservoir of information.

"These are hours of strain for the CIA men. They have the job of finding out what the Communists are doing, and that is hard to find out, and if they do not find out, there will be trouble. The Communist armies of China slipped into North Korea across the Yalu River by the thousands before our people grasped what was going on. And Communists at the moment are undertaking large scale operations in the Middle East. The threat of war is there. It is of the greatest importance that we acquire the facts on what is going on, facts about the shipments of arms and so on. The Central Intelligence Agency needs that sort of information in cooperation with the army, navy, air force and the State Department and it presents it to the National Security Council, presided over by President Eisenhower.

"The Senate vote, incidentally, is quite probably evidence of awareness by the members of the Senate that Allen Dulles knows his business. He has been a very successful foreign agent, and a lawyer. He is cheerful sort of man with a twinkle in his eye and almost always he has a pipe in his mouth. His appearance

resembles that of his elder brother but he is a bit more informal in his clothing. Both are sometimes described as patricians. Their father was Presbyterian minister in Watertown, New York. Both went to Princeton, both have made money in the law, and both have a ministerial streak in their behavior pattern.

"Allen Dulles, shortly after his graduation from Princeton, taught English for a year at Allahabad in India. That was in 1916. Later he entered the Foreign Service of the State Department assigned to Vienna, Austria, and later he was posted to Bern, Switzerland; that was in 1917. It was there he decided upon his policy of talking to those who so desired, those who wanted to talk to him. The reason is this. One night he was invited to go to a political meeting in Bern, Switzerland. He did not go to that meeting, and later, he learned that the speaker at the meeting was none other than Nikolai Lenin, the mastermind of the revolution who was about to leave for Moscow and Russia. All the time since Allen Dulles has regretted that he did not go to that meeting.

"But it was in Bern too in Switzerland that Mr. Dulles served as representative during World War II of the Office of Strategic Services. The place was crowded with spies, undercover men of all sorts. It was a center for European resistance. Through an intelligence man, Mr. Dulles learned of the conspiracy to assassinate Der Fuhrer, Adolph Hitler; that was on July 20, 1944. He tried with might and main to get his superiors to give support to the enterprise. The plot failed, but Mr. Dulles did succeed in saving a German whom he had personally encouraged to get out of Germany with forged papers and an identification ring, all supplied by Mr. Dulles.

"Since then Mr. Dulles, Allen W. Dulles, has done a great many large things. He will be called upon to do many, many more. The Senate apparently has confidence that he will do them well. That was the reason for the vote on endorsement."

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Approved For Release 2002/01/24 : CIA-RDP84-00

CIA WATCHDOG PLAN KILLED

Senate Defeats Proposal For Check On Activities

Washington, April 11 (AP)—The Senate, after much talk about whether Congress can keep a secret, today killed a plan to set up a Senate-House committee to keep tabs on the supersecret Central Intelligence Agency.

The proposal, defeated on a 59-27 vote, was strongly opposed by President Eisenhower, who let it be known he feels CIA's activities are too sensitive for such congressional supervision.

Congress does look into CIA affairs through existing committees, however, and this was one argument used by opponents of the defeated proposal.

Supporters contended Congress lacks an adequate check on CIA, despite secret briefings of key members.

Sponsored By Mansfield

Veteran Senate Democrats joined Republican leaders in turning back the resolution, which would have needed the approval of the Senate and House but not the President's signature. It would have created a twelve-member group, six from each branch.

The joint committee plan was sponsored by Senator Mansfield (D., Mont.), and 34 other senators. Some of the cosponsors turned against the proposal during the debate, however.

One of them, Senator Francis Case (R., S.D.), said he was swayed by the argument that secret information would be available to the proposed committee and might leak out.

"One Disillusionment"

Senator Russell (D., Ga.), a leading opponent, said his "one disillusionment" about the Senate had been the frequency with which classified material leaked to the press from secret committee sessions.

Mansfield countered with an argument that both former President Hoover and Walter Bedell Smith, retired general and former CIA director, had urged establishment of a congressional watchdog group to check on CIA.

Before the vote, Senator Knowland (Cal.), minority Senate leader, said the President believed creation of the joint committee would "jeopardize" United States intelligence services abroad. He said Eisenhower felt CIA is "much too sensitive for close checking by Congress."

Knowland got into a hassle with Senator McCarthy (R.,

Wis.), who told the Senate he had roughly 100 pages of documentation of incompetency, inefficiency, waste and Communist infiltration in the CIA.

Holding up a thick batch of papers, he said:

"I am not going to introduce this into the record because it may involve security information. But if this committee is set up, I will turn this information over to it immediately."

Knowland told McCarthy that both the Armed Services or Appropriations committees were in a position to go into the matter "very fully" if McCarthy would turn the material over to them.

APR 16 1956

Approved For Release 2002/01/24 : CIA-RDP84-00161R000100110002-6

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY—
DOCUMENTS FURNISHED BY SEN-
ATOR McCARTHY

Mr. McCARTHY Mr. President, I wish to give the Senate some information.

A few days ago when the Senate was considering the CIA joint resolution I stated that if the resolution were passed I would turn over to the proposed new joint committee some 50 or more documents having to do with everything from incompetence to communism in the CIA. The resolution failed, and the joint committee was not established.

The question arose as to whether the information should go to the Armed Services Committee, headed by the Senator from Georgia (Mr. Russell), to the Permanent Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, headed by the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. McClellan), or to the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary. I felt that the Internal Security Subcommittee had the most complete jurisdiction of the subject, so I have turned over the documents, as of today, to the subcommittee of the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. Eastland), not because I preferred that subcommittee to the other committee but because I thought that it had unquestionable jurisdiction on the subject.

I know they will have difficulty getting the witnesses from the CIA. They refused to appear before our committee. However, I hope that we will test on the Senate floor the right of the Internal Security Subcommittee to get the necessary information. For that reason I have turned over all the pertinent material to the Eastland committee.

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APR 17 1956

STATINTL

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Bills That Died Consume Half of Senate's Time

WASHINGTON, March 16 (UP)—The Senate has spent about half of its time this year in debating bills that never became law.

The first big breath-waster was the natural gas bill, which came before the Senate Jan. 16 and was approved Feb. 6. Three weeks of words went down the drain when President Eisenhower vetoed the measure to exempt natural gas producers from direct Federal controls.

The Senate took up the farm bill on Feb. 22. The measure was passed March 19. President Eisenhower vetoed the House-Senate compromise version today and another three weeks of debate was in vain.

While waiting on the final outcome of the farm bill, the Senate spent six days of debate on the electoral reform amendment. After several preliminary votes, it finally was sent back to a committee pigeonhole.

Later, the Senate took up a resolution to establish a joint watchdog committee for the Central Intelligence Agency. It was defeated after three days of debate.

The time consumed on these four measures adds up to almost two months. The Senate has been in session less than four months.

NOV 18 1956

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NEW YORK POST

Circ.: e. 399,886

S. 265,066

Front Page Edit Page Other Page

Date:

Battle on the Potomac

By Robert S. Allen



Washington, Nov. 17—The Central Intelligence Agency is definitely headed for another critical scrutiny at the coming session of Congress.

The backstage plan is again to try to set up a special committee with watchdog authority over CIA, as the Joint Atomic Committee has over the Atomic Energy Commission. Such legislation was rejected by the Senate last spring, but another fight will be made for it next year.

The bipartisan sponsors of the measure are already laying the ground for this. The war-inflamed crises in the Middle East and satellite countries are providing them with a lot of material.

There was a significant tip-off on these undercover preparations at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's long meeting with top Administration officials.

CIA Director Allen Dulles was subjected to critical grilling on charges of failing to provide adequate advance information on the British-French-Israeli assault in Egypt, and the Polish and Hungarian revolts against Russian rule.

These blasts at CIA are nothing new. The Intelligence Agency has long been under fire by both Republicans and Democrats on complaints of incompetence and bungling. The significance of this barrage is that it was obviously for the purpose of providing ammunition for the coming legislative battle.

This intention was not lost on Dulles. He defended himself and his agency vigorously.

Sen. Mansfield, (Mont.), slated to be the Democrats' new Assistant Floor Leader, wasted no breath in bluntly putting Dulles on the spot.

"Why were we caught napping on what happened in the Middle East, Poland and Hungary?" demanded Mansfield. "Why is our Intelligence always so inadequate; so poor, or totally missing?"

A categorical denial of all these accusations was made by Dulles.

"Our Intelligence concerning the attack on Egypt was excellent," he retorted. "A full report warning that Israel was preparing a major attack against Egypt was placed on President Eisenhower's desk more than 24 hours before the event occurred. That report also forecast the likelihood that Britain and France would aid Israel once the fighting broke out."

This brought an exclamation of surprise from Sen. Fulbright (D., Ark.).

"Then how did it happen the President displayed so much astonishment when his press secretary handed him a news dispatch about this attack?" asked Fulbright. "I have a press report in my hand quoting Hagerty as stating the President got his first word of this attack from a press dispatch."

"I believe you will find that what Hagerty actually said," pointed out Dulles, "was that the President was informed of the attack when he read the press report. That is quite different from first knowing about it. The President did know about it in advance."

That drew a challenge from another angle by Mansfield.

"If he knew an attack was coming," demanded the Montanan, "then why didn't he act; why didn't he do something to avert this dangerous conflict?"

"That's a question which should be directed to other officials," declared Dulles. "I am concerned with Intelligence. My job is to gather information, evaluate it and to report it. What is done about it is outside of my jurisdiction."

Dulles also asserted the CIA had submitted numerous reports on unrest in the satellites and the likelihood of uprisings.

"It is difficult to forecast the exact timing of such revolts," he pointed out. "You can never tell just what will touch them off. But we definitely knew they were in the making, and also that the Kremlin would react as ruthlessly as it did in Hungary, and may yet do in Poland."

NEW YORK POST, SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 18, 1956

NOV 19 1956

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STATINTL

MANSFIELD CALLS INTELLIGENCE LAX

**C. I. A. Branded 'Delinquent'
in Its Reports on Poland,
Hungary and Mideast**

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 18—Senator Mike Mansfield indicated today that he might renew his drive for a joint Congressional committee to supervise the Central Intelligence Agency.

The Montana Democrat said that United States intelligence agencies had been "delinquent" in reporting on the outbreak of troubles abroad.

"We were caught short," he said. "We were caught by surprise in Poland, caught by surprise in Hungary, caught by surprise in the Middle East."

Answering questions on the American Broadcasting Company's television program "College Press Conference," he expressed the opinion that the C. I. A. the National Security

Council "and all our intelligence arms have been delinquent."

Mr. Mansfield, a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, is slated to be the Democratic whip.

Praises U. N. Action

He said he thought there had been "a great deal of bipartisanship" in foreign policy, but declared that the Democrats should be in on the "take-offs" rather than the crash-landings.

He said he thought the world had avoided war "thanks to action of the United Nations." He praised the United Nations action in sending a police force to Egypt and said that it should remain "until the question is settled."

Mr. Mansfield said that he would favor subsidizing shipments of oil to Western Europe if necessary to replace shipments cut off as a result of the blocking of the Suez Canal. He said such action would be far better "than to see the Soviet Union come in and take it [Western Europe] over lock, stock and barrel."

Meanwhile, Senator Hubert H. Humphrey of Minnesota proposed that the Democratic party hold a victory ball to celebrate

its retention of control of both houses of Congress.

In a letter to members of the Democratic National Committee's Executive Committee, Senator Humphrey said that "instead of letting the Republicans seize all the limelight with [Presidential] inauguration festivities in January, why can't we Democrats sponsor a big Democratic victory celebration here near the year end?"

"We have an impressive case to present to the American people on Democratic gains and such an event would focus public attention on that story."

Senator Humphrey suggested that the national committee and the Senate and House Democratic Campaign Committees sponsor the ball. Democratic governors should be invited to lead delegations from their states and "join in showing the country the great potential of future leadership in Democratic ranks," he said.

NOV 19 1956

INTL

Approved For Release 2002/01/24 : CIA-RDP84-00161R0001
CHICAGO SUN-TIMES

Circ.: d. 564,829
S. 550,165

Front Edit Other
Page Page Page

Date:

CIA Faces Fresh Intelligence Test

Special to The Sun-Times

WASHINGTON—The Central Intelligence Agency is headed for another critical scrutiny at the coming session of Congress.

The plan is to try again to set up a special committee with watchdog authority over CIA, as the Joint Atomic Committee has over the Atomic Energy Commission. Such legislation was rejected by the Senate last spring.

The bipartisan sponsors of the measure are already preparing for the inquiry. The crises in the Middle East and Soviet satellite countries are providing them with material.

Allen Dulles Quizzed

There was a significant tipoff on the undercover preparations at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's meeting with top administrative officials.

CIA Director Allen W. Dulles was subjected to critical questioning on charges of failing to provide adequate advance information on the British-French-Israeli assaults in Egypt, and the Polish and Hungarian revolts against Russian rule.

The Intelligence Agency long has been under fire by both Republican and Democrats on complaints of incompetence and bungling. Significance of

the latest barrage is that it was obvious for the purpose of providing ammunition for the coming legislative battle.

Sen. Mike Mansfield (Mont.), slated to be the Democrats' assistant floor leader, bluntly put Dulles on the spot.

"Why were we caught napping on what happened in the Middle East, Poland and Hungary?" demanded Mansfield. "Why is our intelligence always so inadequate; so poor, or totally missing?"

Dulles retorted: "Our intelligence concerning the attack on Egypt was excellent. A full report warning that Israel was preparing a major attack against Egypt was placed on President Eisenhower's desk more than 24 hours before the event occurred. That report also forecast the likelihood that Britain and France would aid Israel once the fighting broke out."

That brought an exclamation of surprise from Sen. J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.).

"Then how did it happen the President displayed so much astonishment when his press secretary handed him a news dispatch about this attack?" asked Fulbright. "I have a press report in my hand quoting Hagerty [James C.] as stating the President got his first word of this attack from a press dispatch."

"I believe you will find that what Hagerty actually said," said Dulles, "was that the President was informed of the attack when he read the press report. That is quite different from first knowing about it. The President did know about it in advance."

Why Didn't President Act?

That drew a challenge from another angle by Mansfield.

"If he knew an attack was

coming," demanded the Montanan, "then why didn't he act? Why didn't he do something to avert this dangerous conflict?"

"That's a question which should be directed to other officials," declared Dulles. "I am concerned with intelligence. My job is to gather information, evaluate it and to report it. What is done about it is outside of my jurisdiction."

Dulles also asserted the CIA had submitted numerous reports on unrest in the satellites and the likelihood of uprisings.

NOV 21 1956

S. 626 545

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From/ Edit Other
Page Page Page

Date:

21

CIA Warning of Mid-East Attack Bared

By RICHARD WILSON

Chief of the Minneapolis Tribune
Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON—A controversy is developing here on the Eisenhower administration's awareness of and readiness for international crises.

Was the United States caught unready and off guard by the Middle East crisis in a less disastrous version of the Pearl Harbor surprise of 1941?

The answer thus far is that the central intelligence agency (CIA) did, in fact, advise the White House 24 hours in advance of the imminence of the Israeli, British and French assault on Egypt.

THE GOVERNMENT'S top intelligence agency also advised the White House of the unrest in Hungary, but it was not able to forecast the course of events and the repression imposed by the Soviet Union.

Congressional leaders have been informed of these advance intelligence estimates, but they are not completely satisfied.

Sen. Mike Mansfield (D., Mont.), an influential member of the senate foreign relations committee, charges that the intelligence services were "delinquent" in not having advance information. He demands a joint congressional watchdog committee for the intelligence agencies.



Wilson

CENTRAL intelligence agency is fighting such congressional supervision, but has welcomed a study of its work on the Egyptian and Hungarian crisis by Mansfield or other members of the foreign relations committee. CIA will oppose being probed by members of any supervisory committee on the ground that

this would interfere with its secret work.

The intelligence estimate on the action in Egypt did not name the time when the assault would begin except that it would be in the near future. Thus, when President Eisenhower recently said that he had learned of the attack only through the press, intelligence reports were in the White House on the imminence of the attack.

It is said that there is no discrepancy between these two facts, and that it was perfectly true that President Eisenhower had received no information from the British, French or Israelis on their intentions, and only got the definite news from the press.

THIS FITS the previous picture of an administration which had been deliberately misled by the British and the French who, from Oct. 15 onward, kept their allies ignorant of their plans.

The point now made is that the central intelligence agency was, without British and French co-operation, able to determine somewhat in advance the action these countries and Israel were about to take.

Submission of such estimates, which amount to exact evaluations and predictions, is a relatively new function for the central intelligence agency. These estimates have been going before the national security council for something over four years and were first introduced by Gen. Walter Bedell Smith.

PRIOR to that time it had been the function of the various intelligence agencies to inform the military services, the state department and the White House of developments, but not to evaluate these developments.

Under Allen Dulles, the CIA has advanced even further in this direction. What it amounts to is that Dulles and his top staff tie themselves to predictions of probable events.

In the present case, they were right in evaluating Israel's intention to attack in the Sinai desert rather than in Jordan. But it is not disclosed in what cases CIA has been wrong.

Nor is the agency itself in a position to reveal when it has been right or when wrong for its operation.

STATINTL

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NOV 21 1956

Circ. m. 53,259
S. 181,704

Front Page
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Other Page

Date:

U.S. Intelligence Unit Gave Mideast Tipoff

By FREDERIC W. COLLINS
Journal-Bulletin Washington Bureau

Washington — Controversy on the question whether the United States knew early enough and fully enough what was boiling up in the Middle East and Eastern Europe this fall is almost certain to develop when Congress begins to come back to life.

The Central Intelligence Agency did inform the White House 24 hours in advance that Israel was about to attack and pinpointed Egypt as the target despite efforts to misdirect CIA's attention toward Jordan.

It did give an estimate 24

hours in advance that there would be British and French intervention in Egypt.

It provided a forecast to the government long in advance that something was ripening in Hungary and Poland, although it did not fix a date or a close range of dates for outbreak.

Senator Mike Mansfield (D-Mont), who is likely to be the Democratic whip in the new Senate, is an influential member of the foreign affairs committee, and the author of a so-far unsuccessful attempt to set up a congressional "watch-dog committee" over CIA, has said "we were caught short."

In a panel TV show Sunday called College Press Conference, Senator Mansfield suggested strongly that he would renew his drive for congressional supervision of the CIA. The CIA is a large operation in itself, and a parent company for subsidiary intelligence agencies in other departments such as state and defense.

Senator Mansfield did not disclose the basis for his charge that U.S. intelligence agencies were "delinquent" in catching on to what was happening. He was present at a briefing of congressional leaders on the whole subject of the Mideast and Eastern Europe after the eruptions occurred there.

Questions are still being asked why CIA did not make a forecast on the Mideast more than 24 hours in advance.

Others are being asked why it did not furnish a forecast

of the violence of the Soviet reaction in Hungary.

The intelligence activity with respect to the Israel attack and the British and French intervention in Egypt was carried out under somewhat unusual conditions, in that friendly countries were involved with whom this government ordinarily has a satisfactory exchange of information.

In this case, the United States was not informed by the participants. Instead, there was for weeks what is characterized as a blackout. Two weeks before the whole thing came out into the open, the CIA knew that the blackout was on. There are background indications, in fact, that this government acted to warn Britain, France and Israel privately well in advance of the public warnings given as the crisis came to a head.

Knew British, French Intent

The CIA was aware of British and French intention to act, having watched preparations for fighting, shipments of material, and a buildup on Cyprus. It did not limit itself to reporting "capabilities," but made an estimate of intent.

The boiling up of revolts in Poland and Hungary provided a slightly different problem. Whereas a military invasion is a relatively precise thing, any judgment as to just when a revolt will occur is almost im-

possible to lay down with any accuracy.

What the government was told at the highest levels in a long series of meetings was that a process of spontaneous combustion was going on and that a flareup was going to occur. In Poland, there had been the spectacular advance notice given by the Ponzan riots. In Hungary, it was perhaps impossible to tell until the last instant when underlying hatreds of the Russians would break through the surface. When it came it came with the sparking of an incident during a seemingly peaceful demonstration.

For a matter of two years or thereabouts there has been a 24-hour watch on in the Pentagon in which CIA and military intelligence officers join, culling out information from all over the world on prospective war situations. This is keyed into machinery which can reach the White House and the top officials of key departments at any hour.

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WASHINGTON

By ROSCOE DRUMMOND

How Good Is U. S. Intelligence?

WASHINGTON.

Most of the Congressional criticism of the Central Intelligence Agency is wide of the mark. The C. I. A. has, on balance, been doing a better job than many of its critics realize.

The current attacks on the C. I. A. remind one of the famous remark of the editor of "Punch" who, in reply to a disappointed reader, agreed that "Punch" was not as good as it used to be and added: "It never was."

If the critics of the C. I. A. would argue that the United States intelligence operation is not as good as it ought to be and never will be good enough, that would seem to me a fair and useful comment—intelligence always needs to be better.

But to contend that the United States government has recently been "caught short" virtually everywhere—in Poland, in Hungary, in Israel, Egypt and the Middle East—is not, to the best of my knowledge, borne out by the facts.



Drummond

Quite possibly some of the impression that the American government had no advance clues as to what was in the making in the countries came, in part, from President Eisenhower's entirely accurate statement, with respect to the Israeli-Franco-British intervention in Egypt that we had "not been informed." Here the President was referring to official information, not to intelligence, and was stating for the record that our NATO allies had undertaken a major foreign policy action not only without consulting us but without informing us.

But this is far different than saying, as some on the hill have been saying, that the United States had no advance intelligence that any of these things were stirring. That would have been a grievous intelligence breakdown and my information is:

That we had at least a twenty-four-hour advance intelligence estimate that Israel was mobilizing and was poised to move;

That our intelligence estimates indicated the probability of British and French participation;

That our information in and around the satellite countries showed that distress and popular resentment against the Soviet were coming to a boil, although I doubt if the C. I. A. could have predicted whether the outbreak would be first in Poland, or first in Hungary.

There can be no doubt that our intelligence is weakest where it would be invaluable to have it strong—namely, inside the Soviet Union. But any conspiratorial dictatorship is hard to crack and the Russians were slightly averse under the C.I.A. The kind of military, economic, and political information which is in the public domain in a free society like the United States is covered by layers of secrecy in Russia and is disconcertingly skimpy. Obviously the C. I. A. is itself far from perfect—when it is as it should be.

waiting for some official to open his office Monday morning.

Today a staff of qualified experts maintains a continuous, twenty-four-hour-a-day scrutiny of every piece of information, estimate and tip from every source which reaches every intelligence arm of the government. At whatever time of day or night it instantly refers any critical new development to a special committee for immediate appraisal. This group has direct contact with the intelligence advisory committee which is made up of the intelligence representatives of the C. I. A., Army, Navy, Air Force, Joint Chiefs of Staff, State and F. B. I. This intelligence advisory committee is the adviser to the President and the National Security Council and provides them with daily intelligence information and appraisal.

One of the healthiest things about the C. I. A. is its attitude of self-examination and its awareness that its operation needs freshness, vigor and freedom from smugness. One of its principal critics, Sen. Mike Mansfield, D. Montana, has regressed the suggestion that a joint Congressional committee "supervise" the intelligence operation.

I don't see how Congress can efficiently "supervise" the executive branch of the government, but if Mr. Mansfield and other able members of Congress like him would be prepared personally to put in the time to check the C. I. A., inside and out, upside and down, that would be expected the C. I. A. would welcome it.

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WASHINGTON FRONT

A Look at Intelligence

Mansfield Expected to Lead Drive For Closer Supervision of Agency

By ROBERT ROTH

Bulletin Washington Bureau

Washington—There is certain to be some hue and cry when the new Congress convenes for a shakedown of the American Intelligence system.

Such outcries have been heard before and have never amounted to much. This one promises to be more substantial, for two reasons. First, because this government was apparently caught unprepared by the momentous developments of the last month in eastern Europe and the Middle East, and, second, because the current demand for a close look at our hush-hush espionage activities has more formidable backing than similar proposals have ever had before.



Roth

The chief spokesman for a new deal in Intelligence is Senator Mike Mansfield, Democrat, of Montana. Mansfield, who is slated to become the majority whip in the Senate, is respected in both parties as an alert and intelligent Senator who has not allowed partisanship to cloud his judgment and who has been a consistently strong supporter of bipartisan foreign policy.

As a hard-working member of the Foreign Relations Committee, in close and frequent touch with both State Department and Central Intelligence Agency officials, Mansfield is better informed on what is going on in the world than most of his colleagues.

'Caught by Surprise'

When he asserts, as he did recently, that "we were caught short—we were caught by surprise in Poland, caught by surprise in Hungary, caught by surprise in the Middle East," his words carry considerable weight. And when he says that the time has come to consider creating a "watch-dog" congressional committee to supervise the functioning of the Central Intelligence Agency, he is apt to be listened to.

It may be correct to say that we were "caught short" by the Israeli invasion of Egypt. In the sense that we were not prepared with an effective and consistent policy for meeting that crisis.

But it is not true that we were caught completely by surprise. The White House was informed of the Israeli mobilization almost as soon as it began, and knew 24 hours before it was launched that the strike was to be against Egypt.

The White House also had 24 hours warning from intelligence sources of the Franco-British move into Egypt in conjunction with the Israeli attack.

It can be argued that 24 hours' notice isn't much when events of such proportion are being dealt with, but it can also be argued that it is better than nothing.

In that connection it should be remembered that Intelligence operated under some handicap not of its own making.

One of these handicaps was the breakdown of the close liaison that once existed between ourselves and our principal allies. It has been well publicized, and it is true that Britain and France did not inform this country of their intention to go into Egypt. Such a situation would have been unthinkable in the days when the heads of government were operating on a close personal basis, as when Roosevelt and Churchill, or even Truman and Attlee, were in power.

It would also have been expected in the not too distant past that whenever a government planned a major move of importance to us we would get a tipoff from some neutral power that got wind of it.

The fact is that, in the Middle East situation, Britain and France planned their move at least two weeks in advance but we got no hint of it, from them or anyone else.

Contact Was Lost

The onus for that lies, if it lies anywhere, not on Intelligence but on the State Department and the Executive.

Our diplomacy is no longer conducted on a personal basis. It may well be that the way we now operate is better in the long run, that more solid foundations for peace can be laid by relying on negotiation through the United Nations than on the personal understandings of heads of states. But our new method demonstrably involves some loss of contact with other governments. That is a price we may be willing to pay, but it should not be charged against Intelligence, or at least not against Intelligence alone.

The intelligence problem in eastern Europe was different from that in the Middle East. The CIA was long aware that trouble was brewing in Poland and Hungary and that it was only a question of time when the lid would blow off.

But it did not know when, or in which country the crisis would come first, or what form it would take when it did. As a result, the Intelligence Service was unable to provide the Administration with a firm estimate of the situation and the Administration was similarly unprepared to deal with the circumstances that did develop. There was, apparently, no intelligence information on how Russia would react when the satellites began throwing off their shackles.

It is, of course, easier to detect defects in Intelligence in the light of hindsight than to suggest how a better result might have been achieved. Mansfield and some other members of Congress feel that the fault lies partly in the fact that the CIA has been permitted to function as a law unto itself, free of the congressional restraints on budget, personnel and general operations that serve to keep most administrative agencies in line.

Proud of His Agency

It is generally recognized that an intelligence agency cannot operate in the open, but many question whether the secrecy that surrounds the CIA does not serve as well to cloak inefficiency as to protect its activities from enemy gaze.

Allen Dulles, brother of Secretary of State Dulles and director of the CIA, is proud of his agency. He feels he has done a good job in assembling an effective professional espionage corps. Most of his top men have long experience in intelligence service.

Dulles has worked well with key members of the Senate, particularly those on the Appropriations and Armed Services committees, with which he has principally to deal. But he has been reluctant to acknowledge that the work of his agency is any of the business of Congress as such.

He fears particularly the establishment of a committee that would have the right to probe his records and set up dangerous avenues for leaks. He is distrustful of amateurs in the espionage field who might do harm without knowing it, and he feels that this risk would be particularly great if a congressional committee established to supervise intelligence were to delegate a considerable portion of its work to a staff, as it almost certainly would do.

Advocates of a congressional committee contend that the discretion of senators and representatives has been well established by their service on such bodies as the Foreign Relations and Atomic Energy committees, and that it is no harder for a congressional committee to assemble a trustworthy staff than for a branch of the executive department.

The chances are that efforts to establish a watchdog committee will get nowhere, for basically the inclination of most people is to rely on the executive rather than the legislature in such delicate areas as intelligence and espionage. But before the proposal is ditched there is likely to be considerable airing of the shortcomings of our intelligence system and a certain amount of calling to account on the part of those responsible for it.

That may be a good thing.

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There's New Talk Of Removing Cloak From Super-Spy Agency

Secrecy Conceals Both Good And Bad Points Of Dulles' CIA

By GEORGE ZIELKE
Toledo Blade Bureau

WASHINGTON, Nov. 24—Some time ago the Central Intelligence Agency arranged coverage for its employees with a group hospitalization organization. But when the group hospitalization people wanted to know the names of the persons covered, the CIA canceled the deal.

That in a nutshell describes the hush-hush atmosphere surrounding the CIA, set up in the defense reorganization of 1947.

(By the way, CIA employees got their hospitalization coverage through a blanket policy written by a private insurance company to CIA's specifications.)

The CIA is directed by the man who, for his exploits in World Wars I and II, has been called the greatest spy in American history—Allen W. Dulles (brother of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles).

Though Allen Dulles is listed in the Congressional Directory and the CIA is listed with address and number in the Washington telephone book, he isn't listed in the Official Register of the United States—and the only thing you can find out about the CIA from the federal budget is an appropriation for a new building in nearby Virginia. The rest of CIA's funds are concealed—even from Congress, except for subcommittees of the Senate and House Appropriations and Armed Services committees.

OF COURSE secrecy about the CIA conceals any bad points as well as any good points.

More and more questions have been asked recently about the CIA—as to why United States officials have been so

surprised by developments in the Middle East and Europe.

There are indications, however, that intelligence reports must have given some inkling about Middle East preparations, since on Sunday, Oct. 28, President Eisenhower sent a warning to Premier Ben-Gurion of Israel against taking "a reckless initiative" and the State Department asked Americans in the Middle East to leave if "not performing essential functions." Israel invaded Egypt the following day.

THE NATIONAL Security Act of 1947 established the CIA, under direction of a National Security Council responsible to the President, with assignments to "correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to national security" and to perform "such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally." Thus the CIA has no direct authority over other civilian and military agencies functioning in the field of foreign intelligence.

The separate Central Intelligence Act of 1949 didn't change the functions but gave almost unlimited authority to its director—including spending of government money on his own say-so.

Director Dulles has found on descriptions of his work as a cloak-and-dagger agent. One of his rare speeches last week he said, "The CIA is a sensationalism should ever cloud the main and valid



ALLEN W. DULLES
Spotlight's on him

tion of this agency. This function is to coordinate the work of finding the facts in the international situation without bias or prejudice, and to make those facts available to others in our government that have the infinitely difficult task of charting a policy which will make for peace . . ."

BEFORE the recent developments, primary congressional dissatisfaction with the CIA stemmed from the Communist invasion of South Korea in 1950 and again from the Chinese Communist intervention in Korea later that year. However, CIA got the word around that it had invalidated the possibility of the Chinese action—in addition, former President

in his memoirs wrote that he received a memo from the CIA to the effect that the Chinese would not intervene to prevent the United States from

al committees were irked by the apparent surprise of the CIA over a revolution in Colombia. On the other hand, the CIA got credit for forestalling a Communist shipment of arms to Guatemala in 1954, and also has been credited with a role in the overthrow of Iran's Premier Mossadeq in 1953.

That congressional concern has seeped into the executive branch of the government was reflected by President Eisenhower's decision this year to establish a board of consultants on foreign intelligence activities to review an report to him on such activities—including the CIA.

SUCH A BOARD was recommended by the second Hoover Commission on Organization of the Government in 1955 after a commission "task force," headed by Gen. Mark Clark, concluded that "there is still much to be done by our intelligence community to bring its achievements up to an acceptable level."

Sen. Mike Mansfield (D., Mont.), who has been a principal proponent of more congressional control over the CIA, said just the other day that U.S. intelligence agencies had been "delinquent" in reporting on troubles abroad.

"We were caught short," he said. "We were caught by surprise in Poland caught by surprise in Hungary, caught by surprise in the Middle East."

SENATOR MANSFIELD, who will become the Democrats' "whip" (assistant leader) in the Senate, may again push his proposal for a congressional joint committee—something like the joint Atomic Energy Committee which keeps an eye on the Atomic Energy Commission's secret affairs—as a watchdog over the CIA.

His resolution for such a joint committee ran into opposition both from the Administration and from heads of the Senate committees that already deal with the CIA. And when the question came to a vote last April, the Senate 10, 10, 27.

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Senate Group Will Urge 'Watchdog' Over CIA

Mansfield Bill Expected to Stir Debate on Secret Agency's Work

By RICHARD FRYKLUND

In a day or two the most supersecret agency in American history, the Central Intelligence Agency, will find itself in the public spotlight—a position it shuns like a death sentence.

The Senate Rules Committee plans to report approval tomorrow or Tuesday of a bill to set up a House-Senate watchdog committee to oversee the intelligence agency's activities.

The bill, written by Senator Mansfield, Democrat of Montana, and signed by 20 Democrats and 15 Republicans, is likely to stir up congressional and public discussion of three questions:

Should Congress more closely supervise CIA activities?

How does the CIA operate?

Is the CIA any good as a spy outfit?

The CIA itself and its chief, Allen Dulles, have no public answers to any of these questions. It never explains or defends its operations publicly and believes that to do so would be to destroy its usefulness.

See Need for Checks

The backers of the bill agree super-secrecy is necessary. But they believe they have a formula for a committee which will maintain the secrecy but restore some Congressional checks and balances over the executive branch that were lost when the CIA was created.

Some months ago a suspicious Congressman demanded on the House floor that CIA Director Dulles state publicly how he stood on a dispute among refugee groups over the future political status of areas liberated from behind the Iron Curtain. The Congressman was afraid Mr. Dulles was siding with the wrong faction and wanted an open disavowal.

Mr. Dulles declined to take a stand. His agency was getting

This is the first of three articles on the Central Intelligence Agency and the attempts being made in Congress to set up a Watchdog Committee for it.

intelligence with the help of refugees in all factions, and he apparently felt it was to America's interest for him to stay out of the dispute. He said nothing.

The incident illustrates, according to the CIA's friends, how an overzealous Congressman on a watchdog committee could unwittingly upset the espionage applecart. The less Congress looks over the CIA's shoulder, the better, these people say.

Free Rein Opposed

But there are these arguments advanced in favor of a watchdog committee:

First, the group could protect the CIA's interests, be a buffer between the CIA and its critics and act as a guarantor of the agency's efficiency. "I don't want to investigate the CIA," Senator Mansfield said, "I want to safeguard it."

Second, although it is Congress' constitutional responsibility to check on executive spending, there is no formal machinery for a watch on the CIA today.

Third, a standing watchdog committee would provide continual supervision in contrast to present informal and intermittent checks.

Fourth, the Hoover Commission recommended last year that "Congress consider creating a Joint Congressional Committee on Foreign Intelligence . . . in order that intelligence activities be carried out efficiently. A presidential commission to check the CIA periodically, recommended in the Hoover report, recently was appointed by Mr. Eisenhower.

Senator Mansfield and his backers and the dozen Representatives who have introduced similar bills in the House believe a joint intelligence committee could be just as effective and safe as the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy has been.

No leak of atomic secrets has

ever been traced to the Congressional Atomic Committee. And in carrying out its watchdog function, the committee has performed some obvious services—getting a speedup on hydrogen bomb development, for instance.

An intelligence committee, its backers say, would hold few public hearings. Representative McCarthy, Democrat of Minnesota, who has a watchdog bill before the House Rules Committee now, foresees no need to have any public sessions.

Senator Mansfield insists that the committee would not probe every detail of CIA operation and demand justification of each "shady deal or peculiar expenditure." "We know, the Senator said, "that espionage activities require that we spend money on blonds and bartenders in far corners of the world and that those expenditures frequently are

calculated risks that don't pay off. The Committee would expect that and would ask no embarrassing questions."

The recommendation of those opposing the bill is, "Let's let well enough alone."

Senator Russell, Democrat of Georgia, chairman of the Armed Services Committee takes this stand:

"The responsible officials in the CIA have demonstrated their willingness to keep the Armed

Services and Appropriations Subcommittees fully informed on the subject of the agency's activities and operations. . . . I do know that the subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee has had periodic contact with the appropriate CIA officials. . . .

"If there is on agency of the Government in which we must take some matters on faith without a constant examination of its methods and sources, I believe this agency is the CIA."

Senator Mansfield assumes Mr. Dulles is opposed to his bill, though the CIA has taken no formal stand.

Mr. Dulles will say only this: "We are not omniscient. We are always open to suggestions from appropriate quarters on our administration and operations."

Mr. Dulles is satisfied with his present relations with Congress and feels it is Congress's job, not his, to decide if existing contacts are sufficient.

Actually the CIA says it has always been ready to "tell all" to the subcommittees it has dealt with. Some Congressmen, in fact, have asked CIA officials to tell them less—they don't want to know any more than absolutely necessary about America's intelligence activities.

Senator Russell and Chairman Hayden of the Appropriations Committee plan to write a strong dis-

senting report when the Rules Committee, of which he is a member, gives its approval. On the other hand, Chairman McClellan of the Government Operations Committee and Minority Leader Bridges favor it.

Thus the bill has strong bipartisan support and opposition. Senator Mansfield thinks he has a good chance of getting favorable action this year, but the bill clearly has a long way to go.

The House bills are languishing in the Rules Committee.

A public hearing on the McCarthy bill indicated many members have reservations about the bill, but that perhaps less than a majority are firmly against it. Give McCarthy believe a simplification of his bill can overcome the reservations.

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CIA Leaders Are Cool To 'Watchdog' Proposal

By RICHARD FRYKLUND

The Central Intelligence Agency enthusiastically obeys the law which imposes strictest secrecy on its activities, but the agency still is subject to the scrutiny of several outside executive and congressional groups.

Soon—possibly Wednesday—a new group with the sole function of watchdogging the CIA is expected to get Senate Rules Committee approval.

Backers of the watchdog committee say that while it is true that four congressional subcommittees, the Budget Bureau and a new presidential commission all do look at some facets of the CIA, no congressional group keeps a close, constant check on it the way the Joint Atomic Energy Committee watches the also-secret Atomic Energy Commission.

Cool to Scrutiny

The CIA is reported to be cool toward the watchdog idea. But perhaps the most distasteful part of the expected Rules Committee approval of the bill will be the public attention sure to follow.

The job of the CIA is to gather intelligence and co-ordinate the intelligence activities of more than a score of other agencies.

The genesis of the CIA goes back to the day Japanese bombs shattered the morning calm at Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941. American intelligence agencies knew that raid was coming, but the information was never properly used.

To protect against future Pearl Harbors, a National Intelligence Authority was set up immediately after the war body created a Central Intelligence Group that grew into the Central Intelligence Agency. The job of the agency is to gather foreign intelligence, which includes spying in the traditional sense as well as research into more conventional sources; co-ordinate intelligence activities of other agencies, and assemble the material in usable form and deliver it to the policymakers in time.

Weekly Meetings

Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles meets once a week with the heads of Army, Navy and Air Force intelligence, the National Security Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the intelligence sections of the executive departments, to draw up summaries of latest estimates of a potential enemy's capabilities and to predict the potential enemy's probable course of action.

This is the second of three articles on the Central Intelligence Agency and the attempts being made in Congress to set up a Watchdog Committee for it.

These estimates—and often vigorous dissenting opinions—are taken the next day to the National Security Council by Mr. Dulles. Sitting on the council are President Eisenhower, Vice President Nixon, Secretary of State Dulles, Secretary of Defense Wilson and Office of Defense Mobilization Director Arthur S. Flemming.

How the CIA arrives at the intelligence estimates and the nature of the estimates themselves are things the potential enemy would very much like to know. To guard that information, the CIA was given unprecedented powers of secrecy by Congress.

Can Set Own Pay Scales

The 1947 act setting up the agency specifies that the director need not make his spending public or explain the agency's organization or the identity of its personnel, its methods of operation or its sources. Mr. Dulles can hire or fire whom he pleases and set his own salary scales. He can bring as many as 100 unidentified aliens into this country every year, and he can hand out bribes to foreign code clerks or finance beautiful blondes in Vienna apartments.

There are some checks on the CIA, however. The agency is directly under the President and the National Security Council and must justify its activities

there. And the CIA budget must be defended in detail before a small group of Budget Bureau officials.

An eight-man board of consultants was named by President Eisenhower last month to review semi-annually the work of the CIA. Its chairman is Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., president of Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

The group has set up shop with a small staff in the Executive Offices building. It will report directly to the President, and only a few innocuous parts of each report will be made public.

The CIA also is checked by four subcommittees of Congress, made up of 17 Congressmen, the senior members of the House and Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees.

The CIA tells the Appropriations Subcommittees as much as they want to know about the agency's budget. Figures are not made public. They are concealed in the published Federal budget, in fact, by being scattered through appropriations for other agencies.

Get Complete Answers

The Armed Services Subcommittees receive intelligence reports and complete answers, according to Senator Russell, to all questions asked about CIA activities.

The annual spending of the CIA is known only to the Appropriations Subcommittees. Many guesses have been made—ranging from a few hundred million dollars a year up to more than a billion. But the Hoover Commission said other intelligence agencies outspend the CIA, so it is perhaps a fair guess to say the CIA budget is around \$100 million and that the agency employs about 15,000 full-time persons.

Headquarters No Secret

Headquarters of the agency is a group of aged brick buildings at 2430 E street NW. Its location is no secret. Any cab driver can take you there if you just ask for the Central Intelligence Agency.

Once you are there, however, you cannot enter any building unless you're on business. Security restrictions inside, of course, are maximum. No visitor wanders through the halls alone. Guards are everywhere.

Much of the work—perhaps 90 per cent—is routine research in unclassified documents—foreign publications, phone books, technical journals, newspapers, and the like. It is not the material, but the way it is put together and the conclusions that can be drawn that are important.

A minor number of employees are engaged in cloak-and-dag-

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Watchdog Proposal

No Domestic Function

The CIA has no domestic function, according to the law, but every once in a while a CIA man turns up with a bit of domestic intelligence—such as the time an agent reported erroneously that Far East specialist Owen Lattimore was about to leave the country.

Job applications are mistrusted—they might be from Communists trying to gain entry—and the agency likes to seek out its own prospective employees. Higher echelon workers are recruited through personal contact.

Of all persons who formally apply for jobs with the CIA, more than 67 per cent are rejected by personnel or security officials. Every employee must undergo a full FBI security check.

As director of Central Intelligence, Mr. Dulles, brother of the Secretary of State, is head of the CIA and co-ordinator of all Government intelligence activities. Mr. Dulles, 62 years old, has had a long career in diplomacy, international law and spying. His exploits as an OSS agent in Switzerland during World War II have become spy-thriller classics.

He is as friendly and shaggy as a St. Bernard, dresses in rumpled tweeds and baggy sweaters, and gestures with a pipe. His appearance creates two impressions valuable to him: He is a man you can trust; he has nothing to hide.

Mr. Dulles' deputy is Lt. Gen. Charles P. Cabell, formerly director of the Joint Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and intelligence director of the Air Force. He is 60 years old.

Head of the CIA's technical intelligence is a former Harvard law professor, Robert Amory, Jr.

Product of CIA Expenses Queried on Capitol Hill

By RICHARD FRYKLUND

Several Congressmen who are not on one of the four unpublicized subcommittees which have contact with the Central Intelligence Agency want to know if the country is getting its money's worth out of the supersecret organization.

"The average member of Congress knows no more about the CIA than what he reads in the papers," said Representative McCarthy, Democrat of Minnesota. "We don't know how much the group spends or what it produces, and that disturbs many of us."

"I doubt if even Chairman Vinson of the Armed Services

Last of a Series

Subcommittee on the CIA knows enough about the agency—and, of course, what he does know he quite properly keep to himself."

Neither Representative McCarthy nor other backers of bills to set up a House-Senate Committee to "watchdog" the CIA want the agency's affairs made public. Nor do they believe the CIA is grossly maladministered.

Check Is Sought

But they do believe that the interests of good government require that a standing committee keep a continual check on the CIA.

"Such a committee would not pass on much information either," Mr. McCarthy said, "but it could assure other Congressmen and the public that the CIA is operating efficiently."

Whether the CIA is a top-flight intelligence organization spending its money judiciously, no one is in a position to say publicly. Most criticism is necessarily uninformed, and the CIA never answers back openly.

Allen Dulles, director of Central Intelligence, will sometimes call a critic in for a private chat or will drop a note of protest to the editor of a paper which he thinks has attacked the CIA injudiciously.

The most authoritative criticism has come from the Hoover Commission task force, headed by Gen. Mark Clark. The group was given full access to CIA secrets. In a public report filed last June (there was another classified report given to the President) the Commission gave the CIA this indorsement:

"On the basis of its comprehensive studies the task force feels that the American people can and should give their full confidence and support to the intelligence program . . ."

Dulles' Burden Cited

But there were also these specific criticisms:

Director Dulles has taken on too many "burdensome duties and responsibilities" himself. There is not enough concentration on collection of intelligence information from behind the Iron Curtain.

The glamour and excitement of some aspects of the work sometimes overshadows other vital functions.

There is not enough machinery available for outside surveillance of the CIA.

On the first criticism, the Hoover Commission was whistling into the wind. Mr. Dulles, considered one of the world's master intelligence experts by the cognoscenti, loves his work and is not about to turn the fun over to subordinates. If anything, he has assumed more responsibilities since the Clark report.

Mr. Dulles does not tense up under responsibility. His friends believe he can safely assume more work than could another administrator.

Reds Tough to Penetrate

The quality of intelligence from the Soviet Union, Red China and the satellites does not satisfy Mr. Dulles. The Communist countries are tougher to penetrate than Germany was during World War II, and spying there is an exceedingly difficult job.

The problem of glamour versus grubbing always will be with the CIA. Employees have no reward except their Government salaries and inward satisfaction. The occasionally exciting assignment is what keeps many employees on the job.

A Hoover Commission recommendation for a presidential panel to examine the CIA periodically was approved by Mr. Dulles, and the panel is now operating. Another recommendation for a congressional watchdog committee has been ignored officially by the CIA.

Senator Mansfield, author of a watchdog bill scheduled to be approved by the Senate Rules Committee tomorrow, believes that Mr. Dulles opposes his bill on two grounds: The present intermittent contacts with congressional committees are very satisfactory, and the more persons who know about CIA activities, the more difficult it will be to maintain secrecy.

Success and Failure

The proof of the CIA pudding lies of course in the eating. What are the successes and failures of the group?

Again one runs into uninformed opinion and "no comment." Critics say the CIA muffed the Red Chinese invasion of North Korea, the release by South Korean President Rhee of the Red prisoners of war during the truce negotiations and the recent Soviet economic penetration of South Asia. They say the CIA has lost friends for America in Burma by maintaining a group of Nationalist Chinese guerrillas there and that CIA agents have messed unsuccessfully in palace revolutions in several countries.

These are the answers:

No one knows when the CIA muffs because the agency's responsibility ends when it has gathered and evaluated the intelligence. If this country was caught off base in North Korea it may be because the CIA was unable for policy and action to properly use the intelligence available.

There are some well-known successes. The CIA helped the overthrow of Soviet-backed government of Czechoslovakia and the Iranian revolution. In both cases, apparently, CIA helped organize and supply the opposing, more democratic forces.

Still Has Bugs

The CIA is a fine agency organized in 1947, so it certainly has bugs to be worked out. Its biggest administrative

problem is personnel. Mr. Dulles pays Civil Service wage scales, yet he needs employees of high intellectual quality. A young man who can get money, public prestige and the admiration of his wife by doing a good job in law or business has little inclination to bury his talents in the CIA—where he can't even boast to his wife.

Relatively low pay and complete anonymity has lost many good men for Mr. Dulles. The director is sufficiently worried about it that he personally examines the problems of all persons above clerical level who submit resignations.

He does not expect to solve the personnel problem. He hopes to ease it by making working conditions more attractive. That is why he wants a new "campus" headquarters for the CIA in a pleasant residential area near Langley, Va.

Security within CIA walls is a constant problem. The Hoover Commission said, however, that the CIA handles it well—that there apparently has been no effective Communist penetration

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of the agency. Lower-level employees have been ousted, how- good reasons for the cloak and dagger stuff. What the reasons ever, for alleged subversive associations are specifically, it won't say, but apparently the agency believes a criticism: The trivial secrecy rules the general merriment.

There comes a final area of few extra precautions are worth that are always good for laughs, at Washington cocktail parties.

Can't Reveal Job

Except for a half dozen top-most employees, CIA workers are not permitted to say publicly where they work. So frequently when a group of Government people get together to talk shop there will be one man in the crowd who will say, "I can't tell you where I work." The group laughs and says, "CIA."

When one telephones the CIA—the number is in the book—an operator answers with the phone number, under the impression, it seems, that she can keep secret the outfit one is calling.

And the CIA used to get along without an identifying sign on the gate—despite the fact most any cab driver can take a passenger there without directions.

The CIA knows everyone is laughing, but maintains there are

Stand on CIA By President Is Discounted

Presidential opposition to a proposed congressional committee to "watchdog" the Central Intelligence Agency probably will have little effect on the resolution to set up the committee, its author said today. Revelation of the President's opposition was sparked by a series of stories on the CIA in The Evening Star, according to Capitol Hill sources.

Senator Mansfield, Democrat of Montana, said the decision on his resolution was "entirely up to Congress." The President, he pointed out, does not get a chance to sign—or veto—such a resolution.

It is rare for a President to take a stand on concurrent resolutions, as they deal ordinarily with internal congressional matters. Backers of the Mansfield bill thought the President's opposition might backfire and help the measure.

Bridges Discloses S and

Senator Bridges, Republican of New Hampshire, disclosed the presidential stand yesterday. He said Senate Minority Leader Knowland of California told the G. O. P. Policy Committee in closed session that Mr. Eisenhower is "very much opposed" to creation of a CIA watchdog group and that he believes the agency is "too sensitive" to be examined by a standing committee.

The Mansfield resolution, summer recommendation that Congress consider creation of a watchdog committee and also urged that a presidential commission be set up to check the CIA periodically. The commission was organized—in what Mansfield bill backers interpreted as partially a move to sidetrack the congressional committee. Senator Bridges, chairman of the Republican Policy Committee, said he would support the Mansfield resolution unless a compromise can be worked out through intermittent contacts with House and Senate appropriations and armed services committees.

The bill has been held up in Maryland, a co-sponsor of the committee waiting for a minority resolution, said. "It is the report from Senator Hayden's formal reporting of the bill is scheduled now for tomorrow."

The Evening Star stories told of widespread support for the watchdog proposal among Congressmen of both parties—as well as grave doubts among many Congressmen that the super-secret intelligence agency should be subjected to closer scrutiny.

Sidetracking Move Seen

The Hoover Commission last summer recommended that Congress consider creation of a watchdog committee and also urged that a presidential commission be set up to check the CIA periodically. The commission was organized—in what Mansfield bill backers interpreted as partially a move to sidetrack the congressional committee.

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Senator Butler, Republican of Maryland, a co-sponsor of the committee waiting for a minority resolution, said. "It is the report from Senator Hayden's formal reporting of the bill is scheduled now for tomorrow."

FEB 22 1956

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STATINTL

CIA

WASHINGTON (AP)-SEN. MANFIELD SAID TODAY THAT DESPITE REPORTED OPPOSITION FROM PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, HE WILL PRESS FOR CREATION OF A CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE TO KEEP AN EYE ON THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

HE SAID A DECISION ON SETTING UP A COMMITTEE TO CHECK ON THE SUPERSECRET AGENCY "RESTS ENTIRELY IN THE HANDS OF CONGRESS." HE NOTED A RESOLUTION HE IS SPONSORING NEEDS ACTION ONLY BY SENATE AND HOUSE, AND DOES NOT REQUIRE EISENHOWER'S SIGNATURE.

SEN. BUTLER, A CO-SPONSOR OF THE MANFIELD RESOLUTION, SAID "IT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY AND OBLIGATION OF CONGRESS TO KNOW WHAT THE CIA IS DOING."

THEIR COMMENTS WERE MADE IN SEPARATE INTERVIEWS.

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STATINTL

Senate Group Asks For New C. I. A. Watchdog

WASHINGTON, Feb. 24 (P.) — The Senate Rules Committee urged today the creation of a Congressional watchdog committee to help allay "much of the suspicion in Congress" concerning the secrecy of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Until such a committee is created, a majority report said, "there will be no way of knowing what serious flaws in the Central Intelligence Agency may be covered by the curtain of secrecy in which it is shrouded."

Release of the report coincided with the appearance of C. I. A. director Allen Dulles before an ultra-secret session of a Senate Armed Services subcommittee which gets periodic reports from C. I. A. officials.

Thirty-four other Senators have joined Sen. Mike Mansfield, D., Mont., in a resolution to create a joint Senate-House committee to supervise the C. I. A. in much the same manner as the joint Senate-House Committee on Atomic Energy looks into United States atomic matters.

The resolution to look into the C. I. A.'s operations has drawn opposition from President Eisenhower.

Senate Republican leader William F. Knowland, Calif., said the President has told Republican leaders he regards the agency as "too sensitive" for that type of scrutiny.

Nevertheless, Sen. Mansfield says he is going to press for its adoption in the Senate.

Opposing the legislation, Sen.



Associated Press wirephoto

Allen W. Dulles prior to testifying in Washington yesterday.

Carl Hayden, D., Ariz., told the Senate yesterday that both the Armed Services subcommittees and the Appropriations Committees of Senate and House get regular reports from C. I. A. officials.

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STATINTL

CIA Watchdog Unit Backed

By Herbert Foster

United Press

The Senate Rules Committee said yesterday the hush-hush Central Intelligence Agency has "placed itself above other Government agencies" and should be subjected to congressional auditing.

The Committee made the statement in urging the Senate to approve a bill to set up a joint congressional "watchdog" committee to oversee the super-secret CIA. The Committee stamped its approval on the bill Jan. 23.

In a follow-up formal report, the Rules group said the proposed joint committee could inform Congress about the agency on a "need-to-know" basis and provide a forum for congressional doubts and complaints.

President Eisenhower has notified Congress that he opposes the joint committee plan, sponsored by Sen. Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.).

Mr. Eisenhower last month set up a special eight-member board to keep tabs on the CIA and the military spy systems.

The Hoover Commission had recommended a sweeping reorganization of the agency to overcome what it called a serious lack of "adequate intelligence data" on Russia and other Communist nations.

The Rules Committee said Congress should share in the responsibility for the CIA, as well as the White House and the National Security Council.

"Secrecy beclouds everything about CIA, its cost, its personnel, its efficiency, its failures, its successes," the committee said. "An aura of superiority has been built around it."

It added that a congressional auditing of the CIA "is compatible with the legitimate purposes of the Government."

Sen. Carl Hayden (D-Ariz.) Thursday made public his dissenting views as the Committee's second ranking Democrat. Hayden said it is a mistake to believe that Congress does not keep careful tabs on CIA through the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees.

Mansfield's bill, co-sponsored by 32 other Senators, calls for creation of a 12-man committee, composed of three members each from the House and Senate Appropriations and Armed Services Subcommittees dealing with the CIA.

FEB 26 1956

VINSON HITS C. I. A. BILL**Say House Unit's Check on Agency Is Adequate**

WASHINGTON, Feb. 25 (UP) —A move to set up a special Congressional "watchdog" committee to keep tabs on the super-secret Central Intelligence Agency faced strong House opposition today.

Representative Carl Vinson, Georgia Democrat, said he would fight the move. He said that the House Arms Services Committee, which he heads, already was doing that job.

The Senate Rules Committee formally endorsed yesterday a bill to establish a joint committee to check on the agency, which is responsible for collecting intelligence on the activities and intentions of other nations.

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GEN. PHILLIPS**Senators Disagree Over Need For a Committee to Supervise Super-Secret CIA's Operations****Rules Group Indorses Bill—Members of Subcommittees That Deal With Agency Say It Could Be Harmful, Term Controls Adequate.****By BRIG. GEN. THOMAS R. PHILLIPS, U.S.A. (Ret.)**
Military Analyst of the Post-Dispatch.

WASHINGTON, March 3

IN AN EFFORT to pry the lid off the super-secret Central Intelligence Agency, the Senate Rules Committee has indorsed a bill by Senator Mike Mansfield (Dem.), Montana, to create a special joint Senate-House committee to supervise the operations of CIA in much the same way as the Joint Atomic Energy Committee does the Atomic Energy Commission.

The director of CIA, Allen W. Dulles, brother of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, has made no public statement on the proposal, but that he objects to it is obvious, since the President has informed the Congress of his own objections.

The Rules Committee majority report recognized the need for secrecy in gathering intelligence, but said "there was a profound difference between an essential degree of secrecy to achieve a specific purpose and secrecy for the mere sake of secrecy."

"The CIA has unquestionably placed itself above other Government agencies" the report affirmed. "There has been no regular methodical review of this agency, other than a briefing which is supplied to a few members of selected subcommittees."

The CIA is supervised in the Congress at present by small subcommittees of the Senate and House Armed Services and Appropriations Committees. Allen Dulles recently testified in executive session before the Senate Armed Services Committee, but no report, as usual, has been made on his testimony.

Terms Supervision Adequate.

Senator Carl Hayden (Dem.), Arizona, chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, and a member of the Rules Committee, in a minority report, declared that Congress maintains "supervision over the operations of that agency to an entirely adequate degree."

He said that the idea that Congress did not control the CIA sufficiently was "a mistaken and erroneous assumption."

Hayden should know, since he is one of the few Senators who is given complete information on the operations and appropriations of CIA.

The Armed Services Committees, generally, feel that congressional supervision of the CIA is adequate. In addition, they see the proper responsibilities of the Armed Services Committees diluted by the formation of joint committees to take over part of their functions. They object to a new joint committee for the CIA on this ground.

The CIA has been investigated four times in the last six years by task forces of the Hoover Commission. After the last investigation, the commission, as distinguished from its task force headed by Gen. Mark W. Clark, recommended two committees to supervise CIA.

The first, to be appointed by the President, was also recommended by the task force and was to be composed of "experienced private citizens who would periodically examine the work of the Government foreign intelligence agencies and report to him." The President has appointed this committee.

The second committee recommended was the joint Senate-House committee now cleared by the Rules Committee of the

Lack of Understanding.

The report of the Senate Rules Committee shows a lack of understanding of the special need of CIA for utter secrecy. It is true that some of the outward aspects of the rules for secrecy look absurd to the outsider.

The cloak-and-dagger agency broke down far enough to permit its number to be listed in the Washington telephone directory. It appears there is small type with the number EX-ecutive 3-6115. Anyone calling the agency, however, is answered by an operator who repeats the number instead of answering "Central Intelligence Agency." From there on, all is secret.

Having obtained the extension of the person called, and called for it, again the extension number is repeated. The caller asks for an individual. The individual is always out of the office and will call when he returns. The return call usually comes within a few minutes, the time necessary to consult with the individual and to find out if he wishes to take the call. The reason for this last precaution is that no one except a few top individuals is allowed to admit even that he works for the CIA.

In Washington, the prohibition on admitting that one works in CIA automatically discloses where the individual does work, since CIA is the only agency with such restrictions. An old friend shows up in town, evades telling what he is doing, and you know he is with CIA. This is not so silly as it may appear. The same individual may be sent out on a covert operation in which he operates as a business man, or under some other type of cover. If he were identified as a member of the CIA, his cover and usefulness would be destroyed.

Spies in Panama.

There were certain Japanese business men in Panama between the two great wars who our intelligence agency knew were spies. They were allowed to continue to operate since their communication helped to discover all the ramifications of the Japanese spy net.

These spies had as their German watchhead at Scapa Flow, the German submarine base. He made no use of communication with his superiors.

er the war broke out, he gave the German navy information which enabled a German submarine to penetrate the theoretically impregnable defense and torpedo half a dozen British warships and escape.

Some of CIA's efforts to establish a business cover have not turned out well. Two, Western Enterprises on Formosa and the Southeast Trading Corporation in Thailand, were the jokes of the Far East. Everyone knew they were cover operations for United States intelligence.

The numbers of personnel involved were too large to make the cover effective. Imagine a Chinese customs official receiving an invoice for 300 pianos for Western Enterprises and scratching his head in wonderment while he said: "How can they use 300 pianos when there are not that many American families on Formosa?"

CIA has been given credit, probably much to the distress of its director, in national magazines for having arranged the overthrow of King Farouk of Egypt, of Mossadegh in Iran and of the Communist government of Jacob Arbenz in Guatemala; but if CIA engages in such interference in the internal affairs of friendly countries—and CIA does not admit that it does—it is apparent that an authoritative leak, no matter how trifling, from a Senator or Representative in a position to know, could utterly destroy the effectiveness of its operations and get the United States into all kinds of international

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Lives at Stake.

The need for complete secrecy for undercover intelligence operations—spying—is obvious. The lives of spies depend on the other side's total lack of knowledge of how they get in, how they report and who their contacts are. A carefully built up undercover intelligence operation can be destroyed and many of the operatives executed as a result of an indiscretion at a Washington cocktail party.

If a Senator or Representative cannot be trusted, one may ask, how can the thousands of people who work for CIA around the world be trusted? The answer is that everyone who joins the CIA is carefully investigated for discretion and loyalty and is subject to prosecution under special laws for failures of discretion. They are legally bound for the rest of their lives, if they leave CIA, not to disclose anything about the agency.

Senators and Representatives are not investigated and there are no legal strings to prevent them from making disclosures at some time.

Intelligence methods do not change much. CIA is suffering now from the rash of books about the wartime Office of Strategic Services which disclosed our intelligence methods. The necessary legal authority to prevent this from happening again has been granted CIA.

Basically, CIA's objection to a large congressional committee arises from the well known fact that the more people know a secret, the more likely it is to be disclosed.

Some of CIA's Jobs.

CIA does a great deal besides cloak-and-dagger work. It analyzes the technical publications of the countries it is interested in and the political pronouncements of their officials. It records radio broadcasts and analyzes them. It receives and analyzes the intelligence produced by the armed services, the State Department and other agencies operating abroad. It is feared that if a nation so that the United States is unlikely to have a surprise at Pearl Harbor.

A special desk handles day-to-day matters much like the city editor on a large newspaper. The implications of some cryptic fact or speech are analyzed at once and a quick flash goes to the appropriate official, perhaps the President.

A superior intelligence agency cannot be created overnight. In the opinion of some in a position to know, the CIA has accomplished an almost miraculous feat in reaching its present state of excellence. It is generally conceded that only the Soviet Union has better intelligence now than the United States. Even this is primarily due to the much simpler problem the Soviets have in gaining intelligence in the Democracies than the United States has in penetrating Communist security precautions.

Fear CIA Will Be Hurt.

There is general fear that close congressional supervision of the agency will hurt it. Even critics who have a basis for their opinion feel that the present conditions under which the agency operates should not be changed.

The problem is to select an able director who can be trusted and to trust him under the supervision of the President and the National Security Council.

The Hoover Commission task force reported that the present director is "industrious, objective, selfless, enthusiastic and imaginative."

MAR 12 1956

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STATINTL

Control Over CIA Not Impractical**EXTENSION OF REMARKS**

OF

HON. CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI

OF WISCONSIN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES*Thursday, March 8, 1956*

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks in the Record, I wish to recommend to the attention of the membership of this body an editorial which appeared in the Milwaukee Journal on March 6, 1956, entitled "Some Congressional Control Over CIA Is Not Impractical."

During the last 3 years, I have exerted repeated efforts on behalf of the proposal to establish a Joint Committee on Intelligence Matters. I have first outlined my proposal on this subject, in House Concurrent Resolution 169, 83d Congress and reintroduced it, in an amended version, in House Concurrent Resolution 28, 84th Congress, together with over a score of my distinguished colleagues.

It is my sincere hope that the House Rules Committee will report House Concurrent Resolution 28 in the near future.

SOME CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OVER CIA IS NOT IMPRACTICAL

For several years there has been a rash of resolutions in Congress calling for an agency to watch over the Central Intelligence Agency, our top cloak and dagger corps.

The second Hoover Commission called for the same thing. It suggested that a small, permanent commission composed of a bipartisan representation from Congress and distinguished private citizens handle the job.

President Eisenhower has gone halfway. He recently named a civilian commission in the executive branch to serve as watchdog and report to him. But he has shied away from letting Congress in on the act. This hasn't stilled demands that Congress take a hand in watching an agency for which it appropriates money. Senator MANFIELD, Democrat, Montana, has come up with a bill to create a joint committee of both Houses of Congress to work with the CIA. The Senate Rules Committee has agreed to congressional action on the bill and it has attracted a large measure of support.

The Hoover Commission pointed out that the CIA, because it needs a large degree of secrecy to operate, is exempted by law from rules that control other Government agencies. For instance, the General Services Administration—the Government's housekeeper, has no control over CIA at all. CIA is exempted "from compliance with any provision of law limiting transfers of appropriations; any requirements for publication or disclosure of the organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed by the agency; and any regulations relating to the expenditure of Government funds."

Such exemptions are, by and large, proper. The Atomic Energy Commission has similar exemptions. But Congress does have to appropriate funds for the CIA. It created the

Agency and set its scope of activities. Surely someone in Congress should be given at least peek enough to make sure that CIA is operating efficiently and properly. This is particularly true because of criticisms—some from the Hoover Commission itself—of some shortcomings in CIA.

The AEC, which hoards secrets, too, has a Joint Congressional Committee which is given enough of a picture to judge whether the organization is handling Government funds properly. The Joint Committee has worked exceedingly well, and without weakening national security. The same sort of committee could do the same sort of job for CIA. It wouldn't have to be told everything—and shouldn't.

But Congress ought to be able to determine whether the dagger is being kept sharp and the cloak is kept cleaned and pressed and buttoned. It's basic that Congress, with control of the purse, must get enough information to make an informed judgment on how the purse is expended.

That's all MANSRUKE and others want—and it's little enough to ask.



By JERRY GREENE

Washington, March 12.—When Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 2 is called up for action on the floor any day now, chances are excellent that the roof of the north end of the Capitol will rock from the resultant explosion.

This resolution, introduced by Sen. Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.), sponsored by 35 Senators and vigorously opposed by the White House, would create a joint watchdog committee to keep tabs on the super-secret Central Intelligence Agency.

Mansfield himself told THE NEWS he is neither satisfied nor dissatisfied with CIA because he doesn't know anything about it, but he thinks the Congress should. There are other senators who are violently dissatisfied, among them being Sen. Joseph McCarthy (R-Wis.), and they expect to say so, and why.

Ike Satisfied As Things Are

At his last press conference, President Eisenhower emphatically said that he thought the present committees of Congress are "fully competent" to look after CIA, and have done so. He was referring to subcommittees of the House and Senate Appropriations and Armed Services Committees, which get some information from the agency from time to time.

The Mansfield joint committee would have 17 members, evenly divided between House and Senate. They would be drawn from the Appropriations and Armed Services subcommittees which have been dealing with CIA already. This is an obvious gesture toward the "security" of which CIA is so fond.

There has been a great deal of uneasiness in Congress since Dec. 7, 1941, about the amount of intelligence to take that any way you want—available to the armed forces and policy makers of the government. Everybody around the town wants the U.S. to have a good spy system. The big question is whether CIA, which has grown faster and more strangely than Topsy is the answer.

Door Was Open, So Out It Went

CIA was born by executive order on Jan. 20, 1949, when President Truman created a central intelligence group. That, he has said, was to coordinate all the spy reports reaching the White House and to work out the frequent conflicts in reports from the Army, Navy and State Department agencies. The State Department act for the armed services CIA was established in its own legal right.



Sen. Mike Mansfield
He wants a closer look.

The act said that CIA was created "for the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several government departments." But the barn door was left open for considerable further functions. In the opinion of a number of Senators and Congressmen, CIA has raced out that barn door and functioned frantically.

The Senate Rules Committee, in approving the Mansfield resolution with one dissenting vote, said of CIA: "Its very secrecy keeps its operations from justification or criticism. The suspicion grows, however, that some of its secrecy has been secrecy for its own sake."

How to Hide Half a Billion

CIA's budget is hidden, buried among appropriations for other government agencies. Similar secrecy applies to the number of good or inefficient spies on the payroll. But an informed guess from a man who ought to know fixes the budget at about \$500,000,000 a year and the number of

The budget for the FBI last year was \$2,000,000 and the pay-

roll included about 14,000 employees, of whom 6,200 were special agents.

CIA and its short-lived predecessor, the CIG, have had five different directors in its eight years. Adm. Sidney Souers, the late Gen. Hoyt Vandenberg, Adm. Roscoe Hillenkoetter, Gen. Walter (Beedle) Smith and the current spy boss, Allen Dulles. An amendment to the act last year requires now that if the head man is from the military, his deputy must be a civilian.

CIA Reports to Security Council

The agency works directly under the National Security Council, and the CIA supporters in Congress insist they, through the Appropriations and Armed Services subcommittees, get all the facts they require about its operations, including those concerning spending.

Each week, the day before the National Security Council meets, the Intelligence Advisory Council holds a huddle to see what's new. Dulles is chairman of this council and present are representatives of the FBI, Navy, Army and Air Force intelligence, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, State Department and the Atomic Energy Commission. They go over the report which Dulles uses to open meetings of the Security Council, which is headed by the President.

Nobody could be found around the Capitol who objects to these procedures. It could be that they might prevent a repetition of the confusion which fouled up the military on Pearl Harbor Day.

Spending Power Called Too Vast

But there is a considerable objection to the building of a tremendous secret agency—CIA has no police, subpoena, law enforcement or internal security functions—which has a virtually unlimited pocketbook.

The Senate Rules Committee noted that CIA has been examined four times by outside agencies, twice by the Hoover Commission, and the substance of all findings, never fully made public, was that "inadequacies and poor organization existed and had gone uncorrected."

Sen. McCarthy, when chairman of the Select Investigating subcommittee, was ready to probe CIA when he got involved in other matters. It is understood that he has not yet done so.

STATINTL

SENATORS TO QUIZ DULLES TOMORROW

Foreign Relations Committee
Arranges Open Hearing
on Administration Policy

By WILLIAM S. WHITE

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 19—

The first grand-scale and critical Senatorial examination of foreign and high military policy since the Eisenhower Administration took office is in prospect.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee plans to interrogate John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State, over the whole world range—from Indo-China to the "New Look" in military planning—in a public hearing Friday.

Mr. Dulles was invited to appear by the committee chairman, Senator Alexander Wiley, Republican of Wisconsin, at the urgent "suggestion" of Democrats headed by Senator Mike Mansfield of Montana.

The Secretary is understood not only to have accepted instantly but to have taken the initiative in arranging for the proceedings to be in public.

The impression left among some Senators was that he welcomed the forum as an opportunity both to reply to recent Democratic criticisms and to attempt to close or narrow a considerable foreign policy gulf existing among the Republicans themselves.

Though Mr. Dulles has been before the Foreign Relations Committee several times since the new Administration came to power he has not testified in public heretofore except on limited and relatively collateral foreign policy subjects.

The available information tonight indicated that he would face searching questioning, from both the Republican and the Democratic sides of the committee table, for quite different reasons.

Some of the leading Republicans in Congress have been skeptical almost to the point of hostility about Mr. Dulles's agreement to have the United States sit down with Communist China, among others, in Geneva April 26 to discuss the possibility of peace in Korea and Indo-China. The other big power conferences will be Britain, France and the Soviet Union.

Knowland Leads Critics

The principal figure in this attitude toward Geneva is Senator William F. Knowland of California, the Republican Senate floor leader, and a member of the Foreign Relations Committee as well. Mr. Knowland's principal complaint has been that Mr.

Dulles committed himself not only to discuss Korea but also to discuss Geneva.

The Democrats in general have remained severely aloof from the decision to go to Geneva, which Secretary Dulles made in Berlin in February at a meeting of the foreign ministers of the United States, Britain, France and the Soviet Union.

Their primary determination is to examine Mr. Dulles on other matters.

Mr. Mansfield, for example, has prepared this "incomplete" list of questions:

"Just what does the Administration mean by the 'New Look' in military policy?"

"Who drew up this 'New Look' concept, and did the Joint Chiefs of Staff participate fully in it, or were they only handed the program after it had been decided upon by the National Security Council?" [This body, primarily made up of President Eisenhower and Cabinet officers, is the highest strategic arm of the Government.]

"Does this 'New Look' policy [under which Mr. Dulles has asserted that the President without consulting Congress could order atomic retaliation against the Russians for any attack anywhere against an associate of the United States] conflict with the constitutional provision that only Congress can declare war?"

(Mr. Dulles was a member of the Senate when in recommending in 1949 the ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty the Foreign Relations Committee unanimously stipulated that the pact would not give the President "the power to take any action, without specific Congressional authorization, which he could not take in the absence of the treaty." Almost certainly he will be confronted with this passage.)

"How does this policy affect our relationship with our allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization?"

"What is its significance with respect to Indo-China?"

"If the Communists renew the aggression in Korea will the policy of retaliation come into play; will this, for example, result in the bombing of Communist China?"

Mr. Mansfield, who is also attempting to have Charles E. Wilson, Secretary of Defense, invited to the hearing Friday, asserted today:

"The 'New Look' doesn't look new to me. It seems to me that while we are reducing the striking power of the Army, Navy and Marine Corps we are placing reliance on a strategic air [heavy bombing] arm that is reported to be woefully weak in machines."

He contended, too, that the Administration now appeared to be "playing down" the forthcoming Geneva Conference, "though Mr. Dulles earlier described it as a 100 per cent victory for us at Berlin."

No member of Congress has yet been invited to go to Geneva in

an observer's role. The understanding is that the Administration's planning has not excluded such an invitation but rather that no decision has yet been made on the point.

Wiley Amenable to Observers

Senator Wiley would assent to the attendance, though not the actual participation, of a bipartisan Congressional delegation if the Administration should decide that this would be helpful.

Other Republicans more powerful in the hierarchy, however, including Senator Knowland, have no enthusiasm for sending any sort of Congressional deputation.

Senator Walter F. George, Democratic foreign policy leader in the Senate, has privately made it plain that under no visible circumstances now would be considered going to Geneva.

The prospect of that conference has in fact provoked great political unease in the Senate. Senator Knowland has taken the position that Mr. Dulles must act on the Administration's own responsibility in Geneva. He publicly warned Mr. Dulles Feb. 23 that what he did in Geneva would be subjected to "close scrutiny."

The Republicans who follow Mr. Knowland are particularly anxious lest anything be done to give any color of support to Communist China's demand for recognition by this Government or seriously involve the United States in Indo-China.

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CIA Inquiry Is Supported

Not Above Congress, Says Hruska

World-Herald Washington Bureau,
1220-22 National Press Building.

Representative Roman Hruska of Omaha said Tuesday that the hush hush Central Intelligence Agency "should not be above" Congressional scrutiny.

"It should be legitimate for a study group to inquire soberly and objectively into the main aspects of CIA, including personnel and methods," he said.

"It's a very delicate situation over there, of course," he added.

It has to be recognized, he explained, that the agency's operations must be a closely guarded secret if they are to be effective and that anything involving the agency has to be treated with great care.

"But the fact remains that they are spending a lot of money and are dealing with a matter highly vital to the nation's security," he said.

Mr. Hruska pointed out that it is inherently dangerous to let any agency of the Government have a free hand, with no Congressional check-rein.

Joint Committee Suggested

"They (the CIA) should not be above scrutiny in a proper way and at the hands of a proper and qualified legislative study and inquiry group," he said.

Certain members of Congress have suggested that a joint committee, similar to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, be established to work with the CIA.

Mr. Hruska indicated that he thought that proposal had some merit.

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STATINTL

Brownson Proposes Congressional Intelligence 'Watchdog' Group

THE STAR'S WASHINGTON BUREAU
Washington — Congressman Charles B. Brownson, Indianapolis Republican, proposed in the House yesterday to establish a joint Committee on Central Intelligence.

Brownson, in a resolution, indicated the proposed intelligence committee would be patterned after the joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy.

A similar resolution already has been offered in the Senate. Senator Homer E. Capehart (R.-Ind.) is one of the co-sponsors of the Senate proposal.

The suggested committee

would be a "watchdog" group over the highly-secretive mysterious Central Intelligence Agency. CIA has been described as being even more secret in operation than the Atomic Energy Commission.

IN HIS REMARKS before the House, Brownson said:

"For some time I have been aware of the problem of dealing wisely with the needs of and guidance for Central Intelligence Agency. With our government established on a basis of checks and balances between the executive judicial and legislative branches, stronger inter-dependence between the three renders ultimate control of the policies and direction in policy matters responsive to the people."

The super-secrecy of CIA tends to create criticism of the operation, the Indianapolis Republican pointed out, and also leads to unjustified misunderstandings.

The committee, as proposed

by Brownson, would consist of five senators and five representatives. No more than three from each house could belong to the same political party.

"There has been almost no congressional inspection of CIA since its formation in 1947," Brownson said.

He expressed belief that some participation by Congress in the operation of CIA is necessary.

"AS IT IS NOW, CIA is completely relieved of any congressional check—expenditures free of review, Budget Bureau does not report CIA personnel strength, and, in fact, the only congressional knowledge is a little briefing given to members of the appropriations committee," the congressman continued.

He concluded:

"Mr. Speaker, I agree that an intelligence agency must maintain complete secrecy to be effective. If its clandestine sources of information are not protected, much of the efficiency of any intelligence operation is lost.

"Secrecy for intelligence's sake is a far different thing from secrecy for secrecy's sake. As the CIA operates today, we have no way of knowing whether we have an efficient operation or not.

"Secrecy now veils everything it does—its cost, its success and its failures, its size, its area of operation. Attempts to get information along these lines is met with a resistance not encountered in any field of government operation today."

Brownson pointed out that the atomic energy congressional committee has protected AEC secrets while aiding taxpayers at the same time.

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AN INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER

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Spotlight On Intelligence

Senator Mansfield of Montana has introduced a resolution that on first view has a strong appeal. He proposes that Congress establish a Joint Committee on Intelligence, on the model of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, to keep Congress informed on the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency. There has been concern about some of CIA's activities that have seemed to be contrary to American foreign policy, and there is a commendable reluctance in Congress to see an agency operate outside the public view as CIA does. Senator Mansfield argues that "an urgent need exists for regular and responsible congressional scrutiny." Such scrutiny, he says, is essential to the success of our foreign policy, to the preservation of our democratic processes and to the security of CIA itself.

These are forceful arguments, and they would be convincing if the agency had any powers within the United States or over American citizens. But the agency does not; it operates only in the foreign field. It is a new type of organization for our country that no one can be confident will always stay within proper bounds. But its aims will be defeated if it is hampered by undue legislative interference in what is essentially an executive responsibility. If CIA were subject to no congressional check, Senator Mansfield's proposal would be extremely difficult to resist. However, the Armed Services Committees have a perfunctory knowledge of what is going on, and the Appropriations Committees pass on CIA's spending. Also, CIA makes periodic reports to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. All this does not constitute close scrutiny, but another committee with broad powers to investigate might be one too many, and there would be additional opportunities for leaks, either by committee members or members of the committee staff.

CIA operates under the President and the National Security Council, and it works closely with the Budget Bureau and the State and Defense Departments. It does not give detailed accountings of its funds, as other agencies do, and its appropriations are hidden from public view. Secrecy is required by the nature of the operation. If there is to be an intelligence organization—and Congress created this one—its secrets must be protected. The primary responsibility for its activities must rest with the President, rather than with Congress. CIA is one of the tools of the official responsible for the Nation's foreign and defense policies. He of all people should be the first to assure himself that it operates in conformity with established foreign policies.

If the President should fail in this respect, CIA would lose its usefulness and the confidence of Congress. When there is evidence that CIA has abused its authority or violated the statute under which it was created, Congress, of course, would have a right to demand an accounting even at the risk of harmful disclosures.

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Date:

26 Senators Back Curbs For CIA

By JAMES ROGERS

Binghamton Press Bureau

Washington—A move to put a leash on the most independent and hush-hush agency in Washington has gained the support of 26 senators in the last two weeks.

Uneasy about the blank check Congress gave the Central Intelligence Agency five years ago, the senators are backing a plan to create a Senate-House "Committee on Central Intelligence" that would keep tabs on CIA the way the Joint Atomic Energy Committee watches the Atomic Energy Commission.

CIA's reaction to this plan has been unenthusiastic. Director Allen Dulles declared in an interview that the security so important to CIA's operation would be broken if the agency had to tell "any committees anywhere" about the details of its work.

CREATED IN 1947

CIA was created in 1947 to focus American efforts to keep abreast of the "capabilities and intentions" of aggressive nations.

By law, CIA's annual budget is concealed from the public and all but about a dozen members of Congress. The agency can hire and fire employees without regard to Civil Service regulations, and it never reveals how many employees it has. CIA spending is exempt from review by the General Accounting Office.

To the 26 senators, this privileged status is a departure from the constitutional principle that Congress, the courts and the executive branch of the government are supposed to check and balance each other.

The senators also think CIA would be better off if it dealt with a specific, trusted congressional committee. They point to the respect in which the Atomic Energy Commission is generally held. They compare this with the forest of rumors that has grown up around CIA because that agency so rarely confirms or denies anything anybody says about it.

Did CIA tap the telephone of Jose Figueres, president of Costa Rica? Does the agency have 30,000 employees and spend \$1,000,000,000 a year? Was CIA trying to start a revolution in Guatemala and blame it on the United Fruit Co.?

NOBODY WILL SAY

Nobody who knows will say, although each of these claims has been made about CIA.

Listen to Senator Mike Mansfield (Dem., Mont.), principal sponsor of the plan for a joint congressional committee on central intelligence:

"I do not need to point out the tremendous impact which this sort of activity could have on our foreign policy. Other countries cannot be expected to distinguish between CIA policy and United States policy.

"If these reports are true, then it would appear to others that it was United States foreign policy to promote a neo-Nazi organization, to incarcerate a Japanese citizen, and start a revolution in one of our neighboring countries.

"Is there any wonder that there should be increasing concern with the absence of control over this agency? We cannot permit CIA, any more than we can permit any other government agency, to have free rein to do anything it wants anywhere in the world. If its agents play carelessly with fire, the whole world might get burned."

CIA No Without Checks

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But Publicity of Its Activities Would Greatly Handicap Agency in Its Super-Secret Work

By FREDERIC W. COLLINS

Journal-Bulletin Washington Bureau

Washington—The firm and wide-spread impression that the Central Intelligence Agency operates on an absolutely free-wheeling basis with no check on it whatever is something short of being completely accurate.

The CIA collects information, and conducts secret activities abroad. It would like very much to be left alone, not because it doesn't want to be bothered, but because there is a fundamental incompatibility between publicity and much of the work it does.

More and more often lately, however, it finds itself on the front pages. Senator McCarthy threatens to investigate it, claiming Communists have infiltrated. Director Allen W. Dulles says flatly that is false.

Sen. Mansfield (D-Mont) wants to set up an 18-member joint congressional committee to keep a check on the agency. The Hoover commission on reorganization of the executive branch has chosen Gen. Mark W. Clark as head of a task force to study CIA.

Watched by 4 Committees

The agency is almost always referred to as "super-secret" and "hush-hush," and it undoubtedly qualifies for both descriptions. And the impression somehow gets around that Congress, for example, is not permitted to know anything about what goes on at CIA.

Actually, two House and two Senate groups keep an eye on it. These are subcommittees of the Appropriations Committees and Armed Services Committees of both branches.

As the thing works out in practice, the Appropriations subcommittee is the more interested of the two House groups, and the Armed Services subcommittee shows the more interest in the Senate.

This arrangement means that CIA is answering, for example, to such a noted watchdog as Rep. Taber, chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, and on the Senate side to such men as Sen. Saltonstall, Armed Services Committee chairman, and Sen. Russell, ranking Democratic member.

Allen Dulles and some of his key men are in regular touch with these congressmen and senators, appearing frequently before them. The House Appropriations subcommittee is given a pretty good idea where CIA's money goes. Like the Senate Armed Services subcommittee, it is informed as to major projects by areas—what is cooking in the Middle East, South Asia, and so on.

No Details Are Asked

The committee members do not ask for details, and it is a question how the problem could be handled if they did. But Allen Dulles has a good personal relationship with them, and the arrangement represents considerable success in striking a bargain between the congressional right to inquire and CIA's necessity for secrecy.

There has never been an instance in which members of these subcommittees have ever broken security on anything they have been told in confidence.

CIA's total budget (which is given very close examination in the Budget Bureau before its requests go to Congress) is not made public and it is not intended that it ever will be. The total number of its employees is likewise a secret. Its appropriations are concealed in various ways in the budget. A large but unspecified portion of its expenditures are "unvouchered," meaning not accounted for in any way, although Dulles vouches many things he is not required to. It seems to be true that a corrupt director could get away with all kinds of dishonesty, at least for a time.

Proposal Seen Shelved

Mansfield's proposal for a joint committee to watch the agency is considered to be well-intentioned, although the CIA would prefer not to have such a group created. The proposal is probably dead for this session.

The CIA could probably live with such a committee, just as the Atomic Energy Commission gets along with a joint committee. Some drawbacks to such an arrangement, however, are cited. The CIA is only one of several intelligence agencies in the government. The armed services and the State Department each have their own. So the question is raised why CIA should be singled out for scrutiny by a joint committee. The Atomic Energy Commission is a special case, it is pointed out, in that it is engaged in vast business enterprises and in several of its activities is a government monopoly.

New Security Problems

There is a feeling that there really isn't enough in CIA to keep a joint committee occupied. But it is taken for granted that such a committee, like all others in Congress, would speedily build up a big staff. That, in itself, would raise new security problems, and for that matter, it is felt that if men are interested in such work, the CIA itself could probably use them.

As long as Dulles is director, he probably will flatly refuse to submit to any congressional investigation which would expose CIA's secrets. CIA has relations with every secret service in the free world, 30 or 40 of them. Dulles has been told bluntly what he knew anyway, that those relationships cease the moment CIA's secrets start coming out before a congressional investigating committee.

The CIA was only indirectly involved in one such congressional investigation, in connection with questions on the security of the State Department's John Patton Davies, a career diplomat whose case still is not completely resolved. But the public hearings, despite the only indirect involvement of CIA, "blew" two CIA operatives and seriously damaged two others.

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STATINTL

Better CIA Control Now Sought

By JAMES ROGERS
Gannett News Service

WASHINGTON — A new bid to establish stronger congressional control over the super-secret Central Intelligence Agency will be made in the Senate next year.

Revised to meet the objections to a similar plan this year by such influential senators as Leverett Saltonstall (R-Mass) and Richard Russell (D-Ga), the new move is expected by its backing to have a good chance of adoption.

Sen. Mike Mansfield (D-Mont), who originated the 1954 plan and lined up a bipartisan group of 25 other senators as co-sponsors, revealed the new plan to Gannett News Service recently.

Mansfield said that instead of proposing an entirely new Senate-House Committee on Central Intelligence as he did this year, he will introduce a bill making the four subcommittees now dealing with CIA joint committee.

The Senate and House Appropriations and Armed Services Committees each have three-member subcommittees to work with CIA. These 12 members of Congress would comprise the joint committee envisioned by Mansfield.

Saltonstall and Russell, the senior members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, opposed Mansfield's plan for a new Joint Committee on Central Intelligence this year because they felt the Armed Services and Appropriations subcommittees were doing an adequate job.

They pointed out that secrecy is essential to the success of CIA and that secrecy would be increasingly difficult to preserve if more members of Congress were supervising the agency.

Mansfield agrees on the importance of secrecy to CIA, but he also contends that it is dangerous for the agency to be as free of congressional control as it is now.

CIA is the only federal agency that can conceal its spending, the number of employees it has, and virtually its entire operation from the public, the General Accounting Office and every member of Congress except the 12 who are on the CIA subcommittees.

Mansfield and others assert that the control exercised by these subcommittees over CIA is spotty and uncoordinated.

"If we fail to establish some sort of permanent, continuing link between Congress and the CIA, the only result will be growing suspicion," Mansfield said. "From that, in all likelihood, will come sporadic investigations by various committees of Congress."

Mansfield has in mind the type of relationship that has been established between the Atomic Energy Commission and the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy.

The senator's plan was shelved by the Senate Rules Committee this year after a hearing at which Mansfield spoke for about 30 minutes.

JOINT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE ON CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, because of the very nature of the Central Intelligence Agency, I think that it is imperative that a joint congressional committee be established for the purpose of making continued studies of the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency and problems related to the gathering of intelligence affecting the national security. I feel that there should be a joint congressional committee authorized, and that the CIA should, as a matter of law, keep that committee fully and currently informed with respect to its activities.

The need for the Central Intelligence Agency is seldom questioned any longer and I certainly am not challenging it now. What I am concerned with, however, is CIA's position of responsibility to none but the National Security Council. I believe this should be changed. It is true that intelligence services of other major countries operate without direct control of the legislatures. This is understandable in a totalitarian government, such as the Soviet Union. It is even understandable in a parliamentary democracy, such as Great Britain where the entire administration is a part of and is responsible to Parliament. Our form of government, however, is based on a system of checks and balances. If this system gets seriously out of balance at any point the whole system is jeopardized and the way is opened for the growth of tyranny.

There has been almost no congressional inspection of the Central Intelligence Agency since the latter's establishment in 1947. It is conceivable that as the need for an intelligence service had been evident in 1946, the Congressional Reorganization Act of that year would have made provisions for congressional participation in the committee structure of Congress. As it is now, however, CIA is freed from practically every ordinary form of congressional check. Control of its expenditures is exempted from the provisions of law which prevent financial abuses in other Government agencies. Each year only a handful of Members in each House see the appropriation figures. There is no regular, methodical review of this Agency, other than a briefing which is supplied to a few Members of selected subcommittees.

I agree that an intelligence agency must maintain complete secrecy to be effective. If clandestine sources of information were inadvertently revealed, they would quickly dry up. Not only would the flow of information be cut off, but the lives of many would be seriously endangered. In addition, much of the value of the intelligence product would be lost if it were known that we possessed it. Secrecy for these purposes is obviously necessary.

However, there is a profound difference between an essential degree of secrecy to achieve a specific purpose and secrecy for the mere sake of secrecy. Once secrecy becomes sacrosanct, it invites abuse. If we accept this idea of secrecy for secrecy's sake we will have no way of knowing whether we have a fine intelligence service or a very poor one.

If a new committee is set up as proposed in this legislation, all bills, resolutions, and other matters in the Senate or in the House of Representatives relating primarily to the CIA, would be referred to the joint committee; and the joint committee would, from time to time, make whatever reports are necessary to the Congress concerning its relationship with the CIA.

This resolution would establish a joint committee, composed of 6 Members of the Senate to be appointed by the President of the Senate and 6 Members of the House of Representatives to be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives. In each instance, not more than 4 Members shall be of the same political party.

The joint committee or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof would be authorized to hold such hearings, to sit and act at such places and times, to require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, to administer such oaths, to take such testimony, to procure such printing and binding, and make such expenditures as it deems advisable. The committee is, in addition, empowered to appoint its staff; and is authorized to utilize the services, information, facilities, and personnel of the departments and establishments of the Government.

Mr. President, in my opinion, the CIA is in somewhat the same category as the Atomic Energy Commission; and just as a special committee, with well defined authority and powers has been created on a joint congressional basis to oversee and supervise the interests of the AEC, so I believe should a joint congressional committee be created for the same purpose in connection with the CIA. I realize full well, because of the very nature of the duties of the CIA, there there has been no public scrutiny of its activities. This may be necessary in this day and age, but I do believe that a joint congressional committee should be created for the purpose of seeing that good management is maintained in the CIA and also to keep a constant check on its intelligence policies. It is well, too, that this joint committee should be in a position to criticize any mistakes which the CIA may make.

Until a committee of the kind I am proposing is established, there will be no way of knowing what serious flaws in the Central Intelligence Agency may be covered by the curtain of secrecy in which it is shrouded. In 1949 the Hoover Commission examined the CIA. A task force stated that—

The Central Intelligence Agency has not yet achieved the desired degree of proficiency and dependability in its estimates. With—

out it, the National Security Council cannot succeed in assessing and appraising the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in relation to our . . . military power, with sufficient continuity or definiteness to constitute a practical guide to the Military Establishment as to the size of our military needs.

It is recommended that vigorous steps be taken to improve the Central Intelligence Agency and its work.

The purpose of the joint congressional committee would be in a sense to safeguard as well as to supervise the policies of the CIA. In my opinion the Congress should, because of the very nature of the work of the CIA, do everything in its power to protect its activities and to make it possible that the CIA, as an organization, will not lose its effectiveness, and will be able to continue its extremely important work in such a manner as to warrant the necessary amount of freedom of activity and the necessary security to perform the duties allocated to it under the law.

Mr. President, if a joint committee is established, CIA officials will no longer be defenseless against criticism because their lips are sealed. They would have a congressional channel to turn to. The joint committee, in turn, could maintain the confidence of Congress and the public, without loss of security.

To this end, Mr. President, I submit, on behalf of myself and the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. BARRETT], the Senator from Maryland [Mr. BEALL], the Senator from Indiana [Mr. CAPEHART], the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. CHAVEZ], the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. COTTON], the Senator from Texas [Mr. DANIEL], the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. DUFF], the Senator from North Carolina [Mr. EVIN], the Senator from Vermont [Mr. FLANDERS], the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT], the Senator from Georgia [Mr. GEORGE], the senior Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. GREEN], the senior Senator from Alabama [Mr. HILL], the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. HUMPHREY], the Senator from Washington [Mr. JACKSON], the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. KEFAUVER], the senior Senator from North Dakota [Mr. LANGER], the Senator from New York [Mr. LEHMAN], the Senator from Michigan [Mr. McNAMARA], the Senator from Nevada [Mr. MALONE], the senior Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE], the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. MUNDT], the Senator from Montana [Mr. MURRAY], the Senator from West Virginia [Mr. NEELY], the junior Senator from Oregon [Mr. NEUBERGER], the junior Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. PASTORE], the junior Senator from Maine [Mr. PAYNE], the Senator from Florida [Mr. SMATHERS], the senior Senator from Maine [Mrs. SMITH], the junior Senator from Alabama [Mr. SPARKMAN], the Senator from Idaho [Mr. WELKER], and the junior Senator from North Dakota [Mr. YOUNG], a concurrent resolution to establish a joint committee on Central Intelligence, and ask for its appropriate reference.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The concurrent resolution will be received and appropriately referred.

The concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 2), submitted by Mr. MANSFIELD (for himself and other Senators) was referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration, as follows:

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring). That there is hereby established a Joint Committee on Central Intelligence to be composed of 6 Members of the Senate to be appointed by the President of the Senate, and 6 Members of the House of Representatives to be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives. Of the 6 members to be appointed from the Senate, 3 shall be members of the Central Intelligence Agency Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and 3 shall be members of the Central Intelligence Agency Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate. Of the 6 members to be appointed from the House of Representatives, 3 shall be members of the Central Intelligence Agency Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and 3 shall be members of the Central Intelligence Agency Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives. Not more than 4 members appointed from either the Senate or the House of Representatives shall be from the same political party.

Sec. 2. (a) The joint committee shall make continuing studies of the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency and of problems relating to the gathering of intelligence affecting the national security and of its coordination and utilization by the various departments, agencies, and instrumentalities of the Government. The Central Intelligence Agency shall keep the joint committee fully and currently informed with respect to its activities. All bills, resolutions, and other matters in the Senate or the House of Representatives relating primarily to the Central Intelligence Agency shall be referred to the joint committee.

(b) The members of the joint committee who are Members of the Senate shall from time to time report to the Senate, and the members of the joint committee who are Members of the House of Representatives shall from time to time report to the House by bill or otherwise, their recommendations with respect to matters within the jurisdiction of their respective Houses which are (1) referred to the joint committee, or (2) otherwise within the jurisdiction of the joint committee.

Sec. 3. Vacancies in the membership of the joint committee shall not affect the power of the remaining members to execute the functions of the joint committee, and shall be filled in the same manner as in the case of the original selection. The joint committee shall select a chairman and a vice chairman from among its members.

Sec. 4. The joint committee, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, is authorized to hold such hearings, to sit and act at such places and times, to require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, to administer oaths, to take such testimony to produce a printed and bound report, and to make such expenditures as it deems advisable. The cost of stenographic services to report public hearings shall not be in excess of the amount prescribed by law for reporting the hearings of standing committees of the Senate. The cost of such services to report executive hearings shall be fixed at an equitable rate by the joint committee.

Sec. 5. The joint committee is authorized to appoint such expert consultants, technicians, and clerical and stenographic assistants as it deems necessary and advisable. The committee is authorized to utilize the

services, information, facilities, and personnel of the departments and establishments of the Government.

Sec. 6. The expenses of the joint committee, which shall not exceed \$ per year, shall be paid one-half from the contingent fund of the Senate and one-half from the contingent fund of the House of Representatives upon vouchers signed by the chairman. Disbursements to pay such expenses shall be made by the Secretary of the Senate out of the contingent fund of the Senate, such contingent fund to be reimbursed from the contingent fund of the House of Representatives in the amount of one-half of the disbursements so made.

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CONGRESS IS ASKED TO SUPERVISE C.I.A.

**Mansfield Offers Resolution
for a Joint Committee—
Scores Super-Secrecy**

Special to The New York Times.

WASHINGTON, Jan. 14.—Senator Mike Mansfield introduced a resolution today to authorize creation of a joint Congressional committee to supervise activities of the Central Intelligence Agency.

The Montana Democrat told the Senate, in effect, that the super-secret C. I. A. was too super-secret for him. Thirty-two co-sponsors of the resolution apparently agreed.

The Mansfield resolution, which would have to be approved by both houses of Congress before it could take effect, would establish a twelve-man committee, six from each house. Its jurisdiction over C. I. A. would parallel that which the Joint Atomic Energy Committee exercises over the Atomic Energy Commission.

The committee would be charged with making "continuing studies" of the agency, which would be directed to keep the committee "fully and currently informed" on its activities. The committee would be empowered to hold hearings, either public or private, as it deemed advisable, on the agency's operations.

"As it is now . . . C. I. A. is freed from practically every ordinary form of Congressional check," Senator Mansfield said. "Control of its expenditures is exempted from the provisions of law which prevent financial abuses in other government agencies. Each year only a handful of members in each house see the appropriation figures. There is no regular, methodical review of this agency, other than a briefing which is supplied to a few members of selected sub-committees."

The Senator said he agreed that complete secrecy of operations was necessary.

"However," he said, "there is a profound difference between an essential degree of secrecy to achieve a specific purpose and secrecy for the mere sake of secrecy. Once secrecy becomes sacrosanct, it invites abuse. If we accept this idea of secrecy for secrecy's sake we will have no way of knowing whether we have a fine intelligence service or a very poor one."

Until a joint committee is established, the Senator added, "there will be no way of knowing what serious flaws in the Central Intelligence Agency may be covered by the curtain of secrecy in which it is shrouded."

Meanwhile, the agency itself took two small steps toward lifting the curtain of secrecy it has always maintained in Washington: It put up a sign reading, "Central Intelligence Agency," outside its headquarters, and it directed its telephone operators to come right out boldly and say, "Central Intelligence Agency" when somebody calls up.

The operators used to remark discreetly, "Executive 3-6115," which puzzled everybody who didn't take time to look it up.

Co-sponsors of the bill were:

Democrats: Senators Dennis Chavez of New Mexico, Price Daniel of Texas, Samuel J. Ervin of North Carolina, J. W. Fulbright of Arkansas, Walter F. George of Georgia, Theodore Francis Green of Rhode Island, Lister Hill of Alabama, Hubert H. Humphrey of Minnesota, Henry M. Jackson of Washington, Estes Kefauver of Tennessee, Herbert H. Lehman of New York, Patrick J. McNamara of Michigan, James E. Murray of Montana, Matthew M. Neely of West Virginia, Richard L. Neuberger of Oregon, John O. Pastore of Rhode Island, George A. Smathers of Florida, and John J. Sparkman of Alabama.

Republicans: Senators Frank A. Barrett of Wyoming, J. Glenn Beall of Maryland, Homer E. Capehart of Indiana, Norris Cotton of New Hampshire, James H. Duff of Pennsylvania, Ralph E. Flanders of Vermont, William Langer of North Dakota, George W. Malone of Nevada, Karl E. Mundt of South Dakota, Frederick G. Payne of Maine, Margaret Chase Smith of Maine, Herman Welker of Idaho and Milton R. Young of North Dakota.

Independent: Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon.

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C. I. A. "WATCHDOG"

The secret eyes and ears of the Federal Government, otherwise known as the Central Intelligence Agency, have been receiving an unusual amount of serious attention lately. A special Presidential appointed group headed by Lieut. Gen. James H. Doolittle (ret.) made a confidential survey of certain aspects of the C. I. A. last fall, and reported that the organization was doing "a creditable job" but that some changes were needed. An entirely distinct and possibly more far-reaching inquiry has been proceeding for some time now under direction of Gen. Mark W. Clark on behalf of the Hoover Commission.

Meanwhile, Senator Mansfield of Montana, a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, has renewed his long-standing demand for closer Congressional liaison with the C. I. A. through establishment of a joint committee on intelligence, somewhat comparable to the existing Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. In introducing his resolution with the support of more than thirty Senators of both parties, Senator Mansfield fully recognizes the obvious need for secrecy regarding intelligence operations; but he makes the point that "once secrecy becomes sacrosanct it invites abuse," and under present conditions the C. I. A. is "freed from practically every form of Congressional check." A secret intelligence agency with so wide a field of operations as the C. I. A. is inevitably an instrument of great power; and it seems to us that Congress has a broad responsibility for it that should not be avoided. Of course this is not to say that detailed direction of the C. I. A. is within the province of Congress; but it is to say that there is a place for a small and highly discreet Congressional body, aware of what is going on in this sensitive area, that can deeply affect the foreign relations of the United States.

Furthermore, the formation of a joint Congressional committee on intelligence affairs should do much to improve the relations between C. I. A. and Congress and to reduce the suspicion that the latter body inherently has for the former. As Mr. Mansfield says, it would safeguard as well as supervise the C. I. A., and it would give to C. I. A. officials, now "defenseless against criticism because their lips are sealed," a Congressional channel to which they would have ready access. Some years ago a Hoover Commission task force recommended a Congressional "watchdog" committee for C. I. A. Its establishment would in our opinion be of benefit to Congress and C. I. A.

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AN INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER

MONDAY JANUARY 31, 1955

PAGE 14

Intelligence Quotient

Senator Mansfield has again introduced his resolution for the establishment of a joint congressional committee on central intelligence, this time with the support of 32 other Senators. Initially this newspaper was skeptical of such a step, not because there is not a need for more intensive congressional scrutiny of the Central Intelligence Agency, but because of the danger that the confidential nature of a sensitive executive agency might be compromised. Now we are persuaded, however, that some broader congressional review would on balance be desirable and could be accomplished safely.

Most persons in a position to have some appraisal of CIA's work agree that the intelligence estimates have improved markedly in recent years and that the undercover operations have been considerably less flamboyant—despite reports of somewhat clumsy and transparent undertakings in the Far East. But a secret intelligence operation insulated from normal checks and balances is, however necessary, at best a risky enterprise. No agency is so proficient, either, that it could not benefit from informed criticism. CIA is responsible to the National Security Council, it is true; but NSC in turn also is a vehicle of the executive department and has too heavy responsibilities to give CIA any very comprehensive scrutiny. A joint congressional committee on the pattern of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy would not only provide a check against free-wheeling by this supersecret agency, it would also give CIA a spokesman on Capitol Hill and fend off McCarthy-type fishing expeditions.

There are some disadvantages to such a plan, of course. One is the danger of leaks, though the concern of the committee ought to be with broad policy rather than with intimate details, and care in the selection of members could avoid loading the committee with known blabbermouths. Another difficulty lies in the fact that CIA is responsible for only a part of the total intelligence operation; the major intelligence contributors are the military services, with CIA filling in the gaps and providing top evaluation. Still another lies in the possibility that a congressional committee would be bitten by the operating bug and be tempted to interfere with the day-to-day work of CIA.

But these are all difficulties which, it seems to us, could be overcome. The membership of the committee as provided in the resolution already includes men from the Appropriations Subcommittees which handle CIA's fund; perhaps it could be amended to provide some sort of liaison with the military intelligence agencies. A task force of the Hoover Commission now is studying the CIA, and undoubtedly it will make some recommendations when it reports this

spring. No action ought to be taken until these recommendations are weighed. But there is good reason to think that the concept of a more informed congressional review is practicable and that such a review would help the country improve its intelligence efficiency.

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TO WATCH THE WATCHDOG:

Senator Asks Joint Committee on CIA

On January 14, Senator Michael J. Mansfield, of Montana, with 22 fellow Senators as copatrons, offered a resolution to create a new joint Congressional Committee on Central Intelligence, patterned after the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. The News Leader several times has endorsed this proposal editorially. We believe Senator Mansfield's introductory remarks, which follow, merit widespread consideration.—EDITOR.

Mr. Mansfield. Mr. President, because of the very nature of the Central Intelligence Agency, I think that it is imperative that a joint congressional committee be established for the purpose of making continued studies of the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency and problems related to the gathering of intelligence affecting the national security. I feel that there should be a joint congressional committee authorized, and that the CIA should, as a matter of law, keep that committee fully and currently informed with respect to its activities.

The need for the Central Intelligence Agency is seldom questioned any longer and I certainly am not challenging it now. What I am concerned with, however, is CIA's position of responsibility to none but the National Security Council. I believe this should be changed. It is true that intelligence services of other major countries operate without direct control of the legislature. This is understandable in a totalitarian government, such as the Soviet Union. It is even understandable in a parliamentary democracy, such as Great Britain where the entire administration is a part of and is responsible to Parliament. Our form of government, however, is based on a system of checks and balances. If this system gets seriously out of balance at any point the whole system is jeopardized and the way is opened for the growth of tyranny.

THERE HAS BEEN almost no congressional inspection of the Central Intelligence Agency since the latter's establishment in 1947. It is conceivable that as the need for an intelligence service had been evident in 1943 the Congressional Reorganization Act of that year would have made provisions for congressional participation in the committee structure of Congress. As it is now, the CIA is a body which is

ly every ordinary form of congressional check. Control of its expenditures is exempted from the provisions of law which prevent financial abuses in other government agencies. Each year only a handful of members in each House see the appropriation figures. There is no regular methodical review of this agency, other than a briefing which is supplied to a few members of selected subcommittees.

I agree that an intelligence agency must maintain complete secrecy to be effective. If clandestine sources of information were inadvertently revealed, they would quickly dry up. Not only would the flow of information be cut off, but the lives of many would be seriously endangered. In addition, much of the value of the intelligence product would be lost if it were known that we possessed it. Secrecy for these purposes is obviously necessary.

HOWEVER, THERE is a profound difference between an essential degree of secrecy to achieve a specific purpose and secrecy for the mere sake of secrecy.

If a new committee is set up as proposed in this legislation, all bills, resolutions, and other matters in the Senate or in the House of Representatives relating primarily to the CIA would be referred to the joint committee; and the joint committee would, from time to time, make whatever reports are necessary to the Congress concerning its relationship with the CIA.

This resolution would establish a joint committee, composed of six members of the Senate to be appointed by the President of the Senate and six members of the House of Representatives to be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives. In each instance, not more than four

members shall be of the same political party.

THE JOINT COMMITTEE or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof would be authorized to hold such hearings, to sit and act at such places and times, to require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, to administer such oaths, to take such testimony, to procure such printing and binding, and make such expenditures as it deems advisable.

UNTIL A COMMITTEE of the kind I am proposing is established, there will be no way of knowing what serious flaws in the Central Intelligence Agency may be covered by the curtain of secrecy in which it is shrouded. In 1949 the Hoover Commission examined the CIA. A task force stated that—

The Central Intelligence Agency has not yet achieved the desired degree of proficiency and dependability in its estimates. Without it, the National Security Council cannot succeed in assessing and appraising the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in relation to our . . . military power, with sufficient continuity or definiteness to constitute a practical guide to the Military Establishment as to the size of our military needs.

THE PURPOSE OF the joint congressional committee would be in a sense to safeguard as well as to supervise the policies of the CIA. In my opinion the Congress should, because of the very nature of the work of the CIA, do everything in its power to protect its activities and to make it possible that the CIA as an organization, will not lose its effectiveness, and will be able to continue its extremely important work in such a manner as to warrant the necessary amount of freedom of activity and the necessary security to perform the duties allocated to it under the law.

Mr. President, if a joint committee is established, CIA officials will no longer be defenseless against criticism because their lips are sealed. They would have a congressional channel to turn to. The joint committee, in turn, would be a channel to the Congress and the public in the event of a loss of security.



SENATOR MANSFIELD

Eyes on Intelligence

**EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF**

HON. VERA BUCHANAN

OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, February 2, 1955

Mrs. BUCHANAN. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks, I wish to include in the Record an editorial from the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette of January 31, 1955.

The editorial calls attention to a resolution introduced in the Senate for the creation of a Joint Committee on Intelligence Matters. A resolution for a similar purpose has been introduced in this House, and I am happy to be one of the cosponsors of it.

EYES ON INTELLIGENCE

A resolution that deserves the early attention of Congress has been introduced by Senator MIKE MANSFIELD, of Montana, on behalf of a bipartisan group of 33 Senators. The measure would create a joint 12-member congressional committee, similar to that on atomic energy, to supervise the Central Intelligence Agency.

Much of the activity of the Central Intelligence Agency, like that of the Atomic Energy Commission, is secret and not subject to routine scrutiny by Congress. Yet if the CIA is to be ultimately answerable to the American people for what it does all over the world, it should come under the regular observation of elected officials. It should be subject to the system of checks and balances designed to prevent any one department from becoming too autocratic.

A committee of Senators and Representatives could facilitate the handling of CIA legislative business. Like the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, it could, when secrecy is essential, hear testimony in executive session without the necessity of repetition such as occurs when two committees of Congress must deal with the same question. The proposed joint committee would bring under systematic review an agency of Government which, to its detriment, now only attracts congressional eyes when some sensational suspicion about it is voiced.

Joint Congressional Committee on
Central Intelligence

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF

HON. EDWARD P. BOLAND

OF MASSACHUSETTS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, February 2, 1955

Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Speaker, I call the attention of the House to the resolution of Senator MANSFIELD creating a joint committee on intelligence. For years Senator MANSFIELD has argued with increasing effectiveness for a closer look at our intelligence efforts. In effect this joint committee would be a watchdog of the extremely important and highly sensitive Central Intelligence Agency. Since Congress appropriates the funds for its operation and because there is little or no knowledge on the part of Congress as to the disposition of the appropriated moneys, it does seem to be good commonsense that both branches of the Congress have some Members who are aware of the mission and effect of the CIA. Congress should not be so completely in the dark as to its functions. The creation of a joint committee such as recommended by Senator MANSFIELD and several Members of the House, including myself, would go a long way in establishing better relations between the Agency and the Congress; fears would be dispelled and the magnificent work of the CIA would be appreciated.

In conjunction with the above, I include with these remarks two very fine editorials—one from the New York Times and the other from the Washington Post and Times Herald. Both articles approve the suggestion of a joint committee on central intelligence and both point up some very significant observations:

[From the New York Times]
CIA "WATCHDOG"

The secret eyes and ears of the Federal Government, otherwise known as the Central Intelligence Agency, have been receiving an unusual amount of serious attention lately. A special Presidential appointed group headed by Lieut. Gen. James H. Doolittle (retired) made a confidential survey of certain aspects of the CIA last fall, and reported that the organization was doing a "credible job" but that some changes were needed. An entirely distinct and possibly more far-reaching inquiry has been proceeding for some time now under direction of Gen. Mark W. Clark on behalf of the Hoover Commission.

Meanwhile, Senator MANSFIELD, of Montana, a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, has renewed his long-standing demand for closer congressional liaison with the CIA through the establishment of a joint

committee on intelligence, somewhat comparable to the existing Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. In introducing his resolution with the support of more than 30 Senators of both parties, Senator MANSFIELD fully recognizes the obvious need for secrecy regarding intelligence operations; but he makes the point that "once secrecy becomes sacrosanct it invites abuse," and under present conditions the CIA is "freed from practically every form of congressional check." A secret intelligence agency with so wide a field of operations as the CIA is inevitably an instrument of great power; and it seems to us that Congress has a broad responsibility for it that should not be avoided. Of course this is not to say that detailed direction of the CIA is within the province of Congress; but it is to say that there is a place for a small and highly discreet congressional body, aware of what is going on in this sensitive area, that can deeply affect the foreign relations of the United States.

Furthermore, the formation of a joint congressional committee on intelligence affairs should do much to improve the relations between CIA and Congress and to reduce the suspicion that the latter body inherently has for the former. As Mr. MANSFIELD says, it would safeguard as well as supervise the CIA, and it would give to CIA officials, now "defenseless against criticism because their lips are sealed," a congressional channel to which they would have ready access. Some years ago a Hoover Commission task force recommended a congressional "watchdog" committee for CIA. Its establishment would in our opinion be of benefit to Congress and CIA alike.

[From the Washington Post and Times
Herald]

INTELLIGENCE QUOTIENT

Senator MANSFIELD has again introduced his resolution for the establishment of a Joint Congressional Committee on Central Intelligence, this time with the support of 32 other Senators. Initially this newspaper was skeptical of such a step, not because there is not a need for more intensive congressional scrutiny of the Central Intelligence Agency, but because of the danger that the confidential nature of a sensitive executive agency might be compromised. Now we are persuaded, however, that some broader congressional review would on balance be desirable and could be accomplished safely.

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There are some disadvantages to such a plan, of course. One is the danger of leaks, though the concern of the committee ought to be with broad policy rather than with intimate details and care in the selection of members could avoid loading the committee with known blabbermouths. Another difficulty lies in the fact that CIA is responsible for only a part of the total intelligence oper-

ation; the major intelligence contributors are the military services, with CIA filling in the gaps and providing top evaluation. Still another lies in the possibility that a congressional committee would be bitten by the operating bug and be tempted to interfere with the day-to-day work of CIA.

But these are all difficulties which, it seems to us, could be overcome. The membership of the committee as provided in the resolution already includes men from the Appropriations Subcommittee which handle CIA's funds; perhaps it could be amended to provide some sort of liaison with the military intelligence agencies. A task force of the Hoover Commission under Gen. Mark Clark now is studying the CIA, and undoubtedly it will make some recommendations when it reports this spring. No action ought to be taken until these recommendations are weighed. But there is good reason to think that the concept of a more informed congressional review is practicable and that such a review would help the country improve its intelligence efficiency.

Mansfield Urges Unit To Eye CIA

Sen. Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) said yesterday he has the promised support of 35 other Senators for his proposal to set up a joint congressional committee to keep a constant check on the Central Intelligence Agency.

"We have no desire to pry into the necessary secrets of CIA," Mansfield said in an interview. But, he contended, the present method of letting a few top members of Senate and House committees check the supersecret agency "is a hodge-podge system."

Mansfield said there "has been almost no congressional inspection" of CIA since it was set up to replace the Office of Strategic Services of World War II days. Only a few members of Congress even know how much money it spends or how many persons work for it, he said.

"I agree that an intelligence agency must maintain complete secrecy to be effective," he said.

"But once secrecy becomes sacrosanct, it invites abuses."

The Montana Senator said the joint CIA committee he proposes "would operate in much the same manner as the present Joint Atomic Committee operates in that field."

His proposal is expected to run into powerful opposition of the Appropriations and Armed Services Committees in both the Senate and House.

Chairman Richard B. Russell (D-Ga.) of the Senate Armed Services Committee disclosed last week that senior members of that group had been checking on CIA from time to time since it was set up by the National Security Act of 1947.

Gen. James Doolittle, World War II Air Force leader, has completed a special investigation of CIA at the request of President Eisenhower, and a separate probe now is being made by Gen. Mark Clark under auspices of the Hoover Commission on Government organization. Mansfield said he probably would delay

a request for action on his proposal pending completion of Clark's report.

STATINTL

Compassional "watchdog" proposals

33 Senators Propose Joint Congressional Check On CIA

By GERALD GRIFFIN

(Washington Bureau of The Sun)

Washington, Jan. 14—Senator Mansfield (D., Mont.) today introduced with the support of 32 other senators, a resolution which would create a twelve-member joint committee to check on the work of the supersecret Central Intelligence Agency.

His resolution was sponsored by eighteen other Democratic senators, thirteen Republicans (among them Brad of Maryland) and the single Independent Morse (Ore.). The Montana Senator put forward a similar measure in the last Congress but it was not acted upon.

Mansfield Gives Views

Mansfield argued today that the special joint committee should be authorized along the lines of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, and that the CIA should as a matter of law, keep the proposed committee "fully and currently informed with respect to its activities."

He said there has been almost no congressional inspection of the agency since it was established in 1947.

"The need for the Central Intelligence Agency is seldom questioned any longer and I am certainly not challenging it now," Mansfield said. "What I am concerned with, however, is CIA's position of responsibility to none but the National Security Council."

The National Security Council is an agency of the President.

On the point that the CIA now is freed from "practically every ordinary form of congressional check," Mansfield said:

"Control of its expenditures is exempted from the provisions of law which prevent financial abuses in other Government agencies.

"No Methodical Review"

"Each year only a handful of members in each house see the appropriation figures. There is no regular, methodical review of this agency, other than a briefing which is supplied to a few members of selected subcommittees."

Mansfield's resolution indicated the members of Congress who now are given such information about the CIA as is submitted. His resolution provided that of the six senators who would be appointed to the proposed joint

committee, three would be members of the CIA subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee and three would be members of the CIA subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee.

The six House members similarly would be appointed from the CIA subcommittees of the Appropriations and Armed Services committee.

As Mansfield noted, the figures in the CIA appropriations bills have not been identified separately in Congress or in the budget.

Last October 19, Lieut. Gen. James A. Doolittle, who headed a four-man group appointed by the President to examine "sensitive aspects" of the intelligence agency, reported that the CIA is "doing a creditable job" and "gradually improving its capabilities."

Another retired general, Gen. Mark W. Clark, heads a Hoover Commission "task force" which has been at work on an investigation of the CIA for several months. The Hoover Commission is expected to make a report to Congress.

McCarthy Considered Probe

Senator McCarthy (R., Wis.) talked of investigating the CIA last summer, alleging that its security standards needed examining, but Allen Dulles, head of the agency, objected that public questioning of its officials would jeopardize its operations.

Senator Mansfield recalled today that the Hoover Commission examined the CIA in 1949 and recommended that steps be taken to improve the agency and its work.

"I agree that an intelligence agency must retain complete secrecy to be effective," Mansfield said. "If clandestine sources of information were inadvertently revealed, they would quickly dry up..."

"However, there is a profound difference between an essential degree of secrecy to achieve a specific purpose and secrecy for the mere sake of secrecy."

"Once secrecy becomes sacrosanct, it invites abuse. If we accept this idea of secrecy for secrecy's sake we will have no way of knowing whether we have a fine intelligence service or a very poor one."

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Date:

CIA 'Watchdog' Plan Problem For Saltonstall

Senator Sees Too
Many Leaks from
Large Commission

By EDWARD J. MICHELSON

(Herald Washington Correspondent)

WASHINGTON, July 9—The now-dormant Hoover Commission has created a problem for Sen. Saltonstall (R., Mass.) by recommending creation of a "watch-dog" system for closer surveillance of federal intelligence agencies.

The Hoover Commission report on such activities, issued several days ago, said there ought to be a check on the operations and spending of government units engaged in overseas intelligence work.

The Administration has expressed its opposition to a joint Congressional committee on strategic intelligence, proposed by Sen. Mansfield (D., Mont.) and supported by a score of co-sponsors.

Saltonstall has spearheaded the opposition to the Mansfield bill, which was introduced in the last Congress and re-introduced this year. Saltonstall is one of a handful of senators who meet from time to time with Allen Dulles for a secret briefing about CIA. The others are Sens. Russell (D., Ga.), Byrd (D., Va.) and Bridges (R., N.H.).

Saltonstall fears that a joint committee patterned along the lines of the joint Congressional committee on Atomic Energy would go too deeply into secret strategic intelligence activities. Since the proposed committee would have up to 22 members, the dangers of inadvertent "leaks" would be multiplied proportionately, he has testified.

Mansfield denies this. He says the atomic energy committee has a good record in safeguarding classified information, as have the Senate and House appropriations committees. Mansfield long has held, as does the Hoover Commission, that the U. S. government is not getting adequate information from Russia and Communist China. Congressional check-ups could correct such deficiencies, he holds.

The Hoover Commission proposed the creation of a Mansfield-type committee, and of a second group, people from private life who would be named by the President. They would collaborate with the Congressional watch-dog.

The Hoover Commission task force which looked into the CIA operations was headed by Gen. Mark W. Clark, president of the Citadel, a military academy in Charleston, S. C. The Clark task force thinks a single small permanent commission would be best, to be set up by Congress and modeled after the Hoover Commission. The Clark recommendation calls for selection of senators, representatives and distinguished private citizens.

Sen. Saltonstall told The Herald:

"I am studying the Hoover Commission report and recommendations before deciding what position I will take when the matter comes before us." A bill embodying the commission recommendations is being offered next session by Saltonstall's colleague, Sen. Kennedy, chairman of a government operations subcommittee on government reorganization plans.

"I think Allen Dulles is doing a good job as director, and I have found that Congress is getting sufficient information from him concerning Central Intelligence Agency operations," Saltonstall went on.

"I prefer to have a small group of us meet with him and discuss problems which confront his agency, than to have a large group."

One of the jobs that CIA is supposed to carry out is technical intelligence—the collection of information about Soviet technological developments as well as military plans and activities.

The Hoover Commission indicated it thought we should have scholars poring over Russian publications for such information, just as the Soviets presumably scrutinize newspapers, magazines and books published in the U. S. about advancements in aircraft and weapons research and in heavy industry production techniques.

The Clark task force praised Director Dulles for conscientious and enthusiastic devotion to duty but criticized him for taking on too many operational burdens, to the neglect of his administrative responsibilities.

Gen. Clark's group found there were serious administrative flaws in the management of the agency, which gets its funds in a roundabout way, and doesn't have to account to Congress for its expenditures.

The task force found that adequate precautions are taken to keep subversives from infiltrating CIA. In this respect it found no basis for suggestions raised by Sen. McCarthy (R., Wis.) and former aides of the CIA. It also found that the CIA had security risks in the CIA's personnel.

STATINTL

JUL 21 1955

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STATINTL

A JOINT COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE

(Mr. Hiestand asked and was given permission to address the House for 5 minutes.)

Mr. Hiestand. Mr. Speaker, I am introducing a bill which would set up a permanent congressional "watchdog" system as recommended by the Hoover Commission, to check the operation and expenditures of our foreign intelligence and especially the Central Intelligence Agency. It is important that Congress consider this matter immediately, for the present situation existing in our Central Intelligence Agency, the Commission's task force reports, is unsatisfactory. The Congress is responsible.

Certainly in this age of undeclared war when our very survival might depend on adequate advance warning of enemy movements, both real and contemplated, we can appreciate the importance of reliable intelligence. We must recognize the responsibility of Congress to make certain that the citizens of this country can depend upon its principal intelligence agency. The story of American foreign intelligence has not been outstanding, and Congress has recognized that if America does not have the will and ingenuity to secure needed information, then it leaves itself wide open to a surprise attack such as that on Pearl Harbor. With the knowledge that information necessary to anticipate that attack actually was available to the Government, but that there was no system in existence to assure that the information, properly evaluated, would be brought to the attention of the proper authorities, Congress created the Central Intelligence Agency by the National Security Act of 1947.

The Central Intelligence Agency recently received its first thorough evaluation by an able Hoover Commission Task Force, presided over by Gen. Mark W. Clark.

Although the task force report was reassuring in that it did not find reason for alarm about the loyalty of employees in intelligence work, many of its findings are quite disturbing. Some of these particularly bothered me, and led me to the conclusion that a congressional watchdog committee is important to carry out our responsibility as elected representatives.

The task force says:

Effective intelligence has become increasingly necessary for our protection against the propaganda, infiltration, and aggressiveness of the Communist leaders. By trial and error, study, and skill, we have made progress; but we must not labor under any complacent delusions. There is still much to be done by our intelligence community to bring its achievements up to an acceptable level.

Now I do not know whether this shocks you as it does me. To me this means one thing: Our intelligence activities are simply unacceptable. Subversives have penetrated into important areas of our society, and the task force says that our security measures have permitted the collection of vital secrets in this country with relative ease. Yet, the task force continues:

The information we need, particularly for our Armed Forces, is potentially available. Success in this

Says the task force—depends on greater boldness at the policy level, a willingness to accept certain calculated political and diplomatic risks, and full use of technological capabilities.

The report indicates that diplomatic timidity and protocol inhibitions have seriously interfered with intelligence operations. The task force says:

It must be realized that diplomacy is not an end in itself—

And it goes on to say that—among some of those responsible for implementation of our foreign policy by diplomacy and negotiation, there seems to exist an abhorrence to anything that might lead to diplomatic or even protocol complications.

From this one can picture the stifling of important intelligence activities because of the concern of some career diplomat over proper protocol. This would be amusing if it did not involve a serious danger to our safety.

The task force report continues:

This negative attitude, usually at the desk level, at times has stifled initiative and action in the collection of intelligence. Some of these efforts, if permitted to proceed properly, might have brought direct and immediate results and made positive contributions to the national welfare that would have justified the attendant political risks and possible inconsequential diplomatic embarrassment.

In 1949 Congress exempted the Agency from compliance with any provision of law limiting transfers of appropriations; any requirements for publication or disclosure of the organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries or numbers of personnel employed by the Agency; and any regulations relating to the expenditure of Government funds. This gives the Agency a free rein as it now stands, and this situation should be corrected by a "watchdog committee."

Clearly, then, Congress has a responsibility to see that more effort is devoted to gathering data. This in itself is sufficient reason for the Joint Committee on Foreign Intelligence which this bill would establish, but there is another very important reason. The American people are entitled to know that the CIA is using its funds properly and not abusing its power.

The task force recognizes that secrecy is necessary for proper operation of our foreign intelligence activities but is concerned over the possibility of the growth of license and abuses of power where disclosures of costs, organization, personnel, and functions are precluded by law.

Whenever an agency is granted immense freedom and no restrictions and no checkup on its activities, inefficiency is apt to result.

The task force says:

There is always a danger that such freedom from restraints could inspire laxity and abuses which might prove costly to the American people. Although the task force has discovered no indication of abuse of powers by the CIA or other intelligence agencies, it nevertheless is firmly convinced, as a matter of future insurance, that some reliable, systematic review of all the agencies and their operations should be provided by congressional action as a checkrein to assure both the Congress and the people that this hub of the intelligence effort is functioning in an efficient, effective, and reasonably economical manner.

The continued success of our system of free government depends on the principle of checks and balances. The Constitution provides that the elected representatives of the people are charged with the responsibility of checking any and all Government operations.

Mr. Speaker, I believe the compelling need is obvious for immediate consideration of this bill I am introducing to create a congressional watchdog committee, to be known as the Joint Committee on Foreign Intelligence. As the task force report says:

The overall aim would be the promotion of aggressive leadership which would unify the intelligence effort, make it more productive, and inspire a higher spirit of teamwork.

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JUL 23 1955

PASADENA (Ca)

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Ac4 Congress

STATINTL

Date:

Hiestand Introduces CIA 'Watchdog' Bill

Rep. Edgar W. Hiestand of Altadena yesterday introduced a bill to create a Congressional "watch-dog" joint committee to check operations and expenditures of our foreign intelligence activities and especially the Central Intelligence Agency, according to a special dispatch to The Star-News from Washington, D.C.

The bill is based on Hoover Commission Task Force findings that the agency, immune from Congressional investigation or checkup, was doing an inadequate job.

HIESTAND was quoted as saying, "This proposed joint House-Senate committee, authorized to investigate classified material and operations, can have a very beneficial effect upon the operations of the agency. Elected representatives of the people are responsible for a constant check on all government operations. This can and should be confidential, sympathetic but thorough.

"Foreign intelligence is very

vital, especially to our military effort. The Central Intelligence Agency was created to co-ordinate intelligence of all services including the State Department. In many ways it has done an excellent job, but in others its style has been cramped by diplomatic timidity and protocol complications.

"THE Task Force report says, "The overall aim would be the promotion of aggressive leadership which would unify the intelligence effort, make it more productive, and inspire a higher spirit of teamwork."

"The object of the bill is to assist the agency in creating more effective world-wide intelligence service. Secrecy, of course, is vital, and the Task Force of the Hoover Commission recognizes this. They had access to all classified information and operations and recommended this joint committee. The joint committee method has elsewhere been proven successful. In this case I believe it makes sense."

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Congress, "watchdog" proposals

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It's Congress' Job

The Hoover Commission has proposed both the reorganization of the Central Intelligence Agency and the creation of a watchdog committee to constantly scrutinize its operations. The CIA is, by necessity, a secret agency dealing in international intelligence that must be kept secret. The Task Force of the Commission, headed by Gen. Mark Clark, has given it a clean bill of health as far as personnel and general aims are concerned. But the Task Force found loose administration and considerable confusion. It also believes that the agency is not using its intelligence as fully as it might. These recommendations for reorganization should be followed.

But more important is the creation of a watchdog committee. The Task force recommends that this committee be composed of members of Congress and public members. The parent Hoover Commission recommends a wholly public body that would report to the President plus a joint congressional committee similar to the Atomic Energy Committee. Certainly the latter proposal should be followed. Congress should keep itself informed on the activities of the CIA, for Congress is responsible for providing the funds to operate it. The members of Congress must know how this public money is being spent and whether it is wisely or unwisely used. Congress should give no blank checks to an executive agency to spend in secret and without accounting to the representatives of the people.

Congressman Brownson of Indiana, in discussing the CIA budget, noted how the complete secrecy under which the CIA operates makes it impossible for Congress to know whether or not it is spending the people's money wisely. "I do not know whether the CIA needs a \$6,000,000 building site and a \$50,000,000 building," he said. "I do not know or have any idea of how many employees the CIA now has. I do not know what they do or to whom they are really accountable . . . Certainly we exercise no controls over this super secret agency through a check on the purse strings."

This is a deplorable condition that should be quickly corrected. Brownson also proposed that a joint Congressional committee be created. Congress not only has the right, it has the duty to know how, when, where and why the taxpayers' money is spent. It is perfectly possible to protect vital secrets and still put the ultimate control of the CIA where it belongs, in the hands of Congress. This Congress and past Congresses have too often issued blank checks to the executive branch and thus completely evaded its responsibilities to the people. That is not representative government. It is a form of semi-dictatorship.

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Checking Central Intelligence

By DAVID BARNETT

WASHINGTON (NANA) — A backstage attempt is being made to work out a compromise method of providing congressional supervision of the super-secret Central Intelligence Agency.

Officials in the Executive Branch are dead set against a plan for a joint committee that Sen. Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) and 36 of his colleagues plan to push early next year.

The legislation, introduced Jan. 14, would put the CIA under a Joint Committee similar to that which oversees the work of the Atomic Energy Commission.

Rep. Stuyvesant Wainwright (R-N. Y.) said today he was convinced, on the basis of his discussions with leaders in the executive branch, that President Eisenhower would veto the bill introduced by Sen. Mansfield unless important changes were made in the legislation.

He said he planned to meet with the Montana Senator in about two weeks to try to work out a bill that would meet administration objections.

The New Yorker made it clear that neither he nor the Administration was irrevocably opposed to congressional supervision as such. But, he added, there was legitimate concern over some features of the Mansfield bill.

Expenditures Uncontrolled

The agency, headed by Allen W. Dulles, deals in such "secret" matters that congressional committees have been unable to maintain more than perfunctory control over its expenditures. Funds for

the agency are disguised in appropriations for other agencies.

The Hoover commission, in a report based on a task force study headed by Sen. Mark Clark, last June 29 recommended, among other things, that a "small bipartisan commission" made up of members of both houses and "other public-spirited citizens" be established to make periodic surveys of the CIA's work and to report its findings to Congress and to the President.

In Sen. Mansfield's view, the function of this commission could be performed by a joint committee composed of six senators and six representatives who control Congress now exercises over the CIA is done through subcommittees of the Armed Services Committees.

The main criticism of the Mansfield proposal by Rep. Wainwright and presumably by the Administration is that it leaves membership on the joint committee up to regular congressional procedure, that means seniority.

Wainwright pointed out that there had been men in Congress in the past with "strong leanings" toward the Communist Party and others with ideas of personal publicity that could make their membership on the CIA committee a "danger to the national security."

Under the Wainwright plan, the bill creating the committee would specify that it was to be a "select" group chosen "without regard to seniority."

The Wainwright bill also would

make a concession to the Hoover Commission idea. It would provide a "quasi-congressional" group, made up of three members from each House and a chairman who would not be a member of Congress.

The chairman would be appointed by the President.

"It is obvious," Rep. Wainwright said, "that no group set up to watch over the CIA could make detailed reports public. The reports could not even be made to other congressmen."

"Under these security restrictions, the best that could be done would be for a respected group to work through the appropriations committee and the President to make sure of efficient and non-duplicating operations."

Rep. Wainwright said his interest in the problem resulted from his wartime experiences as an officer in the Office of Strategic Services, a forerunner of the CIA.

STATINTL

Mansfield to Push Bill For Joint CIA Group

By DAVID BARNETT
North American Newspaper Alliance

Attempts to work out a compromise method of providing congressional supervision of the super-secret Central Intelligence Agency apparently have collapsed.

Senator Mike Mansfield, Democrat of Montana, says he is standing firmly behind his proposal to set up a joint congressional committee, similar to the group that supervises the Atomic Energy Commission, as a watchdog for

the intelligence agency and "other public-spirited citizens."

Last month, Representative Stuyvesant Wainwright, Republican of New York, indicated President Eisenhower might veto such a bill unless important changes were made in the proposal.

The New Yorker, presumably reflecting the administration view, wanted the bill changed in these two respects:

1. The compromise legislation would specify that the Congressmen named to the group would be picked "without regard to seniority."

2. The Wainwright suggestions would change the makeup of the group to provide for three members from each House and a chairman who would not be a member of Congress.

The Hoover Commission recommended in a report last June 29 that the watchdog group be a "bipartisan committee made up of members of both Houses

Senator Mansfield said in an interview yesterday his bill would provide "continuity" by putting on the joint committee six members from each House who now make up the subcommittees of the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees that deal with the CIA.

To the suggestion that a "public" member be named by the President as chairman of the watchdog group, the Senator said he was "absolutely" opposed. He added:

"We will have a joint congressional committee or none at all."

Senator Mansfield said he intended taking his bill, now backed by some 36 Senators from both parties, before the Senate Rules Committee next month. The Montana Democrat is a member of the legislation-scheduling group.

If all goes as anticipated, the bill will come up for action on the floor of the Senate early in 1956.

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STATINTL

TX A2 EXCLUSIVE--CIA

BY RUTH MONTGOMERY

INTERNATIONAL NEWS SERVICE SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT

WASHINGTON- FEB. 1--(INS)--PRESIDENT EISENHOWER- IT HAS BEEN LEARNED ON TOP AUTHORITY- IS PREPARING AN ALL-OUT FIGHT TO BLOCK PASSAGE OF A BIPARTISAN SENATE RESOLUTION CALLING FOR A WATCHDOG COMMITTEE ON HIS HUSH-HUSH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

IKE- WHO ONLY TWO WEEKS AGO APPOINTED A HIGH LEVEL CITIZENS COMMISSION TO CHECK ON CIA- IS REPORTEDLY HIGHLY INCENSED AT THE COUNTERMOVE TO GIVE CONGRESS A VOICE IN THE SECRET AGENCY'S ACTIVITIES.

THE PRESIDENT WILL PROBABLY HAVE A STIFF FIGHT ON HIS HANDS. THE RESOLUTION- INTRODUCED BY DEMOCRATIC SEN. MIKE MANSFIELD- MONT.- BOASTS 35 SENATE SPONSORS FROM BOTH SIDES OF THE POLITICAL AISLE. IT HAS ALREADY BEEN FAVORABLY REPORTED BY THE SENATE RULES COMMITTEE AND NOW AWAITS ACTION IN THE UPPER CHAMBER.

AMONG THE 14 REPUBLICAN SPONSORS ARE SENATORS OF SUCH WIDELY DIVERGENT VIEWS AS KARL E. MUNDT- S.D.- GEORGE MALONE- NEV.- AND HERMAN WELKER- IDA.- GENERALLY CONSIDERED RIGHT-WING; AND CLIFFORD CASE- N.J.- WILLIAM LANGER- N.D.- AND MARGARET CHASE SMITH- ME.- OF THE SO-CALLED LIBERAL WING OF THE GOP.

THE DEMOCRATIC SPONSORS ARE EQUALLY DISSIMILAR IN THEIR VOTING RECORDS. CHAIRMAN WALTER GEORGE- GA.- OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE- ORDINARILY AN EISENHOWER BACKER ON BIPARTISANSHIP- HAS SIGNED THE RESOLUTION ALONG WITH LIBERAL SENATORS HUBERT HUMPHREY- MINN.- ESTES KEFAUVER- TENN.- WAYNE MORSE- ORE.- RICHARD L. NEUBERGER- ORE.- AND HERBERT LEHMAN- N.Y. CONSERVATIVE SENATOR PRICE DANIEL (D) TEX.- IS ALSO A BACKER.

THE CURRENT BEHIND-THE-SCENES ROW HAD ITS BEGINNING LAST FALL WHEN THE HOOVER COMMISSION RECOMMENDED A CITIZENS WATCHDOG COMMITTEE. SENATORS STYLES BRIDGES (R) D.C.- AND JOHN MCCLELLAN (D) ARK.- HOWEVER- FLATLY DISSENTED.

ALTHOUGH IT WAS KEPT BEHIND CLOSED DOORS AT THE TIME- THE TWO SENATORS HEATEDLY ARGUED THAT ANY SUCH COMMITTEE WOULD BE MEANINGLESS UNLESS IT HAD THE AUTHORITY OF LAW.

THEY PROPOSED THAT THE CIA WATCHDOG GROUP- TO BE EFFECTIVE- SHOULD BE COMPOSED OF SEVERAL MEMBERS OF BOTH HOUSES APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE AND THE SPEAKER- WITH ADDITIONAL CITIZENS TO BE NAMED BY MR. EISENHOWER.

IKE- HOWEVER- PREFERRED THE HOOVER COMMISSION PLAN. ON JAN. 13 HE APPOINTED DR. JAMES R. KILLIAN JR.- PRESIDENT OF MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY- AS CHAIRMAN OF THE NEW GROUP.

OTHER DISTINGUISHED MEMBERS INCLUDE LT. GEN. JAMES H. DOOLITTLE- BENJAMIN F. FAIRLESS- ADMIRAL RICHARD L. CONOLLY (CQ)- GEN. JOHN E. HULL- FORMER AMBASSADOR JOSEPH P. KENNEDY- FORMER DEFENSE SECRETARY ROBERT A. LOVETT AND EDWARD L. RYERSON.

ALMOST SIMULTANEOUSLY- THE SENATE GROUP MOVED TO CREATE A JOINT HOUSE-SENATE WATCHDOG COMMITTEE TO KEEP THE SAME CHECK ON CIA THAT A SIMILAR JOINT COMMITTEE NOW DOES ON THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION.

THE RESOLUTION CALLS FOR 12 MEMBERS CONSISTING OF THE CHAIRMEN OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS AND ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEES- WITH THE RANKING REPUBLICAN AND DEMOCRATIC MEMBER OF EACH.

MEANWHILE- OTHER CONGRESSIONAL GROUPS HAVE BEEN TRYING TO STEP INTO

- 2 -

THE HERETOFORE UNTOUCHABLE CIA AGENCY. BOTH SEN. RICHARD B. RUSSELL (D) GA.- AND REP. CARL VINSON (D) GA.- CHAIRMEN OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEES- HAVE- WITHIN THE LAST FEW DAYS- APPOINTED SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEES TO LOOK INTO THE ACTIVITY OF OUR TOP INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

TODAY- THE HOUSE RULES COMMITTEE IS HEARING ARGUMENTS ON A BILL BY REP. EUGENE J. MCCARTHY (D) MINN.-SOMEWHAT BROADER IN FORM THAN THE MANSFIELD RESOLUTION--FOR A JOINT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE TO KEEP WATCH NOT ONLY ON CIA- BUT ALSO ON ALL INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMED SERVICES AND THE VOICE OF AMERICA.

THE ADMINISTRATION HAS LONG OPPOSED ANY CONGRESSIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH THE SECRET WORKINGS OF CIA AND OUR COUNTERESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES.

IKE'S NEW CITIZENS WATCHDOG COMMITTEE PAID A COURTESY CALL ON THE PRESIDENT LAST WEEK- BUT HAS NOT YET HELD A FORMAL MEETING.

WITH THESE NEW STORM CLOUDS DEVELOPING ON CAPITOL HILL- A RATTLE ROYAL WITH THE ADMINISTRATION SEEMS DEFINITELY IN THE WIND.

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NEED FOR ORDERLY EVALUATION OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(Mr. ZABLOCKI asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Speaker, yesterday I joined my colleague from New York, Representative EDNA KELLY, in introducing a concurrent resolution which provides for the creation of a joint committee on intelligence matters. The joint committee would consist of 9 members from both bodies of Congress with no more than 5 members being selected from the same political party.

The activities of the Central Intelligence Agency and related intelligence services have been handled from a congressional standpoint in a piecemeal fashion. The importance of these activities to the national security demands at this time the creation of a joint committee, which will keep the Congress informed and bring these activities under responsible scrutiny. The proposed committee would operate in a manner which has been successfully adopted by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy matters.

Intelligence has developed as an activity of utmost importance since World War II. The agencies in this field are entitled to a continuous, constant, and stable relationship with the Congress. The membership of the joint committee on intelligence matters, which would presumably be drawn from those charged with responsibility for military and foreign-policy matters, would supply this important link in this crucial area. At the same time, the joint committee would save the executive branch's intelligence activities from being subjected to undue interference by a number of separate congressional committees, which may consider themselves called upon to pursue inquiries into their operations.

I earnestly hope that this concurrent resolution will receive prompt and favorable consideration from the Congress before the contemplated adjournment early next month.

C. I. A. PLAYS VITAL ROLE IN NATIONAL SECURITY

Congress Has Hitherto Left Agency Free to Carry on Its Top-Secret Work

By ANTHONY LEVIERO

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 18—Senator McCarthy's recent threat to subpoena officials of the Central Intelligence Agency has focused unwelcome attention on the shyest of our security organizations.

Secret intelligence can thrive only in the shadows, and yet accountability is one of the strongest forces that Congress can exert in our governmental system of checks and balances.

The C. I. A. has been granted by law a degree of immunity from accountability for funds, personnel and activities probably never exceeded by any other Federal agency in American history. In an age of crisis, with its potential for unlimited warfare, the nation has realized the importance of having such an agency and of legalizing its exemption from normal surveillance by Congress and the General Accounting Office.

The public has been told exactly how much this country has spent for the atomic program but has never been given an inkling of how much C. I. A. is spending in the twilight realm to safeguard us during the "cold war." Its funds are hidden away among the appropriations of other departments, but a reported estimate for "cold war" activities covering all agencies engaged in them is \$800,000,000.

British Example

Great Britain has demonstrated through several centuries that a democracy can have an intelligence organization that serves as an effective instrument of national policy, keeps out of the limelight, and is not allowed to impinge on domestic affairs and civil liberties.

In the United States the Federal Bureau of Investigation has maintained such a high record of integrity that Congress readily grants with little modification the requests for funds and personnel made by its director, J. Edgar Hoover. Certainly the F. B. I. has never been made a political football.

The C. I. A. is a new and strange baby, however, and consequently

FORMER C.I.A. CHIEF



Associated Press

Walter Bedell Smith.

has been involved occasionally in controversies. Dating it from the creation of its forerunner, the Office of Strategic Services, it is a little more than ten years old. It came into being in its present form and name with the passage of the National Security Act in July, 1947.

Does the C. I. A. deserve the trust and confidence of Congress and the people? On the face of the rather scanty evidence of its achievements, qualified observers on the whole agree that it does. Whether it will continue to remain immune from scrutiny, however, is an issue that will be decided now or in the future between the President and Congress, largely on the basis of its worth and integrity.

Agency's Functions

What is intelligence and why is it so vital that it is shrouded in secrecy? In the narrow sense, intelligence is as comprehensive as an encyclopedia. A C. I. A. patrol kills an enemy sentry, gets at his insignia, finds his password for identification purposes, that produces intelligence.

PRINCIPALS IN M'CARTHY-C. I. A. CASE



William P. Bundy.



Associated Press

Allen W. Dulles.

clues to the identity, size and positions of enemy units. A well-traveled industrialist is called in by the Air Force for information on a big plant in an enemy country and its capacity for war. That is intelligence—target data for the Strategic Air Force intercontinental bombers. Translations of foreign newspapers and professional periodicals, produce intelligence on economics, production, morale. The Aberdeen Proving Ground periodically tests the hardness of the armor of enemy tanks as they are captured; providing intelligence that leads to the development of effective counterweapons. A man sinks in the dark to a key unit of an industrial plant, leaves a package and the building blows up. He comes under the "cloak and dagger" category, labeled officially as "secret intelligence."

These examples, by no means an exhaustive list, suggest the range of the mission now assigned by act of Congress to the Central Intelligence Agency. Activities like these are implicit in the warning sounded by a task force of the (Hoover) Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, which stated in a report of January 1949: "Intelligence is the first line of defense in the atomic age."

The C. I. A. distills data produced by itself and by the Army, Navy, the Air Force and other government departments and pro-

duces as its supreme product "National Intelligence Estimates," on which critical national policies and objectives are based by the National Security Council. The C. I. A. was credited by the Eberstadt committee of the Hoover commission with having helped to detect a grave error in an intelligence estimate made by an unidentified departmental intelligence unit. The estimate, if it had prevailed, might have precipitated total mobilization and perhaps even war. That was in the spring of 1948, and the incident was associated with Soviet troop movements in the Soviet Zone of Germany.

Questions in Congress

But Congress has been in a questioning mood several times. Why was there no advance warning of the North Korean aggression? That was no surprise, answered C. I. A., but the policy makers disregarded its estimate of the situation. That was an echo of Pearl Harbor. Was there any warning of the uprising in Bogotá in April, 1948, while the then Secretary of State, George C. Marshall, was attending the Inter-American conference there? Yes, replied the C. I. A. General Marshall had brushed the warning aside, refusing to be intimidated, but a State Department functionary in Bogotá had refused to transmit one specific warning of the plot to damage United States prestige.

In the midst of the bitterly fought Presidential campaign last fall General Walter Bedell Smith, then director of the C. I. A., said in a court hearing that Communists might have penetrated his as well as virtually every other security agency.

Only by strenuous efforts was he able to prevent this from becoming a political issue. More recently, however, he has said that the C. I. A. was as good as any intelligence service in the world except possibly Russia's.

Last fall also, the C. I. A. was involved in a compromising situation. The law specifies that it "shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement power or internal security functions"—these being reserved to the F. B. I. But two C. I. A. agents, Miller Holland and Wayne Richardson, reported information from Harry A. Jarvinen, a Seattle gravel agent, that Prof. Owen Lattimore, a leading target of Senator McCarthy and now under indictment for alleged perjury, was planning to go to Russia.

Repeated Inquiry

The information was passed to the F. B. I., which investigated and found no evidence of this. The C. I. A. reported back that it had obtained additional information verifying its original report. The F. B. I. requested an interview with the C. I. A. informant and Jarvinen told the F. B. I. what he had told the C. I. A. agents. The F. B. I. investigated further and still found no evidence that Professor Lattimore planned to go abroad. Nevertheless the State Department announced it had put a stop order on his departure on the basis of the C. I. A. information.

Jarvinen was indicted on two counts of giving false information to Federal agencies. Holland and Richardson refused to testify on security grounds, but an F. B. I. agent took the stand. The jury

acquitted Jarvinen. The court held the C. I. A. agents in contempt of court for refusing to testify and sentenced them to fifteen days in jail, but while their appeal was pending President Truman pardoned them.

By his pardon President Truman took cognizance of the C. I. A. position that it should not be made to talk about its activities. General Smith, however, had not sought refuge in this position when he mentioned the possible Communist infiltration of the C. I. A. He was then appearing in the \$2,000,000 libel suit brought by Senator McCarthy against former Senator William Benton.

Latest Controversy

Neither Senator McCarthy nor any other agent of Congress has sought to investigate the C. I. A., either as to propriety and jurisdiction in the Jarvinen case or as to the possible infiltration of the C. I. A. suggested by General Smith. The current controversy arose from Senator McCarthy's efforts to interrogate William P. Bundy, a C. I. A. official who is a son-in-law of Dean Acheson, the former Secretary of State.

Allen Dulles, present director of the C. I. A., has indicated that he will resist Senator McCarthy's efforts to question members of his organization, although the situation this week-end was still in flux. Despite what General Smith had said, Mr. Dulles can maintain that the employees of his agency get the most rigorous kind of loyalty test, including the lie detector.

There is every indication also that President Eisenhower will resist any efforts to pry into C. I. A. in the conviction that secrecy is vital in its operations. The attitude of Congress as a whole, however, seems to be that it will never pry too deeply as long as C. I. A. appears to be attending to its primary number-one mission of preventing an atomic Pearl Harbor.

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Russell Says C.I.A. Check Isn't New Under Senate's Watch for Years

WASHINGTON, Feb. 3 (AP).—Sen. Richard B. Russell, D., Ga., said today a Senate group has been keeping a close check for years upon operations and activities of the super-secret Central Intelligence Agency.

Sen. Russell, as chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, named a three-man subcommittee to, as he phrased it, "continue the work." The members are Sen. Russell himself and Sens. Everett Saltonstall, R., Va., and Harry F. Byrd, D., Va.

Sen. Russell's statement that there has been a continuing check on the C. I. A. came as a surprise, since many Congress members have complained they were kept completely in the dark about C. I. A. activities. Even the agency's spending is secret.

Sen. Joseph R. McCarthy, R., Wis., said last year that he had reports of Communist infiltration of the C. I. A. and talked of an investigation. Allen Dulles, C. I. A. head, informed Sen. McCarthy he would not permit C. I. A. employees to testify before him.

Sen. Russell agreed that many persons, including some Senators, did not know about this survey because there had been no publicity about it. "It's the kind of activity that is not publicized," he said.

Sen. Russell said his new subcommittee expects to hear later a report from Gen. Mark W. Clark, who has been conducting a special inquiry into C. I. A. activities under auspices of the Hoover Commission.

Congress and CIA ...

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Coups and CIA

M'CARTHY PLEDGES AID ON C.I.A. STUDY

Back From Vacation, Senator
Promises Cooperation in
Hoover Group's Action

By ANTHONY LEVIERO

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 6. Sen. Joseph R. McCarthy returned to the Capitol today after a seven-day vacation and promised to cooperate in the Hoover Commission's study of the Central Intelligence Agency.

The Wisconsin Republican, who said he was glad to see such a turn over anything I have to do, implied he would postpone indefinitely his own investigation of the intelligence agency. It has been disclosed that Sen. McCarthy, who has charged the C. I. A. was heavily infiltrated by Communists, has a head-on clash with the White

House. Response to sources have said President Eisenhower will not permit an inquiry into the affairs of C. I. A. by the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, which Senator McCarthy heads.

One of the Senator's spokesmen said his promise of cooperation did not necessarily mean Senator McCarthy was abandoning his own plans on the C. I. A.

Former President Hoover announced Sunday that Gen. Mark W. Clark, former Far Eastern commander, would head a task force of the Committee on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government that would study the "structure and administration" of the intelligence agency.

"I have great confidence in General Clark," said Senator McCarthy. "And I will be glad to do anything I have to do."

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"I have great confidence in General Clark," said Senator McCarthy. "And I will be glad to do anything I have to do."

Clark Glad to Get Data

CHARLESTON, S. C., July 6. General Clark said today he would be "glad to get any information" Senator McCarthy has. The general is president of The Citadel military college here.

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CIA 'Red' File Given Clark by McCarthy

Associated Press

Senator Joseph R. McCarthy (R-Wis.) said yesterday he has turned over to Gen. Mark W. Clark a file of information about "alleged communism and corruption" in the Central Intelligence Agency.

Clark, who heads a six-man Hoover Commission task force studying the Intelligence Agency, met with McCarthy in the Senator's office. Afterward, Clark said "I have not had a chance to evaluate the information yet."

Clark announced last month that he planned a meeting with McCarthy to learn what evidence the Senator might have to back up his charges that Communists have worked their way into the Agency.

Allen Dulles, CIA chief, has called these charges false.

(Dulles disclosed last night that he had asked McCarthy three times without success to produce whatever information on infiltration or disloyalty that he might have so that CIA could take appropriate action immediately. In the most recent request, made in a letter dated July 7, 1954, Dulles stressed the importance of prompt action in such matters, pointing out:

"I feel that any unfavorable information regarding any CIA employee would require immediate action and should not necessarily await the report of the task force.")

*Congress and CIA: Sen
McCarthy*

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Summaries of Annual Reports

Legislative Reference Service--Report of the Executive Officer.

* One observation about the work of the Legislative Reference Service stands out above all others--despite a volume of requests which was clearly and significantly greater than ever before, the limits of potential demand for research and analysis have not been approached. This is confirmed by the number of inquiries that had to be delimited, deadlines that were extended, work released on a rush basis, and, most important, by the personal testimony of Members of Congress as to needs for assistance.

The appropriation was increased from \$1,067,387 in fiscal 1957 to \$1,200,000 in fiscal 1958, which permitted the addition of five budgeted positions in relation to a 15 percent increase in workload. The number of staff members assigned to committees of Congress continued to grow.

Personnel changes of note included the director's announced resignation to accept a deanship at American University and the appointment of his successor and a deputy director. Statistics relating to personnel actions were about the same as last fiscal year, with a slight rise in classification actions and a noticeable decline in clerical

turnover. There were no significant changes in the various areas of administration, but several minor changes improved substantially the day-to-day operations of the department.

A review of activities pointed up the need for more extensive statistics that will give greater insight into the requirements of Congress and the continuing need to improve the staff by recruiting persons with the highest level of potential and providing them with every opportunity for training in the expanding interests of the Congress.

IRS--American Law Division. Measured in terms of gross number of inquiries answered, the division handled a workload of 11,460, an increase of 13.6 percent over 1957 and of 3 percent over 1956 (the previous high record). Substantively speaking, the work was related more closely than usual to important pending legislation. Recent Supreme Court decisions precipitated inquiries requiring study of the underlying constitutional problems. These "special" subjects, added to those of a more routine sort, such as modification of anti-trust laws, retail price maintenance, etc., made the year unusually interesting.

Commissions were received from all but one of the standing committees of both House and Senate, from 18 House and 19 Senate subcommittees, and from 3 joint committees, as well as several select and special committees. Four members of the division were on duty with Congressional committees during the year.

Late in the fiscal year, the division was asked to undertake, on a contract basis, certain of the research work for the Civil Rights Commission. The research of this project, now getting under way, will furnish the Commission with information, from both Federal and State law, upon which the Commission's study and reports (to both President and Congress) may be grounded.

The Economics Division of IRS answered a record number of inquiries during the year--a total of 12,593, including 2,955 spot replies handled over the telephone. Congressional interest covered every important aspect of economics and economic policy.

IRS--Education and Public Welfare Division. The division's first full fiscal year was one of healthy growth, and was marked by heavy legislative activity in the fields with which it is concerned. The advent of "sputnik" in October 1957 put education into the foreground of public attention, rising unemployment beginning in late January led to hearings and legislation, and there was social security legislation late in the session.

The division's work for the Congress deals with some of the most complex law on the statute books today. A quick view of the scope of Congressional interest in these fields can be gained by listing those programs in which legislation or reports have been prepared during this session of Congress. In the field of public welfare there was wide concern with the liberalization of the old-age and survivors insurance program and with its financial structure; with revision of the Federal

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share for public assistance programs for the aged, the blind, dependent children, and the disabled; with the railroad retirement system and with Civil Service and military retirement systems, as well as other Federal systems; with unemployment insurance; with maternal and child health; with problems of the aged; with distribution of surplus commodities to the needy; and with Federal-State intergovernmental relations in welfare programs. Other areas of Congressional interest included the Hospital Constitution Act, the National Institutes of Health, public health activities and Government health plans, narcotics, juvenile delinquency, and immigration. In the field of education, the major issues covered were Federal aid for scholarships and loans, for school construction, for teachers' salaries, and for public community college construction; the national school-lunch program, schools in Federally-affected areas; rural library services, and education systems in other countries. In the area of Indian affairs, the division dealt with health and welfare aspects, with treaty rights, with assets of the various tribes and Federal expenditures on behalf of Indians, as well as with historical and cultural aspects of Indian life.

LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE --

LRS--Foreign Affairs Division. The persistent trend in the Foreign Affairs Division is toward an ever-increasing workload, and the persistent problem is how to fill the increasing flow of Congressional requests adequately and on time with present staff. During fiscal 1958 the division filled 6,538 requests, compared with 5,431 for the previous year. This represents a 20 percent increase in the total workload of the last 12-month period. If the workload of 1958 is compared with that of 1956, the division has experienced an 81 percent increase in 2 years.

The wholesome balance between work for committees and individual Members of Congress and between larger and more serious background studies on the one hand and short-range "crisis" inquiries on the other, which was achieved in fiscal 1957, was maintained during 1958. Approximately 25 percent of the non-constituent requests in 1958 came from committees.

LRS--History and Government Division. In the fiscal year 1958, the research section of the division completed work on 12,802 recorded inquiries, compared to 10,016 for the previous year, an increase of 27 percent. The Congressional Reading Room answered 3,144 recorded inquiries, compared to last year's total of 4,365. The combined total of recorded inquiries was 15,946, an increase of 1,565 over the previous year's combined total of 14,381, or 10.8 percent. Including spot inquiries, which numbered 3,220, the division handled 19,160 inquiries, compared to a total of 17,018 for the preceding year. This was an increase of 12.7 percent and represented 27 percent of all the inquiries handled by the entire Legislative Reference Service in fiscal 1958.

LRS--Library Services Division. Quantitatively, the division put more material into the files and into the hands of the research staff than ever before. Qualitatively, it improved the usefulness of the files

by revising subject headings, clearing out old material, and completing reorganization in several types of files.

IRS--Translators and Graphic Information Specialist. The two translators completed 1,238 requests from Members and committees of Congress for approximately 4,300 pages of translations in 14 languages--Czech, Danish, Dutch, French, German, Italian, Norwegian, Polish, Portuguese, Russian, Slovak, Spanish, Swedish, and Ukrainian.

The Graphic Information Specialist prepared graphic materials for 53 Members of Congress and 80 Congressional committees and prepared graphic material to accompany IRS reports sent to 4 Members of Congress and 24 Congressional committees.

IRS--Senior Specialists Division. Unlike the other divisions of the Service, the inquiries handled by the division fell slightly in number during the year; 2,271 were handled compared with 2,481 in the previous year. Of this group, 834 were recorded inquiries involving research or consultation, compared with 913 in the previous year. Committees that sought the assistance of the division included the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Senate Banking and Currency Committee, the Senate Judiciary Committee and its Subcommittee on Internal Security, the House Small Business Committee, and the House Select Committee on Astronautics and Space Exploration. The Senior Specialists also played the major role in the extensive study of the effects of Federal activity on the economy and local self-government that was undertaken for Congressman Cwinn and a number of other Members of the House.

During the year Wallace Vawter retired as Senior Specialist in Engineering and Public Works and was succeeded by Theodore Schad. Leon Herman joined the division as Specialist in Soviet Economics.

Acquisition Notes

The personal papers of Judge Alton Brooks Parker (1852-1926), the 1904 Democratic Party nominee for President, have been presented to the Library of Congress as a gift from his widow, Mrs. Amelia C. Parker, and his granddaughter, Mrs. Mary H. Oxholm, both of New York City.

The collection was delivered to the Library by Robert C. L. Scott of Williams College, who is engaged in studies relating to Parker's career and who urged their gift to the Library. Professor Scott is the son of the late Gen. Charles L. Scott, whose papers the Library also holds.

Mr. Parker served as justice of the New York Supreme Court (1886-89) and of the New York Court of Appeals (1889-92) before becoming chief justice of the Appellate Division of the State Supreme Court in 1898. Among the papers are letters from many of the leading judicial figures of the time, including Charles Evans Hughes and Rufus W. Peckham.

The major value of the papers lies in the extensive correspondence which Judge Parker carried on with the leading politicians of New York State, and this at a time when New York State politics dominated the

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THE NEW YORK TIMES.

C. I. A. PLAYS VITAL ROLE IN NATIONAL SECURITY

Congress Has Hitherto Left Agency Free to Carry on Its Top-Secret Work

By ANTHONY LEVIERO
Special to The Times

WASHINGTON, July 18—Senator McCarthy's recent threat to subpoena officials of the Central Intelligence Agency has focused unwelcome attention on the shyest of our security organizations.

Secret intelligence can thrive only in the shadows, and yet accountability is one of the strongest forces that Congress can exert in our governmental system of checks and balances.

The C. I. A. has been granted by law a degree of immunity from accountability for funds, personnel and activities probably never exceeded by any other Federal agency in American history. In an age of crisis, with its potential for unlimited warfare, the nation has realized the importance of having such an agency and of legalizing its exemption from normal surveillance by Congress and the General Accounting Office.

The public has been told exactly how much this country has spent for the atomic program but has never been given an inkling of how much C. I. A. is spending in the twilight realm to safeguard us during the "cold war." Its funds are hidden away among the appropriations of other departments, but a reported estimate for "cold war" activities covering all agencies engaged in them is \$800,000,000.

British Example

Great Britain has demonstrated through several centuries that a democracy can have an intelligence organization that serves as an effective instrument of national policy, keeps out of the limelight and is not allowed to impinge on domestic affairs and civil liberties.

In the United States the Federal Bureau of Investigation has maintained such a high record of integrity that Congress readily grants with little modification the requests for funds and personnel made by its director, J. Edgar Hoover. Certainly the F. B. I. has never been made a political foot-

The C. I. A. is a new and strange thing, however, and consequently

FORMER C.I.A. CHIEF



Associated Press
Walter Bedell Smith.

has been involved occasionally in controversies. Dating it from the creation of its forerunner, the Office of Strategic Services, it is a little more than ten years old; it came into being in its present form and name with the passage of the National Security Act in July, 1947.

Does the C. I. A. deserve the trust and confidence of Congress and the people? On the face of the rather scanty evidence of its achievements, qualified observers on the whole agree that it does. Whether it will continue to remain immune from scrutiny, however, is an issue that will be decided now or in the future between the President and Congress, largely on the basis of its worth and integrity.

Agency's Functions

What is intelligence and why is it so vital to shroud it in secrecy? In the modern sense, intelligence is as comprehensive as an encyclopedia. A G. I. patrol kills an enemy plane, and off his insignia, title, his pocket, and so on, he produces intelligence. That produces intelligence

PRINCIPALS IN M'CARTHY-C. I. A. CASE



William P. Bundy.

clues to the identity, size and positions of enemy units. A well-traveled industrialist is called in by the Air Force for information on a big plant in an enemy country and its capacity for war. That is intelligence—target data for the Strategic Air Force intercontinental bombers. Translations of foreign newspapers and professional periodicals, produce intelligence on economics, production, morale. The Aberdeen Proving Grounds periodically tests the hardness of the armor of enemy tanks as they are captured; providing intelligence that leads to the development of effective counter-weapons. A man sinks in the dark to a key unit of an industrial plant, leaves a package and the building blows up. He comes under the "cloak and dagger" category, labeled officially as "secret intelligence."

These examples, by no means an exhaustive list, suggest the range of the mission now assigned by act of Congress to the Central Intelligence Agency. Activities like these are implicit in the warning sounded by a task force of the (Hoover) Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, which stated in a report of January, 1949: "Intelligence is the last line of defense in the atomic age."

The C. I. A. distills data produced by itself and by the Army, Navy, State Department and pro-



Associated Press
Allen W. Dulles.

duces as its supreme product "National Intelligence Estimates," on which critical national policies and objectives are based by the National Security Council.

The C. I. A. was credited by the Eberstadt committee of the Hoover commission with having helped to detect a grave error in an intelligence estimate made by an unidentified departmental intelligence unit. The estimate, if it had prevailed, might have precipitated total mobilization and perhaps even war. That was in the spring of 1948, and the incident was associated with Soviet troop movements in the Soviet Zone of Germany.

Questions in Congress

But Congress has been in a questioning mood several times. Why was there no advance warning of the North Korean aggression? That was no surprise, answered C. I. A., but the policy makers disregarded its estimate of the situation. That was an echo of Pearl Harbor. Was there any warning of the uprising in Bogotá in April, 1948, while the then Secretary of State, George C. Marshall, was attending the Inter-American conference there? Yes, replied the C. I. A. General Marshall had brushed the warning aside, refusing to be intimidated, but a State Department functionary in Bogotá had refused to transmit one specific warning of the plot to damage United States pres-

over

In the midst of the bitterly fought Presidential campaign last fall General Walter Bedell Smith, then director of the C. I. A., said in a court hearing that Communists might have penetrated his as well as virtually every other security agency.

Only by strenuous efforts was he able to prevent this from becoming a political issue. More recently, however, he has said that the C. I. A. was as good as any intelligence service in the world except possibly Russia's.

Last fall also, the C. I. A. was involved in a compromising situation. The law specifies that it "shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement power or internal security functions"—these being reserved to the F. B. I. But two C. I. A. agents, Miller Holland and Wayne Richardson, reported information from Harry A. Jarvinen, a Seattle travel agent, that Prof. Owen Lattimore, a leading target of Senator McCarthy and now under indictment for alleged perjury, was planning to go to Russia.

Repeated Inquiry

The information was passed to the F. B. I., which investigated and found no evidence of this. The C. I. A. reported back that it had obtained additional information verifying its original report. The F. B. I. requested an interview with the C. I. A. informant and Jarvinen told the F. B. I. what he had told the C. I. A. agents. The F. B. I. investigated further and still found no evidence that Professor Lattimore planned to go abroad. Nevertheless the State Department announced it had put a stop order on his departure on the basis of the C. I. A. information.

Jarvinen was indicted on two counts of giving false information to Federal agencies. Holland and Richardson refused to testify on security grounds, but an F. B. I. agent took the stand. The jury

acquitted Jarvinen. The court held the C. I. A. agents in contempt of court for refusing to testify and sentenced them to fifteen days in jail, but while their appeal was pending President Truman pardoned them.

By his pardon President Truman took cognizance of the C. I. A. position that it should not be made to talk about its activities. General Smith, however, had not sought refuge in this position when he mentioned the possible Communist infiltration of the C. I. A. He was then appearing in the \$2,000,000 libel suit brought by Senator McCarthy against former Senator William Benton.

Latest Controversy

Neither Senator McCarthy nor any other agent of Congress has sought to investigate the C. I. A., either as to propriety and jurisdiction in the Jarvinen case or as to the possible infiltration of the C. I. A. suggested by General Smith. The current controversy arose from Senator McCarthy's efforts to interrogate William P. Bundy, a C. I. A. official who is a son-in-law of Dean Acheson, the former Secretary of State.

Allen Dulles, present director of the C. I. A., has indicated that he will resist Senator McCarthy's efforts to question members of his organization, although the situation this week-end was still in flux. Despite what General Smith had said, Mr. Dulles can maintain that the employees of his agency get the most rigorous kind of loyalty test, including the lie detector.

There is every indication also that President Eisenhower will resist any efforts to pry into C. I. A., in the conviction that secrecy is vital in its operations. The attitude of Congress as a whole, however, seems to be that it will never pry too deeply as long as C. I. A. appears to be attending to its priority-number-one mission of preventing an atomic Pearl Harbor.

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ad valorem or such quantitative limitations on any article or articles which may be entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption as the Tariff Commission has found and declared in its report to be necessary in order that the entry of such article or articles will not render or tend to render ineffective, or materially interfere with the national objective of achieving full parity prices for agricultural commodities, or products thereof, in the domestic market place, or any program or operation referred to in subsection (a) of this section, or reduce substantially the amount of any product processed in the United States from any such agricultural commodity or product thereof with respect to which any such program or operation is being undertaken: *Provided*, That no proclamation under this section shall impose any limitation on the total quantity of any article or articles which may be entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption which reduces such permissible total quantity to proportionately less than 80 percent of the total quantity of such article or articles which was entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption during a representative period as determined by the Tariff Commission: *And provided further*, That in designating any article or articles, the Tariff Commission may describe them by physical qualities, value, or use, or upon such other basis as it shall determine."

The statement and letter presented by Mr. MAGNUSON are as follows:

STATEMENT BY SENATOR MAGNUSON

Today I have introduced a bill to give agricultural industries, under certain specified circumstances, direct access to the Tariff Commission when imports of like or competitive commodities threaten to impair or disrupt a price support program, marketing agreement, acreage allotments, or other programs undertaken by the Federal Government, in cooperation with the farmers of the Nation, to stabilize farm prices.

A major part of the bill contains the same provisions as the amendment I offered some days ago to the Reciprocal Trade Extension Act.

Senators will recall that a part of the amendment I offered to the Reciprocal Trade legislation was adopted by the Senate. I refer to that portion which granted the President authority, under emergency conditions, to act on the import problem without waiting for a report from the Tariff Commission.

In failing to adopt the remainder of my amendment, the Senate overlooked a basic and vital principle—namely, that an agricultural industry benefiting from an officially sponsored Federal program, when seriously affected by imports, should have a right to its day in court—should have a right to an investigation and hearing by the Tariff Commission.

As matters now stand, an affected agricultural industry cannot get its case before the Tariff Commission for investigation and hearing except by sufferance of the Secretary of Agriculture and the President. Either the Secretary or the President, or both, may throw a roadblock in the path of an affected industry—may prevent it from ever getting its case before the Tariff Commission. It is my view that this violates a fundamental principle of American justice.

The agricultural industry, seriously affected by imports, should be able to get its case before the Tariff Commission as a matter of statutory right—rather than by sufferance of the Secretary of Agriculture, or the President, as is now the case.

In debate on my amendment to the Reciprocal Trade Extension Act, the chairman of the Finance Committee and a number of his colleagues on the other side of the aisle stated their emphatic support of the objec-

tive I am seeking. They raised some questions regarding specific wording of my amendment, but at no time took issue with its purpose.

I am introducing the amendment as a separate bill in order to give the Finance Committee an opportunity to study the proposal. I hope they will find it possible to report the measure as a separate bill, or as an amendment to appropriate legislation before the session ends.

NATIONAL COUNCIL

OF FARMER COOPERATIVES,

Washington, D. C., June 30, 1953.

Hon. WARREN O. MAGNUSON,

United States Senate,

Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR MAGNUSON: The National Council of Farmer Cooperatives supports your proposed section 22, amendment to the bill to extend the Trade Agreements Act.

Farm prices have been falling for more than 2 years. Farm parity price programs, credit policies, and disaster programs are strained to their limits in a losing battle to attain parity of farm income presently caught a price squeeze between high costs and reduced prices.

A weakened farm economy is a threat to the whole American economy at this time. A workable section 22 is fundamental to a functioning parity price-support program which will enable the farm front to sustain its share of the national economy. Section 22 should provide for direct application to the Tariff Commission for investigation and relief, a 6 months' limit on time to report, and finality of action based on the report.

Without a workable section 22 we cannot have a farm parity program. Without an effective farm parity program the country cannot stand the trade-agreement program. Section 104 of the Defense Production Act was allowed to expire on the implied promise of a workable section 22. So far section 22 has not been strengthened to warrant confidence in its effectiveness.

We urge the approval of the proposed amendment.

Sincerely yours,

HOMER L. BRINKLEY,
Executive Vice President.

JOINT COMMITTEE ON CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I submit a concurrent resolution to establish a Joint Committee on Central Intelligence.

Because of the very nature of the Central Intelligence Agency, I think that it is imperative that a joint congressional committee be established for the purpose of making continued studies of the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency and problems related to the gathering of intelligence affecting the national security. I feel that there should be a joint congressional committee authorized, and that the CIA should, as a matter of law, keep that committee fully and currently informed with respect to its activities. All bills, resolutions, and other matters in the Senate or in the House of Representative, relating primarily to the CIA, should be referred to the joint committee; and the joint committee should, from time to time, make whatever reports are necessary to the Congress concerning its relationship with the CIA.

The concurrent resolution which I have submitted would establish a joint committee composed of 9 Members of the

Senate to be appointed by the President of the Senate and 9 Members of the House of Representatives to be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives. In each instance, not more than 5 Members shall be of the same political party.

The joint committee, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, would be authorized to hold such hearings, to sit and act at such places and times, to require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, to administer such oaths, to take such testimony, to procure such printing and binding, and make such expenditures as it deems advisable. The committee is, in addition, empowered to appoint its staff; and is authorized to utilize the services, information, facilities, and personnel of the departments and establishments of the Government.

Mr. President, in my opinion, the CIA is in somewhat the same category as the Atomic Energy Commission; and just as a special committee, with well-defined authority and powers has been created on a joint congressional basis to oversee and supervise the interests of the AEC, so I believe should a joint congressional committee be created for the same purpose in connection with the CIA. I realize full well, because of the very nature of the duties of the CIA, that there has been no public scrutiny of its activities. This is necessary in this day and age, but I do believe that a joint congressional committee should be created for the purpose of seeing that good management is maintained in the CIA and also to keep a constant check on its intelligence policies. It is well too that this joint committee should be in a position to criticize any mistakes which the CIA may make.

Mr. Hanson W. Baldwin, one of this country's outstanding military analysts, in an article published in the New York Times of July 25, 1948, in which he suggested the establishment of a watchdog group for the CIA, had this to say:

Because of the importance to national security of secret intelligence and secret operations, because of our past errors in intelligence, and particularly because the grants of power given to intelligence agencies must be major and secret, a congressional committee to act as a discreet watchdog over all our intelligence agencies—particularly the CIA—ought to be established. It ought to be composed of men of great discretion and thorough reliability, close-mouthed men able to keep secrets. It should be composed of representatives of both parties; such a committee must be nonpartisan, for, above all, intelligence must be kept out of politics. It should have the same relationship to the CIA and other intelligence agencies that the Senate-House Atomic Energy Committee has to the United States Atomic Energy Commission. Such a group, to act as a sympathetic advocate for our intelligence agencies and at the same time as a gadfly to those agencies and a checkrein upon undue power, would serve a highly useful purpose in the atomic age in establishing and maintaining a sound intelligence system—the first line of defense.

Mr. President, the purpose of the joint congressional committee would be in a sense to safeguard as well as to supervise

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the policies of the CIA. In my opinion, the Congress should, because of the very nature of the work of the CIA, do everything in its power to protect its activities and to make it possible that the CIA, as an organization, will not lose its effectiveness, and will be able to continue its extremely important work in such a manner as to warrant the necessary amount of freedom of activity and the necessary security to perform the duties allocated to it under the law.

I ask unanimous consent that the concurrent resolution be appropriately referred and printed in the Record at this point as a part of my remarks.

The concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 42), submitted by Mr. Mansfield, was referred to the Committee on Armed Services, and ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That there is hereby established a Joint Committee on Central Intelligence to be composed of nine Members of the Senate to be appointed by the President of the Senate, and nine Members of the House of Representatives to be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives. In each instance not more than five Members shall be members of the same political party.

Sec. 2. The joint committee shall make continuing studies of the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency and of problems relating to the gathering of intelligence affecting the national security and of its coordination and utilization by the various departments, agencies, and instrumentalities of the Government. The Central Intelligence Agency shall keep the joint committee fully and currently informed with respect to its activities. All bills, resolutions, and other matters in the Senate or the House of Representatives relating primarily to the Central Intelligence Agency shall be referred to the joint committee. The members of the joint committee who are Members of the Senate shall from time to time report to the Senate, and the members of the joint committee who are Members of the House of Representatives shall from time to time report to the House, by bill or otherwise, their recommendations with respect to matters within the jurisdiction of their respective Houses which are (1) referred to the joint committee or (2) otherwise within the jurisdiction of the joint committee.

Sec. 3. Vacancies in the membership of the joint committee shall not affect the power of the remaining members to execute the functions of the joint committee, and shall be filled in the same manner as in the case of the original selection. The joint committee shall select a chairman and a vice chairman from among its members.

Sec. 4. The joint committee, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, is authorized to hold such hearings, to sit and act at such places and times, to require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, to administer such oaths, to take such testimony, to procure such printing and binding and to make such expenditures as it deems advisable. The cost of stenographic services to report such hearings shall not be in excess of 25 cents per hundred words.

Sec. 5. The joint committee is empowered to appoint such experts, consultants, technicians, and clerical and stenographic assistants as it deems necessary and advisable. The committee is authorized to utilize the services, information, facilities, and person-

nel of the departments and establishments of the Government.

Sec. 6. The expenses of the joint committee, which shall not exceed \$ per year, shall be paid one-half from the contingent fund of the Senate and one-half from the contingent fund of the House of Representatives upon vouchers signed by the chairman. Disbursements to pay such expenses shall be made by the Secretary of the Senate out of the contingent fund of the Senate, such contingent fund to be reimbursed from the contingent fund of the House of Representatives in the amount of one-half of the disbursements so made.

AMENDMENT OF RULE RELATING TO INQUIRIES AND INVESTIGATIONS BY COMMITTEES

Mr. MONRONEY. Mr. President, I submit for appropriate reference a resolution to amend the Senate rules.

This amendment would give the same power to the entire Senate for the discharge of committees conducting investigations which the Senate traditionally, since the beginning of its existence, has had to discharge committees from the consideration of legislative bills. If the investigations of any and all United States agencies by subcommittees of the Senate are to continue, going beyond the proper jurisdictional scope or beyond the traditional reputation of the Senate for fair play and fair dealing, I believe it is high time that the Senate accept full responsibility for the actions and activities of committee chairmen, and of their staffs, in carrying out such investigations.

I believe my amendment would in a proper and effective way again place under the responsibility of the entire Senate the power of investigation and the methods used in conducting investigations.

I hope, in submitting this resolution, that we may transfer back to the Senate the powers which have been assumed in having one-man rule in certain congressional investigative subcommittees, specifically the senatorial subcommittee conducted by the distinguished junior Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. McCARTHY].

The resolution (S. Res. 146), submitted by Mr. MONRONEY, was received, and referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration, as follows:

Resolved, That Rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:

"3. In any case in which a controversy arises as to the jurisdiction of any committee of the Senate to make an inquiry or investigation, the question of jurisdiction shall be decided by the Presiding Officer of the Senate, without debate, upon a motion to discharge the committee from further pursuing such inquiry or investigation; but such decision shall be subject to an appeal. The chairman of each committee shall from time to time and at the earliest date practicable, report to the Senate the general nature of inquiries or investigations the committee proposes to undertake, or, in any case he deems the national security might be endangered by such report, he shall in writing advise the President of the Senate of that fact."

AMENDMENT OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT RELATING TO REQUESTS OF COMMON CARRIERS FOR INCREASED TRANSPORTATION RATES—AMENDMENTS

Mr. DOUGLAS submitted amendments intended to be proposed by him to the bill (S. 1461) to amend the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended, concerning requests of common carriers for increased transportation rates, which were ordered to lie on the table and to be printed.

AMENDMENT OF RUBBER ACT OF 1948, RELATING TO SALE OF GOVERNMENT-OWNED RUBBER-PRODUCING FACILITIES—AMENDMENTS

Mr. MAYBANK (for himself and Mr. CAHENART) submitted amendments intended to be proposed by them, jointly, to the bill (S. 2047) to amend the Rubber Act of 1948, as amended, to provide for the sale of Government-owned rubber-producing facilities, to repeal and modify certain of its provisions affected thereby, and for other purposes, which were ordered to lie on the table and to be printed.

Mr. DOUGLAS submitted amendments intended to be proposed by him to Senate bill 2047, supra, which were ordered to lie on the table and to be printed.

Mr. LONG submitted amendments intended to be proposed by him to Senate bill 2047, supra, which were ordered to lie on the table and to be printed.

Mr. MAYBANK submitted amendments intended to be proposed by him to Senate bill 2047, supra, which were ordered to lie on the table and to be printed.

NOTICE OF CHANGE OF DATE OF HEARING ON S. 2308, TO AUTHORIZE INVESTIGATION BY ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CERTAIN OFFENSES

Mr. LANGER. Mr. President, on behalf of a subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, on July 15, 1953, I gave notice that a public hearing would be conducted on Thursday, July 23, 1953, at 10 a. m., in room 424, Senate Office Building, on S. 2308, a bill to authorize and direct the investigation by the Attorney General of certain offenses, and for other purposes. I wish to bring to the attention of all interested parties that the hearing for the above-mentioned time has been rescheduled for Thursday, July 23, 1953, at 2:30 p. m., in room 424, Senate Office Building. Persons desiring to be heard should notify the committee so that a schedule can be prepared for those who wish to appear and testify. The subcommittee as originally announced consists of myself, chairman, the Senator from Illinois [Mr. DRUMMOND], and the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. MCCLINTOCK].

NEED FOR ORDERLY EVALUATION
OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(Mr. ZABLOCKI asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Speaker, yesterday I joined my colleague from New York, Representative EDNA KELLY, in introducing a concurrent resolution which provides for the creation of a joint committee on intelligence matters. The joint committee would consist of 9 members from both bodies of Congress with no more than 5 members being selected from the same political party.

The activities of the Central Intelligence Agency and related intelligence services have been handled from a congressional standpoint in a piecemeal fashion. The importance of these activities to the national security demands at this time the creation of a joint committee, which will keep the Congress informed and bring these activities under responsible scrutiny. The proposed committee would operate in a manner which has been successfully adopted by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy matters.

Intelligence has developed as an activity of utmost importance since World War II. The agencies in this field are entitled to a continuous, constant, and stable relationship with the Congress. The membership of the joint committee on intelligence matters, which would presumably be drawn from those charged with responsibility for military and foreign-policy matters, would supply this important link in this crucial area. At the same time, the joint committee would save the executive branch's intelligence activities from being subjected to undue interference by a number of separate congressional committees, which may consider themselves called upon to pursue inquiries into their operations.

I earnestly hope that this concurrent resolution will receive prompt and favorable consideration from the Congress before the contemplated adjournment early next month.

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A Weakness in Security

McCarthy Attacks on Intelligence Agency
Reveal Need for Close Watch by Congress

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, who stubbed his toe in the process of inadvertently revealing one of the weaknesses of the Central Intelligence Agency, a key unit in our national security system.

The Senator demanded the right, recently, to question a veteran and trusted employe of the Central Intelligence Agency who had been many times checked and cleared by the agency itself and by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The demand, many in Washington assumed, was an indirect attack on the intelligence unit, which is headed by Allen W. Dulles, brother of the Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles—direct and indirect target of many of Senator McCarthy's attacks.

The Central Intelligence Agency is one of the most sensitive and secret agencies of the Government; it is privy to all collectible information about all the world's hot spots, and it receives top secret data from many of our friends and allies.

Allen Dulles, backed by the White House, took the stand that he could not allow Senator McCarthy to examine his subordinates in the free-swinging fashion that has characterized the Senator's past investigations; to do so would compromise completely the worth of the agency. The Senator, despite the face-saving statement he issued, obviously has backed away in the face of such a formidable stand.

More Congress Scrutiny Needed. Whether Senator McCarthy now has abandoned the C. I. A. as a future target altogether, or whether he will return to the attack only the future can tell. In any case the whole incident confirms the need for the establishment of a Joint House-Senate Committee, akin to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, to act as father-confessor, protector, counselor, supervisor and governor for one of the most powerful and most important of the Executive agencies of Government.

Such a committee was suggested five years ago when the intelligence body was in the throes of internal trouble, and later the National Security Task Force of the commission headed by former President Herbert Hoover mentioned the possible desirability of establishing a "watchdog" committee in Congress to supervise it. Senator Mike Mansfield of Montana now has introduced a bill to provide such a joint committee of eighteen members, to be called the Joint Committee on Central Intelligence.

Such a committee, if it could be composed—as the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy is—of discreet, balanced and able members of Congress, forewarned to security, could serve two major purposes:

It would protect the C. I. A. from such investigations as proposed by Senator McCarthy. At the same time it could provide much needed legislative supervision over an agency that works in great secrecy, has available large, hidden funds, some of which do not have to be accounted for, and that—by its nature—engages in activities that must be carefully balanced and well executed, could lead to peacetime, psychological and military defects, and even to danger to our form of government.

A few persons in government are really in a position to know whether or not the C. I. A. is doing a good job. The need for objective evaluation by a detached group is great.


Intelligence, in the atomic age, is the first line of defense. We must know our enemy, or die. Whether we like it or not, therefore, the Central Intelligence Agency is necessary.

But the very philosophical approach that must govern the operations of a clandestine intelligence unit produces its own danger, for it is essentially a philosophy of secrecy and power, of the ends justifying the means, of disagreeable methods for agreeable ends. The C. I. A., if it is to serve its purpose, must deal with questionable characters and persons of doubtful morals, with known Communists and with "double agents" of uncertain loyalty. It naturally attracts, among its many able men, some who are "clucks," others who are themselves attracted by the megalomania of secrecy and quite a number who are out for the ride.

Haste and Some Waste Cited. Its budget is only partly direct. Some of its funds are concealed in budgets for other departments. It is an agency relatively new to the United States scene. Under pressure of cold and hot war, it was forced—in answer to demand—to expand with great rapidity; empires were built and many persons who had no competence were put in jobs.

There were—and there still are—waste and administrative inefficiency, there have been mistakes, many of them inherited from the past, there were some projects that had been better left untried, and there have been intelligence failures.

It is precisely for these reasons that the agency offers a shining target for attack by men like Senator McCarthy. Yet security and intelligence are too important to expose this vital agency to such irresponsible scrutiny. Our links with the intelligence agencies of foreign governments would be imperiled, some of our sources of information dried up, the whole mechanism of the agency, which is now running more and more



smoothly—stuff be thrown off balance by a Senator McCarthy let loose among the files. This is unthinkable.

The intelligence arm is improving in effectiveness. Yet there is no doubt that Congress should have more direct control over it, for the sake of the agency itself, as well as for the sake of the country. Allen Dulles has secret sessions occasionally with small subcommittees of the Appropriations Committee of House and Senate. But there is no such intimate relationships between the agency and Congress as exists in the case of the Atomic Energy Commission.

Yet in some ways C. I. A. and its whole philosophy of operation, so alien in concept to past American ideas, is a more explosive proposition and more important to our future than is the atomic agency.

A joint Congressional committee might protect the Central Intelligence Agency from destructive and irresponsible attacks and provide constructive and essential legislative supervision.

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TIME Magazine,

January 3, 1953

THE ADMINISTRATION

The Man with the Innocent Air

See Cover

What can the CIA do? It can't do much. It can't strike and can't go out and force things beyond the reach of ordinary men. It is not a force.

—Sam T. Griggs, Editor, *TIME* (see B.C.)

"Promotional Intelligence." Before World War II had ended, these men, together with like-minded officials of other agencies, had begun to agitate for a permanent strategic-intelligence service. One of their strongest arguments was the fact that the existing U.S. intelligence system encouraged "sales promotion intelligence." Any information evaluated by the Office of Naval Intelligence, for example, was likely to agree with Navy strategic doctrine and be in support of the services. The Air Force had a similar record, and if Army and State Department evaluation was less biased, that could be ascribed to the not very creditable fact that the Army and the State Department had fewer ideas on grand strategy than the Navy and Air Force.

There was no agency that was responsible to the President himself and committed to the interpretation of intelligence from the point of view of the U.S. Government as a whole. The Central Intelligence Agency, established in 1947, was designed to fill this function. So, or donate to the National Security Council, and thus to the President, it was given responsibility for coordinating all U.S. intelligence activities, and for the preparation of national intelligence estimates representing the best combined judgment of all branches of U.S. intelligence, including CIA itself. This was supposed to give policymakers estimates free of the promotional bias of particular services or departments.

In its first three years of existence, however, CIA, hampered by service rivalry, did not make much of a success of its main job. Instead, the first director, Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, concentrated on another CIA function: the collection of those kinds of intelligence which are not the special province of any other agency. Bureaucratically, this was the line of least resistance, but it was not the main job CIA was set up to do.

Though CIA officials do not admit it publicly, the agency was from the start engaged in a wide range of "covert activities": espionage and to resistance movements and perhaps sabotage. Armed with all the traditional devices of espionage and a few 20th century improvements, such as plastic explosives and microfilm which can be sealed under the stamp on an envelope, CIA agents spread across the world. Covert activities are the main

part of the emphasis on them is effective public relations policy.

Clock, Dagger & File. In the last two or three years, CIA has got closer to its main function as a central evaluation agency, a mission where the information is hard to get and harder to evaluate, but where espionage is only one of many techniques. The mass organization of modern military, economic and political systems means that every government has to give thousands of officers, engineers, businessmen, artisans and minor politicians access to thousands of facts that the government might like to cover up.

As a consequence, the modern intelligence agency resists getting so much as a research formula. The modern intelligence officer's primary tools include newspaper, technical publications, broadcast transcripts, intercepts of returning travelers, known in CIA parlance as "debriefing," and a vast collection of files.

To assemble out of these sources immovable arguments and arrange them in meaningful relationships requires several types of staff. The information-picked expert on Soviet Slavic economic history has to be a good setup, and so has the expert on the latest biologist who is trained to make comparisons from incomplete and biased sources. The CIA has dozens of these, both types, than it has of people who can do a dagger men.

Simple Collection. CIA was still concentrating on its original use as an independent intelligence collection and research agency when the division of South Korea, bought by the U.S. Government by agreement, came up to Capitol Hill to examine why there had been no advance warning. Admiral Hillenkoetter convinced the Congressmen that CIA was not at fault. Nobody asked a critical question which nevertheless hung over CIA's head. The question: Had CIA ever pulled all the intelligence services together and produced a national intelligence estimate on the North Korean threat? The answer, no.

Four months later Harry Truman appointed Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter to succeed Hillenkoetter. Assisted by Dulles and New York lawyer Frank William Jackson (Chief Counsel), Smith revamped CIA from top to bottom. Items:

Q A Joint Watch Committee, including members from the military services, the State Department, the FBI and the Atomic Energy Commission, was set up to keep an eye on any to do indications of Communist activity anywhere in the world.

Q An Office of National Estimates was established in the middle of Smith's regime to produce national estimates as many combined intelligence estimates as CIA had tried and failed to do.

Q For the first time, all U.S. intelligence agencies began to get regular guidance from a central source on what information they should look for and the urgency with which to get it.

Q Another change was a shake-up CIA's staff. At the end of the year, the number of jobs was set at 1,000 and 100.

employees were fired. The criterion which Smith established was simple. Said he: "I don't care whether they were blabbing secrets or not. Just give me names of people at Georgetown cocktail parties."

The Mysterious Visitors. CIA staffers, who respected but feared Smith, are even more impressed by Allen Dulles, who runs the agency smoothly and with apparently inexhaustible energy. Dulles is in his office every morning by 8 o'clock, often works through till 11 at night. Though he is burdened with the reading of a staggering number of documents and the usual quota of time-consuming conferences (including a weekly meeting of the National Security Council), Dulles manages to see scores of visitors every day, ranging from foreign ambassadors to secret agents. To avoid embarrassing confrontations, Dulles' visitors are frequently dispersed among a number of nearby offices, with Dulles himself moving from room to room like a big-city dentist.

These summer weekends Dulles hurries up to his handsome shore place at Lloyd Neck Long Island, where he spends as much time as possible with his wife, two married daughters and son Allen Macy, an ex-Marine lieutenant who is still recuperating from a near-fatal head wound suffered in the fighting around Korea's Bomber Hill last November.

Room for Improvement. Much of the increased respect with which CIA is now regarded in Washington is directly attributable to Smith and Allen Dulles. But Dulles himself is the first to admit that there is plenty of room for improvement. Relations with the military intelligence services, though better than ever before, are still less than good. (The Navy, which had advance warning of the Batista coup d'état in Cuba last year, failed to pass the word on to CIA.) Because of insufficient filtering and analysis at lower levels, a vast and confusing flood of information is still passed up to top U.S. officials. Says Dulles: "We have got to get more selective, and that may mean fewer people."

Congress has let CIA alone. So far, the only serious interference has been Joe McCarthy's demand that a CIA employee appear before his committee—a demand which Dulles, with White House backing, flatly and successfully rejected (*TIME*, July 27).

So Dulles has a free hand to tackle an old, old job with new methods. He thinks that U.S. intelligence is now better than the British, but he has not yet caught up with the more serious competition. Because the U.S. is—and expects to remain—an open society, the job of Communist intelligence here, Dulles thinks, is easier than his own. Some day, however, he hopes, that his collection of scholars, scientists, historians, lawyers and spies will be running a service second to none in its field as effective perhaps as Joshua's.

Congress, "watchdog" proposals

'Complaints' Worry Senate Appropriations Committee Probe of CIA Is Considered

By JACK STEELE
Scripps-Howard Staff Writer

The Senate Appropriations Committee is considering a full-scale inquiry into the secret operations of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Government's top spy agency.

Chairman Styles Bridges (R., N. H.) confirmed today that some members of his committee have urged such an inquiry based on a series of "complaints" relating to the CIA's effectiveness and efficiency.

None of these complaints apparently involve charges of communist infiltration of the super-intelligence agency.

Sen. Bridges said the committee would discuss the possibility of such an inquiry soon. He said the inquiry, if one is conducted, should not be called an "investigation." He made it plain any such probe would be behind closed doors.

If the committee goes ahead with the plan—which may bring strong objections from the Eisenhower Administration—it will mark the first time that Congress has demanded detailed information about the CIA operations.

Sen. Joseph R. McCarthy (R., Wis.) started an investigation last year of a reported CIA project to utilize communists in some of its activities, but called it off after Administration leaders strenuously objected.

There is some difference of opinion now within the Appropriations Committee, it was learned, on the necessity of a probe of the CIA.

Some members say the committee should give no more "blank check" appropriations to CIA without first finding out whether there is any substance to the complaints about its effectiveness.

Others want to keep on giving CIA the funds it wants without asking any questions, on the theory

that it is up to the President to make sure that the agency is doing its job well.

HIDDEN CASH

The CIA's operations are so secret that even its appropriations are hidden in the budget—in the same way funds were concealed for the "Manhattan Project" which developed the atom bomb. Committee members will only say that it has a budget of "many millions."

Allen W. Dulles, brother of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, heads the CIA. His predecessor was Walter Bedell Smith, new Under-Secretary of State. Senators who want more information about CIA operations insist their proposed inquiry is not aimed at either Mr. Dulles or Gen. Smith.

Among the complaints are:

- CIA has not done an effective job collecting information behind the Iron Curtain.
- Military intelligence groups have done a better job in the "cloak and dagger" field than the CIA.
- CIA has become a haven for "broken-down generals and admirals."
- Much of the money spent on CIA thus far has been wasted.

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I wish also to commend the chairman of the Committee on Rules and Administration (Mr. JENNETT) for the position he has taken as chairman of the committee in calling the committee together to consider the report on next Tuesday.

I think the action on the part of both Senators is proper. The case should be closed. Final action should be taken on it, and I hope that can be done next week.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Let me say to the Senator that it was only with the full cooperation of the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Rules and Administration and the chairman of the subcommittee, the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. BARRETT), that it was possible to expedite this matter. We also had the cooperation of the staff of the committee.

While I shall not at this time propound a unanimous-consent request, I am hopeful that when the subject is brought to the attention of the Senate, Senators on the other side of the aisle will explore the situation to see if we cannot arrive at a reasonable division of time for a couple of days, or whatever time it may be felt is necessary to debate the question, so that the attention of the Senate may be concentrated on that subject. I hope it will not be delayed by extraneous matters. I believe that when the seat of any United States Senator is at stake he and the State he represents, as well as the Senate, are entitled to have as prompt action as the facts developed will warrant.

Mr. CLEMENTS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I yield.

Mr. CLEMENTS. I can speak for only one Member of the Senate. I believe that Senators on this side of the aisle will desire only sufficient time to present the case of the Senator from New Mexico (Mr. CHAVEZ) in the proper light.

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I yield.

Mr. GORE. In order that the distinguished majority leader may be fully advised, let me say to him that the calling of Calendar No. 703, Senate bill 798, would entail considerable debate, of such length that perhaps it could not be concluded in 1 day, whereas Calendar 1632, House bill 5509, might well be disposed of within a much briefer time.

Mr. KNOWLAND. I did not necessarily mean the bills would be called up in the order mentioned. I am mindful of the fact that undoubtedly there will be some debate. What I have in mind is this: If debate runs out today after the Senator from Montana (Mr. MANSFIELD) speaks on a different subject, I wish to be in a position to proceed to the consideration of certain other bills.

Tomorrow the time will be controlled under the unanimous-consent agreement. The vote is to come at 4 o'clock. We can then return to the consideration of whatever is the unfinished business at that time, and the debate on the two bills referred to can be continued on Friday, if necessary.

Mr. BUSH. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I yield.

Mr. BUSH. With respect to Calendar No. 703, Senate bill 798, I advise the majority leader that I had not realized that he was about to bring up that bill. Frankly, I am not prepared to debate the bill at this time, but I may be prepared in 24 or 48 hours. I agree with the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. GORE) that consideration of Senate bill 798 should be postponed, if possible. I shall be glad to advise the majority leader as soon as we are ready to have it considered. There are certain points of difference. Minority views have been filed and we are in the process of trying to reach an agreement which will accommodate the minority point of view, which would make the bill generally more acceptable.

Mr. KNOWLAND. We have discussed the bill from time to time. I certainly have no desire to move ahead if the distinguished Senator from Connecticut is not prepared to do so this afternoon. I wished to give notice that the bill should be taken up for consideration in the near future. Very soon we shall have a heavy program, including tax legislation, appropriation bills, and major parts of the administration's legislative program, as well as the important measure now pending. I am afraid that if we do not consider the Senator's bill soon it may be lost in the general tieup of the session later. So, if the Senator is hopeful that the bill will be passed, I think the sooner we can get to it the better it will be.

Mr. BUSH. I thank the distinguished majority leader. I assure him that I shall be ready within 48 hours to take up the bill at his convenience.

Mr. KNOWLAND subsequently said: Mr. President, earlier in the day I gave notice that among several bills for which consideration would be sought was Calendar No. 620, Senate bill 2231, a bill to amend the Trading With the Enemy Act relating to debt claims. That was one of the bills with respect to which I had given advance notice to the leadership on the other side of the aisle. We are attempting this afternoon to devise a program to fill in the time when debate on the pending legislation runs out. I should like to be prepared to take up the bill referred during the afternoon.

JOINT COMMITTEE ON CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Mr. MANSFIELD obtained the floor. Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, would the Senator mind if I suggested the absence of a quorum?

Mr. MANSFIELD. That is agreeable to me, provided I do not lose the floor.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may suggest the absence of a quorum without the Senator from Montana losing the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none.

Mr. KNOWLAND. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The Chief Clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. PAYNE in the chair). Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, on behalf of myself, the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. BARRETT), the Senator from Ohio (Mr. BURKE), the Senator from Maryland (Mr. BUTLER), the Senator from Indiana (Mr. CAPEWANT), the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. CLEMENTS), the Senator from Texas (Mr. DANIEL), the Senator from Georgia (Mr. GEORGE), the Senator from Iowa (Mr. GILLETTE), the Senator from Minnesota (Mr. HUMPHREY), the Senator from Colorado (Mr. JOHNSON), the junior Senator from South Carolina (Mr. JOHNSTON), the senior Senator from West Virginia (Mr. KILGORE), the Senator from New York (Mr. LEHMAN), the senior Senator from South Carolina (Mr. MAYBANK), the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. MARTIN), the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. MOWAT), my colleague, the senior Senator from Montana (Mr. MURRAY), the junior Senator from West Virginia (Mr. NEELY), the Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. PASTOR), and the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. FULBRIGHT), I ask unanimous consent to submit for appropriate reference a concurrent resolution to establish a Joint Committee on Central Intelligence.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the concurrent resolution will be received and appropriately referred.

The concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 69) was referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration, as follows:

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring). That there is hereby established a Joint Committee on Central Intelligence to be composed of 5 Members of the Senate to be appointed by the President of the Senate, and 5 Members of the House of Representatives to be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives. In each instance not more than three members shall be members of the same political party.

Sec. 2. The joint committee shall make continuing studies of the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency and of problems relating to the gathering of intelligence affecting the national security and of its coordination and utilization by the various departments, agencies, and instrumentalities of the Government. The Central Intelligence Agency shall keep the joint committee fully and currently informed with respect to its activities. All bills, resolutions, and other matters in the Senate or the House of Representatives relating primarily to the Central Intelligence Agency shall be referred to the joint committee. The members of the joint committee who are Members of the Senate shall from time to time report to the Senate, and the members of the joint committee who are Members of the House of Representatives shall from time to time report to the House, by bill or otherwise, their recommendations with respect to matters within the jurisdiction of their respective Houses which are (1) referred to the joint committee or (2) otherwise within the jurisdiction of the joint committee.

Sec. 3. Vacancies in the membership of the joint committee shall not affect the power of the remaining members to execute the functions of the joint committee, and shall be filled in the same manner as in the case of the original selection. The joint committee shall select a chairman and a vice chairman from among its members.

Sec. 4. The joint committee, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, is au-

thorized to hold such hearings, so sit and act at such places and times, to require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, to administer such oaths, to take such testimony, to procure such printing and binding and to make such expenditures as it deems advisable. The cost of stenographic services to report such hearings shall not be in excess of 25 cents per hundred words.

Sec. 5. The joint committee is empowered to appoint such experts, consultants, technicians, and clerical and stenographic assistance as it deems necessary and advisable. The committee is authorized to utilize the services, information, facilities, and personnel of the departments and establishments of the Government.

Sec. 6. The expenses of the joint committee, which shall not exceed \$ per year, shall be paid one-half from the contingent fund of the Senate and one-half from the contingent fund of the House of Representatives upon vouchers signed by the chairman. Disbursements to pay such expenses shall be made by the Secretary of the Senate out of the contingent fund of the Senate, such contingent fund to be reimbursed from the contingent fund of the House of Representatives in the amount of one-half of the disbursements so made.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the concurrent resolution just submitted proposes to establish a Joint Committee on Central Intelligence, to be composed of five Members of the Senate, to be appointed by the President of the Senate, and five Members of the House of Representatives, to be appointed by the Speaker of the House. In each instance not more than three members shall be of the same political party.

Mr. President, events during the past year have convinced me that an urgent need exists for regular and responsible congressional scrutiny of the Central Intelligence Agency. Such scrutiny is essential to the success of our foreign policy, to the preservation of our democratic processes, and to the security of the Intelligence Agency itself. The sooner we provide a legislative framework for proper congressional-CIA relations, the quicker we can begin to build mutual confidence.

This is a prerequisite for effective operation by an executive agency, especially one hidden behind closed doors. If we fail to establish some sort of permanent, continuing link between Congress and the CIA the only result will be growing suspicion. From that, in all likelihood, will come sporadic investigations by various committees of Congress.

It should not be surprising that a great many Members of Congress are already questioning the wisdom of continuing to allow almost complete independence to a Government agency as vital and powerful as CIA. In the first place, the whole concept of peacetime foreign intelligence operations has been alien to American tradition. It was not until 1947, when CIA was established, that this Nation began to develop an intelligence service of any significant size. Even then many harbored serious doubts as to whether such an organization belonged in a democracy in peacetime.

Nevertheless, by 1947 most Americans realized that the United States was confronted with a foe which would use any means to attain its aim—the conquest

of the world. Information on the capabilities and intentions of aggressive nations became imperative, especially in view of the developments in atomic energy.

The need for the Central Intelligence Agency is seldom questioned any longer and I certainly am not challenging it now. What I am concerned with, however, is CIA's position of responsibility to none but the National Security Council. I believe this should be changed. It is true that intelligence services of other major countries operate without direct control of the legislatures. This is understandable in a totalitarian government, such as the Soviet Union. It is even understandable in a parliamentary democracy, such as Great Britain, where the entire administration is a part of and is responsible to Parliament. Our form of government, however, is based on a system of checks and balances. If this system gets seriously out of balance at any point the whole system is jeopardized and the way is opened for the growth of tyranny.

There has been almost no congressional inspection of the Central Intelligence Agency since the latter's establishment in 1947. It is conceivable that as the need for an intelligence service had been evident in 1946, the Congressional Reorganization Act of that year would have made provisions for congressional participation in the committee structure of Congress. As it is now, however, CIA is freed from practically every ordinary form of congressional check. Control of its expenditures is exempted from the provisions of law which prevent financial abuses in other Government agencies. Its appropriations are hidden in allotments to other agencies, and the Bureau of the Budget does not report CIA's personnel strength to Congress. Each year only a handful of Members in each House see even the appropriation figures. There is no regular, methodical review of this agency, other than a briefing which is supplied to a few members of the appropriations committees.

Mr. President, I agree that an intelligence agency must maintain complete secrecy to be effective. If clandestine sources of information were inadvertently revealed, they would quickly dry up. Not only would the flow of information be cut off, but the lives of many would be seriously endangered. In addition, much of the value of the intelligence product would be lost if it were known that we possessed it. An example is the breaking of a code. If we break a code we can continue to intercept and decipher important messages as long as the enemy or potential enemy is unaware of our knowledge. However, the instant the enemy learns that we have the key, they will stop using that code or possibly use it only to mislead us. Secrecy for these purposes is obviously necessary.

However, there is a profound difference between an essential degree of secrecy to achieve a specific purpose and secrecy for the mere sake of secrecy. Once secrecy becomes sacrosanct, it invites abuse. If we accept this idea of secrecy for secrecy's sake we will have no

way of knowing whether we have a fine intelligence service or a very poor one.

Secrecy now bedevils everything about CIA—its cost, its efficiency, its successes, and its failures. It has been mustered against questions or proposals regarding CIA by Members of Congress. It is difficult to legislate intelligently for this agency because we have no information which we can be positive is correct.

An aura of superiority has been built around the CIA. Calls for an investigation of CIA personnel have been met with a resistance not encountered from any other agency. The administration appears to support the view that CIA officials merit an immunity which has never been claimed for the State Department or other Government agencies handling equally confidential material. CIA seems to have marked out for itself a setting above other Government agencies, Congress, and the public.

I do not believe that responsible congressional auditing of the CIA is incompatible with the maintenance of the degree of secrecy necessary to the legitimate operations of this agency. On the contrary it has many advantages. It would protect the reputation of the agency against unjustified attacks. It would make unnecessary sporadic investigations which might lead to unauthorized disclosures. Adequate funds would be assured for all legitimate purposes. Most important, the assertion of congressional interest in this field would reduce the threat to our democratic processes which this uncontrolled agency by its very nature now poses.

The kind of congressional role which is called for in this situation is similar to that played by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. The resolution which I am introducing today is similar to one I sponsored last July. It proposes the creation of a Joint Committee on Central Intelligence. This committee would be composed of 5 Members of the Senate and 5 Members of the House. No more than 3 Members in either House would be selected from the same political party. The committee would make continuing studies of the activities of the Agency, its problems, its utilization by other departments and agencies, and its coordination with them. From time to time the members of the committee would report to the Senate and House and recommend such legislation as might be needed.

The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy offers a model for congressional participation in the control of CIA. The joint committee deals with a subject that requires at least as much secrecy as would a committee on intelligence. It deals with a subject that is even more vital to our national security.

The Atomic Energy Commission has earned the respect of both the executive and legislative branches of the Government. It has been entrusted with the most vital secrets of state and it has proved worthy of that trust. Other Members of Congress have full confidence in its judgment. Their legislative actions affecting atomic energy are based on the secure knowledge that trusted Members of both Houses are fully cognizant of developments in atomic energy.

They do not have to depend on the unilateral judgment of the executive branch as to what Members of Congress ought or ought not to know.

The Atomic Energy Commission also benefits from its ties with the committee because it provides the commissioners with a clear channel into which they can direct their legislative problems. The security of the atomic energy program, moreover, is not periodically threatened by sporadic investigations and embarrassing questions from the floor of Congress.

I do not believe that the Central Intelligence Agency enjoys the same degree of confidence in Congress and among the American people which has been gained by the Atomic Energy Commission. And I do not believe the CIA will ever obtain it under present arrangements. On the contrary, all signs point to a steady loss of confidence. How could it be otherwise when we are left to wonder about the efficiency and economy of its operation, if the only assurances we have of the effectiveness of the service are those proffered by the men who run it?

Until a committee of the kind I am proposing is established, there will be no way of knowing what serious flaws in the Intelligence Agency may be covered by the curtain of secrecy in which it is shrouded. In 1949 the Hoover Commission examined the CIA. A task force stated that—

The Central Intelligence Agency has not yet achieved the desired degree of proficiency and dependability in its estimate. Without it, the National Security Council cannot succeed in assessing and appraising the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in relation to our . . . military power, with sufficient continuity or definiteness to constitute a practical guide to the Military Establishment as to the size of our military needs.

It recommended that vigorous steps be taken to improve the Central Intelligence Agency and its work.

Mr. President, have these steps been taken? We do not know and we have no way of finding out. Yet we are asked to go on appropriating vast funds without debate or question for this Agency.

Recently the Washington Star carried a story to the effect that CIA "has become so topheavy and unwieldy that it should be scrapped altogether and replaced by a new organization." Is this charge true? The columnist who reported this view said further that "our legislators feel strongly that there must be much overlapping and useless expenditure in the activities" of the five separate groups engaged in intelligence—CIA, the State Department, the Navy, the Army, and the Air Force. Is this charge true? He also wrote that "legislators who have been in close contact with the CIA believe that there is much deadwood in the organization which should be eliminated and it contains too many 'pals' of men with influence in the Government. Is this charge true?"

The fact is that we do not know whether these and other charges similarly unrelated to secrecy are true or not true. And if we are to appropriate funds for this Agency, we ought to know.

Neither do we know if CIA is staying within the limits established by law or if it has expanded beyond its original purposes. On December 30, 1953, the same columnist asserted that "the CIA established an intelligence service in the United States," although the law creating the Agency specifically prohibits it from "police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers or internal-security functions." Yet, as was pointed out in an article in the New York Times on July 19, 1953, two CIA agents gave reports to the FBI that Owen Lattimore was about to leave this country. Nevertheless, they later refused on security grounds to testify in court on their role in this matter. Does this incident mean that the CIA is getting into the internal security field in competition with the FBI? Does it mean that officials of this Government Agency can defy the courts?

What of the quality of the product which CIA is producing? CIA officials claim that the United States intelligence system is second only to that of the Soviet Union. I do not know whether this is a boast of strength or a confession of weakness. Hanson Baldwin has reported that some observers believe it is actually not as effective, in terms of end results, as the British Secret Service with roughly 3,000 employees, or the Israeli service with roughly 300. Others believe that this country is spending too much money on intelligence for the results we are obtaining. The amount is a classified figure, but published estimates of the annual appropriation run from \$500 million to \$800 million. Personnel estimates in the press run between 8,000 and 30,000 employees.

Whatever the cost, we ought to be certain of the quality of our intelligence. Faulty intelligence estimates could jeopardize our entire defense and our foreign policy. Both of these must be based on cold knowledge and intelligent evaluation of the capabilities and intentions of other countries. If our premises are wrong, it is logical to assume that the policies based upon them will be wrong.

The Central Intelligence Agency plays a more direct role in foreign policy than that of simply providing some of the information on which our policies are based. It also serves, apparently, as an instrument of policy. Time magazine recently reported that—

Though CIA officials do not admit it publicly the agency was from the start engaged in a wide range of "covert activities," espionage aid to resistance movements and perhaps sabotage.

Exactly how many and what kind of activities are carried on, I do not know. This is a field in which information is even more closely guarded. Nevertheless, several such activities have been reported in the press, and we can assume that there have been others which have not made the headlines.

In the Washington Post of January 9, 1953, the following undertakings of CIA agents were cited as a "sampling of exploits which have been the subject of many whispered complaints":

1. Subsidization by CIA of a neo-Nazi organization which had marked for liquidation

the leaders of the Social Democratic Party.

The Social Democratic Party was the party of Ernst Reuter, later mayor of Berlin and vehement anti-Communist.

2. Incarceration for 8 months of a Japanese citizen under excuse of cross-examination—a job initially undertaken by General Willoughby's Army Intelligence and passed on to CIA.

3. Tapping of the telephone of Jose Figueres, former Costa Rican President—

And, by the way, he is now President again—

at which a CIA man was caught red-handed.

4. Abortive effort by CIA undercover men to start a revolution in Guatemala and blame it on the United Fruit Co.

5. Burmese and Siamese and Vietnamese suspicions of CIA activity in promoting guerrilla forays from the Burmese border into mainland China on the part of the tattered demagogues among Chiang Kai-shek's defeated Nationalists.

I do not need to point out the tremendous impact which this sort of activity could have on our foreign policy. Other countries cannot be expected to distinguish between CIA policy and United States policy. If these reports are true, then it would appear to others that it was United States foreign policy to promote a neo-Nazi organization, to incarcerate a Japanese citizen, and start a revolution in one of our neighboring countries. Moreover, the Burma episode, according to the Washington Post, "led to the resignation in disgust of one of the best and most respected of our career Ambassadors on the ground not only that he did not go along with the black diplomacy around him, but that he was kept in ignorance of it." Is there any wonder that there should be increasing concern with the absence of control over this agency? We cannot permit CIA, any more than we can permit any other government agency, to have free reign to do anything it wants anywhere in the world. If its agents play carelessly with fire, the whole world might get burned.

I do not have official verification of any of the criticisms I have mentioned. All my information, as I have indicated, has been taken from public sources. But the point is that any of these reported incidents could be true, and we would not know the facts. Would it not be far more sensible if Congress were aware of the general policies being pursued by Central Intelligence? Is there any other way that we can be reasonably certain that public funds are not being wasted? That the country is getting the intelligence it needs for its protection?

If a joint committee is established, CIA officials would not have to seal their lips and put on the face of martyrdom, everytime they were criticized. They would have a congressional channel to present their side. The joint committee, in turn, could maintain the confidence of Congress and the public, without loss of security. Until we create some sort of "watchdog committee," however, we will have nothing but continued anxiety about the Central Intelligence Agency and its widespread activities.

It is characteristic of our system of government that we are suspicious, and rightly so, of unrestrained power. Technically, the CIA is part of the executive branch, and the executive branch is subject to the checks and balances of our Constitution. Actually the nature of its work, and its peculiar place in our governmental structure, have given this agency in effect a position inviting irresponsibility. At its best this makes for continued suspicion; at its worst it is a menace to free government.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in my remarks a letter dated August 25, 1953, written by me to the Director of Central Intelligence, and the reply which I received, dated September 4, 1953, signed by C. P. Cabell, lieutenant general, United States Air Force, Acting Director.

There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

AUGUST 25, 1953.

HON. ALLEN W. DULLES,
Director of Central Intelligence,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. DULLES: As you know, I have introduced a bill to establish a joint congressional committee, along the lines of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, for the CIA. I would appreciate receiving an answer from you on the questions listed below:

1. What is the present relationship between Congress and CIA?

(a) Before what committees, other than Appropriations, have CIA representatives appeared on agency business? Is there any regular survey of CIA's activities by any committee? What is CIA's procedure for getting desired legislation? How many Members of Congress know CIA's annual appropriation?

(b) In what instances do Members of Congress receive intelligence reports from CIA? Is it only when some other executive agency recommends it to support their position?

2. Does the Central Intelligence Agency feel that the present ties with Congress are adequate? What is its opinion of a Joint Committee on Central Intelligence similar to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy?

3. What action was taken on the Hoover Commission recommendation that vigorous efforts be made to improve the internal structure of the CIA and the quality of its product?

Must close now but hoping to hear from you soon, and with best personal wishes, I am,

Sincerely yours,

MIKE MANSFIELD.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR,
Washington, D. C., September 4, 1953.
The Honorable MIKE MANSFIELD,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR MANSFIELD: In Mr. Dulles' absence from the country, I am taking the liberty of replying to your letter of August 25, 1953, regarding CIA relations with the Congress. The answers below are numbered in accordance with the numbers of the questions in your letter.

1. (a) CIA representatives have appeared on Agency business before the following Senate committees: Armed Services, Government Operations (permanent Subcommittee on Investigations), Judiciary (Immigration Subcommittee), (Internal Security Subcommittee).

Agency representatives have appeared before the following House committees: Armed Services, Foreign Affairs, Government Operations, Un-American Activities.

Agency representatives also have appeared before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and liaison is maintained with the Joint Committee on Printing.

Concerning regular surveys of CIA's activities by congressional committees, it should be noted that special subcommittees of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees receive a detailed briefing on the various aspects of CIA work in the course of the annual review of CIA's budget requirements. The Armed Services Committees also receive briefings on CIA, particularly in connection with CIA legislation. In addition, in connection with atomic energy, the joint committee is regularly advised of CIA's activities in this field.

CIA legislation is handled by the Armed Services Committee in both Houses.

The CIA appropriation figure is very tightly held and is known to not more than 5 or 6 Members in each House.

1. (b) The only committee which receives intelligence reports from CIA on a regular basis is the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. The Agency also makes certain information available to the Immigration Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committees of both Houses, and has also been of some assistance to the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.

CIA intelligence reports are not made available merely to support the position of another executive agency, in fact there would probably be many instances in which CIA could give intelligence reports to certain other committees if requested.

2. It is our opinion that, from our point of view, the present ties with Congress are adequate. As far as we are able to determine, these ties are stronger than those which exist between any other nation's intelligence service and its legislative body.

In view of the fact that a decision to establish a joint congressional Committee on Central Intelligence involves many factors, some of which are not within the knowledge of CIA, it would not appear appropriate for CIA to express an opinion on the establishment of such a group.

3. At about the same time as the Hoover Commission subcommittee was making its study of intelligence in 1949, a special group appointed by the President, consisting of Mr. Allen Dulles, Mr. William H. Jackson, and Mr. Matthias F. Correa, was requested to make a detailed survey of CIA. At the time of the survey, these men were all in private life. Many of their recommendations, as well as those of the Hoover Commission, were carried into effect and were largely implemented upon the advent of General Smith as Director in October 1950 and Mr. Jackson as Deputy Director. This implementation has been carried forward by Mr. Dulles, who succeeded Mr. Jackson as Deputy Director, and subsequently succeeded General Smith as Director. While it is safe to say that no intelligence organization is ever completely satisfied with the quality of its end product, nevertheless, we feel, and have been informed by impartial observers, that the organization and the end product have been continuously and vigorously improved.

I know that Mr. Dulles would be happy to discuss this entire problem with you in greater detail at your convenience upon his return.

Sincerely,

C. P. CABELL,
Lieutenant General, USAF, Acting
Director.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in my remarks three editorials pertaining to the Central Intelligence Agency, all published in the Richmond News Leader.

There being no objection, the editorials were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the Richmond (Va.) News Leader of March 30, 1953]

THE CIA: WHO WATCHES THE WATCHDOG?

In heavily guarded offices at 2430 M Street in Washington, on the grounds of the old naval hospital there, this Nation's Central Intelligence Agency directs the most secret and least publicized operations of the United States Government. Not even the Atomic Energy Commission functions with the secrecy of the CIA; the taxpayers know something of atomic research—how much it costs, in general how well it is succeeding, where the principal work is being done.

Of the CIA, whose expenditures are reckoned by well-informed observers at something in the neighborhood of \$1 billion a year, the taxpayer knows nothing.

This almost invisible agency of the Government came into existence in 1947, as the successor to an unwieldy central intelligence group that was organized after World War II. By way of background, it should be noted that prior to World War II, there was no American intelligence agency; we relied largely upon the reports of diplomatic and military officers, openly gathered at consulates and embassies around the world. During the war, the cloak-and-dagger Office of Secret Services was set up to direct American espionage, but this went out of existence with the end of hostilities.

The National Security Act of 1947, creating the CIA, gave the new body some simple—and sweeping—duties. The CIA is to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government. By one provision, it is specifically directed that the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. Even the sweeping terms of this enactment were regarded as inadequate by the CIA. So in June 1949 the administration obtained from Congress one of the most amazing laws ever put on the books—Public Law 110 of the 81st Congress. This is the law that makes CIA almost literally a law unto itself.

By this enactment, CIA is made exempt from all rules of purchasing that apply to other agencies. It may hire and fire at will, without regard to civil service regulations. All provisions of law and all regulations "relating to the expenditure of Government funds" are specifically waived for the CIA. It is above any law that might require "the publication or disclosure of the organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed by the Agency." The Director of the Bureau of the Budget is flatly instructed to make "no reports to the Congress" of CIA's expenditures, either lump sum or itemized. CIA spends what it pleases, as it pleases, "solely on the certificate of the Director, and every such certificate shall be deemed a sufficient voucher for the amount therein certified." No ordinary Congressman can touch it; no ordinary citizen is even admitted to the CIA's office.

For all the taxpayers know, the CIA may be doing an appallingly inefficient job. It may be wasting millions of dollars in fantastically extravagant and unnecessary schemes. It may be needlessly duplicating the work of other agencies. It may be the worst run bureaucracy in Washington. Westbrook Pegler has made the flat and unqualified charge that the CIA "sipped subsidies of millions of dollars to the AFL [David] Dubinsky, the Garment Workers Union, and a mysterious group of persons unknown," in some nebulous venture to strengthen free trade unions in Europe against Communist infiltration. This charge

the CIA neither affirms nor denies; it simply evades answering.

From what little has been printed about the CIA, it is known that the Agency has had its internal difficulties. In October 1947 several employees were fired as "bad security risks." On another occasion, Senator McCARTHY charged (with apparent accuracy) that a pervert dismissed from the State Department had turned up on CIA's payroll. The Agency came in for severe criticism when South Korea was invaded—to this Nation's total surprise—in June 1950 and again the following fall when the size of the Chinese Communist intervention was tragically underestimated. CIA was badly mousetrapped last year when it swallowed a false tip that Owen Lattimore was about to skip the country for Russia.

The extent of CIA's successful efforts is understandably unknown; in common with intelligence services everywhere, the Agency never mentions its successes. It is known that CIA had a hand in reporting Soviet Russia's first atomic explosion. Beyond that, nothing can be pinned down.

Of CIA's organization and routine, little has been officially disclosed. One account is that CIA has 6 major divisions—3 to collect information, 1 to index information, the fifth to evaluate the information and prepare the CIA's estimates. These estimates (originated by Gen. Walter Bedell Smith when he was director of CIA in 1950-52) are summaries of intelligence prepared by the agency for the President and other top officers of the Government. They arrive daily at the White House, it is said, mimeographed in purple ink and sealed in a blue folder. Other more extensive estimates are prepared weekly and monthly. These are compiled not merely from the reports of the CIA's espionage agents—the cloak-and-dagger spies of adventure fiction—but more matter-of-factly from the reports of Foreign Service observers, military and naval intelligence officers, immigration officials, narcotics inspectors in far-off corners of the world, and employees of the Treasury and Commerce Departments in foreign stations. It has been estimated that about 90 percent of CIA's work is no more secret than a Carnegie library, and the bulk of its work lies simply in correlating factual information that is lying around for anyone to pick up.

How many employees this worldwide operation involves, how much they are paid, how well they are doing their jobs, whether the jobs are worth doing—to all of these questions the CIA stands dumb. Of a few executives, some names and skeleton facts are known. The top brass include:

Allen Welsh Dulles, 59, director of the CIA; brother of the Secretary of State, graduate of Princeton and George Washington Universities, lawyer, in United States diplomatic service, at Vienna, Berne, Berlin, Constantinople, 1916-26, delegate to international conferences of 1925-33, attached to OSS in World War II.

Sherman Kent, 49, assistant director for national estimates; native of Chicago; graduate of Yale and member of Yale's faculty (professor of history) since 1928; chief of the Europe-Africa Division of OSS, 1941-45; State Department, 1946; instructor in National War College, 1947; author of *Strategic Intelligence* (1947).

Loftus E. Becker, 41, deputy director for intelligence; native of Buffalo; graduate of Harvard and Harvard Law School; lawyer; rose from private to major in World War II, served with Ninth Army in Europe, attended the Nuremberg trials as an adviser on German military organizations; joined CIA in April 1951.

Matthew Baird, 42, director of training; native of Ardmore, Pa., graduate of Princeton and Oxford; educator, former headmaster of the Arizona Desert School; served 44 months with Air Force in World War II,

mostly in South Pacific; resident of Arizona, cattle breeder and rancher.

Frank G. Wisner, 43, acting deputy director, native of Laurel, Miss., graduate of the University of Virginia; lawyer; served in World War II as a naval intelligence officer, later with OSS in Africa, Middle East, Balkans, France, and Germany, discharged as commander; with State Department, 1947, as deputy assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas; joined CIA, 1948.

Walter Reid Wolf, 58, deputy director; graduate of Yale; banker; vice president of National City Bank of New York since 1936; leader in many civic activities.

Charles Pearce Cabell, 49, director of the general staff; native of Dallas, graduate of West Point; holds rank of major general in the Air Force; formerly director of intelligence for the USAF, attended the Yalta Conference.

That about exhausts our notes on the CIA, and a thin batch of facts it is to work with. What disturbs us about the Central Intelligence Agency is this very thinness. To be sure, we recognize that some secret operations are necessary if this Nation is to be properly vigilant in the cold war, and secret operations would cease to be secret if they were conducted in kilig lights and full publicity. But we are far from certain that the sweeping secrecy of the CIA—extending even to its most routine operations—can be justified, or that the value of many of its investigations outweighs the old, established value of Government accountability directly to the people.

Congress long ago created a special committee to watch the Atomic Energy Commission, in part to keep a check on the day-to-day activities of men with tremendous power over mighty weapons. It would be in the public interest, as we see it, for a similar committee to be set up to watch the watchdogs of the CIA, to make spot-checks on expenditures, to keep budget requests in line, to see that secret policies laid down by the director of the CIA are not opposed to the people's wishes as the people's representatives understand them.

We are uneasy about this outfit—the power it holds, the secrecy with which it shrouds its operations, the potential for evil that lies in the CIA's virtually unchecked authority. And we commend to Congress a searching study of the powers it has vested in the agency. What Congress has given, Congress can take away—and in the case of the CIA, some taking away of excess power might prove exceedingly wise.

[From the Richmond (Va.) News Leader of July 17, 1953]

"ABOUT WHICH YOU ACTUALLY KNOW NOTHING"

One of our more articulate critics, in a letter full of strawmen and ad hominem arguments, takes us severely to task in the Forum today for an editorial of July 13. In that editorial we reviewed the astonishing law under which the Central Intelligence Agency is permitted to conceal every aspect of its operations—including the size of its budget and the length of its payroll—from the American people. At no time has this newspaper suggested that CIA activity be fully revealed to the American people. What we have demanded is an amendment to the basic CIA law that would provide some measure of public accountability for funds, and place some restrictions upon the CIA's now unlimited opportunities for international troublemaking.

One phrase in Mr. Lucas' letter serves to buttress the point we have been making. He says we are spreading mistrust of an agency about which you actually know nothing. We most assuredly mistrust an agency of Government about which we actually know nothing. The CIA is responsible not to the

people of the United States, in the sense that the people are permitted to form their own opinions of whether they are getting value received, but solely to the National Security Council—a group of top Government officials who have a thousand other concerns and cannot possibly maintain a close check on the CIA's day-to-day spending.

Nothing like the CIA exists anywhere in the American Government. The Atomic Energy Commission deals in secrets of the most vital nature, yet the AEC's budget is a matter of public record; the AEC publishes an annual report; a special committee of Congress keeps a watchdog eye on its activities; the AEC's budget is not sacrosanct, and can be trimmed whenever the American people conclude that too much money is being poured into atomic research. The FBI is a highly secret outfit, yet it is no secret that the FBI spent nearly \$77 million in the last fiscal year, and that it employs some 14,000 persons whose average salary is \$4,800. Similarly, the defense establishment deals constantly in matters of the deepest secrecy, yet the budgets of Army, Navy, and Air Force are available for any citizen's inspection. No one in his right mind would suggest that every American should have a pass to the Pentagon's code room, or access to Secretary Wilson's private files; yet the very essence of the American form of government by the people is reflected in the fact that the people are kept fully informed on military spending and can check the high brass whenever the spirit moves them to do so.

None of this applies to the Central Intelligence Agency. It is a separate and clandestine entity in our Government. One of the most reliable budgetary experts in Washington has told us that he believes CIA's spending "is in the neighborhood of a billion dollars a year," yet no committee of Congress can check on this figure nor can the beleaguered American people find out whether the CIA is worth its cost—whatever the cost may be. Funds may be transferred to the CIA from other agencies of the Government "without regard to any provisions of law limiting or prohibiting transfers between appropriations." Surely that clause in the CIA Act makes a mockery of congressional control over the public purse.

No restrictions are laid upon the CIA's activities. The status reads that "Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, sums made available to the agency by appropriations or otherwise may be expended for purposes necessary to carry out its functions." The CIA, of course, decides for itself what its functions are. The law specifically approves expenditures for "personal services without regard to limitations on types of persons to be employed; radio-receiving and radio-sending equipment; purchase, maintenance, and cleaning of firearms, including purchase, storage, and maintenance of ammunition; acquisition of necessary land; construction of buildings and facilities without regard to 36 Statutes, 699, 40 United States Code 259, 267."

All sums made available to the CIA "may be expended without regard to the provisions of law and regulations relating to the expenditure of Government funds; and for objects of a confidential, extraordinary, or emergency nature, such expenditures to be accounted for solely on the certificate of the Director, and every such certificate shall be deemed a sufficient voucher for the amount therein certified."

We deny, as vigorously as we know how, that any such sweeping concealment is in the public interest. The most effective restraint yet devised on the extravagant ambitions of Government officials is the vigilant watch of the American people and the American press. Once that restraint is wiped out, and power is permitted to breed unchecked in the darkness, waste and corruption are provided a fertile soil in which to grow. Certainly we mistrust the CIA—and we will

continue to spread that mistrust in the fervent hope that others will awake to the dangers inherent in this unknown and unknowable OGPU in our midst.

[From the Richmond (Va.) News Leader of July 24, 1954]

TO WATCH THE CIA

Senator **MIXE MANSFIELD**, of Montana, this week offered a resolution that merits wide-spread and immediate public support. He proposes the establishment of a Joint Committee on Central Intelligence, to be patterned after the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

"The CIA is in somewhat the same category as the AEC," Senator **MANSFIELD** said, "and just as a special committee, with well-defined authority and powers has been created on a joint congressional basis to oversee and supervise the interests of the AEC, so I believe should a joint congressional committee be created for the same purpose in connection with the CIA . . . for purposes of seeing that good management is maintained in the CIA and also to keep a constant check on its intelligence policies. It is well, too, that this joint committee should be in a position to criticize any mistakes which the CIA may make."

This newspaper has been urging the creation of such a committee for the past several months. At present the CIA is wholly beyond the reach of the Congress that created it. The agency's budget is secret; its payroll is secret; its employees are under orders to ignore congressional committees and to refuse to answer their questions. By law the CIA has unlimited authority to spend virtually unlimited amounts of money for wholly unlimited purposes. Neither the Congress nor the public has any way of knowing whether the CIA is doing a good job or a terrible job, whether it is wasting millions or spending its funds with scrupulous care.

Senator **MANSFIELD**'s proposed committee has been needed for a long time. We commend his resolution warmly to Virginia's delegation on the Hill.

MR. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

MEDICAL SERVICE CORPS, REGULAR ARMY

MR. KNOWLAND. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The **PRESIDING OFFICER** (Mr. **FURRELL** in the chair). The clerk will call the roll.

The Chief Clerk proceeded to call the roll.

MR. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The **PRESIDING OFFICER** (Mr. **GOLDWATER** in the chair). Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

MR. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, pursuant to my earlier announcement, I ask unanimous consent that the unfinished business be temporarily laid aside and that the Senate proceed to the consideration of House bill 5509, to amend the Army-Navy Medical Services Corps Act of 1947, relating to the percentage of colonels in the Medical Service Corps, Regular Army.

I might say to the acting minority leader that the other bill which I had contemplated might be called up today. I have agreed to have go over until at least Friday, because tomorrow the time for debate will be controlled.

"So far as I know, there was no objection to the Medical Service Corps bill in the committee, but I will address an inquiry to the junior Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. **DUFF**), who is representing the Armed Services Committee in connection with the bill. I understand no minority views were filed.

MR. DUFF. The Senator is correct. **MR. JACKSON.** Mr. President, as acting minority leader, I may say that I understand that the ranking minority member of the Committee on Armed Services has no objection to the bill.

MR. DUFF. The Senator is correct; the Senator from Georgia (Mr. **RUSSELL**) raised no objection, and there was no objection to the bill in the committee.

The **PRESIDING OFFICER.** The clerk will state the bill by title.

The **CHIEF CLERK.** A bill (H. R. 5509) to amend the Army-Navy Medical Services Corps Act of 1947, relating to the percentage of colonels in the Medical Service Corps, Regular Army.

MR. KNOWLAND. I might say, before the Senate acts on the bill, that I understand the Senator from Pennsylvania is prepared to make a statement about the bill for the information of the Senate.

The **PRESIDING OFFICER.** Is there objection to the present consideration of the bill?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill.

MR. DUFF. Mr. President, the purpose of this bill is to repeal an existing provision of law which limits the number of permanent colonels in the Medical Service Corps of the Regular Army to 2 percent of the authorized Regular Army officer strength of that corps. This 2-percent limitation contrasts with a limitation of 8 percent which is applicable to all other male arms and branches of the Army.

The 2-percent limitation was included in the original legislation as recommended by the Department of the Army. The basis for the limitation was the number of positions justifying officers of this permanent rank in the then existing tables of organization for Medical Service Corps officers.

Since the Army-Navy Medical Service Corps Act of 1947 was enacted, the Department of the Army has significantly broadened the utilization of Medical Service Corps officers, with the result that today there are many additional areas and positions of responsibility for officers of the Medical Service Corps that did not exist in 1947.

The Department of the Army is attempting to relieve medical and dental officers from administrative and managerial duties, so that they may devote more time to the exercise of their professional duties and qualifications. Army representatives maintain that the full achievement of the objective of relieving professional officers of administrative and managerial duties is hindered by the 2-percent limitation which restricts career opportunities for Medical Service Corps officers.

Furthermore, the continued existence of this limitation handicaps the Army in procuring and retaining officers who possess the educational, scientific, and

technical qualifications desired in the Medical Service Corps.

Enactment of this bill will enable the Medical Service Corps to have the same percentage of officers serving in the permanent grade of colonel as is now authorized for the other arms and branches of the Army. Notwithstanding this fact, Army representatives have assured the committee that the enactment of this bill will not result in full utilization of the authority in the near future. The additional positions of permanent colonel would be filled gradually during the next few years, as officers become qualified and demonstrate the ability to serve in this grade.

The **PRESIDING OFFICER.** The bill is open to amendment.

If there be no amendment to be proposed, the question is on the third reading of the bill.

The bill (H. R. 5509) was ordered to a third reading, read the third time, and passed.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. **CHAFFEE**, one of its clerks, announced that the House had disagreed to the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H. R. 5337) to provide for the establishment of a United States Air Force Academy, and for other purposes; asked a conference with the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and that Mr. **SHORT**, Mr. **ARENS**, Mr. **COLS** of New York, Mr. **SHAFER**, Mr. **VINSON**, Mr. **BROOKS** of Louisiana, and Mr. **KILPATRICK** were appointed managers on the part of the House at the conference.

STATEHOOD FOR HAWAII

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 49) to enable the people of Hawaii to form a constitution and State government and to be admitted into the Union on an equal footing with the original States.

MR. JACKSON obtained the floor. **MR. JOHNSON** of Colorado. Mr. President, will the Senator from Washington yield at this time, to permit me to suggest the absence of a quorum?

MR. JACKSON. I am happy to yield for that purpose.

MR. JOHNSON of Colorado. Then, Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The **PRESIDING OFFICER.** The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

MR. JACKSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the call of the roll be rescinded.

The **PRESIDING OFFICER.** Without objection, it is so ordered.

MR. JACKSON. Mr. President, I rise today in support of the amendment offered by the distinguished Senator from New Mexico (Mr. **ANDERSON**) to add as title II of the Hawaiian statehood bill the bill reported from the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs providing statehood for Alaska.

I should like to make it clear at the outset that I have always supported statehood for both Hawaii and Alaska.

Democrats Propose Joint Committee to Watch Over CIA

A joint congressional committee similar to that which supervises the activities of the Atomic Energy Commission may soon be set up to keep an eye on the Federal Government's No. 1 "untouchable"—the super-secret, hush-hush Central Intelligence Agency.

The committee is proposed in a bill introduced by a group of Democratic Senators led by Senator Mansfield of Montana. It would create a 10-man committee, five from each house, which would make "continuing studies" of the CIA. The agency would be directed to "keep the joint committee fully and currently informed with respect to its activities."

Senator Mansfield told the Senate, when he introduced the bill, that "growing suspicion" of CIA might lead to "sporadic investigations by various committees of Congress" unless a single, over-all committee were established.

McCarthy Planning Probe.

Senator McCarthy, Republican, of Wisconsin tangled with CIA some months ago and reportedly has been considering a further probe by his Permanent Investigations subcommittee. He has said he has "a really major inquiry" in preparation but has refused to comment on whether it might involve the CIA.

Senator Mansfield pointed out that CIA at present is "freed from practically every ordinary form of congressional check." Both its appropriations and its personnel are concealed from Congress, he said, and, as a result, "it is difficult to legislate intelligently for this agency because we have no information which we can be positive is correct." Congress, he said, can only guess at the amount spent—somewhere between \$500 and \$800 million—and personnel—reportedly "between 8,000 and 30,000 employees."

The Senator noted that calls for investigations of CIA personnel "have been met with a resistance not encountered from any other agency."

"The administration," he said, "appears to support the view that CIA officials merit an immunity which has never been claimed for the State Department or any other Government agencies handling equally confidential material. CIA seems to have marked out for itself a setting above other Government agencies, Congress and the public."

Losing Confidence.

CIA, the Senator said, does not enjoy the same degree of confidence from Congress and the country that the Atomic Energy Commission does. And "all signs point to a steady loss of confidence."

Senator Mansfield said the agency is apparently involved in matters directly affecting foreign policy, such as aid to Nationalist Chinese troops in Burma and alleged attempts to start internal troubles in Guatemala.

"Until we create some sort of watchdog committee" we will have nothing but continued anxiety about the Central Intelligence Agency and its widespread activities," the Senator said.

"Actually, the nature of its work, its peculiar place in our governmental structure have given this agency in effect a position inviting irresponsibility. At its best this makes for continued suspicion; at its worst it is a menace to free government."